Part V: Some Damned Foolish Thing In The Balkans
"An English attack would only be thinkable if we found ourselves at war with both Russia and France or did anything so utterly absurd as to fall upon Holland or Belgium or block the Baltic by closing the Sound."
—German Chancellor Prince Otto von Bismarck, 1883.
German & French War Planning, 1898-1913. By Erich von Manstein.
Prussian War Academy Collection, Berlin. 1933.
The controversial decision to invade the Netherlands (specifically Maastricht) has been the subject of a great deal of post-war historic revisionism. However at the time it was considered both a requirement and not something that would be a problem. From 1905 to 1913 the German General Staff and Helmuth von Moltke strongly considered the use of neutral Dutch ports versus invading the country. Even in 1913 both plans were fully drawn up and ready to go, but a belief that the attack against France would not succeed without Maastricht railroads gave slight favour to the invasion of the Netherlands. Several key factors including Wilhelm II's quiet attempts to avoid war (as his thinking on the matter was that invading the Netherlands would make the General Staff less likely to go to war) and seemingly promising talks with the Dutch were also important to the matter.
Perhaps the final factor in deciding upon invading the Netherlands was the General Election of 1913 in the United Kingdom, as it coincided with the first General Election of the Empire, the creation of the Imperial Parliament, and the transfer of foreign affairs to that new Parliament. This resulted in increasingly poor British diplomatic communication throughout the year and convinced the General Staff that the British would not be able to successfully intervene—or, indeed, even react—to the invasion of the Netherlands and Belgium. In that, of course, they would be mistaken.
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The French General Staff also hesitated over their invasion of Belgium as war drew near. However Joseph Gallieni's insistence that any attack against Germany would fail utterly without Belgium loomed over the General Staff. Likewise French Prime Minister Gaston Doumergue's dismissal of internal issues that might effect the invasion such as problem with reservists and socialist strikes, and his strong backing of Gallieni essentially prevented any attempt to create an alternative to Plan XVI.
As with the Germans the British disorganization in their transition to the Imperial Parliament convinced the French that any lingering chance of war with the United Kingdom was not a problem. In fact they believed that the neutral United Kingdom would work to their benefit, leaving them a free hand in engaging German merchant shipping with no possibility of German dreadnoughts being allowing to transit the Channel.
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European Diplomacy Before & During the Great War.
© Isaäc van Bosse & Wolters Kluwer; 1938.
Published in English & Dutch
Alphen aan den Rijn, Kingdom of the Netherlands.
[…] crisis had reached European proportions. Naturally this pre-war period was marked by increasingly threatening diplomatic correspondence and all major powers took something of a "carrot and stick" approach to their discussion.
Germany spent nearly a month in quiet talks with the Netherlands over the issue of transiting their territory in order to properly mount their grand attack on France. The Netherlands were placed in the awkward position of finding a way to gently inform the Germans that they would be forced to declare war if their territory was violated and that as much as they might like adding the nicer pieces of Belgium (that is, the Flemish speaking parts) to their territory they were not going to join the Triple Alliance as a full partner over concerns about the British.
These talks culminated in the final notice of 15 May 1913 and the subsequent invasion, but even then a surprisingly large segment of the German foreign office remained convinced that the Netherlands would, at worst, declare war and then stay out of the picture. The military was less convinced, but they did believe that they'd have time to muster reserve forces on the Germany-Netherlands border before any Dutch attack not aimed at occupied railways in Maastricht.
German-Belgian correspondence on the other hand was fraught from the beginning as the Belgians knew that both the French and Germans were planning to invade. The Belgian attempt to convince one of the powers not to invade in return for entering the war against the power that did invade proved futile (although, oddly, neither Germany nor France seems to have realized from Belgium's attempts the other's plan to invade Belgium as both planned for delaying actions on their mutual border) since both Germany and France believed they needed to take Belgium as fast as possible for a successful short war.
[…]
French talks with the Netherlands soon grew the powers closer together as the Dutch were confronted with the probability of German invasion. Combined with doubt about the United Kingdom, and certainty that if they did land troops it would be at Antwerp and not anywhere in the Netherlands, Franco-Dutch relations took on a rather friendly cast. The French and Dutch even managed to put together a joint operations plan for the Pacific, which gave early notice to the Far East naval forces in French IndoChina that Dutch East Indies bases were available. Certain other preliminary contingency plans were created as well.
As with Germany, Franco-Belgian talks were hung on the principle that Belgium was going to be invaded. Despite several offers of African territory to be added to the Belgian Congo and a variety of threats as to the consequences of refusing the Belgians remained resolute in their refusal to allow themselves to be invaded. This would prove to be a costly though understandable mistake, as the potential of Belgium willingly joining either side could have resulted in a very different outcome in the Great War.
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The United Kingdom invariably comes off poorly in historical treatment of their diplomatic actions. First Minister Asquith's Liberal government was preoccupied with the General Election of 1913, the British Foreign Office had already begun their transition to the Imperial level of affairs and were working on adding the best members of the various Dominion civil services to the new and not-quite-created Imperial Foreign Office, and the both the Royal Navy and the Army were also busy in integration talks with the Dominions.
As such the United Kingdom was clear on their intent to intervene in the case of a European war but with no existing alliances with any European power it was at best a mixed message. In the strictly technical sense it was very clear to the British that they had told both Germany and France that any invasion of Belgium or the Netherlands (Luxembourg was overlooked) would result in consequences. However the British belief in their lucid position was not something that carried through to Paris or Berlin. Both the Germans and French had been receiving what they thought were mixed signals on the issue.
In the end the French believed that the United Kingdom would remain neutral, working to their advantage as German naval ships would not be allowed to transit the Channel. The Germans thought that the British might declare a blockade, but were certain that the risk potential of the High Seas Fleet would deter the Royal Navy from any effective action. With the General Election ongoing and the strong possibility of the Liberal government falling, coupled with the completely unknown possible make-up of the Imperial Parliament, both France and Germany remained quite sure that they could invade Belgium and—in essence—"get away with it".
[…]
The Ottoman Empire was primarily concerned with finding someone to support them in a war with the United Kingdom to bring Egypt back under their control and to eliminate rebellious forces operating out of non-Ottoman Arabia. Naturally they found no support for that position, as nobody wanted to go to war with the United Kingdom. In the absence of that Ottoman planning shifted to some discussion with Germany over the issue of Russia as Kars had been lost to the Russians decades earlier. In addition the potential of victory in that region could propel Ottoman forces forward to seize key oil fields in Baku and gain control of the entire South Caucasus region.
By the eve of war the Ottomans were close to joining the Triple Alliance, but hesitated in the end over concerns about fighting Russia and the United Kingdom at the same time if events developed in an unexpected fashion. Instead they began low-level mobilizations and pre-positioning of supplies and army units to accommodate either a Caucasus or Arabian/Persian campaign as well as purchasing additional military equipment from various countries in Europe.
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The Groundwork for Conflict: European Relations after the Congress of Berlin.
Jane Fairchild, Editor.
© We Publish Books! San Francisco, 1967.
The Serbian-Albanian Crisis
Serbia-Montenegro had coveted northern Albania since the Balkan War when the other powers of Europe (notably Italy and Austria-Hungary) prevented their gain there. That had also angered the Bulgarians, as Serbia-Montenegro kept control of much of northern Macedonia (compensation for Albania) instead of handing it over to Bulgaria as had been the original plan.
So in April of 1913 when Bulgaria and Serbia-Montenegro renewed their alliance with each other and Greece it came as something of a surprise, until Serbia-Montenegro promptly turned around and demanded to Albania half of their country (making it obvious that Bulgaria would get their long promised section of Macedonia) and Greece demanded the other half. Italy and Austria-Hungary each announced the situation was unacceptable, and then threatened each other over the issue of Albania as Italy wanted it and Austria-Hungary preferred it independent. Russia quickly intervened, insisting that Serbia-Montenegro was well within their rights and any Austro-Hungarian invasion of Serbia-Montenegro would be met with Russian force.
Germany backed Austria-Hungary over the matter over their close alliance and a belief that their support would quiet Serbia-Montenegro & Bulgaria. France opportunistically backed Italy, saying that a Great Power should control Albania to defuse the tensions in the region. Romania, seeing an opportunity to gain at the expense of Bulgaria, joined in the call that Serbia-Montenegro & Bulgaria should back down from Albania. Greece was rapidly growing nervous over what they thought was a simple matter that wouldn't anger the rest of Europe too much, but before they could completely disentangle themselves events moved out of control.
In Austria-Hungary Archduke Franz Ferdinand was perhaps the strongest proponent for peace, but found himself overridden by much of the military who were determined to end the threat of Serbian expansionism as it related to Bosnia-Herzegovina. However he was nonetheless in technical charge of the military, although he would be unable to gain control until a few months into the war when Emperor Franz Joseph passed away but by then Austria-Hungary was committed.
In Russia Tsar Nicholas II ignored his advisors and as Russia lacked partial mobilization plans made the fateful choice to begin the the full mobilization of the Russian Army. It was essentially a declaration of war, and soon the de facto would become de jure.
In Germany Emperor Wilhelm II found his own attempt for peace foundering as the military and foreign office adroitly side-stepped him. Of course that would have political consequences for all involved parties, but nevertheless Germany was going to be at war and with Russian mobilization and refusal to back down from support of Serbia-Montenegro they too were forced into mobilization.
France deliberately conducted a partial mobilization of trusted reserves, although this would in the event not prevent the infamous socialist revolt that accompanied their invasion of Belgium it did mitigate the effect in the early days of the war.
Despite his best efforts Italian Prime Minister Giovanni Giolitti was unable to defy his party and Italy too began mobilizing and by tragic comedy would find themselves in a unique position by the time the flurry of war declarations petered out.
Belgium remained unmobilized until it was clear that they too were to be invaded and in the event their only partially and spottily mobilized army of 15 May would have grave consequences for the movement of German and French forces through the country.
Europe teetered on the brink, and then went over. Serbia-Montenegro declared war and invaded Albania (although Greece did not) with Bulgaria following suit on the war declaration and their troops rapidly moved into the equally rapidly vacated section of Macedonia they'd been promised. More importantly a fair amount of Bulgarian equipment was transferred to Serbia-Montenegro as Bulgaria continued to have perhaps the best small power army in the Balkans.
Austria-Hungary declared war on Serbia-Montenegro and Russia made good on their promises by declaring war against Austria-Hungary. Italy declared war on Serbia-Montenegro (Russia returned the favour promptly) and began preparing the veterans of Libya for another amphibious invasion. Austria-Hungary declared war on Italy (returned), despite German pressure. Germany declared war on Russia, rapidly returned. Romania declared war on Bulgaria and after some consideration Russia declared war against Romania. Bulgaria and Italy declined to declare war against each other, and Greece stayed out entirely for the moment.
France declared war on Germany and Austria-Hungary in support of Russia and Italy and Germany followed suit against France; both powers began their frantic diplomatic correspondence with Belgium, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom and […]
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The Domestic Fronts of the Great War by Timothy van Halgren.
© Arbitrary Press, 1990.
New York City, New York, United States of America.
France had long been beset by a number of problems relating to socialism, radicalism, and simple instability. Although obvious at the time Prime Minister Gaston Doumergue ignored the reasonably clear fact that the call-up of reserves for an invasion of Belgium would lead to serious problems at home, as indeed they did.
Even as French forces assaulted the fortifications of Namur trusted reserve forces were stuck putting down massive socialist strikes and indeed their fellow reservists. This state of affairs would last until Doumergue's government fell and Georges Clemenceau and Théophile Delcassé replaced him. With Clemenceau in charge the most committed socialist strikers, remembering his previous breaking of them, redoubled their efforts but many of the less committed rallied to the new left-wing government instead. Indeed the harsher and more violent turn of the strikes and protests acted as a catalyst against their own effect, with ordinary French citizens who had previously supported them turning to Prime Minister Clemenceau to bring internal peace to the country.
However those seven days in May would have a major impact on the French invasion of Belgium as […]
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The Course of the Great War
© 1977: Garnett Stavans & Stuart Fox.
Pathfinder Publishing Press, London.
History, it seems, is not without a sense of dramatic comedy.
On 15 May 1913 the French government issued its final diplomatic note to the governments of Belgium and Luxembourg, informing them that they intended to breach their territory in order to strike at the Germans regardless of objections.
On 15 May 1913 the German government issued its final diplomatic note to the governments of Belgium, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands that they intended to breach their territory in order to strike at the French regardless of objections.
Although official histories of all sides disagree on the exact hour, by 10 a.m. the morning of 15 May both the French and Germans had carried through and invaded the Low Countries. The war in the west had begun.
[…]
Despite persistent continental disbelief in British action the United Kingdom had in fact been working towards an intervention on the continent. The Foreign Office and the Royal Navy had made clear their preference to intervene on the side of the French, but the Army continued to raise doubts about the possibility of major forces arriving in time to effect the presumed short war. With no combined Anglo-French or Anglo-German plans it was clear that landing in Belgium—specifically Antwerp—was the most plausible solution.
Therefore joint Navy-Army planning was centred almost completely on landing the Imperial Expeditionary Force at Antwerp in support of the Belgians and the creation of a blockade against the invading power. For a variety of reasons from operational planning to internal domestic opinion to the ongoing election it had been generally concluded that despite the broad preference of supporting the presumed weaker side of France and Russia that the United Kingdom would be forced to either conduct a blockade or land forces at Antwerp in support of whoever struck Belgium second. It is an irony of history that both Belgium and the United Kingdom knew of Franco-German invasion plans but that neither France nor Germany managed to realize that they were both planning invading Belgium. It is generally accepted as the perhaps the most colossal intelligence failure of modern history.
Naturally the simultaneous invasion of Belgium and the entry of the Netherlands (with their forts covering access to Antwerp) onto the side of the French threw all British plans into disarray. After initial hesitance the British declared a blockade of France and Germany as the aggressor powers against Belgium but just as carefully did not blockade the Netherlands on the condition that the Dutch would not prevent the British support of Antwerp.[1][2] As the Netherlands were only loosely allied to the French this was acceptable, but it was a brief-lived state of affairs.
Even this action plunged the government into crisis, with pro-French, pro-German, and anti-blockade factions (the last for economic reasons) but the Liberal government's distress over the prospects of the election did not prevent a firm blockade being put into place, pressure on neutral powers exerted, and land forces assembled.
The First Imperial Expeditionary Force (I IEF) with British (as well as planned for Irish and Canadian) troops had been partially assembled and elements were landing at Antwerp even as Liège and Namur fell and the war across northern Belgium was about to take an entirely different turn. Meanwhile the II IEF in Cape Town with forces from the Dominions of Australia, New Zealand, and Capeland-Orangia had been staging there for possible Arabian or Mediterranean action and the III IEF in India was also being raised from primarily non-Muslim Indian troops both for the potential Persian theatre as well as the ongoing chances of a new Indian revolt.
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The Dreadnought War. By Kenneth R. Clark. Oxford Publishing Press, Oxford. 1948.
Across half the world ships set sail, in that anachronistic turn of phrase.
[…]
Fleet actions in the early days of the war were deeply limited by the British blockade of the European coast. Instead the French and German ships scattered across Africa steaming into the oceans around them looking for merchant shipping. The Royal Navy contented itself with preparing for a dozen possible operations, were they given freedom to engage Franco-German ships outside Europe.
The French carrier
La Gloire, approaching Dakar as the war began, saw the most early success as her aeroplanes helped the South Atlantic Squadron hunt German shipping across a wider area. However the four German battlecruisers at Dar es Salaam were the most powerful overseas units of either France or Germany at the beginning of the war and the refusal of French naval forces from Le Port (Reunion) or Djibouti to engage them—understandable, given the 1890s era ships both ports had—gave them free reign across the Indian Ocean.
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[1] The British are trying very hard on this matter, helped by the fact that there's no way for the Dutch to trans-ship supplies to the French for the time being.
[2]The line-up before the invasion of Belgium:
France, Russia, Serbia-Montenegro, and Bulgaria against Germany and Austria-Hungary.
Russia and Bulgaria against Romania.
Italy against Russia, Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Serbia-Montenegro.
The line-up after the invasion of Belgium:
France, Russia, Serbia-Montenegro, and Bulgaria against Germany and Austria-Hungary.
Russia and Bulgaria against Romania.
France and the Netherlands against Germany.
Italy against Russia, Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Serbia-Montenegro.
United Kingdom and Belgium against Germany and France.
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Yeah, I've been planning on both sides invading Belgium at the same time since the beginning. As has often been discussed on these boards, regular history comes off more implausible than even the best alternate histories a lot of the time so I feel that maybe it's a touch too cute but still not unreasonable.
I have to attend some party for some reason (I honestly don't remember, so unless there's cute girls I'll probably respond to people on this thread… perhaps drunkenly. Yay!
so have at it! I feel like I missed something, this post. Shrug. Part VI covers early battles in Belgium, East Prussia, and probably some other stuff. Maybe zeppelins. Or a fascinating—and I'm not being sarcastic—discussion of pasta as it regards Futurism.
