The future of Austria-Hungary without WWI

Deleted member 94680

The Hungarians didn`t actually have the authority to cede Slavonia or Bosnia to anyone. Bonsia was an Austro-Hungarian co-dominium, and Croatia while being a part of the Lands of the Crown of Saint Stephen, wasn`t really part of Hungary proper.

I think the implication is that Slavonia and Bosnia would be ceded in the resultant peace treaty after a War was won. After all, Britain, France and Russia had no authority to cede the Dalmatian coast to Italy, but they promised it in the Treaty of London.
 
I think the implication is that Slavonia and Bosnia would be ceded in the resultant peace treaty after a War was won. After all, Britain, France and Russia had no authority to cede the Dalmatian coast to Italy, but they promised it in the Treaty of London.

That doesn't quite follow with what Arch King said, especially considering that it is mentioned alongside ceding Transylvania for Romanian support.

The phrasing is all wrong, implying that the Hungarians do this to gain support, rather than awards for support already given.
 
So without the Great War, and a dead FF, does A-H pursue reforms after FJ dies or is their a path to a "velvet" split? Would Hungary truly pursue independence? I gather few voices here see that, but if the future holds a Depression event to stress it economically does A-H survive that? Is Federalization a genuine path forward without the war and with the loss of FF?
 
So without the Great War, and a dead FF, does A-H pursue reforms after FJ dies or is their a path to a "velvet" split? Would Hungary truly pursue independence? I gather few voices here see that, but if the future holds a Depression event to stress it economically does A-H survive that? Is Federalization a genuine path forward without the war and with the loss of FF?
Well, OTL I think reforms would have happened even if FF was killed. I think an economic depression would probably while exacerbating tensions dissolution of the Empire would be a terrible idea. The fact is the economically the Empire had many areas that produced resources and many areas that refined them, which is the Empire was split would cause an even greater economic collapse. Galician and Hungarian grain to Czech and Austrian industrial centers as an example. Eventually some of the oil in Galicia too.
 
So without the Great War, and a dead FF, does A-H pursue reforms after FJ dies or is their a path to a "velvet" split? Would Hungary truly pursue independence? I gather few voices here see that, but if the future holds a Depression event to stress it economically does A-H survive that? Is Federalization a genuine path forward without the war and with the loss of FF?
Why wouldn't Karl follow the path of federalisation? He did promise it (too late) iOTL and he was much, much more sane and well-liked.
 
"Too late" being the operative word. Karl was courteous enough to leave behind a draft of his own political ideas and plans from late 1914 - and this draft does not include federalization.

Which suggests that his ideology was mostly just a watered-down version of his mentor and idol Franz Ferdinand's; and that (like in OTL) Karl wouldn't have tried to take the path of federalization until it was far, far too late.
 
"Too late" being the operative word. Karl was courteous enough to leave behind a draft of his own political ideas and plans from late 1914 - and this draft does not include federalization.

Which suggests that his ideology was mostly just a watered-down version of his mentor and idol Franz Ferdinand's; and that (like in OTL) Karl wouldn't have tried to take the path of federalization until it was far, far too late.
I had no idea he had left plans and that FF was his idol, the latter I have a hard time believing. Where could I find these plans?
 

Deleted member 94680

"Too late" being the operative word. Karl was courteous enough to leave behind a draft of his own political ideas and plans from late 1914 - and this draft does not include federalization.

Which suggests that his ideology was mostly just a watered-down version of his mentor and idol Franz Ferdinand's; and that (like in OTL) Karl wouldn't have tried to take the path of federalization until it was far, far too late.

Traditionally, the Empire took what was the right path late rather than never. The Augsleich being the prime example - if they had offered Hungarians automony earlier than they did, there probably wouldn't have been an 1848.
 
I had no idea he had left plans and that FF was his idol, the latter I have a hard time believing. Where could I find these plans?

I believe they can be found in Politische Dokumente zu Kaiser und König Karl I. (IV.) by Elizabeth Kovács.

Assuming you don't have easy access to that collection: The domestic policies of Emperor Karl I (November 1916 – May 1917) by Christopher Brennan is a good overview of the plans, and of Karl's politics in general.
Traditionally, the Empire took what was the right path late rather than never. The Augsleich being the prime example - if they had offered Hungarians automony earlier than they did, there probably wouldn't have been an 1848.

Can't say I fully understand this argument. A set of historical figures managed to crush or defuse certain crises (sometimes at the very last minute, and invariably in ways that caused yet more trouble in the long run), allowing the Empire to shamble on.
So how does this help the Imperial ruling elites of the 20th century (most of whom were politically nowhere near the "right path") make the right decisions? And on time, too?
 

CaliGuy

Banned
I believe they can be found in Politische Dokumente zu Kaiser und König Karl I. (IV.) by Elizabeth Kovács.

Assuming you don't have easy access to that collection: The domestic policies of Emperor Karl I (November 1916 – May 1917) by Christopher Brennan is a good overview of the plans, and of Karl's politics in general.
Thanks for these book recommendations! :)
 
Until this discussion I had accepted the notion that A-H was doomed, it merely being a matter of when, not if. Although I certainly see how that view developed and I find informative the views expressed that A-H had a difficult path ahead, but not a certain one of failure; I can now ponder just how survivable it might be even with the war given a different peace. I think the door is open to yet another gamble with the brink and A-H while not doomed to fail is certainly dangerously balanced on the edge of peril. Seems one can chose to assume it drifts on or sinks given the desire of divergence.
 

Deleted member 94680

Can't say I fully understand this argument. A set of historical figures managed to crush or defuse certain crises (sometimes at the very last minute, and invariably in ways that caused yet more trouble in the long run), allowing the Empire to shamble on.
So how does this help the Imperial ruling elites of the 20th century (most of whom were politically nowhere near the "right path") make the right decisions? And on time, too?

By doing just what you've said: "crush or defuse certain crises ...allowing the Empire to shamble on" You said they would be "far too late" in implementing the reforms. I was implying historically they had always managed to do something that allowed the Empire to, well, shamble on. Without the epoch-shattering carnage and chaos of WWI there's every chance the elites would find a way to diffuse the crisis and shamble on. It's what the Empire did.
 

yourworstnightmare

Banned
Donor
So without the Great War, and a dead FF, does A-H pursue reforms after FJ dies or is their a path to a "velvet" split? Would Hungary truly pursue independence? I gather few voices here see that, but if the future holds a Depression event to stress it economically does A-H survive that? Is Federalization a genuine path forward without the war and with the loss of FF?

FF would probably try to implement his third Slavic Crown. There would be hard opposition to it both in Vienna and Budapest though. The Hungarians would either try to cut the ties if they feel secure to do so, or continue to press for status quo if they feel the time to secede isn't right.

And don't underestimate the old conservative guard in Vienna, they are not going to be happy about a third uncivilized people getting a say. There will also be worries about the dissolution of Imperial Power. What power does the Kaiser have if he have to listen to 3 Parliaments? Reforms are going to be rocky and risk end up being one steps forward, two steps back.
 
So how about having the Ausgleich in 1848, avoiding the revolution completely. It gives the empire a head start and maybe a chance to emerge into the 20th century more united. Say, that the revolution in Vienna spreads out and coupled with the Hungarian situation, the government caves in to reformers.
 
By doing just what you've said: "crush or defuse certain crises ...allowing the Empire to shamble on" You said they would be "far too late" in implementing the reforms. I was implying historically they had always managed to do something that allowed the Empire to, well, shamble on. Without the epoch-shattering carnage and chaos of WWI there's every chance the elites would find a way to diffuse the crisis and shamble on. It's what the Empire did.

That would be the core of my question: why? How does the first of those things lead to the second? Some men managed to shamble past certain problems...how does this imply that a completely different set of men, in a different context, would overcome an evolved (and in some cases completely different) set of problems?

This idea - the way I see it - basically treats the Imperial government through the ages as a single living creature; which is shackled to some mysterious, almost supernatural, force of ancient wisdom. Making it always do the right thing, despite the numerous flaws and delusions of the people who actually make up that government.

The fact that the Habsburg Empire survived into the early 20th century means precisely that: it survived into the early 20th century. No more, no less. So did, for example, the Qing Empire. It doesn't mean that it was fated (or even necessarily likely) to make the right decisions and survive into the future.
 
That would be the core of my question: why? How does the first of those things lead to the second? Some men managed to shamble past certain problems...how does this imply that a completely different set of men, in a different context, would overcome an evolved (and in some cases completely different) set of problems?

This idea - the way I see it - basically treats the Imperial government through the ages as a single living creature; which is shackled to some mysterious, almost supernatural, force of ancient wisdom. Making it always do the right thing, despite the numerous flaws and delusions of the people who actually make up that government.

The fact that the Habsburg Empire survived into the early 20th century means precisely that: it survived into the early 20th century. No more, no less. So did, for example, the Qing Empire. It doesn't mean that it was fated (or even necessarily likely) to make the right decisions and survive into the future.

The problem is that the primarily argument that people push for it collapse is the fact that it collapse after four years of war, a war where the empire was humiliated and where national state showed them far stronger than muli-ethnic empires. Will the Empire scramble into a new crisis, of course it will, but the first group which tries to leave have to deal with KuK, while Germany have every interest to tell anybody trying to intervene on the rebels side, that they see that as attack on Germany. So with that knowledge, and no humiliation of the KuK, who want to take the risk. The Poles? Do they want to trade Kaiser for Tsar, the Serbs? They risk being murdered by their neighbours before the KuK even move in. The Italians? Do they think that the Italian army can take on KuK? The Czechs? Do they expect that Bohemia won't become part of Germany if the Empire collapse are the trade of being one ethnic group in a multi-ethnic empire worse than being a ethnic minority in Germany?

The empire survived as long as it did, because the risk of leaving it was bigger than the potential reward, when the risk disappeared they of course left it, but here the institutions of the empire continue on and the risks stays high.
 

Deleted member 94680

That would be the core of my question: why? How does the first of those things lead to the second? Some men managed to shamble past certain problems...how does this imply that a completely different set of men, in a different context, would overcome an evolved (and in some cases completely different) set of problems?

This idea - the way I see it - basically treats the Imperial government through the ages as a single living creature; which is shackled to some mysterious, almost supernatural, force of ancient wisdom. Making it always do the right thing, despite the numerous flaws and delusions of the people who actually make up that government.

The fact that the Habsburg Empire survived into the early 20th century means precisely that: it survived into the early 20th century. No more, no less. So did, for example, the Qing Empire. It doesn't mean that it was fated (or even necessarily likely) to make the right decisions and survive into the future.

I am by no means saying the survival of the A-H Empire is guaranteed but there is a fair chance in the end the Dual Monarchy would come to some compromise to preserve the Empire, going by historical prescedence. Fair enough if you want to take the pessimistic view of the situation, but I would suggest the history of that self same "single living creature" leads to the possibility that they would follow 'established procedures' and come to some kind of compromise. Follow the example of their forebears as it were. The same way that, say, France would fight to regain Alsace-Lorraine because it's 'theirs' (acquired by a previous generation) or Britain grew and expanded their Empire over 150 years (it was their 'destiny') the Austo-Hungarians preserved the integrity of the Empire, by compromise if neccessary.
 
Hungary had a fast-growing economy and its minorites already started to shrink in proportion because of urbanisation, the political life was slowly, but certainly was liberalising, so I think avoiding the war would benefit the Hungarians the most. The problem here is Franz Ferdinand, who could ruin everything. Maybe his assasination still happens and the July crisis still takes place, but somehow the war is still avoided (no blank-check or whatever, Serbia accepts the ultimatum, etc.)?

In 1917, at the renegotiation of the shares of common financial burdens, the Austrians and Hungarians could make a compromise, where Hungary can establish its own national bank in return of increased share in common financial burdens and/or supporting the modernisation of the common army, with a garantuee it won't be used against them.

Austria is a harder question, it was in a much worse position, than Hungary on the longrun. It's economy didn't grow that fast, the minority problem was a way more serious threat, while the political situation made the government disfunction.

If the Monarchy survives for some decades more, I think we are safe to say that the dominant side of the Monarchy would not remain the Austrian. Austria might even split into three parts:the Polish dominated Galicia-Bukovina, the primarily Czech-lead Bohemian Crown and Austria.
 
Hungary had a fast-growing economy and its minorites already started to shrink in proportion because of urbanisation, the political life was slowly, but certainly was liberalising, so I think avoiding the war would benefit the Hungarians the most. The problem here is Franz Ferdinand, who could ruin everything. Maybe his assasination still happens and the July crisis still takes place, but somehow the war is still avoided (no blank-check or whatever, Serbia accepts the ultimatum, etc.)?

In 1917, at the renegotiation of the shares of common financial burdens, the Austrians and Hungarians could make a compromise, where Hungary can establish its own national bank in return of increased share in common financial burdens and/or supporting the modernisation of the common army, with a garantuee it won't be used against them.

Austria is a harder question, it was in a much worse position, than Hungary on the longrun. It's economy didn't grow that fast, the minority problem was a way more serious threat, while the political situation made the government disfunction.

If the Monarchy survives for some decades more, I think we are safe to say that the dominant side of the Monarchy would not remain the Austrian. Austria might even split into three parts:the Polish dominated Galicia-Bukovina, the primarily Czech-lead Bohemian Crown and Austria.

That's certainly a different perspective than I usually see, or frankly, assume!

When you say that "minorities {were} shrink{ing} in proportion" to the Magyars, do you mean that Magyar population growth was higher, or that "minority" status is a cultural thing, that individuals from non-Magyar backgrounds were assimilating in their urban settings to a Magyar identity and being accepted as effectively Hungarian by ethnic Magyars? Or what?

Generally speaking, the demographic transition with respect to industrialization is a population surge, due to lowered death rates (including, largely being in fact, higher live birth rates and lowered child mortality) followed some generations later by a slump, due to substantially falling birth rates. Generally speaking in a given population in the early phase, I believe the pattern is the less affluent a given demographic is, the higher its relative birth rate. Thus I'd have expected non-Magyars in industrializing regions, including migrants drawn to a boom area, to outpace Magyar birth rates due to being poorer but benefiting from generally improving public health nonetheless. For the reverse to be true, I might speculate that all the industrial booming is in Magyar areas, with relatively few non-Magyars being drawn in, so the latter remain at more pre-industrial growth rates while the Magyars shoot forward. If this is the case the Magyars certainly do benefit doubly, from having more prevalent numbers and from those numbers being both richer and more connected to the advanced industrial spheres. This helps them maintain dominance, but would also exacerbate the conflicts as the non-Magyars find themselves bypassed and left abandoned by the boom. It could easily then lead to more violent conflict.

Magyarization of former "minorities" (and really, over all the Crown of St. Stephen lands, did the Magyars actually comprise a majority versus the non-Magyars? Perhaps in Hungary itself, but it seems your point is that the CoStSt region was well in hand, so presumably the Magyar elite continues to claim control over all of it) might lead to a milder but still more serious form of the same crisis. Since there is a social "safety valve" as it were presumably siphoning the most ambitious and capable minority individuals to assimilate to Magyar identity, the remaining unassimilated "minorities" (who might, taken one ethnicity at a time each be outnumbered by Magyars, but I suspect taken together might still outnumber the Magyars) might add to other resentments anger at assimilated former non-Magyars--vice versa, if this leads to severe domestic crisis, some of those might reconsider their allegiances if the assimilation of former non-Magyars is anything less than perfect, and take leadership in insurrection and civil war.

Or do you mean some third thing that points to a better outcome for all? All within Greater Hungary aka "Crown of St. Stephen" anyway?

I'd be pretty sure that if the Austrian lands are suffering in comparison, the German elite would connive to try and piggyback off Hungarian success somehow or other to subsidize their dominance, which would tend to lead to a different civil crisis.

Should we really lack confidence that if Hungary can do well, the western part of the Empire would also profit in proportion?

And while if greater Austria, counting all non-Magyar/St Stephen lands as such, does go moribund while Hungary pulls ahead, I suppose that ethnic conflicts in the west would get worse, the general impression one gets reading about AH society is that it was the subjects of the Magyars who were most resentful and least conciliated, whereas Bohemia for instance seems fairly easy to keep included in the Empire with just a few mild concessions. Is this a misrepresentation based on the Western world tending to look through an Austrian lens, or would you concede it was so and your claims are based on a belief that the situation would soon reverse given some time? If Austria profits along with Hungary (and it is certainly reasonable to me that the Empire had some potential to surge ahead in development and wealth) could not the western ethnic crises be managed at least as well as in Hungary, and so does your suggestion it would be the west that would suffer crisis first and most again depend on the assumption the Austrians could not manage as well as the Hungarians?
 
That's certainly a different perspective
Yes it is, there are not too many Hungarians on this forum, so I wanted to present a new perspective from our point of view.
When you say that "minorities {were} shrink{ing} in proportion" to the Magyars, do you mean that Magyar population growth was higher, or that "minority" status is a cultural thing, that individuals from non-Magyar backgrounds were assimilating in their urban settings to a Magyar identity and being accepted as effectively Hungarian by ethnic Magyars? Or what?
The shift in population proportion was mainly because the urbanisation affected the Hungarians more, than most of the minorities and if minorities moved into cities they were very likely to assimilate to the overwhelming majority of Hungarians. The Jews soon integrated into the society and they considered themselves Hungarians in the first place. The Germans on the other hand were more urbanised than the Hungarians, but they still were assimilating quickly, phenomenon, which I can't explain.
The minorities, since many of them lived at the poorer parts of Hungary were migrating from the country in bigger numbers compared to their proportions in the whole population.
The last, but not the least important factor in this demographic shift was the bigger birth-rate and longer life-expectancy of Hungarians compared to the minorities because of the already mentioned urbanisation and wealth differences.
Magyarised former minorities were welcomed among the Hungarian population since the Hungarians considered Hungary a nation-state, where everyone was Hungarian, but some with different language and culture.
Generally speaking, the demographic transition with respect to industrialization is a population surge, due to lowered death rates (including, largely being in fact, higher live birth rates and lowered child mortality) followed some generations later by a slump, due to substantially falling birth rates. Generally speaking in a given population in the early phase, I believe the pattern is the less affluent a given demographic is, the higher its relative birth rate. Thus I'd have expected non-Magyars in industrializing regions, including migrants drawn to a boom area, to outpace Magyar birth rates due to being poorer but benefiting from generally improving public health nonetheless. For the reverse to be true, I might speculate that all the industrial booming is in Magyar areas, with relatively few non-Magyars being drawn in, so the latter remain at more pre-industrial growth rates while the Magyars shoot forward. If this is the case the Magyars certainly do benefit doubly, from having more prevalent numbers and from those numbers being both richer and more connected to the advanced industrial spheres. This helps them maintain dominance, but would also exacerbate the conflicts as the non-Magyars find themselves bypassed and left abandoned by the boom. It could easily then lead to more violent conflict.
I explained most of this above, so I will answer this shortly.
The babyboom and growth in Hungarian areas were still at a relative early stage, so I don't think the minorities outpace Hungarian growth-rate for atleast two more decades. Together with the bigger migration rate and assimilation, I think we are safe to say that the Hungarians would maintain their advantage.
The Hungarian percentage in Hungary with Croatia-Slavonia was ~49%, without it, it was ~54% in 1910. So until the end of the rapid population growth period, the Hungarian percentage could raise with Croatia-Slavonia to ~55-60%, without it to ~60-65%, in the following two-three decades. After that, it's uncertain what could happen.
One little thing, actually Hungary's formal name at the time wasn't "Lands of the Crown of Saint Stephen", but Lands of the Holy Crown of Hungary"/ Lands of the Hungarian Holy Crown". Or atleast all of my sources refer to it like that. ;)
I'd be pretty sure that if the Austrian lands are suffering in comparison, the German elite would connive to try and piggyback off Hungarian success somehow or other to subsidize their dominance, which would tend to lead to a different civil crisis.
You might be right, but according to my knowledge, the problems in Austria took root in deeper depths.
While in Austria there was a better environment to exploit the first industrial revolution, it always struggled to adopt to the second industrial revolution. Austria ofcourse was still the dominant side in the Monarchy, but the time didn't work for them.
There were a couple of reasons why the Austrian economy was lagging behind. Most of which can be explained by the political or infrastructural situation in Austria. The Emperor had a much more firm grip on the Austrian internal affairs, than on the Hungarian, which made the Austrian government more reactionary and anti-reform in nature. It hindered the establishment of ideal climate for business and made state support for enterprises less likely and I'm not even mentioned the disfunction of legislature from 1907.
The infrastructural problem I mentioned is ofcourse the railway system, which even though was quite dense, significantly denser, than its Hungarian countetpart, it was so diverse in the sense of track-width, that it made almost any kind of transportation of goods a logistical nightmare. On the otherside The Hungarian State Railways was established relatively early and set compulsory standards for every company, which wanted to work with them and link the railway lines. Furthermore by the turn of the century, most of the private railway companies were nationalised and thus a pretty decent and homogeneous railway system was established in Hungary. It must be noted that by the end of the century most of the Austrian railway companies were nationalised as well, but unlike the Hungarian they were never standardised. It caused a lot of problems in OTL, when the war actually broke out.
And then there is the minorities' problem. Most people, when the minorities of the Empire is mentioned, they almost immediately links it to Hungary. It is understandable, since the minorities in Hungary had nation-states to support them and not the minorities in Austria (with the exception of Italy, but Italy was dangerous in a whole other way. But even though the minorities in Austria had no existing nation-states to support them, but they still posed a bigger threat. First of all, these minorities were much more populous than the minorities in Hungary were, which allowed them to pressure the government in Austria more effectively, than the many tiny minorities in Hungary did. Second, while in Hungary most of the industry was in Hungarian or German majority regions, in Austria the most important industrial areas were in the Czech majority Bohemia, which is fairly dangerous if the minorities are upset to say the least. Third, while the territory of Hungary had an almost perfect geographic integrity and as state had a long history of existence and unity in that form of it (Carpathian Basin), and had the Hungarians who had the will to hold it together, Austria was a framework of a bunch of political marriages of the Habsburgs, attaching together many different countries and lands which had nothing to do to each other earlier, thus they had no real sense of unity at all. The only thing that kept them together was the loyalty to the Emperor, which is in my opinion is a very fragile trust to rely on.
So Austria had many problems to deal with, much more difficult ones than Hungary did in my opinion, but I'm very interested hearing your opinion as well. Even though
Should we really lack confidence that if Hungary can do well, the western part of the Empire would also profit in proportion?
I'm really struggling to find a way to save Austria from a major depression, but I'm open to hear your opinion and suggestions. :)
And while if greater Austria, counting all non-Magyar/St Stephen lands as such, does go moribund while Hungary pulls ahead, I suppose that ethnic conflicts in the west would get worse, the general impression one gets reading about AH society is that it was the subjects of the Magyars who were most resentful and least conciliated, whereas Bohemia for instance seems fairly easy to keep included in the Empire with just a few mild concessions. Is this a misrepresentation based on the Western world tending to look through an Austrian lens, or would you concede it was so and your claims are based on a belief that the situation would soon reverse given some time? If Austria profits along with Hungary (and it is certainly reasonable to me that the Empire had some potential to surge ahead in development and wealth) could not the western ethnic crises be managed at least as well as in Hungary, and so does your suggestion it would be the west that would suffer crisis first and most again depend on the assumption the Austrians could not manage as well as the Hungarians?
Give me a little time, I will answer this part as well a bit later. ;)
 
Top