That's certainly a different perspective
Yes it is, there are not too many Hungarians on this forum, so I wanted to present a new perspective from our point of view.
When you say that "minorities {were} shrink{ing} in proportion" to the Magyars, do you mean that Magyar population growth was higher, or that "minority" status is a cultural thing, that individuals from non-Magyar backgrounds were assimilating in their urban settings to a Magyar identity and being accepted as effectively Hungarian by ethnic Magyars? Or what?
The shift in population proportion was mainly because the urbanisation affected the Hungarians more, than most of the minorities and if minorities moved into cities they were very likely to assimilate to the overwhelming majority of Hungarians. The Jews soon integrated into the society and they considered themselves Hungarians in the first place. The Germans on the other hand were more urbanised than the Hungarians, but they still were assimilating quickly, phenomenon, which I can't explain.
The minorities, since many of them lived at the poorer parts of Hungary were migrating from the country in bigger numbers compared to their proportions in the whole population.
The last, but not the least important factor in this demographic shift was the bigger birth-rate and longer life-expectancy of Hungarians compared to the minorities because of the already mentioned urbanisation and wealth differences.
Magyarised former minorities were welcomed among the Hungarian population since the Hungarians considered Hungary a nation-state, where everyone was Hungarian, but some with different language and culture.
Generally speaking, the demographic transition with respect to industrialization is a population surge, due to lowered death rates (including, largely being in fact, higher live birth rates and lowered child mortality) followed some generations later by a slump, due to substantially falling birth rates. Generally speaking in a given population in the early phase, I believe the pattern is the less affluent a given demographic is, the higher its relative birth rate. Thus I'd have expected non-Magyars in industrializing regions, including migrants drawn to a boom area, to outpace Magyar birth rates due to being poorer but benefiting from generally improving public health nonetheless. For the reverse to be true, I might speculate that all the industrial booming is in Magyar areas, with relatively few non-Magyars being drawn in, so the latter remain at more pre-industrial growth rates while the Magyars shoot forward. If this is the case the Magyars certainly do benefit doubly, from having more prevalent numbers and from those numbers being both richer and more connected to the advanced industrial spheres. This helps them maintain dominance, but would also exacerbate the conflicts as the non-Magyars find themselves bypassed and left abandoned by the boom. It could easily then lead to more violent conflict.
I explained most of this above, so I will answer this shortly.
The babyboom and growth in Hungarian areas were still at a relative early stage, so I don't think the minorities outpace Hungarian growth-rate for atleast two more decades. Together with the bigger migration rate and assimilation, I think we are safe to say that the Hungarians would maintain their advantage.
The Hungarian percentage in Hungary with Croatia-Slavonia was ~49%, without it, it was ~54% in 1910. So until the end of the rapid population growth period, the Hungarian percentage could raise with Croatia-Slavonia to ~55-60%, without it to ~60-65%, in the following two-three decades. After that, it's uncertain what could happen.
One little thing, actually Hungary's formal name at the time wasn't "Lands of the Crown of Saint Stephen", but Lands of the Holy Crown of Hungary"/ Lands of the Hungarian Holy Crown". Or atleast all of my sources refer to it like that.
I'd be pretty sure that if the Austrian lands are suffering in comparison, the German elite would connive to try and piggyback off Hungarian success somehow or other to subsidize their dominance, which would tend to lead to a different civil crisis.
You might be right, but according to my knowledge, the problems in Austria took root in deeper depths.
While in Austria there was a better environment to exploit the first industrial revolution, it always struggled to adopt to the second industrial revolution. Austria ofcourse was still the dominant side in the Monarchy, but the time didn't work for them.
There were a couple of reasons why the Austrian economy was lagging behind. Most of which can be explained by the political or infrastructural situation in Austria. The Emperor had a much more firm grip on the Austrian internal affairs, than on the Hungarian, which made the Austrian government more reactionary and anti-reform in nature. It hindered the establishment of ideal climate for business and made state support for enterprises less likely and I'm not even mentioned the disfunction of legislature from 1907.
The infrastructural problem I mentioned is ofcourse the railway system, which even though was quite dense, significantly denser, than its Hungarian countetpart, it was so diverse in the sense of track-width, that it made almost any kind of transportation of goods a logistical nightmare. On the otherside The Hungarian State Railways was established relatively early and set compulsory standards for every company, which wanted to work with them and link the railway lines. Furthermore by the turn of the century, most of the private railway companies were nationalised and thus a pretty decent and homogeneous railway system was established in Hungary. It must be noted that by the end of the century most of the Austrian railway companies were nationalised as well, but unlike the Hungarian they were never standardised. It caused a lot of problems in OTL, when the war actually broke out.
And then there is the minorities' problem. Most people, when the minorities of the Empire is mentioned, they almost immediately links it to Hungary. It is understandable, since the minorities in Hungary had nation-states to support them and not the minorities in Austria (with the exception of Italy, but Italy was dangerous in a whole other way. But even though the minorities in Austria had no existing nation-states to support them, but they still posed a bigger threat. First of all, these minorities were much more populous than the minorities in Hungary were, which allowed them to pressure the government in Austria more effectively, than the many tiny minorities in Hungary did. Second, while in Hungary most of the industry was in Hungarian or German majority regions, in Austria the most important industrial areas were in the Czech majority Bohemia, which is fairly dangerous if the minorities are upset to say the least. Third, while the territory of Hungary had an almost perfect geographic integrity and as state had a long history of existence and unity in that form of it (Carpathian Basin), and had the Hungarians who had the will to hold it together, Austria was a framework of a bunch of political marriages of the Habsburgs, attaching together many different countries and lands which had nothing to do to each other earlier, thus they had no real sense of unity at all. The only thing that kept them together was the loyalty to the Emperor, which is in my opinion is a very fragile trust to rely on.
So Austria had many problems to deal with, much more difficult ones than Hungary did in my opinion, but I'm very interested hearing your opinion as well. Even though
Should we really lack confidence that if Hungary can do well, the western part of the Empire would also profit in proportion?
I'm really struggling to find a way to save Austria from a major depression, but I'm open to hear your opinion and suggestions.
And while if greater Austria, counting all non-Magyar/St Stephen lands as such, does go moribund while Hungary pulls ahead, I suppose that ethnic conflicts in the west would get worse, the general impression one gets reading about AH society is that it was the subjects of the Magyars who were most resentful and least conciliated, whereas Bohemia for instance seems fairly easy to keep included in the Empire with just a few mild concessions. Is this a misrepresentation based on the Western world tending to look through an Austrian lens, or would you concede it was so and your claims are based on a belief that the situation would soon reverse given some time? If Austria profits along with Hungary (and it is certainly reasonable to me that the Empire had some potential to surge ahead in development and wealth) could not the western ethnic crises be managed at least as well as in Hungary, and so does your suggestion it would be the west that would suffer crisis first and most again depend on the assumption the Austrians could not manage as well as the Hungarians?
Give me a little time, I will answer this part as well a bit later.
