Grimm Reaper said:
Darkling, let's not get insulting.
1) If Spain is not in the war then the British obviously have different plans than they might if they can see combining Georgia, South Carolina AND Spanish Florida as a backup plan.
That would be the problem I having understanding you, I am aware Florida was British already.
The Spanish got it after the ARW (and had it before the 7YW).
2) Loyalist support in South Carolina was, by your own admission, never able to take control of the state, even with a substantial British contingent.
4,000 split between two states is not substantial.
If Lord North appears before Parliament and announces a requirement of 14,000 men indefinitely(or only half that) on garrison duty, just to hold what is the most loyal colony after tiny(in population) Georgia, then his government dies on the spot.
It wouldn't be permanent, you just having to occupy the area and then convince the locals that the British can protect them, once that happens the neutrals and loyalists support the British and create a militia to enforce the law.
3) Loyalist support in North Carolina proved difficult to find, which was the reason Cornwallis went to Yorktown, resorting to the old and failed plan of march and ravage in the hopes no one would notice that the plan to take control through loyalists had died.
The same North Carolina which had 1,700 highlanders spontaneously uprising to fight for their king?
The reason North Carolina had few loyalists evident was because the British never exercised control over the area for sufficient time and Cornwallis wasn't forced into Virginia because there were no loyalists to be found in North Carolina but because he didn't want to return to South Carolina, he instead decided to head north and help disrupt the Americans in Virginia either to weaken Greene or to draw Washington to battle.
However 8,000 troops was two few to conquered 500,000 people when there was still a standing army present.
4) By your own figures the British would require 50,000 troops plus loyalists to keep some semblence of control in the lower three. Plus the NYC and Newport garrisons, plus some in Canada, plus some kind of field force or two and we're getting to 100,000 and probably past that figure.
I said nothing of the sort, I said Cornwallis could do it with an additional 10,000 troops.
The NYC garrison was 14,000 (although a considerably sum were detached on occasion) and Newport 5,000.
Canada has probably somewhere in the region of 10,000.
We would be nowhere near past that 100,000 figure on the basis of those numbers even assuming Cornwallis was given a force of 50,000.
Needless to say, the idea of the British being willing to fund an army twice what Wellington had at Waterloo for years is very doubtful. As for being able to, when one political crisis too many puts the Whigs in power..
They did fund such a force for years as I have pointed out.
The British kept 47-50,000 troops in North America from October 1778 - March 1782 (10,000 or so were locals and 6,000 or so were in Florida because of the Spanish, in addition to those in Canada).
However overall British forces (the war with France required Britain to reinforce the West Indies, Gibraltar and Britain itself) increased from 112,000 in October 1778 to 150,000 in March 1782.
Britain did spend the money, could afford to spend the money and would spend the money.
Your description of the fragility of the rebel cause is ludicrous.
Then address the economic aspects of my argument.
The militia was loyal to the American Revolution, which is why the British were always bottled up into garrisons and never able to get a chance to control the countryside.
The British army had to keep itself concentrated because the continental army was a force in being, otherwise the British could have blanketed the country side.
You will notice that Cornwallis could and did venture wherever he pleased in Virginia until his orders told him to wait at Yorktown, the Virginia militia (a total of 19,000 people of the course of the entire war) couldn't prevent them doing anything.
The militia can and did go quiet in the face of a British force and many switched sides.
The British also set up their own militia units in the Carolinas, Georgia and New York.
It wasn't difficult to get the militia onside, you just had to convince them that you were the legitimate government of the area (i.e. that you could protect their family from reprisals).
You don’t seem to grasp that an important part of the war was what is currently being called “hearts and minds”, in order to convince the neutrals to switch allegiance and get the Loyalists to form up (and get the rebels to give up the fight locally) it was necessary to win the PR war.
Britain had to convince the locals that they were going to win and that the area would stay theirs, 4,000 troops just wasn’t enough to demonstrate overwhelming superiority which would have tipped the balance.
However if Cornwallis comes in with 14,000 (which is possible without any reinforcements from Britain, in all likelihood he could have been given double that without any distractions from France) he will quickly blanket the area and convince people he can protect them and convince the rebels they won’t be able to successfully fight them.
Once they become convinced of that then the British become the default rulers, the militia fights for the British (not just loyalists but neutrals and even cowed rebels trying to hold onto what they have) at that point Britain has won the state and can move not the next with minimal troops left behind.
This is exactly the strategy Washington feared the British would use.
This is one of the reason Cornwallis had to try and defeat Greene after Greene (or rather Morgan) had inflicted a loss of prestige on the British Cornwallis had to try and restore it.
The retreat from Boston hurt British prestige because the loyalists there (and even Boston had a majority loyalist opinion, as all other urban centres did) and so did the retreat form Philadelphia.
Loyalists were rightly concerned they would sign up with eth British and then be punished if the rebels won, the contrary was also true which is why, before Trenton, people were taking Howe amnesty deal by the 100’s and 1000’s and it is also one of the reason Arnold switched sides, he thought the rebels would lose and so wanted to cut himself a deal.
Britain thus had a lot to prove and wasn’t able to do so with 4,000 troops (of course if the French don’t enter the war Britain may never relinquish Philadelphia which would help their standing).
Even in South Carolina the list of British forts makes clear that the British did not enjoy control outside musket range and if they could not do so with the force level you describe...
The force level I describe is Cornwallis with 4,000; I am proposing Cornwallis could easily get 14,000 men and even more.
You just kept arguing the same thing over and over again "if they can't do it with a hand full of troops then they couldn't do it with many", the argument doesn't follow and you aren't presenting anything else.
No state quit despite the fact that France did not enter the war until 1778 in name and later in terms of troops on the ground.
Yes but the point is they came close, given Britain doing better and the continental army collapsing (as it will in any long drawn out war) then the states will find themselves in the same sort of situation as they were before Trenton and they will have the same reaction.
Lastly, by your own description, most of the so-called loyalists were no better than the neutrals, willing to go along with anyone and perhaps willing to give passive support to a British victory already won in the area but, under the best circumstances, unable to do more than burn a few poles and grab a few courthouses but beaten at the first hint of resistance. So the British still have to do practically everything themselves.
No they weren’t neutrals they were people who knew if they stood up they were faced with brutality.
Do you think every last man in New York was loyalist because there weren’t roving bands of saboteurs; the rebels kept their heads down and waited it out.
Loyalists acted in much the same manner, it is just the rebels had an impressive intimidation network already in place which British troops were required to defeat.
Lastly, if the loyalists in 1780 were still not properly organized and adequately armed, despite years to do so and large British contingents to seek for support, we can confidently conclude that this was because they were incapable of doing so, not unwilling to.
Cornwallis did not have years to train his loyalists from the capture of Charleston until Guilford court house we have just over a year.
Either that or the entire loyalist leadership and the British officer corp in North America didn't have a clue, which seems most unlikely.
Many loyalists were armed; Cornwallis’ army (the initial 4,000 he was left with) was mostly loyalist.
They were loyalists who had been recruited (mainly from New York) and had been given the required amount of training instead of being rushed into service as Cornwallis was forced to do.
Lets cut to the chase shall we, it is your contention that Britain couldn't have held the American colonies because you believe the rebels had infinite resolves and would have fought on long after their field force had been defeated, you also believe that despite the rebellion becoming less popular over time that the populace will always spring up unless then is a soldier garrisoned in every house (you claim of 100,000 for the south means just that).
I say that is nonsense, 6% of Virginians were willing to get paid to fight the British, how many of them do you think would be willing to do it for free?
The defections to the British and the mutinies indicate that payment was a big factor for the rebels (understandably,. nobody wants to starve to death) so what possibly makes you think that they will fight on without pay and with no hope of victory?
Because they are Americans right?
The Irish might knuckle under without having a soldier bunking with everyone of them, so might the French or the Spanish or anybody else but the Americans despite being split on the issue will fight until the last breath.
It just flies in the face of the facts and I have to wonder how acquainted you are with them, given you weren't aware of Florida’s disposition, you weren't aware of British troop strength throughout the war, you weren't of the relative financial situations of the combatants, you weren't aware about the particulars of Britain’s campaign in North Carolina and so on and so forth.
If you have some logic behind you position you just aren’t showing it or I am not seeing it.
