"The Freedoms of February"

Space Oddity

Space Oddity

My first attempt at a TL. Please be kind. Or not.


"...It is easy--all too easy--to undervalue Vladimir Ilyich Ulyanov's influence on the SD in light of his premature death in 1907. Virtually overnight he changed from one of the most influential men in the Party to an afterthought, a historical curiosity. Casual historians, glancing at the Party history of those days, finds themselves buried in obscure doctrinal disputes, involving incomprehensible factions such as the Bolsheviks and the Mensheviks--things that are not merely hard to understand, but hard to care about. The temptation to say, as Khrushchev did, that ‘Lenin was mad, and while he lived, he drove those around him mad’ is understandable. And yet the fact remains--during his life, Ulyanov did not merely participate in SD party politics--he dominated them. His disputes, obsessions, and preoccupations were at the center of Marxist politics in Russian politics for years. And yet in the end, they were a slender thread that snapped with his passing…

“A question one finds oneself asking, when considering things, is what would have happened had Ulyanov lived? This is difficult to answer. History involves so many contingencies, it is hard to be sure what might happen if events changed in even the slightest degree. My personal suspicion is that the SD, assuming it survived the near constant infighting he engulfed it in--and that is a major assumption--would have been completely sidelined during the February Revolution, and had little-to-no effect in Russian politics during the Provisional Government and Civil War, though again, this is merely supposition on my part…”

--Transcribed from the lecture “Lenin: the Forgotten Man”, by Professor Joseph McCarthy, 1952, Marquette University
 
Space Oddity

Space Oddity

“Three weeks into the Emergency Party Congress, and Trotsky was the last holdout. It seemed rather silly, the way he’d gone on about party unity, but then, that was Trotsky for you. Everyone else had agreed to put factionalism behind us--even Djugashvili, who we’d been concerned about going into the Congress--but Trotsky insisted that he wanted action against the Liquidationists, or else. Eventually, he stormed out of the meeting. Martov suggested we expel him, but there was a general feeling that would just lead to the same old problems. Then Djugashvili suggested we give Trotsky some high profile position in the new Party Administration as a sop--something to sooth his ego, and keep him busy. This was agreed to be an ideal solution--and was the first hint that Djugashvili was something besides Lenin’s factotum.”
--Lev Kamenev, Pravda Interview, 1934

“In retrospect, the Emergency Party Congress of 1908 at Berne was where it all went wrong. While I had my differences with Lenin, one cannot deny that he was dedicated to this being an absolutely revolutionary party. Without him, the SD quickly slipped into bourgeois’ habits of compromise and individualism--traits, I am sorry to say, that I encouraged as much as any of the others. It was this that lead into the party’s ultimate failure to act as a Marxist agency for change…
“…Another worrisome trait that manifested at the Emergency Congress was intrigue. Comrade Djugashvili--who hitherto had been little more than one of Lenin’s hatchet men--produced an ingenious plot to sideline me, the first of many, and one that I fell for, to my eternal shame…”
--Lev Trotsky, Traitors to the Revolution, 1943

“…Trotsky’s claims of an ongoing conspiracy on my part to deny and destroy his influence, dating all the way back to the Emergency Congress, are little more than bitterness. If I had wanted to do this, I could have simply supported the motion to expel him at that time--a motion that had a great deal more support than is now popularly imagined. I did not because I held him to be a talented Party member whose abilities greatly enhanced our efforts. I hoped my proposal would lead to his best possible use to the Party, and for a while, I feel it did. But in the end, Trotsky was Trotsky…”
--Josef Djugashvili, Memoirs 1949
 
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Lord Roem

Lord Roem

Hmm, this sounds interesting indeed. Without Lenin in charge the SD's are going to be either united an moderate (relatively) or so fractionalised and prone to schism as to render them totally marginalised in Russian politics. I'm looking forward to reading more.
 
Space Oddity

Space Oddity

"The period immediately following the Tsar's clampdown was terrifying--especially when we heard about Lenin's death. Quite a few of us were certain he'd been covertly killed by the Okhrana. Of course, he'd just fallen through the ice leaving Finland, but--well, we didn't know that. In those days, you could never be sure of anything. There were spies everywhere--or there seemed to be--the Black Hundred were roaming the streets--you didn't know if your friends were your friends, or even if you were going to survive tomorrow.

"It was a long, bad ten years for us, even if we were no longer fighting amongst ourselves. Frankly, in retrospect I'm amazed we survived to the February Revolution..."

--Vyacheslav Molotov, Pravda Interview 1936

"The end result of the Emergency Congress was a reunited, reorganized SD which would stand at the front of the revolutionary movement. At least in theory. The reality was that while factionalism was definitely toned down without Lenin there to continuously stir the pot, it still existed. And even united, we were a small, urban-based party in a large, mostly rural country. But we knew we had history on our side in those days. There are times when I miss that feeling.

"After the Congress, the Party was divided--more or less--into the Central Committee, the Russian Section, the International Section, and the Jewish Bund. The Central Committee handled overall leadership. Ideally, it would have been in Russia--or even Finland, but that was clearly impossible, so it more or less floated all over Europe. The Russian Section handled party recruiting and the ongoing struggle against Tsarist repression. It was headed by a six-man committee which wound up changing membership so many times that I still cannot recall who we originally put on it. Really, Djugashvili was in charge of matters, for all practical reasons. There was a great deal of ill-feeling at times between the Central Committee and the Russian Section--they felt it ignored the situation on the ground and was obsessed with trivialities. The Central Committee on the other hand, felt that Russian Section ignored their wishes whenever it felt like it and often practiced discreditable practices, such as bank robberies and kidnappings. There was truth in both sides, which is probably one reason we were able to soothe the waters after whatever incident had roiled them again and again…

“The International Section was in charge maintaining positive relationships with other socialist parties and courting world opinion. That was Trotsky’s domain--Trotsky, and whatever poor fool we stuck there to keep an eye on Trotsky. It was a nightmare. On several occasions, Trotsky would resign, or threaten to resign. It always ended the same way--whoever else was supposed to help him run the section would quit, Trotsky would take up his old position again, someone else would join him, and then we’d wait for the whole sorry process to repeat itself.

“The Jewish Bund was a semiautonomous ally which we allowed to handle its own affairs, as we had in the past. This initially caused a great deal of resentment in the Russian Section--and Djugashvili in particular--where it was felt that having two sections operating in the same area was somewhat redundant. However, as time went on, the Bund wound up becoming Russian Section’s ally, serving as an intermediary between it and the Central Committee during some of the more heated disputes.

“Really, these days I see it was the most hodge-podge, patchwork way to build and run an underground Socialist Party, but at the time it seemed to be working. And sometimes I wonder if it didn’t prepare us for our situation after the February Revolution…”

--Lev Kamenev, Pravda Interview, 1934


 
Space Oddity

Space Oddity

I must apologize if it seems I'm dragging my feet here. From an actual 'event' position very little is happening during this period. Just like in the OTL.
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"One of the final issues that we dealt with at the Emergency Congress was the uniting of the former Menshevik and Bolshevik papers into one SD publication. It was decided that the Party would have one publication henceforth, named Pravda--the name being Trotsky's idea. There was some early unpleasantness as to which papers would be shut down, and which one would become the party paper, when I made a suggestion that all papers remain in publication under the shared Pravda banner, alternating their publishing dates in an effort to confuse the Tsarist authorities. This proved not only to be a workable compromise, but sound policy. By maintaining multiple offices we were able to keep Pravda in continuous, if often irregular publication until the repressions of 1914, something I consider one of my rare triumphs from this era...

"...(I)t must be pointed out that contrary to what is often stated I was hardly 'the head of Russian Section'. The impression that I was largely comes from being the closest thing that beleagured division had to a continuous presence. I stood on its Directing Committee from 1908 to 1916, albeit with interruptions totalling, when added together, a little over two years. These interruptions constituted five arrests, three exiles to Sibera, and one deportation...

"...On the eve of the Great War, the SD's position was battered--badly battered--but enduring. We had an unofficial alliance with the SR, ties to the more left-leaning members of the Kadets, and affiliations with numerous nationalist movements and labor unions. But none of this should give a too-rosy picture of our strength. We were small--smaller than any other faction--we were heavily persecuted by Tsarist agents--and we were far less effectual than we could have been..."

--Josef Djugashvili, Memoirs 1949

"In my opinion, the Central Committee did more than anything else to foster a sense of unity between former faction members. It didn't matter if you'd been a Bolshevik, a Menshevik or if you belonged to the Bund--we all bonded over our mutual dislike for Central Committee. It wasn't simply that it tried to direct our actions in Russia with little appreciation for our situation. No, it was the grand announcements, the declarations of purpose--and the subsidiary committees. Oh, the committees. Once, I remember getting a telegram a week for two months from them announcing the formations of various committees. Including the 'Committee to Handle the Prolifferation of Committees'. Comrade Djugashvili was staying with me when that one arrived, and I recall looking at him and asking 'How are we ever going to run this nation after the Revolution?'. At that moment, a very pained, very bleak look stole over his face, and he sighed. 'At times like this, Comrade Dan,' he said to me, 'I try not to think about that.' "

--Fyodor Dan, Pravda Interview, 1942
 
Space Oddity

Space Oddity

The Eve of War

There are some more things I considered about writing in the interim period, but I decided that I could always double back or even get that in the director's cut. On with the show!
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"The Great War issue nearly divided the party--the first major factional controversy since the Bolshevik/Menshevik split. The War Faction felt we risked appearing indifferent to our own nation if we came out against it--the Internationalists felt we’d compromise our principles if we didn’t. The real conflict was located in Central Committee. The Russian Section was fairly united in opposition to the War, as were the Bund and the International Section. But Central Committee dithered, and debated the issue, and got nowhere. There was a genuine fear that there would be a new split, and this would trigger further splits in the Party’s support structure. And then, Comrade Martov gave his opinion on the matter...”

--Lev Kamenev, Pravda Interview, 1934

“Comrades--the issue before us is whether we should support this imperialist war. Now, let us start with something we may all agree on--there is no moral reason to support this war. It is an evil conflict, brought about by the vanities of a corrupt system, and it will only breed misery and oppression. I see no dissent on this--we can agree there is no moral reason.

“But there is also no practical reason for our Party to support this war. The members of the War Faction feel that we would lose the nation if we did this--but we do not have the nation. The Tsar has the nation, and he is against us--just as we are against him. This war is the Tsar’s policy, not ours, and there is only one way it may aid him--if the war ends swiftly, and in a victory for his forces. If this happens, then the Tsar will use his strengthened grip on power to crush us utterly, regardless of whether we support him now, or not. So, we gain nothing by supporting the war.

“But if we oppose the war, not only do we keep our consciences clear, not only do we keep our moral authority, but if his policy fails--if this war is not swift, if there is no victory--then our opposition will be strengthened. The people will see that we are their friends, we are the ones who have their best interests at heart, that the Tsar is a criminal, that internationalism is to the benefit of all. So, there is a practical, as well, as a moral reason to oppose the war.

“Given that support is neither moral, nor practical, I must then ask, comrades--why are we even discussing this?”

--From The Speeches, Writings and Letters of Comrade Martov, (Vol. II), Pub 1924

“Many people are amazed that Russian Section--comprising as it did so many former Mensheviks and union activists--opposed the War to the extent it did. Well, first, we can’t deny that just as we moderated the radical impulses of the revolutionary section of the party, they radicalized our moderate impulses--which was perhaps, a very good thing for all involved. But more than that--we had all learned to be observant in Russia, and what struck us was how shallow the support was. Oh, your average citizen was all for the war--provided it was over swiftly, and everyone could get home again quickly. But when it was suggested that might not be the case, many would grow quite concerned…”

--Fyodor Dan, Pravda Interview, 1942

"...On Aug 1st, Germany declared war on Russia, making an expanded conflict inevitable. The Great War would involve more parties in active hostilities for a longer time than any war before or since. It would also count more casualties than any other conflict--and one could say that the imperial regimes of Germany and Russia could be counted among them..."

--from Madness, Vanity, and Folly: A History of the Great War 1914-1919, John Steinbeck
 
Space Oddity

Space Oddity

Revolution Drawing Nearer

The big changes start coming... soon.
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"...As this war drags into its third year, it is now clear that the opposition stance (most notably taken by Russia's Social Democratic Labour Party) far from being a 'naive and idealistic folly' was a sober and clear-sighted appraisal. Those that instigated this war have been discredited--those that allowed it have been sullied..."
--L'Humanite, January 9th, 1917

"Our motto was 'Marxism in practice, not theory', as Comrade Martov used to say! Less arguing--more doing! And that's what we did. Union organization--worker education--raising the revolutionary conscious... We had to remember that those who were not against us, were with us, or heading our way..."

--Vyacheslav Molotov, Pravda Interview 1936

"Our stance became one of 'practical Marxism', or 'living Marxism', a phrase that was coined by--Bogdanov I believe. Discussion and theorizing were of course allowed, but the vital thing was the sustaining of a viable, reasonably united Marxist party. We could not let theory dominate us, or distract us from conditions as they actually existed..."

--Lev Kamenev, Pravda Interview, 1934

"...The endless talk of 'practical, living Marxism' initiated by the Party leaders has ultimately destroyed us as a Marxist force. It has become the watchword of a refusal to reflect on and commit to revolutionary principles, of alliance and partnership with bourgeois and even reactionary factions, and always, always compromise, compromise...

"...(O)ur party's stand is that it has no stand..."

--Lev Trotsky, "Practical Marxism?", Pravda July 14, 1926

"...Our party's stand is that the people are entitled to a decent job in humane conditions that pays a decent wage, a good education, and ultimately, a life lived with dignity. Further, we feel that it is the government's obligation to see that this comes about, and this party's obligation to make the government do so. If comrade Trotsky sees such a stance as an absence of principles, well, then this tells us a great deal about Comrade Trotsky..."

--Grigory Zinoviev, "Yes, Practical Marxism" Pravda July 21, 1926
 
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Space Oddity

Space Oddity

And now all those incremental little changes I've been detailing build into massive ones...

Enjoy.

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"I still remember that day. I was in a little cafe in Stockholm, enjoying a cup of coffee--the Central Committee had relocated there at the start of the war--when Nogin rushed in, and said, 'the Tsar--the Tsar is abdicated--the Tsar is over--the Tsar is finished!'

"At first I didn't believe it--I couldn't--but it was true. The Romanovs had been forced from power. Old Russia was dead. I could go home."

--Grigory Zinoviev, Pravda Interview, 1938

"...(F)ollowing the dissolution of the Autarchy and the formation of the Provisional Government, the members of the RSDLP returned home from Stockholm, from New York City, and in many cases from Siberia. They found a people overjoyed to be free--and a state in chaos…”

--Nikita Khrushchev, Russia In Revolution, 1956

“…This is more a riot than a revolution in my mind. The peasants are free to wreck everything, and they are doing so, with great abandon. Those in power cannot stop it, and many wouldn’t if they could…

“…Our political parties strive valiantly to appear in control of the situation, but it’s clear that after years of dreaming of this day, they have no idea what to do when it arrives in all its horrible glory. The Kadets and the Progressists have control of the Provisional Government, the best intentions, and little else. The SR rush around in the Soviets and ask all to trust--please trust--in the soul of the peasantry, and it’s ability to get us out of the present difficulties…

“The SD meanwhile are milling around as if trying to understand the situation, as the situation mills around and tries to understand them. They’re an odd bunch. Half of them look like bankers, the other half look like bandits--and there’s a strange creature they call the Caucasian who looks like both at once. He was pointed out to me a few days ago, and returned my gaze in a most unsettling manner…

“So the situation stands--bad and likely to get worse. I will be amazed if the country doesn’t fall into a military dictatorship before the year is out…”

--Maxim Gorky, Letters, Vol. 4, 1917

“Ahh, they were exciting times. We pitched around a bit for a party headquarters, and wound up renting two floors in the Grand Hotel Europe. There was an offer to take over the Smolny Institute, but it was felt that a former school for noblewomen was less than appropriate. And as big as those two floors were, they still seemed too small. People came and went constantly--you’d see Comrades Bukharin and Zinoviev arguing with each other, Kollontai talking with Radek, Trotsky writing an editorial in the corner, Comrade Djugashvili among a crowd of Georgians and Bundists talking about the ‘national situation’…”

--Vyacheslav Molotov, Pravda Interview 1936


“My initial feelings on my return from exile were elated. Progress was at last coming to Russia! But this soon turned to bewilderment. The situation was chaotic, and the Provisional Government seemed determined on retaining the policy that had destroyed the Tsars--the Great War.

“Among the Party, the initial enthusiasm for the Provisional Government turned to wariness. The general opinion was that while we couldn’t support it, if we weren’t careful we would destabilize it enough to provoke a military reaction, which would likely produce a dictatorship. Our stance became ‘limited support for the Government as a body, principled opposition to its policies’. This was an exceedingly narrow road to walk on…

“The Soviets were another matter. While the workers and soldiers were the major power, the parties served as a source of guidance. These were ourselves, the Socialist-Revolutionaries, and various minor parties most of whom were ultimately absorbed into the SD and SR. While the SR had more power in the Soviets than we did, this soon changed--we were fairly united, and a coherent stance, while the SR was already showing signs of its later Right/Left split, and unsure of what it wanted.

“This was not a problem for us. By late April, we were already declaring our position--’Peace and power to the Soviets’.”

--Josef Djugashvili, Memoirs 1949

“Towards the end of April, the split between the Soviets and the Provisional Government had become impossible to ignore. I recall telling my fellow ministers--‘if we do not tread carefully, this government will lose all support with the people, and that will be fatal’. Most of them saw the importance of this--but some did not. They failed to see our extremely delicate position, as a government democratic in ideals, but essentially bureaucratic in function…

“We were fortunate that the SD remained committed to our survival. I still shudder to think what a powerful revolutionary organization could have made of our situation.”

--Alexander Kerensky, 1917: The End of The Autarchy, 1936

“The longer the situation went on, the more nervous people got. Many in the Party started to feel that our position was essentially one of inaction. Some felt we should actively support the Provisional Government to shore it up, even if it meant supporting the war in the short term. Others felt that we should demand an election now. And a few people were making more extreme demands…”

--Fyodor Dan, Pravda Interview, 1942


“At one meeting, Trotsky stated that we should attempt another revolution and create a socialist state. Amazing as it might seem, many of the more radical members felt this might be a good idea, and it began to be seriously considered. My opinion of the matter was asked. I told them while we might have the ability to pull such a thing off, assuming great luck on our part, our ability to create a workable government on our own was limited--even negligible. I also told them any government we created would have no legitimacy, that it would be opposed by remnants of the old order and the Provisional Government--that the end result would be either a military dictatorship or, even more ruinously in my mind, a party dictatorship, neither one of which would bear any resemblence whatsoever to any theoretical 'dicatorship of the proletariat'. This ended all such talk.

“Trotsky has never forgiven me for doing this.”

--Josef Djugashvili, Memoirs 1949

“Comrade Djugashvili’s opposition to my proposal set back the cause of true Marxism in Russia-and the world--immeasurably. The weakness of the Provisional Government at this time would soon be made apparent to us. If we had acted then, we almost certainly could have seized the government and begun a true revolutionary state.”

--Lev Trotsky, Traitors to the Revolution, 1943


“On May 1st (April 20th Old Calender) Pavel Milyukov declared that the Provisional Government would support the War until the end in his infamous ‘May Day Note’ , setting off a wave of protests. SD leadership realized that if it did not take control of the protests, the situation would either be taken advantage of by opportunists, or spin into further disorder.”

--Nikita Khrushchev, Russia In Revolution, 1956

“…Our protest would march from outside Peter and Paul Fortress to Mariinsky Palace. Our earlier contact with Kerensky, who was then not only a Vice-Chairman in the Petrograd Soviet but the Minister of Justice, had won an assurance that we would meet no armed resistance. The crowd marched through the streets waving red flags, and shouting out “Depose Milyukov!”, “Peace and Power to the Soviets!”, and similar slogans.

“As we gathered before the Palace gates, Kerensky came out to greet us, to the acclaim of the crowd. He had been as good as his word, and we’d met no opposition, though as he later told us, General Kornilov had wanted to fire on us. Kerensky waved to the crowd, and then declared the Ministers would speak to a deputation and hear our demands. At this the crowd began to shout out, “Peace!” almost as one.

“The deputation consisted of Martov, Bukharin, Zinoviev, Ehrlich, Nogin, and myself. We were brought inside, and introduced to the ministers, including Premier Lvov, whom I saw then for the first time. He seemed like some village elder out of Tolstoi, wise, calm, and very sad. Oh, how’d we all come to depend on, and even love that man! But that was in the future. At this time, he was our opponent.”

--Josef Djugashvili, Memoirs 1949

“When we first heard of the SD’s protest, we were concerned that it might get out of hand--that it might even be an effort to topple the Provisional Government. But Kerensky assured us that they had no such intentions, and we decided to trust him. And to our surprise, the SD deputation proved completely civil and reasonable. They were completely prepared to listen to our arguments--even to admit that they had some merit--but on the subject of the war they would not budge. ‘You may hold it off, and hold it off, Premier,” said Martov to Lvov, “but if you do not end the war effort, it will destroy this government. You may pacify the people with half-measures for a while, but these will do less, and less, and eventually, they will cease to work. And then you will have a mob on your hand that will not be quieted.’ When Guchkov protested, Zinoviev went to a window and opened it. As we heard the roar of the crowd, calling for ‘Peace and Power to the Soviets’, he stated, ‘Ministers, you must understand, we are not unleashing these people on you. We are keeping them from tearing you apart.’”

--Vladimir Dmitrievich Nabokov, Recollections, 1931

“There was an amazing surprise at how well the talks went. Kerensky was, I feel, a little disappointed--he’d hoped to continue on gaining accolades in his conciliatory position and now it appeared that would be unnecessary. Once our initial demands were handled, the discussion turned to the relation of the Soviet and the Provisional Government, which all agreed would have to be regularized. We sketched out a rough plan for doing this, and agreed that the further details would be handled in the immediate future.”

--Grigory Zinoviev, Pravda Interview, 1938

“I remember the cheering as the Ministers and the deputation stepped outside. We had not said anything but the crowd sensed that an agreement had been reached. Premier Lvov stepped forward and declared that Milyukov and Guchkov would be resigning, and that the Provisional Government would shortly send a request for a cease-fire to the Central Powers. ‘I announce the new policy of our government--peace and power to the Soviets!’ he declared. At this moment--and I am still unsure whether this was prepared or not--a young child stepped out of the crowd, and offered the Premier a red flag, which he cheerfully took and waved a few times.

“As the cheering started, I turned to leave. Ehrlich looked at me, and asked me where I was going. I told him I was going home to contact my lawyers, to get my will in order. He stared at me, clearly wondering why I would do that. ‘Don’t worry, it’s not my health,’ I said. ‘I just want to be ready for the coup which almost certainly going to come now.’”

--Vladimir Dmitrievich Nabokov, Recollections, 1931
 
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Space Oddity

Space Oddity

Call me an optimist but I like to imagine ten years out of the dark, dank hole that was Bolshevikism learning to actually deal with people could work wonders.

And these are his Memoirs, where he is following the time-honored course of subtly and not so subtly making himself look good and his opponents look bad.
 

BlahBlahBlah

I like it very much. Can't wait for what's next! I hope they all make it out okay. I find the premise very interesting. I like Lenin as much as any communist will; but it looks like things are going to be better for Russia without him. I agree with Djugashvili's assessment that a revolutionary overthrow the provisional government at the time would have meant civil war and a descent into authoritarianism (as it did). So I like the path things are taking. A shame we probably won't get our first socialist nation in 1921, but I'm glad we'll hopefully avoid the dictatorship.

Also, what effect are you planning this to have on the German Revolution coming in 1918 (assuming it is still happening)?
 
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