The Four Horsemen: the Nuclear Apocalypse of 1962
- Thread starter Onkel Willie
- Start date
If you consider 246.6 miles nearby, then, yes, it's nearby, @Onkel Willie. Also, IMO, Cheyenne Mountain would likely get two missiles, since it is the HQ of NORAD, and knocking it out would be important--just move the Detroit and Wright-Patterson missiles to there (1) (I'm going by @Amerigo Vespucci's TL, which had two missiles hit Cheyenne Mountain--Wright-Patterson was a testing facility in 1962, IIRC) (2)...
Other than that, though, I can't complain; talk about nightmare fuel...
(1) One can't overlook Cheyenne Mountain, IMO...
(2) And, yes, I admit I'm being selfish, since my mom lived in a house about five miles from Wright-Patterson in 1962 with her family. Also, Detroit could just as easily be targeted by bombers...
Thanks for pointing out the distance between NY and Syracuse. Things can look deceptively close on Google Maps. As to Cheyenne Mountain, I considered hitting it, but as it turns out the place was still under construction in 1962. And yeah, it's nightmare fuel. Imagine how bad a 1983 WW III would've been.
Looks like raven rock complex was not hit. That’ll help for post attack military communications. And there’s still a viable CD program in the early 1960s underpinned by a more robust PHS, VA, and DoD health care system than exists in later years.
Going to hurt to lose most of the deep water ports on the East Coast though. And even though some major rail yards were missed, lots of rail is torn up.
Going to hurt to lose most of the deep water ports on the East Coast though. And even though some major rail yards were missed, lots of rail is torn up.
marathag
Banned
Radar Sites
Crossed Circle were the SAGE Command Bunker, TT were for the Sea platform radars, the Texas Towers
CONUS Nike SAM Sites, each with multiple pads, reloads for those pads, and 4 to 20kt nuclear warheads
For the ADC and ANG Interceptors
And Canada
Bomarc are SAMs
Soviet Bombers were not getting thru any of that, except for the Pacific Northwest, where ranges were the shortest, and least radar coverage, besides the offshore Navy picket ships
Crossed Circle were the SAGE Command Bunker, TT were for the Sea platform radars, the Texas Towers
CONUS Nike SAM Sites, each with multiple pads, reloads for those pads, and 4 to 20kt nuclear warheads
And Canada
Soviet Bombers were not getting thru any of that, except for the Pacific Northwest, where ranges were the shortest, and least radar coverage, besides the offshore Navy picket ships
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At the risk of sounding inhumanly callous, it is how much of the US that is still intact that stands out. Five or ten years later the ICBM and SLBM based warhead counts would have been enormously higher.
What has happened is the greatest disaster in human history. Post-MIRV it would have been the END of human history. Large numbers of the more reliable solid-fueled missiles, each with three (land-based) or ten (sub-launched) warheads, plus the bombers and IRBM's in Europe...
That there was a civilisation around to publish and read JFK's book in the 1980s shows this is not as bad as we who were children when this story is set were taught to believe.
It only became clear much later how great a disparity there was between the American and Soviet nuclear arsenals at the time. By the 1980s the reality had matched and even exceeded the expectation for how much overkill each stockpile represented for each country. I consider it one of the great historical ironies that the leadup to the CMC was an era where the American public was most frightened of nuclear attack while they were virtually untouchable to direct attack. By the Eighties the fear had subsided, even as the danger had increased exponentially, to the point where people had to be reminded that yes, the threat of nuclear war was still very real.
Aside from Harbin, these are my guesses.
Any four of Beijing, Changchun, Shenyang, Hohhot, Taiyuan, Shanghai, or Xi'an (Soviet strikes), and either Yanji or Dandong (US strike).
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Just read this TL so far and want to express my congratulations for an excellent and plausible storyline.
I acknowledge that some posters have doubts about the piecemeal use of nuclear weapons by both the USA and USSR. The 'First Strike with all you have' option is a plausible outcome, as is the fact that the US commanders of SAC or the USN could launch one without direct Presidential orders. Would that hold true of SACEUR BTW?? However, it's also feasible that when it comes to the crunch neither would go against direct orders from the CinC withholding permission for such an all-out strike. Lots of people can talk tough before or after it comes to the point where they have to make such a call but then prevaricate or find reasons not to do so. And McNamara may well have been influenced by Herman Kahn's RAND study On Thermonuclear War , and so sought to reinforce President Kennedy's reluctance to authorise an all out attack before absolutely necessary.
It would make an interesting TL for the US (and UK) to launch such an attack, either with the POD of the B-59 using its nuclear-armed torpedo or simply different decisions in OTL. Much less damage to the US and probably a bit less to Western Europe. But the USSR and Eastern Europe would be devoted, probably to an even greater extent than ITTL. However, the impact on western society of such an action is likely IMHO to lead to an even more active Youth Movement by the late 1960s and early 1970s against the "capitalist warmongers". However just or unjust that would have been. Incidentally, has anyone written that TL.? But I digress, apologies.
It's also interesting to see the UK's nuclear force mentioned and as acting in a quasi-independent role - so thanks. again Onkel Willie. As to how the V-force could have been used may I give some background on its strength and deployment in OTL and how this would have affected its actions ITTL. Much of what is below comes from Jim Wilson's Britain on the Brink, which describes the Cuban Missile crisis from a British perspective, the rest from my own fallible memory reading other works. Corrections from those more knowledgeable than me are very welcome. Please feel free to skip most of this as tl:dr and jump to the section marked ----
In October 1962 Bomber Command had 6 squadrons of Victors and 8 equipped with Vulcans, each of 8 aircraft. (Another Vulcan squadron became operational on 1st December 1962.) There were also 3 squadron with Valiant bombers, assigned to SACEUR, 1 Valiant squadron in an ECM role and 2 as tankers. The RAF also had a substantial number of squadrons with Canberra that could carry a nuclear weapon but were intended at this time for conventional missions. There were 60 Thor IRBM deployed in the UK under dual UK-US control. I suppose it's just possible that the UK could seize control of some or all of these missiles as the Cubans did Russian. There were also US SAC squadron with B-47s deployed in the UK, some posted from the US during the crisis to boost the regular number of wings. (Were B-58s possibly deployed there also to improve their reach?) And at least two wing of nuclear-bomb armed F-100s and F105s assigned to SACEUR.
The UK had two basic war plans, one for being used in as part of the US SIOP and one for independent use in extremis. The former gave the V-bombers a mix of cities as targets plus Soviet Air Defence system assets, to help open the way for the more numerous US Bombers with longer flight times. The independent deterrent target list included 40 Soviet cities with populations of 400k+. on which 60 bombs were intended to be dropped. The 15 largest cities would receive two or three bombs each. AFAIK the UK didn't have PAL systems and the CIC of Bomber Command could on his own authority order a strike if contact was lost with the civilian authorities. Although he was meant to consult with the US officer in charge of UK based American and dual controlled weapons if possible - which it might not be.
In OTL PM MacMillan refused permission for the V-force to move from the main bases to their dispersal airfields. (each wing had six) . He did this as he was afraid the Soviets might interpret it as preparations for a first strike adding to the tension. Nor did he authorise the transfer of selected government officials to Corsham, the activation of the Civil Defence Corps or manning the sub-regional seats of government designed to coordinate recovery efforts post-war. Again, he was afraid that such actions would provoke a Soviet attack but they all meant the V-force was at greater risk from a Soviet strike. Notably the head of Bomber Command brought the V-force to greater readiness, without explicit orders, though with efforts to do this quietly rather than using the pre-laid means of recalling personnel via BBC announcements.
Historian Peter Hennessy claimed that the afternoon of Sunday 28th October was when MacMillan would have authorised the move to "burlington" (Horsham) of core government ministers and officials had the crisis escalated. So we can assume this will have happened a few hours after the B-59 incident, Sunday morning UK time. Also he would probably authorise at least the V-force dispersal procedure, if not the public recall of personnel. OTL Bomber Command managed to get 111 of 112 aircraft on establishment service operational by Sunday 28th, bombed and fuelled up and at either 15 or 4 minute status - time for takeoff from the Go order The next step would be to have engines running for a two minute take-off. ITTL some might be on that status by October 29 if not before.
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Four minutes was the warning time of a Soviet missile attack given by early warning radar - a minor nit pick is that OTL Fylingdales BMEW station wasn't operational until 1963. In a piece of improvisation the Jodrell Bank Radio-telescope was pressed into service - I have no idea how much warning it could have given.
The use of a Vulcan bomber to drop a US Mk 5 bomb on Soviet army formations could be questioned. These were under US control at the bases used by the Valiants assigned to SACEUR while the Vulcans had British (bulky) megaton warheads. The British warheads would be too big to use in a tactical situation but the Valiants could be recalled to national orders . And OTL during the crisis many were bombed up and on QRA under Bomber Command control despite the warheads being required to be held by US personnel. (Normally only 1 Valiant per squadron was on QRA and that was held in a secure compound and only released after the US guards had orders confirming its use from SACEUR.) Sounds like the UK went slightly rogue or Kennedy gave in to MacMillan's pleas in the end. Either way, maybe a Valiant is more likely to be used.
The targets hit by Bomber Command look to be the SIOP list, suggesting the attack ordered by MacMillan was co-ordinated with President Kennedy. So some V-bombers should hit Soviet Air Defence assets - radar stations and airfields. IF they got off the ground but it's probable with this level of tension most, would.
Sadly, I think the UK will be much more damaged by the Soviet nuclear strikes than you imply in the first set of posts. In 1967 the UK thought that Lomdon would be targeted by 10 missiles or bombers and other major cities by 4-5. There were also 65-70 military targets, many near cities or towns. Whether the Corsham facility was targeted is unknown but it's possible. The Soviets knew of its location later in the Cold War so might in 1962 - it wouldn't have stood up to a nearby missile hit with a warhead. HM the Queen would have been evacuated elsewhere - the Hebridean island of Benbecuela is sometimes stated as her intended refuge. Other members of the Royal Family would be dispersed to isolated areas to maintain a line of succession. But there might not be much to reign over.
Would Ireland be relatively unscathed? There's a few probable Soviet targets in Northern ireland and they might target infrastructure that the US could use post-war. Ports, especially Cobh harbour and airfields. But in 1962 the Soviets may have better uses for their limited supply of missiles and bombers so I'm glad you ruled otherwise. At least some of my family would survive although as my parents and I were in suburban London our odds don't look good.
@Onkel Willie - I look forward to reading about the recovery phase in due corse. Please keep up the good work
I acknowledge that some posters have doubts about the piecemeal use of nuclear weapons by both the USA and USSR. The 'First Strike with all you have' option is a plausible outcome, as is the fact that the US commanders of SAC or the USN could launch one without direct Presidential orders. Would that hold true of SACEUR BTW?? However, it's also feasible that when it comes to the crunch neither would go against direct orders from the CinC withholding permission for such an all-out strike. Lots of people can talk tough before or after it comes to the point where they have to make such a call but then prevaricate or find reasons not to do so. And McNamara may well have been influenced by Herman Kahn's RAND study On Thermonuclear War , and so sought to reinforce President Kennedy's reluctance to authorise an all out attack before absolutely necessary.
It would make an interesting TL for the US (and UK) to launch such an attack, either with the POD of the B-59 using its nuclear-armed torpedo or simply different decisions in OTL. Much less damage to the US and probably a bit less to Western Europe. But the USSR and Eastern Europe would be devoted, probably to an even greater extent than ITTL. However, the impact on western society of such an action is likely IMHO to lead to an even more active Youth Movement by the late 1960s and early 1970s against the "capitalist warmongers". However just or unjust that would have been. Incidentally, has anyone written that TL.? But I digress, apologies.
It's also interesting to see the UK's nuclear force mentioned and as acting in a quasi-independent role - so thanks. again Onkel Willie. As to how the V-force could have been used may I give some background on its strength and deployment in OTL and how this would have affected its actions ITTL. Much of what is below comes from Jim Wilson's Britain on the Brink, which describes the Cuban Missile crisis from a British perspective, the rest from my own fallible memory reading other works. Corrections from those more knowledgeable than me are very welcome. Please feel free to skip most of this as tl:dr and jump to the section marked ----
In October 1962 Bomber Command had 6 squadrons of Victors and 8 equipped with Vulcans, each of 8 aircraft. (Another Vulcan squadron became operational on 1st December 1962.) There were also 3 squadron with Valiant bombers, assigned to SACEUR, 1 Valiant squadron in an ECM role and 2 as tankers. The RAF also had a substantial number of squadrons with Canberra that could carry a nuclear weapon but were intended at this time for conventional missions. There were 60 Thor IRBM deployed in the UK under dual UK-US control. I suppose it's just possible that the UK could seize control of some or all of these missiles as the Cubans did Russian. There were also US SAC squadron with B-47s deployed in the UK, some posted from the US during the crisis to boost the regular number of wings. (Were B-58s possibly deployed there also to improve their reach?) And at least two wing of nuclear-bomb armed F-100s and F105s assigned to SACEUR.
The UK had two basic war plans, one for being used in as part of the US SIOP and one for independent use in extremis. The former gave the V-bombers a mix of cities as targets plus Soviet Air Defence system assets, to help open the way for the more numerous US Bombers with longer flight times. The independent deterrent target list included 40 Soviet cities with populations of 400k+. on which 60 bombs were intended to be dropped. The 15 largest cities would receive two or three bombs each. AFAIK the UK didn't have PAL systems and the CIC of Bomber Command could on his own authority order a strike if contact was lost with the civilian authorities. Although he was meant to consult with the US officer in charge of UK based American and dual controlled weapons if possible - which it might not be.
In OTL PM MacMillan refused permission for the V-force to move from the main bases to their dispersal airfields. (each wing had six) . He did this as he was afraid the Soviets might interpret it as preparations for a first strike adding to the tension. Nor did he authorise the transfer of selected government officials to Corsham, the activation of the Civil Defence Corps or manning the sub-regional seats of government designed to coordinate recovery efforts post-war. Again, he was afraid that such actions would provoke a Soviet attack but they all meant the V-force was at greater risk from a Soviet strike. Notably the head of Bomber Command brought the V-force to greater readiness, without explicit orders, though with efforts to do this quietly rather than using the pre-laid means of recalling personnel via BBC announcements.
Historian Peter Hennessy claimed that the afternoon of Sunday 28th October was when MacMillan would have authorised the move to "burlington" (Horsham) of core government ministers and officials had the crisis escalated. So we can assume this will have happened a few hours after the B-59 incident, Sunday morning UK time. Also he would probably authorise at least the V-force dispersal procedure, if not the public recall of personnel. OTL Bomber Command managed to get 111 of 112 aircraft on establishment service operational by Sunday 28th, bombed and fuelled up and at either 15 or 4 minute status - time for takeoff from the Go order The next step would be to have engines running for a two minute take-off. ITTL some might be on that status by October 29 if not before.
----------
Four minutes was the warning time of a Soviet missile attack given by early warning radar - a minor nit pick is that OTL Fylingdales BMEW station wasn't operational until 1963. In a piece of improvisation the Jodrell Bank Radio-telescope was pressed into service - I have no idea how much warning it could have given.
The use of a Vulcan bomber to drop a US Mk 5 bomb on Soviet army formations could be questioned. These were under US control at the bases used by the Valiants assigned to SACEUR while the Vulcans had British (bulky) megaton warheads. The British warheads would be too big to use in a tactical situation but the Valiants could be recalled to national orders . And OTL during the crisis many were bombed up and on QRA under Bomber Command control despite the warheads being required to be held by US personnel. (Normally only 1 Valiant per squadron was on QRA and that was held in a secure compound and only released after the US guards had orders confirming its use from SACEUR.) Sounds like the UK went slightly rogue or Kennedy gave in to MacMillan's pleas in the end. Either way, maybe a Valiant is more likely to be used.
The targets hit by Bomber Command look to be the SIOP list, suggesting the attack ordered by MacMillan was co-ordinated with President Kennedy. So some V-bombers should hit Soviet Air Defence assets - radar stations and airfields. IF they got off the ground but it's probable with this level of tension most, would.
Sadly, I think the UK will be much more damaged by the Soviet nuclear strikes than you imply in the first set of posts. In 1967 the UK thought that Lomdon would be targeted by 10 missiles or bombers and other major cities by 4-5. There were also 65-70 military targets, many near cities or towns. Whether the Corsham facility was targeted is unknown but it's possible. The Soviets knew of its location later in the Cold War so might in 1962 - it wouldn't have stood up to a nearby missile hit with a warhead. HM the Queen would have been evacuated elsewhere - the Hebridean island of Benbecuela is sometimes stated as her intended refuge. Other members of the Royal Family would be dispersed to isolated areas to maintain a line of succession. But there might not be much to reign over.
Would Ireland be relatively unscathed? There's a few probable Soviet targets in Northern ireland and they might target infrastructure that the US could use post-war. Ports, especially Cobh harbour and airfields. But in 1962 the Soviets may have better uses for their limited supply of missiles and bombers so I'm glad you ruled otherwise. At least some of my family would survive although as my parents and I were in suburban London our odds don't look good.
@Onkel Willie - I look forward to reading about the recovery phase in due corse. Please keep up the good work
Working on it.
I'm not aware of any existing timelines beyond general discussion threads though. The trend I keep seeing in 'Cuba goes hot' threads is that there seems to be a great need to ensure Soviet weapons maximize their effectiveness, perhaps out of a need to 'balance the scales' when everything east of Berlin is guaranteed to have a very unpleasant afternoon, even when accounting for duds and misfires. An American preemptive attack, done without tipping off the Soviets more than six hours ahead of time, would be embarrassingly one-sided.
Great post about Britain's role and stance during the crisis by the way, I hope someone will be able to dig up an equivalent for the French.