The Forge of Weyland

Because that will take a week, and if I don't post for a week certain people here will start writing about food...
You will also get various tangents on the RAF and their officer corps, the Royal Navy as well as an argument over Carriers and battleships followed by a long ranging discussion about food and a nice cup of tea.
 
Well bombing is useless if there isnt a army to back it up and that was the main issue with both the americans and brits bomber commands since they basicly read on book by a italian of all people and got convinced about bombing from that asfar i can tell.

Hell why the hell didnt the british just apply their own reaction to bombing when considering what their own bombing would do to the germans . Honestly in 40/41/42 heavy bombers are almost better used in coastal command to escort convoys to be honest and thats why everyone gives the stirlings that the brits built for example to coastal command for example in their timelines. Bombers really start to be effective from 1943 to be honest and maybe in 1944 even . And they cost horrific amounts of money . Hell i think it is like 2 squadrons equals a freaking battleship money wise i think ? If you canceled like 10 squadrons and built some audacious class or even malta class carriers the history of the british empire post war could be rather diffrent. very easily.
 
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Driftless

Donor
Write the shorter segments first? Does that give context for the more involved actions? When there are so many events in motion (in several directions)
 
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Hmm, it looks like I mislabelled the last post, that stuff was really the 15th May.
Now for the 16th...

First up some things that set up the Dakka parts :D
 
I am re-reading the "Case Red" book.

One of the things that I found interesting is that the 3rd DLM that gave a good account of itself in Hannut was created only in February 1940. Apparently,
Général de corps d’armée Pierre La Font who was previously in charge of the cavalry school was excellent in training, as he prepared a combat ready division in 3 months. This is a great achievement at the very least on par with the training Monty enforced. If such an officer was exposed to the 7th Army anglo-french training sessions, I believe he would have the capacity and intellect to improve his own division's training.

The Billotte Army Group had also 9 indepedent tank battalions (BCC). The 7th Army that is of particular interest to us had 2 R-35 BCCs. 1st Army had 2 R-35 and 2 H-35 BCCs. 9th Army had 2 R-35 and 1 FT-17 BCCs.

You can see the list of BCCs per army in wikipedia:https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Renault_R35

Now we all know that the R-35 is a crappy tank. But it is still better than having no tanks at all to attach to an infantry division and could handle a Panzer I.

We also know that the 9th Panzer is coming down from the north. As far as reserves go, it is a not a very strong one with 32 Panzer IV, 58 Panzer III, 123 Panzer II and 44 Panzer Is in its OOB in May 10th. Now that they have crossed hundred of kilometers rushing from the german border to Hollands Diep and then back across the country to the belgian border, they must have suffered a substantial number of breakdowns.

By the time it arrives, the Belgians are dug in around Antwerp in the pre-ww1 forts and have hundreds of 47mm guns, bunkers, antitank ditches filled with water, canals and flooded areas. http://www.niehorster.org/021_belgium/forts/image006.jpeg

A question for @Astrodragon: we were told about the battle of the Netherlands, but not what were the plans or actions for South Beveland that controlled the approaches for Antwerp.
 

Deleted member 94680

Honestly in 40/41/42 heavy bombers are almost better used in coastal command to escort convoys to be honest and thats why everyone gives the stirlings that the brits built for example to coastal command for example in their timelines. Bombers really start to be effective from 1943 to be honest and maybe in 1944 even .
The bombers won’t be effective in ‘43 if they don’t gain the experience (and learn from the serious mistakes) of 40/41/42. Bomber Command didn’t spring into being fully effective in ‘43 without building up to it before that.
And they cost horrific amounts of money . Hell i think it is like 2 squadrons equals a freaking battleship money wise i think ? If you canceled like 10 squadrons and built some audacious class or even malta class carriers the history of the british empire post war could be rather diffrent. very easily.
Germany spent far more on fighter construction and bomber defence than tanks. The Malta or Audacious requires a degree of foresight no one would have OTL.
 
Now the author has informed us in detail on the production rate of the british tank industry. I think the Allies produce at least twice as much as Germans or possibly thrice as much. The maximum production of Panzer III was at 65 during May. Until then the average monthly production was 40. From September 1939 to June 1940 the total production of Panzer IV were 169.

Instead, the french production in late May rose to 90 tanks of all types and 20 armoured cars per week and was increasing. Gamelin was planning to turn the 5 DLCs to DLMs. I think even with serious attrition, the French could enter the 1941 campaigning season with 4 beefed-up DCRs and 8 DLMs.

By the way, what were the panzer casualties during the May 10th-15th period?
 
Hmm, it looks like I mislabelled the last post, that stuff was really the 15th May.
Now for the 16th...

First up some things that set up the Dakka parts :D
Could you draft out tbe battles day by day first? And then consider what effect the outcomes of each would have on the senior commanders when they are informed (which might not be for 24 to 48 hours for the French and British.) Then decide on their reaction before proceeding with subsequent developments.
 

Driftless

Donor
Could you draft out tbe battles day by day first? And then consider what effect the outcomes of each would have on the senior commanders when they are informed (which might not be for 24 to 48 hours for the French and British.) Then decide on their reaction before proceeding with subsequent developments.
good point about the relative slowness of information being shared and reacted to. We are all so accustomed to instant knowledge preceding instant action - even when that's the worst reaction.
 
What I'm going to do is do the battles roughly in order (obviously a lot of stuff is going on at the same time), then at the end do a summary showing what happened where and to whom.
The biggest issue with communication speed is Gamelin, who is no tending to be ignored as simply being out of touch. The local situations tend to be better, there the biggest problem is not knowing exactly where their formations are! It not what you'd call working well, but while things are cracking it hasnt all broken wide open - yet.
 
15-16 May 2
15th May 1940, Sedan

The French 3rd DCR had been intended to attack on the previous day, but the chaos on the roads had left it unable to concentrate in time. Instead the infantry formations were left to defend Bulson, which they did with ferocity. The ground changed hands a number of times during the day, but by the evening the French still held the area; although many of their units were exhausted, the German infantry were not in much better shape. Worst for the Germans was the fact that the French had finally managed, despite interference from the Luftwaffe, to bring up some of their 155mm guns, which could now range on the bridges at Sedan. While only limited damage was done that evening, it was obvious that if the crossing and Sedan was to be held, the French would have to be eliminated, or at least pushed back far enough to be out of artillery range. Accordingly a maximum effort would be made the next morning, using 10th Panzer to crack the French defence.

The French were also intending to attack on the 16th. General Georges was intending to split 3rd DCR, sending half of it north to Wadelingcourt near Sedan. However this was countermanded by General Billotte, who reasoned that holding Bulson, and so allowing the artillery to do the job, was more sensible that hoping that part of the 3 DCR could drive through what was obvious a powerful German defensive line. Instead 3rd DCR would press forward with the infantry and push back the German defence towards Sedan.

On the evening of the 15th, General Huntzinger countermanded the attack, instead deciding to use the division to dig in and help hold his line. General Flavigny strongly opposed this idea - it would negate the bravery shown by the French Infantry, and cede the initiative to the Germans, while doing little to recover Sedan or its bridges. Huntzinger was insistent, suggesting Flavigny do as ordered or he would be relieved. Fortunately for General Flavingy, General Billotte had for a while been unhappy with Hunzinger's lack of speed or enthusiasm for driving the Germans back. His Chief of Staff had flown to Huntzinger's HQ on the 14th, and when he heard of this, a phone conversation with Billotte led to Huntzinger being relieved of his command, and General Flavingy placed in charge. The armoured attack would go in as planned.



By midday on the 15th the road for Guderian’s 1st and 2nd Panzer Divisions was wide open despite the heroic efforts of the French Chanoine Group, a battalion of the 152nd Infantry Regiment, the 3rd Spahis and the 53rd Division, all of which had fought tenaciously but which were now to all intents and purposes annihilated. The German tanks were now nosing their way into a twenty-mile stretch of rolling hill country, beyond which lay the broad valleys of the Aisne and Oise. They attacked Chagny in the hills, heroically defended by the 8th Chasseurs and Chanoine’s Cavalry, while further to the north the 3rd Spahis under Colonel Marc battled until nightfall against hopeless odds against the onslaughts of 1st Panzer.

By 1800 the French could fight no more, the panzers rolling into the ruined streets of Chagny The Germans had a stiff fight on their hands at Bouvellemont, where the advance of Guderian’s armour was resisted by the 152nd Infantry Regiment assisted by General Touchon’s training battalions. The French retreated from the blazing village during the early hours of the morning, and the panzers raced after them, bypassing French machine-gun nests which were still firing at dawn. Further to the north the 53rd Division’s 208th Infantry Regiment, the 1st Battalion of the 152nd and troops from a few other scattered units were being pushed back relentlessly by the 2nd Panzer Division. By dawn on 16 May, the whole Vence Valley had been occupied by the Germans and what was left of Touchon’s forces were falling back south-westwards towards the River Aisne.

However while the speed of advance of the two panzer divisions, despite the fierce resistance, was impressive, it also had consequences. 1st and 2nd Panzer had broken through, but were not yet in a position to destabilise the French rear, and in doing so had completely outdistanced their infantry support, still slogging along the French roads on foot. They were also low on fuel and ammunition, though Guderian thought that was a problem that would soon be solved by further French collapses.



16th May 1940

Holland.


The failure of the Luftwaffe attack on Rotterdam has caused Hitler to go into a rage at their defiance. With Goering's eager agreement, he orders that the air attacks will continue "until all of Holland is as flat as its polders". This causes consternation among the Army staff, who have quickly realised that if the Luftwaffe is busy bombing Holland, then they wont be supporting the Army. Worse than the missing He111 bombers is the need for them to be accompanied by fighters, meaning less interference with the Allies in the air, and less available cover for their own aircraft. However any attempt to try and argue this point with Hitler leads to more violent outbursts, so they decide they will just have to live with it. Hopefully Holland will surrender after a few days of air bombardment.

Belgium

Given that there looks like no sensible use for panzers in Holland right now, 9th Panzer has moved to Antwerp. It had originally been hoped that the city would have fallen in the first few days, but the fact that 16 Corps hadn't tried to advance past the city, instead settling in around it to bolster the Belgian defence, had meant it would now have to be taken, The big problem was that the four infantry divisions of 18th Army were now sitting looking across inundations at the Dutch, and in case the Dutch tried anything, they needed to remain there.

Accordingly XXVII Corps of 6th Army had been tasked with the job, and while the Belgian troops weren't highly rated, 9th Panzer would be a welcome addition. Of course this meant that no serious attacks would be able to be made against the Allied Dyle line, but at the moment it seemed they were willing to sit behind the river line and continue to dig in. The attacks in the Sedan area were going well, and the longer the Allied troops stayed put, the easier it would be for the Sickle Cut to isolate them. If Antwerp could be taken, it would help, as it would make it more difficult to retreat to the Belgian coast. The attack was planned to start on the 17th, by which point it was hoped the crumbling French defences further south would be severely distracting the Allies High Command.

In the meantime, light spoiling attacks along the Dyle line would continue, in order to dissuade any withdrawal of troops to use further south. 3rd and 4th Panzer were being held to exploit any breakthroughs which did happen, but the next major attack would be after Antwerp.

France

While the battle on the ground was obviously reaching a critical point, the night of 15th/16th Mayis chiefly memorable in Air Force history as the first on which the Royal Air Force attacked German industrial objectives in the Ruhr. Until then the heavy bombers were held back from such targets in Germany by the British Government, partly to conform with French policy but also because they were themselves determined not to risk the infliction of civilian casualties so long as German observed similar restraint. The ruthless bombing of Rotterdam on May the 14th showed, however, that no regard for humanitarian principle influenced German policy. Their action was dictated solely by military convenience, and so even though civilian casualties might result, it was calculated that a British attack on vital objectives in the Ruhr would provoke the enemy to transfer some of his attention to this country and so weaken his attack on France and Belgium.

On this first night seventy-eight heavy bombers were directed from England against oil targets, nine against blast furnaces and steel works, and nine against railway marshalling yards; all were given as secondary objectives self-illuminating target such as coke ovens and blast furnaces and, as a last resort, marshalling yards. Sixteen failed to locate any targets and brought their bombs home again; only twenty-four found oil plants, some of which were reported to have been left burning fiercely. The remainder had to be content with marshalling yards. But all returned safely, although it wasn't realised at the Air Ministry how useless the effect of the bombing had actually been.
 
Update! Awsome looks like the Germans are hitting fierce resistance all over.
this first night seventy-eight heavy bombers were directed from England against oil targets, nine against blast furnaces and steel works, and nine against railway marshalling yards; all were given as secondary objectives self-illuminating target such as coke ovens and blast furnaces and, as a last resort, marshalling yards. Sixteen failed to locate any targets and brought their bombs home again; only twenty-four found oil plants, some of which were reported to have been left burning fiercely. The remainder had to be content with marshalling yards. But all returned safely, although it wasn't realised at the Air Ministry how useless the effect of the bombing had actually been.
Well in general terms when it gets out how poorly area bombing like this does the Army, Navy and Fighter Command will be pissed to say the least.
 

Driftless

Donor
His Chief of Staff had flown to Huntzinger's HQ on the 14th, and when he heard of this, a phone conversation with Billotte led to Huntzinger being relieved of his command, and General Flavingy placed in charge. The armoured attack would go in as planned.
Big change - logical change that absolutely should have happened.

This causes consternation among the Army staff, who have quickly realised that if the Luftwaffe is busy bombing Holland, then they wont be supporting the Army. Worse than the missing He111 bombers is the need for them to be accompanied by fighters, meaning less interference with the Allies in the air, and less available cover for their own aircraft.

Less Luftwaffe fighters over France, even for a day or three should provide considerable help to the RAF and AdA against the western attacks
 
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