The Forge of Weyland

nbcman

Donor
This may have been answered earlier, but if so I can't find it. What is the order of battle of the British 1st Armoured Division? By that I mean, what regiments are in it?

For contrast, here's the 1st Armoured Division of OTL:
The OP answered what were the units in 1AD in post 2986:
6 tank regiments; 2 armoured brigades and the attached infantry tanks, plus assorted kit
 
Meanwhile, in Italy, Mussolini will be preparing to make a bold, daring, stroke to save the Germans.
Whether that bold daring stroke will be diplomatic, and an offer to mediate in peace negotiations (and maybe Austria wants to join the New Roman Empire, instead of hanging out with Berlin any longer?), or a full-blown (by Italian standards) military onslaught into formerly Italian regions which Mussolini wants back, remains to be seen, and will presumably depend on what conflicting news reports coming from Northern France seem to be saying.
 
In OTL Italy didn't declare war until the 10th June, which is a ways ahead yet.
Though I'm sure the Italian General Staff is watching the battles very closely
 
held a 20km front and retreated only after their flank was turned.
And this is the key statement. Once the French are able to establish some form of position they are very very hard to break through - thats not what a Pz div is designed to do it has to go around.

Time is of the essence . Given 2-3 hours a first rate army of the period and the French are first rate can establish a hasty defence position, site the plentiful AT and automatic weapons and lay the wires for the Arty. How much arty you can call is a function of time in position - more tine more cross connections. But there is a minimum to survey the firing position and lay wire to the Bty FOO who can only see what he can see from his position. Soviet artillery was rendered ineffective quite often because their perfectly capable observers pressed too far forward and either had the wire cut or were killed

Which also applies to the Germans so once they arrive at the start point the arty needs a couple of hours to set up or you don't use arty. Both French and German are largely dependent on phone lines french probably less so.

While the Panzer may indeed be able to advance albeit deaf and mostly blind into concealed AT positions where they will be able to blunder around or even forward as long as their fuel holds out. The Infantry, Engineers, Signals, Supply column, and artillery have no armour and no means of advancing against the unsuppressed machine gun or across the beaten zone until something has dealt with the MG or the Observer. And with out the Infantry the tanks have a very hard time clearing the enemy on their own.
 

Asian Jumbo

Monthly Donor
Sorry it's taken me so long but I finally found a map that summarises the battle so far...

Screenshot 2021-03-05 at 12.02.58.png


(I'll get my apron...)
 
Time is of the essence . Given 2-3 hours a first rate army of the period and the French are first rate can establish a hasty defence position, site the plentiful AT and automatic weapons and lay the wires for the Arty. How much arty you can call is a function of time in position - more tine more cross connections. But there is a minimum to survey the firing position and lay wire to the Bty FOO who can only see what he can see from his position. Soviet artillery was rendered ineffective quite often because their perfectly capable observers pressed too far forward and either had the wire cut or were killed
Exactly!

It is also worth mentioning that the 2nd (18th, 21st Corps and other reinforcements), 6th and 7th Armies had a lot of Active Divisions. These would have a full antitank complement and would have had priority over the newest field guns. Being well trained and having fit young men they can establish a defence position faster than the Series B divisions or the 2nd rate german ones.

There is also the matter of a decisive leadership, in acting quickly and giving orders with clarity. The 2nd (after Flavigny took over), 7th and 6th Army leadership is incredibly better than Hutzinger and Corap. Not to mention that all of the army-level leaders have experience with tanks (Giraud, Touchon, Flavigny).

As mentioned, dug in infantry is a capable opponent. I think the same goes for a DCR that is difficult to turn its flank in a well-established front. In the Battle of Stonne, most of captain Billotte's tanks were destroyed by ... 105mm guns.

By the way, the french 25mm antitank gun that has such a poor reputation was able to destroy not just Pz Is as mentioned before in the thread, but Pz IVs as well. I quote from "Case Red: the collapse of France" (battle of Stonne)

In the village, a battalion from the 3e DI had deployed a single 25mm anti-tank gun manned by a veteran sergeant to cover the road and he promptly knocked out the first three Pz IV tanks as they approached.

The 55th and 71st divisions that had such a poor performance in Sedan, didn't have full complements of antitank guns and their crews had barely any training. This is not the case with the Active and Series A divisions that Guderian faces now.

Edit: the 7th Army had also 90 R-35s in two BCCs. The 2nd Army had an intact 3e BCC with 45 R-35s and the remains of 2 more BCCs with FCM-36s. The 6th Army had been assigned 17e and 23e BCCs with another 90 R-35s but I have no idea when they arrived.
 
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There is one problem (yes, I will be addressing it) in that not many of the French infantry are used to/trained to work with tanks.
It causes the sorts of issues the panzers were good at exploiting.
7th Army is unusual in that its spent the winter training a mixed force of armour and infantry, but they are the exception not the rule.
 
I still want the British to re-enact the charge of the Rohirrim in the battle of the Pelennor Fields against the beastly Hun
The cavalry re-enacted the charge of the Rohirrim oftern enough in the desert. The problem is that in Pelennor Fields the orcs didn't have 88s.
 
There is one problem (yes, I will be addressing it) in that not many of the French infantry are used to/trained to work with tanks.
It causes the sorts of issues the panzers were good at exploiting.
7th Army is unusual in that its spent the winter training a mixed force of armour and infantry, but they are the exception not the rule.

While its a factor less than you may think, and applies even more so to German infantry btw. The French have the largest tank force in the word through to the early 30s and a larger one than the Germans thereafter. The normal complaint is they used them badly - by parcelling them out to the ID.

So while there is an issue of panic in places this is largely because the troops are in position to defend themslves. They are caught on the march with no artillery support which their training tells them they need and they are being expected to attack with hastily formed units they have never exercised with thats an issue but its an issue for every army that tries to do it- classic being Herman Georing Division led by very experiences and capable officers with a lot of first rate troop and junior leaders disintegrates during its approach march in Sicily , But the French do not have to attack they just have to beat off the German attack. Touchon has an army forming on their flank and by now most of the panzer force has been identified and folk can start thinking whether the extreme left is the best place to have Premier Armee Anglais Mechanisee et Choc
 
There is one problem (yes, I will be addressing it) in that not many of the French infantry are used to/trained to work with tanks.
I think it depends. Certainly the vast majority of the french infantry had the same experience in working with tanks as the majority of the other major powers' infantry. A part of the french infantry had greater experience in working with tanks than the Germans.

In OTL interwar, Petain was complaining that the infantry relied too much on tanks. The standard doctrine was the methodical advance of infantry, artillery and tanks. When the French Army had money for large training exercises, the combination of infantry, artillery and tanks was always part of the exercise.

Infantry had developed reliance upon intimate support tanks by 1918 to the extent that, even in training exercises in the 1930s, infantry attacks would peter out as soon as tank (or artillery) support faltered. French doctrine stressed the importance of light infantry tanks, for intimate support, and a heavy tank to rupture enemy defences.
Source: Colonel R. J. M. Porter British Army (2003) Higher command and staff course staff ride paper: As the experience of the French and German armies in 1940 demonstrates,doctrine not equipment is the key to success in modern warfare. Discuss, Defence Studies, 3:1,136-147, DOI: 10.1080/14702430308405055

The main french problem during the interwar was the use of an independent armoured formation outside of the methodical battle concept. DLMs and their use were the problem, not infantry working with tanks or defending against tanks.

The Active and Series A Division infantry knows how to defend against tanks and how to work with independent tank battalions (BCCs).
 
I just want to know what the French press knows, what they're allowed to say and what the French public feels about that regarding their High Command.
 
17 May West of Meuse 2
17th May, Battle West of the Meuse. (part 2), IV Corps

The first actions of that day were by the Luftwaffe. With no diversion of aircraft to Holland, they were putting in a maximum effort over what was now being seen by the German High Command as the critical battlefield. Their reconnaissance planes had located three main areas of concern; the presence of 1DCR and supporting infantry north of Flavion, which could push them back to the Meuse at Dinant, the presence of 1st Armoured near Beaumont, which could move either east or south, and the concentration of infantry and armour blocking the path of the forward panzer divisions in the area surrounding Liart. Ideally they would have preferred to concentrate on one of these, but the Army considered all of them critical, and so the effort had to be divided between them.

The men of 5th Division were as well dug-in as possible; the threat of air attack was obvious, and their soft-skinned support was where possible camouflaged and hidden, any moving this day would be by tank or carrier, which were far less vulnerable to air attack. That didn't stop the Luftwaffe; their fighters had cleared the way for the bombers, and at 0900 a heavy air attack was made on the right wing of 5th Division and the tanks in reserve behind it.

The first wave of attackers was high level bombers, and while they sent everyone diving for cover, and there were casualties, the overall damage was light. One tank was unluckily hit and destroyed, but the amount of disruption was relatively small. One aircraft was shot down by the divisions 40mm AA guns, to loud cheers from the men in their foxholes. It would take a short while to straighten everything out again and get the casualties to the rear, the men had heard about the air attacks on the French some days ago, and had taken digging in seriously.

The second attack was more directed. This time the Stukas were after the concentration of armour and a couple of 5th Divisions artillery batteries they'd spotted, the obvious aim being to disrupt the defence. This was the first time 1st Armoured had attracted their attention, and it was the first time the Stukas had encountered the divisions organic 20mm AA guns. The attacks were precise, and a number of carriers and tanks were damaged by near-misses. The infantry had stayed in their carriers, reckoning they were safer under the armour than out in the open. There were casualties due to splinters, and a couple of carriers had been turned over by blast, but these were considered minor. One tank would need digging out, a bomb had burst close enough, showering it with earth, but its thick armour had protected it from the blast. For their part, the Stukas suffered from the heavy return fire, the hammering chatter of the twin 20mm boosting the morale of the men in cover. Being able to hit back at the dive bombers made a bit difference. The Stuka attack wasn't without loss; three of the planes were shot down, and at least one more seen to be trailing smoke as it headed back east. It was a good first outing for the AA guns. 5th Division would have to re-lay some of the wires to their guns, which had been broken by the bombing attack.



Rommel had been waiting for the air attack; as soon as it started, his tanks were heading forward. He expected to be able to use the disruption the bombing would cause to let him close up before the British realised what was happening. With the information he had on what was in front of him, his initial attack was in two places. First, he would test how strong the infantry defence was, and the second was to circle around to the west and take the infantry in the flank or rear. This type of tactic had worked well against French units, who's infantry didn't deal well with being attacked in the rear by tanks. He knew there was British armour behind the infantry units, and expected either one or both of his attacks to draw this out; if it attacked his front, his tanks would fall back and draw them onto his anti-tank screed, if the western attack he would use his superior mobility and tactics to roll the attacking tanks up.

The attack started off well enough. As expected, the bombing had disrupted the defenders, although they seemed to recover faster than anticipated. What was more worrying was the stubborn defence being put up by the men in front of 7th Panzer. They seemed rather well equipped with anti-tank guns, and these were effectively hidden and dug in. The divisional artillery had to be used to help dig them out, and setting up and engaging each target ate up time.

To the flanks, the initial advance of the lighter tanks started off well. The advance was led by a mix of Pz II and Pz (38)t tanks, the heavier Pz IV being held back for the moment in case they were needed to help deal with the infantry. The problems started once they decided they had got mostly around the flank of the defence, and headed inwards. 5th Division was one of the pre-war divisions, and in addition to the usual training on how to work with and deal with tanks, they had spent the winter doing this, most of it playing the defence against the tank units. The RTR units in particular were fond of trying to find a flank or weak spot to attack, so the panzers weren't doing anything unexpected to them.

Their flank units made initial attacks on Rommel's panzers, destroying a number of the tanks, then fell back onto their own AT guns. As expected the panzers followed up, and the Royal Artillery's HV3pdr guns took out another seven tanks. The response of the panzers was to call in artillery barrage, which made the gunners keep their heads well down. This did suppress the AT firs (it's difficult to aim your gun at a panzer when your deep in a foxhole). It did nothing to stop the tanks of 4RTR, who'd been placed and waiting for this sort or moment. They advanced behind the infantry they were supporting, and once the artillery barrage ceased and the panzers moved forward, they started to engage them.

For a few minutes the panzer commanders were unworried. They'd known there was armour in reserve, and now that they had drawn it out, the expected to be able to outmanoeuvre the defenders and kill them by flank and rear attacks. What they hadn't expected was the surprising competence of the British tanks in manoeuvre. Unlike the bulk of the French tanks they'd fought so far, the British tanks all had radios and were well-practised in using them. This in itself wasn't critical, what was a major problem was the inability of the panzers to penetrate the tanks armour.

The shells of the Pz II 20mm simply bounced off the British tanks, even at close range. One of the panzers managed to use a PzGr40 APCR round to kill a Sabre tank with a shot into the side armour, but was promptly killed by one of the tanks companions. The Germans were very short of this round - to get its penetration it used a tungsten core, and this metal was in very short supply in Germany.

The Pz (38)t was in a bit better position. While its 37mm gun still couldn't kill a Sabre from the front, it could get through the side or rear armour under about 600 yards. If, of course, it could get that close. The HV3pdr gun of the Sabre could kill a Pz (38)t at over 1,200 yards (the range at which the British tanks started to assume they could get a decent chance of a hit), and they didn't have to worry about trying to get behind them. In 15 minutes half the German tank force was no longer in action, the tanks and infantry between them having killed around 35 tanks. The German commander did have six Pz IV as his reserve; they had been intended to deal with any awkward infantry if his artillery was busy elsewhere, but they fared little better. They did kill or disable three Sabres, but they were priority targets, and the tanks (and a few enterprising At gunners) had soon eliminated them.

As the infantry brigade was still in good shape, the 4th RTR moved through their position, intending on finishing the destruction of the enemy column, which was falling back fast onto the rest of 7th Panzer, while radioing back urgently for an anti-tank gun line to be formed. The infantry accompanying the panzers were glad of their half-tracks; they had been going to take out the British infantry once the tanks had disrupted their defence, but the tanks had never managed to achieve that, and they were racing back to the cover of their guns while their panzers tried their best in a delaying action.



While this was happening, the frontal attack on 5th Division had been making more progress. This attack had been given priority for artillery support, as well as most of the remaining Pz IV tanks. Initially the anti-tank guns took a toll of the lighter panzers, but again the German artillery forced the gunners into cover. Once this was achieved, the panzergrenadiers advanced with their tanks, intending on suppressing the British infantry and leave them an easy target for the panzers. This time the planned defence was a bit different. The infantry gave way in the centre, allowing the Cutlass infantry tanks which had been waiting behind them to drive forward. Not the easiest of manoeuvres to manage in the middle of a battle, but one the men had trained in over the cold winter. This was the first time the Panzers had encountered the Cutlass tank, and it wasn't a pleasant encounter for them.

Because the 6/18pdr gun the tanks mounted was only intended to have a limited AT role, they were operating in groups of four. One tank in each unit mounting a HV3pdr. There had been much discussion of what mix was best, and in the end the ration had actually been fixed due to the 6/18pdr production line having a shortfall in output. The 3pdr tanks concentrated on the tanks, while the close support versions started to drop HE among the German infantry. The armour on the Cutlass was noticeably thicker than on a Sabre, and none of the tank guns, or the infantry 37mm guns, were useful. One Cutlass was severely damaged by one of the Pz IV's, whose 75mm shell damaged the turret ring, but the only other casualties were a few tanks with damage tracks or suspensions. The HV3pdr had no difficulty with the German tanks, and the 6/18 pdrs did have a few AT rounds; most of the tank gunners used the opportunity to try out at least one, and while the lower velocity made getting a hit more difficult, the result when one hit a panzer was rather effetcive.

Seeing the chaos they were causing, the tanks rolled forward, followed by their attached infantry carriers. Seeing his tanks falling back over a battlefield littered with burning panzers, Rommel tried his best to rally his men. He frantically formed a gun-line of his 88mm AT guns and some of his artillery, protected by as many men as he could find. He also lined up the 37mm guns, instructing the med to fire at the tanks tracks, hoping for a mobility kill on track or suspension, which would leave the tank immobile for the larger weapons. Rommel had also appealed to his Luftwaffe liaison for air support, telling him that otherwise his division might be destroyed, but the planes were currently being used to support an attack on 2DCR, and nothing would be available for an hour.

The first Cutlass tanks that encountered the line of guns quickly realised that the Germans did actually have a gun that could hurt them. They'd been quite happy having 37mm rounds bounce off them (although the experience was a bit nerve-wracking), but the 88mm guns quickly brewed-up two of the leading tanks, and disabled a third. While they hadn't been expecting anything quite so dangerous, meeting AT guns was something the CS tanks had been trained for. They quickly fired off smoke shells, retiring behind the smoke for any decent cover, while the SP guns were brought into play.

The presence of the mobile artillery was a surprise. The 25pdr guns spotted earlier had been well back, as expected, but these were the guns of 5th Division. The SP Birch guns had been mistaken for tanks, and were further forward than anticipated. In ten minutes, the guns were lobbing 25pd shells onto the German anti-tank line, with grisly consequences. The guns almost vanished as the enthusiastic gunners laid down a barrage on them. While they did, the Cutlass tanks moved forward, and as soon as the artillery stonk ended, charged forward. This time it was 18pd HE rounds landing on the remaining guns, and the gunners and infantry broke, streaming back into any sort of cover from the advancing tanks.

By the time the British tanks had broken the gun-line, 7th Panzer was in full flight. The inability of even the 88mm guns to stop the British tanks had induced what would later be termed 'tank panic' in the men, and the remaining tanks and half-tracks were streaming south. Quite a few of these were destroyed by the British tanks before a halt was called, and they started to round up the remaining troops that hadn't managed an escape. The most difficult task was to find who to surrender to - the Division's commander had been killed in the attack on the guns, and finally it was the fourth in command who surrendered to General Lindsay.
 
Hmm you can send the tank divison or atleast parts of it south to help the french against the 4 panzer divisons . My thought is that they break trough somewhere and evacuate eventually through there behind the meuse is my thought when they acheive partial success ? And the brits armored divison saves the french is my thought here ?
 
Hmm you can send the tank divison or atleast parts of it south to help the french against the 4 panzer divisons . My thought is that they break trough somewhere and evacuate eventually through there behind the meuse is my thought when they acheive partial success ? And the brits armored divison saves the french is my thought here ?
Well, its now early afternoon and they have to regroup (and deal with those pesky POW's!), but they will be heading out again soon
 
So Rommel is dead, very big.
It seemed logical. He mustered the heavy AT gun line at OTL Arras, it seemed a reasonable thing for him to do again (again, heavy tanks heading in with the 37mm useless). This time though he's facing a division with CS tanks, artillery and a practiced plan for dealing with such things.
Artillery is no respecter of Generals
 
It seemed logical. He mustered the heavy AT gun line at OTL Arras, it seemed a reasonable thing for him to do again (again, heavy tanks heading in with the 37mm useless). This time though he's facing a division with CS tanks, artillery and a practiced plan for dealing with such things.
Artillery is no respecter of Generals
That does indeed seem logical to me as well. Rommel took a lot - and I mean a lot - of risks. His luck had to run out at some point.
 
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