Hello to all, today we will have another insight over other two countries - Yemen and Spain. This time, for main plot reasons, Sorairo gave a strong input in this chapter. Enjoy!
‘The Dream of a New Saba: a History of Yemen’ by Ibrahim Marsam
Since the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, the south-western Arabian state of Yemen was ruled by the charismatic Yahya Muhammad Hamid ed-Din, Imam and self proclaimed King of the country. Yahya managed to make Yemen a stable state, keeping it independent, with a certain degree of achieved centralized government through nepotism (the local governors were sons or strict relatives) and a standing army. However, unfriendly countries surrounded him: the Saudi in the north, and the British in the south. With Saudi Arabia, there was for years a border war that ended in 1934, but despite the treaty, distrust between the two nations remained. The British held the important coastal city of Aden, and the region of Hadramaut, therefore the entire South Yemen - territories the Imam considered Yemeni lands and aspired to unite into his realm in name of a “Greater Yemen”. However, he was also well aware fighting the British Empire would have been suicide, so he had to wait for better times.
Diplomatic negotiations with Britain weren’t a plausible course. Yahya Muhammad was quite conservative and decisively autocratic, so he periodically expelled liberal and democratic opponents that normally gathered in Aden. Those groups of opposition tried without avail to promote an underground resistance against the Imam, with the British closing an eye, believing removing Yahya Muhammad would have been more congenial to their interests. The Imam wasn’t totally hostile to certain forms of modernization – in the late 30’s and early 40’s he started to send students and officers to be trained and educated in Lebanon and in Iraq. But Yemen remained a quite backward nation.
In the meanwhile, Yahya Muhammad proceeded to establish more friendly relations with Italy, as the oldest Italian colony, Eritrea, was on the opposite side of the Red Sea. Both being dictatorships, both wary of the British rule in the Red Sea, they both found some initial ground of cooperation and trade agreement, and slowly and gradually their relations will improve. Aside from some issues, like quarrels between Eritrean and Yemeni fishermen in the Red Sea and the status of some islands in the Red Sea, Italy, through the AOI, was Yemen’s best ally in the region. And Yahya Muhammad would never forget that Mussolini was the first to acknowledge his rank of King.
But at the time Yahya Muhammad didn’t commit for a full alliance with Italy, both Rome and Sana’a knowing it would have offended the British. So the Imam kept Yemen neutral and continued to strengthen it internally. The World War, however would change gradually his perspective. The creation of the Roman Alliance, as the rise of third block of authoritarian nations was very appealing to the Yemeni, as despite initially being a Mediterranean focused alliance, the Italians were favourable to search new allies. But drifting the Kingdom towards decisive Pro-Italian positions would have compromised relations with London. Besides, the presence of Turkey in the alliance was a not secondary matter.
Effectively the partition of Greece was perceived as a first alarm bell in the Arab nations. A Turkey that was in a new conquering mind-set wasn’t to be underestimated. The countries of the Middle East knew from the mouths of the Anglo-French that they would be effectively left to themselves following the War. The creation of the Arab League, of which Yemen was a founding member, was also an attempt to forge a common front against Turkey aside the intentions of shared cooperation and creating a strong block.
But the Arab League since its start failed to evolve into a true alliance. Under the surface of a proclaimed Pan Arabian unity there were divisions between its members – above all over the end of the Palestinian mandate and the creation of a Jewish nation. The Levantine nations (Egypt, Syria, Iraq) were decisively hostile. The Arabian proper monarchies, on the Anglo-American payroll, were more moderate on the matter. As for Yahya Muhammad, he kept a cautiously neutral stance. Yemen was a tolerant realm and the Jewish community respected the Imam. Tolerance towards Hebrews was besides a constant in Yemeni history, since the days of the Kingdom of Saba. With respect to Saba, the Yemeni government would take interest to use it in internal propaganda later promote the “Greater Yemen” dream, when Saba ruled over both the South and the North and also over Asir (the region being at the source of the border conflict with Saudi Arabia) and was powerful, respected and rich – the Italian historians reminding of the myth of “Arabia Felix” with Saba/Yemen was its core. Saba being a pagan realm but yet revering the only true God, with ties with the Hebrews and the Ethiopians (the myth of Menelik being added in the Yemeni propaganda to explain the growing commercial relations between Yemen and the AOI) and trading with the Romans, its tale would become really useful for the Imam’s personal dream of greatness. At the same time it would open later to Italian archaeologists in the country and Italian tourism as well, bringing benefits to Yemen in the long term.
But the Imam in 1922 prohibited, more due to external pressure than his own will, the emigration of Yemeni Jews. To solve the matter he essentially closed an eye allowing Jewish migration through Aden. After the First Arabian War, the trickle became a torrent, and by the mid-1950s, Yemen’s once thriving Jewish community was almost non-existent. Despite this, Yemen was lukewarm over the Israeli-Palestinian issue, not wanting to pass like a traitor of the Arab peoples but also not wanting to break relations with the Italians who were highly supportive of the Jewish cause. Yemen would contribute as little as possible to the Arab cause to allow it to save face. Privately, negotiations had already began with Yahya’s government and Israeli officials in the AOI to see if Yemen could become the first nation to recognise Israel. Unfortunately, it wasn’t to be.
In 1948 a rival family, the Alwaziri, also taking strength over certain internal dissatisfaction over Yemeni neutrality, staged a coup. An assassin shot and killed Imam Yahya with his eldest son in Ahmad bin Yayha, to the grief of Israel and Italy. Word of the negotiations with Israeli representatives had leaked, and it resulted in the Yemeni tribes abandoning their support of the dynasty. The assassin, known as Al-Qardaei, was from the Bani Murad tribe. In the brief skirmish that followed, Hassan Bin Yahya (the oldest surviving son of the Imam) fled to the AOI for safety. The Alwaziris then installed their own Imam Abdullah bin Ahmad al-Wazir to run the kingdom, who reversed any of the positive changes that had began under Yayha, deciding to persecute and degrade the Jewish community while condemning Italy. Italy for their part refused to recognise Abdullah as Imam and declared Hassan as the King of Yemen in exile, a claim the Roman Alliance as a whole supported. The archconservative regime hated the Sauds, hated the Italians, hated the British, hated Aflaq and hated the Jews. Yet at the same time, the ancient human sin of ambition welled within Abdullah’s heart. Aden was the apple of Eden, and the temptation led to the government to reluctantly request to join the Saudi-UAR alliance.
At first Aflaq was uninterested in Abdullah, believing Yemen a backwater that couldn’t help in the approaching struggle with Israel. Eventually, convinced by the consistency of their requests Aflaq extended the Arab alliance to include Yemen, which officially signed up on April 20th 1955. By now, the Arab Alliance included the UAR (which consisted of Egypt, Syria, Iraq, Oman and Lebanon), Saudi Arabia and Yemen, not to mention the various guerrilla organisations that swore loyalty to the Pan-Arab movement in the colonial states. While this was certainly impressive in isolation, it was still at a disadvantage against the industry of Europe. But Aflaq, experiencing extreme megalomania after having been able to prostrate so much of the Middle East with barely a shot being fired, was convinced that all the Arab people had to do was rise as one and the Europeans would flee, even at the cost of leaving the Jews to their fate. As Aflaq infamously told Nasser on Yom Kippur in 1955, “I hope the Jews are enjoying this Yom Kippur – they’ll never see another.”
‘Franco’s Dilemma: Spain in the Cold War’ by Xavier de la Vega
During World War II, the Germans tried to convince Franco to join the war exchange for Gibraltar, large swathes of French and British Africa, even Guyenne, while not being ashamed to remember the debt of gratitude he had with them in favouring the Nationalist victory. But the Caudillo was unmoved, aware Spain wasn’t ready for a global conflict, while being reassured by the Italian neutrality respected by Hitler that the Reich wouldn’t dare force anything on him or his nation. The only concrete thing he did was allowing a small division of volunteers to support the German invasion of the USSR. Like the more famous ARMVIR (ARMata Volontaria Italiana in Russia), it was decimated by the same Germans when the Reich attacked Italy.
In truth Franco wasn’t totally sold on German domination of Europe; he wanted to mend the distance created with the West during the civil war, the air bombings in particular tarnishing Nationalist Spain’s reputation. Even if the Germans did those, the Nationalists allowed it. So Spain was in the early phases of WWII isolated and still in search of investments to accelerate the reconstruction effort. The only major commercial partners at the time were Portugal and Italy, despite the first being ambivalent due to its ties with Britain, and the latter embroiled in the Balkan wars. But, after the dust of those conflict settled down, the Italians started to build their own Fascist/autocratic block with their Balkan allies, involving Spain and Portugal as well. At the time, Franco agreed because the alliance appeared balanced between its members even if Italy assumed formal leadership, it would have been a valid counterweight against Germany, would allow Spain to break in part its isolation, and in all honesty he believed Spain would have been considered the second power in importance in such block behind Italy. In that last belief, he would prove to be wrong.
The most notable effect for Spain in being involved in WWII was the end of its isolated status, Franco’s regime being internationally accepted. On the internal front, his leadership was consolidated across the Spanish people – just the imagery of the Spanish armies marching into France had a great effect in the population. But the Roman Alliance would be for Italy to take the lion’s share – of the other members, Bulgaria and Turkey would have a more relevant importance in the peace talks. Besides it disturbed Franco to see a growing unity between Mussolini and the Turkish junta, in part for ingrained cultural distrust against Turks and Muslims (and also Jews), in part for jealousy. Spain wouln’t gain more than a quote of war reparations, normalization of the joint French-Spanish rule over the small Pyrenees state of Andorra, and vague promises over Morocco.
Effectively Franco thought he could use Spanish participation and contribution in the Liberation of France to press the Free France government in getting a more favourable outcome for Spanish division of the spheres of influence in Morocco. It was an idea supported by Mussolini who wanted a new order in Tunisia as well; both the dictators, while acknowledging French rule over Algeria, wanted however Paris to relent its grip over Morocco and Tunisia, nominally protectorates, but in truth treated more like colonies. Now, De Gaulle had some contacts with the Italians during his period in London where could have considered a change of status in Tunisia; during the liberation he seemed to be favourable over this line extending to Morocco as well. But, after the conference of Kiev, the French General apparently started to back off from those negotiations. Officially he promised to discuss the status of the Maghreb when the war would be over; in truth was only gaining time to restore French authority over its overseas empire.
At Potsdam, De Gaulle’s position was ambivalent and ambiguous. As a European and member of the Allies he was outraged over Wallace’s aptitude and bargain with Stalin over the Far East and the occupation of Germany. But he wasn’t intentioned to cry foul like Mussolini and Churchill, nor either being happy over the Anglo-Italian plots in allowing Germany to recover soon as possible to act as a bulwark against the USSR. He would have preferred a much more humiliated and divided German nation. But he needed Britain and Italy’s assistance in recovering Indochina so he went mostly on their side.
De Gaulle however, by accepting the loss of the mandate in Syria and Lebanon and in principle agreeing over the creation of the Jewish nation in Palestine, believed respect to the pre-war situation France couldn’t afford to pull out from the Maghreb after being expelled from the Middle East, so in short claimed that the protectorates in Morocco and Tunisia will stand as they were before the war. He didn’t want to empower Italy further in the Mediterranean by leaving Tunisia and he wanted to get back at Franco for the show he pulled out at Lourdes, when arriving as a saviour welcomed by French partisans. France, Italy and Spain with British mediation would try without success to find a compromise; Paris would even arrive to harden its stance over French jurisdiction in the Maghreb with the excuse only the French could keep order in the region after what happened in the Middle East in the aftermath of the first Arab-Israeli war.
Therefore Franco, through Italian support, would manage to let pass a Roman Alliance statement of support of Spain in retaining its Moroccan territories regardless of the future status of Morocco, especially if handled only by France, meaning if the French one day will concede full independence to the country without involving Spain, as the RA won’t entertain official relations with such state. Italy and Turkey besides would put their vetoes in the UN over resolutions regarding Morocco in appeasement to Spain.
Meanwhile Franco had issues to adapt in the pro-Israeli and pro-Semitism position, which was dominant in the RA. It put Spain in a difficult position, giving its long and established anti-Semitic history. Franco had his own personal anti-Semitic beliefs; nowhere like Hitler, but he was ambivalent about the Jews refuged in Spain during the war nor so convinced even after the Shoah to be allowed to have their own nation. In the end Spain would stay out from the Middle Eastern affairs, to be considered an Italian and Turkish matter; he kept correct relations with Israel however, also for the benefit of Spanish pilgrims in Holy Land.
Franco soon struggled to have a second fiddle role in the Roman Alliance, wondering often what role Spain could play in a three-block way cold war. He was even unsure over the future of the Spanish constitutional asset – also helped by the wind of a monarchic revival across Europe, he restored the Spanish monarchy, claiming also the title of Regent. But he wasn’t sure who proclaim as King of Spain. Many suggested the young Juan Carlos of Bourbon, who was in exile in Rome; there was who proposed a Carlist pretender; someone even arrived to suggest a Haspburg restauration, asking one of King Otto of Hungary’s brothers to take the crown; Umberto II still tried to convince a totally uninterested Mussolini to petition Franco in proclaiming Aimone of Savoia-Aosta (to get rid of him out of the bed of his wife, the more malignant voices in Rome said).
Then an opportunity suddenly appeared. With America’s silent agreement, the Italians managed to let Argentina in the Roman Alliance, followed shortly by Cuba. Latin America, periodically sensible to authoritarian impulses, started to be more attracted by the Fascist siren, as a stable form of government, of economic progress, above all as a way to mark independence from the powerful gringos. For Franco, it was a chance to build some form of influence in the Americas, acting as a mediator and as an agent for those countries, especially in South America, where there was some dissatisfaction over the ascended status of Brazil through its UN seat; several countries feared the US had an agreement with Getulio Vargas to keep them in line through Brazilian influence.
But Spain started to look as well over the Philippines, recently declared independent by the Americans. Through the Italian base in Taiwan, and Thailand joining the RA, and Portugal having Macao, Goa and East Timor, the Far East was more accessible to Italy and its allies – the Spanish as well. Building influence in the archipelago may have been a long shot, but Franco was intrigued and wanted to try nonetheless. Furthermore, inspired by Italy’s success in colonizing Libya, Franco stepped up efforts to colonize Spanish Africa.
So it would start Spanish adventurism across the Spanish-speaking nations of the world. This would be Franco’s legacy: the loss of the Empire in the 19th century may finally start to be reverted in the second half of the 20th century. However, Spain’s new bellicose behaviour had made enemies, especially in Morocco. Sultan Mohammed V, proclaimed after the French left their portion of Morocco in 1955, had no tolerance for Spanish colonialism in Africa. Quickly, representatives of the UAR were flown in to hash out the details of an alliance. Aflaq was excited at the prospect, saying to al-Bitar in a phone call, “We’re going to light a fire from Gibraltar to the Gulf.” In less than a year, his wicked prophecy would be realised.
