The Footprint of Mussolini - TL
I’m not precisely sure if the division of labour in high command shifted towards the expert red generals in stavka here, or if it has shifted back to Stalin yet (as historical). The historical shift back happened with the collapse of AGC when having an effective and moderately efficient red army ceased being more important to Party confidence than having a single guarantor of lack of factionalism or potential bonapartism. Given the real fear of Bonapartism amongst the nomenklatura, and the real existence of, well, perhaps we should call it Robespierrism I’m not suggesting Zhukov has the balls to kill Stalin. What I am suggesting is that competence might rule red army decision making to a greater extent in part because the red army leadership is weaker and in part because Stalin is less magnificent.
But I agree the deaths in the race to Berlin won’t happen. There will be a better or at least earlier post war harvest.
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On the other hand, Stalin for the average citizen of the URSS it's the man that lead the motherland on his darkest hour (there is no way to compare the OTL and ITTL situation to see how things are now much less favorable to the URSS) and his tattic to routinely purge people before they had the possibility to create a more stable powerbase worked.
IMVHO Stalin achievment will be still considered ITTL impressive, he basically bring the URSS border more or less at the level of old Tsarist Russia. Frankly i expect:
- The Molotov Line as the official border with Poland
- Prussia divided as OTL and naturally the Baltic kept
- Finland becoming an SSR...and this can mean the start of a neutralish Nordic block formed by Denmark, Norway and Sweden to protect themselfs by aggresion from any side
- Bessarabia (as stated) but also North Bukovina and Hertza becoming part again of the URSS
- Carpathian Ruthenia also get.
- If/when Stalin enter the Pacific war he will recover Sakahlin and take the Kurili and recognized his interest on Porth Arthur and Dalian on the top to avenge the defeat in the Russo-Japanese war
- Depending on how things will develop on in China there is also the possibility that the URSS will keep as puppet or simply absorb the Second Est Trukestan Republic
Also in need to be considered the 'neutralization' of Hungary and Romania with also the right to passage and the partial demilitarization of the Turkysh border, not excluding the fact that in Czech the communist had real popular support due to the perceived western betrayal; all in all something that Stalin can put realistically as a success
Well, the war in the Pacific is far from being ended and that one may delve into '45 if the Japanese would remain defiant. Even with an earlier ending in Europe, would still take months for the Allies to direct more resources and men Eastwards to end quickly the Asian conflict. Or doesn't mean that Stalin won't attack Japan earlier if the final peace terms won't be satisfying for his aims.
Paradoxally, no or smaller Soviet Empire in Central Europe may eventually open the USSR to certain markets, if not perceived as a threat than TTL. What won't come from exploitation of half of Europe could come in terms of commercial trade... Because this is not going to be a bipolar world and neither a tripolar but a multipolar one. And likely still an eurocentric one. Naturally much would depend from how Germany will be carved out and how much the Soviets will fare in the aftermath.
Anyway, is neither impossible that the "real socialism in a single nation" line may return prioritary in the Union.. There may be room for a more sustainable internal economic development.
Dolan
Banned
How to carve Germany?
What avout just reconstituting the old Member Kingdoms of the Holy Roman Empire without the Emperor on top? Germany turned into a bunch of Petty Kingdoms (and maybe some Republics), that could be easily divided and turned against each others.
Maybe not to the Medieval level of HRE internal wars, but, the point is keeping German vs German fighting tradition alive again.
What avout just reconstituting the old Member Kingdoms of the Holy Roman Empire without the Emperor on top? Germany turned into a bunch of Petty Kingdoms (and maybe some Republics), that could be easily divided and turned against each others.
Maybe not to the Medieval level of HRE internal wars, but, the point is keeping German vs German fighting tradition alive again.
"Then General" Patton.
You magnificent son of a bitch, we're getting President Patton, aren't we?
You magnificent son of a bitch, we're getting President Patton, aren't we?
That would be cool, but I don't see how he can be a good president, lacking the preparation of Eisenhower, being to brusque and hardheaded to succed in politics.
I see him better during a war against the soviets (will Korea still happens?) or as the secretary of war. Outside a military role he's wasted.
Well. Rommel is going to be even more of a legend in this timeline, isn't he? I wonder if this means that Manfred will end up a more significant character as well.
There are times when being morally pure and unimpeachable is necessary. There are times when 'well, we slaughtered all their men, but we didn't rape and kill the women and children' is sufficient moral high ground.
By the dark gods...
There are times when being morally pure and unimpeachable is necessary. There are times when 'well, we slaughtered all their men, but we didn't rape and kill the women and children' is sufficient moral high ground.
By the dark gods...
I think getting elected would be the easiest part. Just make his opponent did almost everything wrong, to the point that Patton's opponent election campaign became an example on what NOT to do.
Intermission- De Gaulle
Here with another side post, about the French perspective of the war, as usual revised and approved by Sorairo:
The Struggle of a Leader: Charles De Gaulle and Free France, by Xavier Montruil
In early 1944, Charles de Gaulle, despite his bravado and proclamations of the imminent liberation of France and so on, was a frustrated man in private. In almost four years, all he did to liberate his country and above all reassert French prestige faced constant obstacles. France would be free soon, but the debacle of the defeat of 1940 still hurt, contributing in his failing to be one of the major leaders of the alliance against Germany. And, what was worse, Mussolini and Italy took the role destined for him and France.
To his defence, De Gaulle had constantly played a hard game with the British and the Italians since the armistice of Compiegne and his establishment as head of government of the French government in exile supported by London. In fact, while Italy still affirmed neutrality in the War, Mussolini and Ciano started to discuss how to exploit the fall of France and its divided government, knowing both Churchill and Hitler were interested to get the Italians on their sides.
Mussolini and Ciano already decided to not recognize either side until the end of the war; nonetheless they decided to stage preliminary talks with both the Vichy government and De Gaulle. Naturally in the first weeks after Compiegne the odds were all in favour of Petain because the overseas French colonies all declared for him; while De Gaulle had only the divisions evacuated in Britain (and not free to use them as he wished at the start, with Churchill needing all the available manpower to face a potential German invasion), some ship in British harbours and a handful of collaborators.
However there were issues between Vichy and Rome. It was soon clear since the start that the Italians didn’t have the possibility to discuss certain border territories (Nice, Savoy, Corsica, Tunisia and Dijibuti) due to impending German veto. Hitler wasn’t going to let Mussolini snatch any French territory unless Italy would intervene on German side, and this allowed Petain and his ministers to feel more reassured towards both Germans and Italians at the time. To the Allies, those claims were mostly considered a provocation from Mussolini as reply from the initial intransigence over Abyssinia. These would mask the intention from the Duce to start a different negotiation about the true Italian aims, essentially over Yugoslavia and Greece. However the French at the time weren’t interested in sacrificing the Yugoslavians to appease the Italians nor to renounce their “Little Entente” network, working as defensive measure against the same Italy but also as way to spread French influence in the Balkans.
But in the early summer of 1940, neither Petain nor De Gaulle had the capacity and the interest to defend Yugoslavia or hold in any way the Little Entente. It wasn’t too difficult to obtain from Vichy or London the acceptance of nothing more than rhetorical condemnation of the Italian War in the Balkans. If Italy was simply willing to respect all the borders between them and the French, then the better for both governments. However difficulties started to come when the Italians tried to discuss a regulation of commerce and other movements with Petain, something the old General wasn’t hostile at all. This faced German distrust however, as Hitler wanted Italian trade to be prioritized towards Germany for its war effort rather than displacing eventual supplies and resources towards a French puppet. He insisted such trade restrictions should have been extended to French Africa as well. Also there were many Frenchmen taking refuge in Italy, a large contingent being Jews, as Petain casually implemented multiple anti-Semitic laws to please Hitler. Considering France had a long history of anti-Semitic persecutions, it was easy for the Vichy government to adopt them. The active persecution towards the Jews of France with their deportation to the camps started after the collapse of the regime lasting for almost a year and an half – thankfully, a large part were rescued by Mussolini’s 1942 agreement with the Reich. The disproportionately educated and wealthy French Jews (compared to other European nations) managed to have more than 50,000 of their number saved. While De Gaulle condemned the actions of the Vichy regime towards the persecutions following the War, promising strong action and at laws “to eradicate anti-Semitism forever from French soil”, the French relations with Israel would have been pretty icy in the first years, especially owing to France’s support towards Syria and Lebanon in the mere attempt to rebuild its influence in the Middle East. For obvious reasons, these attempts were halted following the Arabian Wars.
Returning to the early summer of 1940, the fate of the French fleet, mostly located on Toulon, became the major point of debate between the Italians and the Vichy regime, and another between the Italians and the Germans. Like Churchill, Mussolini didn’t want that navy to fall under German control, and pressed for its neutrality. Over this issue the Duce wasn’t going to budge and in the end Hitler was forced reluctantly to cave, accepting the proposal of compromise of Admiral Françoise Darlan to move the fleet in Algeria and in Senegal, docking at Mers El Kebir and Dakar and staying idle for the end of the war. Mussolini was satisfied, and apparently Churchill was too, but their was no time for any party to take advantage of the situation, as Hitler established a German mission in Corsica – in short establishing military outposts and a garrison.
That was surely a slap to the face of Mussolini, who wouldn’t let this slide so easily, starting with freezing further talks with Petain and increasing contacts through the Italian embassy in London with De Gaulle and its “Free France” movement. Certain advisors convinced Ciano and Mussolini that the French General would eventually attempt through British support to regain the French colonies and establish a government in exile there. It was a situation very appealing for Mussolini, believing that the war in Europe would end in a stall with the rise of two French states, France proper under Petain’s control and a French overseas state in exile ruled by De Gaulle, both being weak enough and therefore more easy to become prey of Italian interests.
Before departing towards Africa, during 1940 De Gaulle had at least a couple of encounters with Italian agents, with the British government looking away. The French General wasn’t too elated to receive Italian support, because it was clear it was to Rome’s advantage, yet the Italians conceded De Gaulle couldn’t compromise over something he didn’t control as of yet. However, certain written and vocal arrangements in case of a potential success of Free France (both Italian and French authorities after the war kept their discretion over such encounters) were apparently arranged. According to certain voices, De Gaulle was willing to concede full independence to Tunisia after the war and allow major Italian investments, also discussing the status of Dijibuti, not excluding the possibility to sell it to Italy.
Regardless, De Gaulle planned a “French Africa first” strategy and staged initial contacts with local colonial officers, but Churchill hampered those initial efforts, as he didn’t trust the Vichy neutrality of the French Fleet, deciding in the end to destroy it. Through Operation Catapult, the 3rd July of 1940 the Royal Navy obliterated the French ships at Mers El Kebir, followed by a similar attack at Dakar. While the British eradicated a potential threat, De Gaulle was flabbergasted, because the attack at the time irked the various French colonial administrations and the metropolitan French population, enforcing the support to the Vichy regime. But also Mussolini protested vehemently against the British assault, though in the end not being totally displeased – whatever would be the fate of France after the war, now the Regia Marina was the largest fleet in the Mediterranean. If else, Mers El Kebir caused sensation in the Italian admiralty, due to the role played by the single air carrier in sinking the French navy through the RAF bombers departed from the deck of that ship, giving new arguments from Balbo to let the Italian navy finally build its carriers as well, while contesting the “Italy as natural carrier in the Mediterranean” principle when the best use of a carrier wasn’t air coverage but mobility. Mussolini effectively wavered on this point and only after Pearl Harbour, which was a Mers El Kebir amplified, agreed with Balbo of the necessity to build Italian carriers as well. Naturally, given the long delay and therefore inexperience of Italy over carrier engineering, it was necessary to start to the basics – in Liguria, two kinda old cruise liners ships would face conversion into escort carriers. The Aquila and the Sparviero were started towards the end of 1941 and the start of 1942, the first one completed just in time in late 1943 to be sent in the Upper Adriatic sea to face its baptism in assisting the air support over the battle of Trieste. Interestingly enough, the Aquila was equipped with German scrapped components bought in 1942 in one of the last major Italian-German commercial deals.
Returning over the aftermath of Mers El Kebir, De Gaulle’s initial attempts to gain the support of French Africa ended into failure, added by a rebuked attempt to land in Dakar; those failures started to sour the general’s opinion towards Churchill and the British, while the same Churchill started to look with some suspicion to De Gaulle feeling he could get a stronger connection with the Italians. But then in the September of 1940, the Vichy Government caved over the Japanese demands to let them occupy French Tonkin and practically consider French Indochina as a protectorate of the Rising Sun. This, along with a subservient approach of Petain to the Germans, allowed the initial defection of French Equatorial Africa in favour of De Gaulle, followed soon by the French Caribbeans, Guyana and Australasian archipelagos.
Having finally an open angle to operate, De Gaulle established the Free France government in Brazzaville and started the liberation of French Africa. This forced Petain to send Darlan to Algeria and organize the resistance, starting what in certain French books is called the Colonial Civil War. It would take another year and a half for the Free French to enter Algiers, while Darlan was assassinated when trying to escape in Libya.
The liberation of Algeria allowed the Anglo-Americans, landed in the Maghreb around the same time, to prepare the invasion of Corsica, favoured by Italian silent assent. The fall of Corsica was the death sentence of the Vichy regime, dissolved after the direct German occupation of South France. This brought Mussolini, distressed over Hitler’s decision, to recognize the Free French government as “ Allied co-belligerant” and the legitimate administration of the French overseas territories. While Berlin wasn’t happy with this decision, Hitler still had to restrain his tongue to “keep Italy in line” as he put it. London and Washington weren’t too happy as well. It could have be seen as an ulterior attempt of Mussolini to approach the Allies in a moment their fortunes were finally surging; at worst, they suspected a growing alignment of De Gaulle towards the Italians.
De Gaulle knew of those voices and tried to contest them, but without evident success as he was left out from the various encounters between Roosevelt and Churchill, or between them and Stalin along 1942 and 1943. Besides he faced growing hostility from the British when he tried to promote a plan to land in France and certainly did not make the Free French happy. But then Stalin started to press for the opening of a Western Front; Roosevelt wanted to end the war in Europe soon as possible; in the end Churchill agreed to allow the invasion of Northern France for the Summer of 1943, to the delight of De Gaulle. The landing in Normandy was a struggled success… but then the Allied forces were obliged to start a war of attrition which slowed considerably from what the French General believed to be a triumphal advance to Paris, and instead ravaged the Northern French countryside with Rommel. However, to his consolation the French metropolitan resistance fought with valour as it started their open war guerrilla encouraged also by the proclaims of De Gaulle.
Still, the morale was low, and to stunt the French effort in the liberation of the motherland came the word towards the late fall of 1943 that Hitler ordered the destruction of Paris should the Allies get too close… then, to break this bloody stalemate, the events in Hungary which led to the German invasion of Italy changed De Gaulle’s perspective of the war again. For better or worse, the Spanish troops flooded Aquitaine, and De Gaulle was forced to hear and approve of Franco’s pilgrimage in Lourdes with French partisans cheering him. All while the Italians crossed the Alps and swept all the way to the Rhone, from Marseille to Lyon. And it didn’t reassure him the official declarations of the Roman Alliance that “not an inch of French soil will be annexed”. The General knew that Mussolini and Franco would search retribution in other forms and ways, and Churchill at least would eventually be willing to concede. Franco in fact was already planning for starters to discuss the Spanish perpetual rule over the Rif and Mussolini was reconsidering again to discuss the post war status of Tunisia.
The Kiev conference was a blow for De Gaulle, ignored to the advantage of Mussolini. His grim mood those days however improved when he heard of the quarrels during the conference, which gave him a new opportunity. Despite the sudden news of the death of Hitler and Germany plunging into civil war favoured a positive conclusion of the conference and a general convergence over the most contested points, De Gaulle found an opening for himself between the growing divisions between Americans and British, the progressive British-Italian warming, and the Soviet displeasure. In the days after the Kiev Conference, he suggested asserting a proper relationship with the Americans, in name of the “historical friendship between France and America” (implied against British pretensions) and finding a potential convergence in not allowing the Italians and their allies to not extend further their influence after the war (considering also that the Roman Alliance was covering the entire French southern flank).
Roosevelt wasn’t too sympathetic towards De Gaulle. While not denying his commitment to democracy he believed in the General there was a certain aptitude which reminded him of Mussolini. But he conceded that France needed to be treated on par with Britain and Italy, and through his intermission suggested that a French delegation would be present on the successive conferences. Churchill wasn’t elated but caved over such request; Stalin was favourable, because while De Gaulle wasn’t certainly a friend of Communism, he wasn’t like Roosevelt hostile to a Soviet expansion in Central Europe, at expense of the Germans and working eventually to restrain Italy. Mussolini wasn’t hostile either, because he conceded that soon or later a discussion with the French would be inevitable and De Gaulle would be their leader and diplomat. In truth, at least from what was reported from Italian side, the Duce admired the struggle of De Gaulle and his capacities and wasn’t hostile to work with him after the war on a more equal level. At the same time, it is reported that De Gaulle wasn’t totally hostile to Mussolini, but he had a certain sentiment amongst Frenchmen who saw the Italians as “lesser cousins”; as France was the reason Italy became a united country and for this should be eternally grateful. Added to a sense of enduring pretended superiority towards the Italians, Post-War relations would go through a difficult stabilization period.
Despite having already seized Paris earlier that year, with Patton giving reluctant assent for a joint American-French squad to enter the city, De Gaulle still felt conflicted. Even though Paris was saved from ruin owing to the suddenness of the city having been taken after the total collapse of the Wehrmacht following the war with the Fascist Bloc, De Gaulle knew there were tough days ahead for his country. Perhaps, if he knew the struggles that were about to swallow his current allies in the years to come (on both sides of the Atlantic) he would have felt better.
The Struggle of a Leader: Charles De Gaulle and Free France, by Xavier Montruil
In early 1944, Charles de Gaulle, despite his bravado and proclamations of the imminent liberation of France and so on, was a frustrated man in private. In almost four years, all he did to liberate his country and above all reassert French prestige faced constant obstacles. France would be free soon, but the debacle of the defeat of 1940 still hurt, contributing in his failing to be one of the major leaders of the alliance against Germany. And, what was worse, Mussolini and Italy took the role destined for him and France.
To his defence, De Gaulle had constantly played a hard game with the British and the Italians since the armistice of Compiegne and his establishment as head of government of the French government in exile supported by London. In fact, while Italy still affirmed neutrality in the War, Mussolini and Ciano started to discuss how to exploit the fall of France and its divided government, knowing both Churchill and Hitler were interested to get the Italians on their sides.
Mussolini and Ciano already decided to not recognize either side until the end of the war; nonetheless they decided to stage preliminary talks with both the Vichy government and De Gaulle. Naturally in the first weeks after Compiegne the odds were all in favour of Petain because the overseas French colonies all declared for him; while De Gaulle had only the divisions evacuated in Britain (and not free to use them as he wished at the start, with Churchill needing all the available manpower to face a potential German invasion), some ship in British harbours and a handful of collaborators.
However there were issues between Vichy and Rome. It was soon clear since the start that the Italians didn’t have the possibility to discuss certain border territories (Nice, Savoy, Corsica, Tunisia and Dijibuti) due to impending German veto. Hitler wasn’t going to let Mussolini snatch any French territory unless Italy would intervene on German side, and this allowed Petain and his ministers to feel more reassured towards both Germans and Italians at the time. To the Allies, those claims were mostly considered a provocation from Mussolini as reply from the initial intransigence over Abyssinia. These would mask the intention from the Duce to start a different negotiation about the true Italian aims, essentially over Yugoslavia and Greece. However the French at the time weren’t interested in sacrificing the Yugoslavians to appease the Italians nor to renounce their “Little Entente” network, working as defensive measure against the same Italy but also as way to spread French influence in the Balkans.
But in the early summer of 1940, neither Petain nor De Gaulle had the capacity and the interest to defend Yugoslavia or hold in any way the Little Entente. It wasn’t too difficult to obtain from Vichy or London the acceptance of nothing more than rhetorical condemnation of the Italian War in the Balkans. If Italy was simply willing to respect all the borders between them and the French, then the better for both governments. However difficulties started to come when the Italians tried to discuss a regulation of commerce and other movements with Petain, something the old General wasn’t hostile at all. This faced German distrust however, as Hitler wanted Italian trade to be prioritized towards Germany for its war effort rather than displacing eventual supplies and resources towards a French puppet. He insisted such trade restrictions should have been extended to French Africa as well. Also there were many Frenchmen taking refuge in Italy, a large contingent being Jews, as Petain casually implemented multiple anti-Semitic laws to please Hitler. Considering France had a long history of anti-Semitic persecutions, it was easy for the Vichy government to adopt them. The active persecution towards the Jews of France with their deportation to the camps started after the collapse of the regime lasting for almost a year and an half – thankfully, a large part were rescued by Mussolini’s 1942 agreement with the Reich. The disproportionately educated and wealthy French Jews (compared to other European nations) managed to have more than 50,000 of their number saved. While De Gaulle condemned the actions of the Vichy regime towards the persecutions following the War, promising strong action and at laws “to eradicate anti-Semitism forever from French soil”, the French relations with Israel would have been pretty icy in the first years, especially owing to France’s support towards Syria and Lebanon in the mere attempt to rebuild its influence in the Middle East. For obvious reasons, these attempts were halted following the Arabian Wars.
Returning to the early summer of 1940, the fate of the French fleet, mostly located on Toulon, became the major point of debate between the Italians and the Vichy regime, and another between the Italians and the Germans. Like Churchill, Mussolini didn’t want that navy to fall under German control, and pressed for its neutrality. Over this issue the Duce wasn’t going to budge and in the end Hitler was forced reluctantly to cave, accepting the proposal of compromise of Admiral Françoise Darlan to move the fleet in Algeria and in Senegal, docking at Mers El Kebir and Dakar and staying idle for the end of the war. Mussolini was satisfied, and apparently Churchill was too, but their was no time for any party to take advantage of the situation, as Hitler established a German mission in Corsica – in short establishing military outposts and a garrison.
That was surely a slap to the face of Mussolini, who wouldn’t let this slide so easily, starting with freezing further talks with Petain and increasing contacts through the Italian embassy in London with De Gaulle and its “Free France” movement. Certain advisors convinced Ciano and Mussolini that the French General would eventually attempt through British support to regain the French colonies and establish a government in exile there. It was a situation very appealing for Mussolini, believing that the war in Europe would end in a stall with the rise of two French states, France proper under Petain’s control and a French overseas state in exile ruled by De Gaulle, both being weak enough and therefore more easy to become prey of Italian interests.
Before departing towards Africa, during 1940 De Gaulle had at least a couple of encounters with Italian agents, with the British government looking away. The French General wasn’t too elated to receive Italian support, because it was clear it was to Rome’s advantage, yet the Italians conceded De Gaulle couldn’t compromise over something he didn’t control as of yet. However, certain written and vocal arrangements in case of a potential success of Free France (both Italian and French authorities after the war kept their discretion over such encounters) were apparently arranged. According to certain voices, De Gaulle was willing to concede full independence to Tunisia after the war and allow major Italian investments, also discussing the status of Dijibuti, not excluding the possibility to sell it to Italy.
Regardless, De Gaulle planned a “French Africa first” strategy and staged initial contacts with local colonial officers, but Churchill hampered those initial efforts, as he didn’t trust the Vichy neutrality of the French Fleet, deciding in the end to destroy it. Through Operation Catapult, the 3rd July of 1940 the Royal Navy obliterated the French ships at Mers El Kebir, followed by a similar attack at Dakar. While the British eradicated a potential threat, De Gaulle was flabbergasted, because the attack at the time irked the various French colonial administrations and the metropolitan French population, enforcing the support to the Vichy regime. But also Mussolini protested vehemently against the British assault, though in the end not being totally displeased – whatever would be the fate of France after the war, now the Regia Marina was the largest fleet in the Mediterranean. If else, Mers El Kebir caused sensation in the Italian admiralty, due to the role played by the single air carrier in sinking the French navy through the RAF bombers departed from the deck of that ship, giving new arguments from Balbo to let the Italian navy finally build its carriers as well, while contesting the “Italy as natural carrier in the Mediterranean” principle when the best use of a carrier wasn’t air coverage but mobility. Mussolini effectively wavered on this point and only after Pearl Harbour, which was a Mers El Kebir amplified, agreed with Balbo of the necessity to build Italian carriers as well. Naturally, given the long delay and therefore inexperience of Italy over carrier engineering, it was necessary to start to the basics – in Liguria, two kinda old cruise liners ships would face conversion into escort carriers. The Aquila and the Sparviero were started towards the end of 1941 and the start of 1942, the first one completed just in time in late 1943 to be sent in the Upper Adriatic sea to face its baptism in assisting the air support over the battle of Trieste. Interestingly enough, the Aquila was equipped with German scrapped components bought in 1942 in one of the last major Italian-German commercial deals.
Returning over the aftermath of Mers El Kebir, De Gaulle’s initial attempts to gain the support of French Africa ended into failure, added by a rebuked attempt to land in Dakar; those failures started to sour the general’s opinion towards Churchill and the British, while the same Churchill started to look with some suspicion to De Gaulle feeling he could get a stronger connection with the Italians. But then in the September of 1940, the Vichy Government caved over the Japanese demands to let them occupy French Tonkin and practically consider French Indochina as a protectorate of the Rising Sun. This, along with a subservient approach of Petain to the Germans, allowed the initial defection of French Equatorial Africa in favour of De Gaulle, followed soon by the French Caribbeans, Guyana and Australasian archipelagos.
Having finally an open angle to operate, De Gaulle established the Free France government in Brazzaville and started the liberation of French Africa. This forced Petain to send Darlan to Algeria and organize the resistance, starting what in certain French books is called the Colonial Civil War. It would take another year and a half for the Free French to enter Algiers, while Darlan was assassinated when trying to escape in Libya.
The liberation of Algeria allowed the Anglo-Americans, landed in the Maghreb around the same time, to prepare the invasion of Corsica, favoured by Italian silent assent. The fall of Corsica was the death sentence of the Vichy regime, dissolved after the direct German occupation of South France. This brought Mussolini, distressed over Hitler’s decision, to recognize the Free French government as “ Allied co-belligerant” and the legitimate administration of the French overseas territories. While Berlin wasn’t happy with this decision, Hitler still had to restrain his tongue to “keep Italy in line” as he put it. London and Washington weren’t too happy as well. It could have be seen as an ulterior attempt of Mussolini to approach the Allies in a moment their fortunes were finally surging; at worst, they suspected a growing alignment of De Gaulle towards the Italians.
De Gaulle knew of those voices and tried to contest them, but without evident success as he was left out from the various encounters between Roosevelt and Churchill, or between them and Stalin along 1942 and 1943. Besides he faced growing hostility from the British when he tried to promote a plan to land in France and certainly did not make the Free French happy. But then Stalin started to press for the opening of a Western Front; Roosevelt wanted to end the war in Europe soon as possible; in the end Churchill agreed to allow the invasion of Northern France for the Summer of 1943, to the delight of De Gaulle. The landing in Normandy was a struggled success… but then the Allied forces were obliged to start a war of attrition which slowed considerably from what the French General believed to be a triumphal advance to Paris, and instead ravaged the Northern French countryside with Rommel. However, to his consolation the French metropolitan resistance fought with valour as it started their open war guerrilla encouraged also by the proclaims of De Gaulle.
Still, the morale was low, and to stunt the French effort in the liberation of the motherland came the word towards the late fall of 1943 that Hitler ordered the destruction of Paris should the Allies get too close… then, to break this bloody stalemate, the events in Hungary which led to the German invasion of Italy changed De Gaulle’s perspective of the war again. For better or worse, the Spanish troops flooded Aquitaine, and De Gaulle was forced to hear and approve of Franco’s pilgrimage in Lourdes with French partisans cheering him. All while the Italians crossed the Alps and swept all the way to the Rhone, from Marseille to Lyon. And it didn’t reassure him the official declarations of the Roman Alliance that “not an inch of French soil will be annexed”. The General knew that Mussolini and Franco would search retribution in other forms and ways, and Churchill at least would eventually be willing to concede. Franco in fact was already planning for starters to discuss the Spanish perpetual rule over the Rif and Mussolini was reconsidering again to discuss the post war status of Tunisia.
The Kiev conference was a blow for De Gaulle, ignored to the advantage of Mussolini. His grim mood those days however improved when he heard of the quarrels during the conference, which gave him a new opportunity. Despite the sudden news of the death of Hitler and Germany plunging into civil war favoured a positive conclusion of the conference and a general convergence over the most contested points, De Gaulle found an opening for himself between the growing divisions between Americans and British, the progressive British-Italian warming, and the Soviet displeasure. In the days after the Kiev Conference, he suggested asserting a proper relationship with the Americans, in name of the “historical friendship between France and America” (implied against British pretensions) and finding a potential convergence in not allowing the Italians and their allies to not extend further their influence after the war (considering also that the Roman Alliance was covering the entire French southern flank).
Roosevelt wasn’t too sympathetic towards De Gaulle. While not denying his commitment to democracy he believed in the General there was a certain aptitude which reminded him of Mussolini. But he conceded that France needed to be treated on par with Britain and Italy, and through his intermission suggested that a French delegation would be present on the successive conferences. Churchill wasn’t elated but caved over such request; Stalin was favourable, because while De Gaulle wasn’t certainly a friend of Communism, he wasn’t like Roosevelt hostile to a Soviet expansion in Central Europe, at expense of the Germans and working eventually to restrain Italy. Mussolini wasn’t hostile either, because he conceded that soon or later a discussion with the French would be inevitable and De Gaulle would be their leader and diplomat. In truth, at least from what was reported from Italian side, the Duce admired the struggle of De Gaulle and his capacities and wasn’t hostile to work with him after the war on a more equal level. At the same time, it is reported that De Gaulle wasn’t totally hostile to Mussolini, but he had a certain sentiment amongst Frenchmen who saw the Italians as “lesser cousins”; as France was the reason Italy became a united country and for this should be eternally grateful. Added to a sense of enduring pretended superiority towards the Italians, Post-War relations would go through a difficult stabilization period.
Despite having already seized Paris earlier that year, with Patton giving reluctant assent for a joint American-French squad to enter the city, De Gaulle still felt conflicted. Even though Paris was saved from ruin owing to the suddenness of the city having been taken after the total collapse of the Wehrmacht following the war with the Fascist Bloc, De Gaulle knew there were tough days ahead for his country. Perhaps, if he knew the struggles that were about to swallow his current allies in the years to come (on both sides of the Atlantic) he would have felt better.
You’ll see why in the next update.
Let’s just say the next few years are going to be ... bumpy.
Also I wonder what the status would be for French Fascists? I mean many French Fascists collaborated with Germany with groups like Mouvement Franciste, Parti Populaire Francais (PPF) and Rassemblement National Populaire working with the Germans.
Also well the PPF, many had join the SS fighting on the Eastern Front. Heck Jacques Doriot the PPF leader became an Officer of the Wehrmacht's Legion of French Volunteers.
Also the Italians would be interested in working with the French Fascists, heck before WW2, Mouvement Franciste had received financial backing from the Italians. I could likely see the Francistes going down a different path not collaborating, although they may still end up collaborating.
Also well the PPF, many had join the SS fighting on the Eastern Front. Heck Jacques Doriot the PPF leader became an Officer of the Wehrmacht's Legion of French Volunteers.
Also the Italians would be interested in working with the French Fascists, heck before WW2, Mouvement Franciste had received financial backing from the Italians. I could likely see the Francistes going down a different path not collaborating, although they may still end up collaborating.
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How did you overcome italy’s logistical issues? In otl Italy had the largest fleet in the Mediterranean and a pretty modern Air Force but no oil for either. Libya had oilf but lacked the technology to detect or drill it. Much of the drilling tech was invented by Howard Hughes’s father. So to extract this oil does Mussolini somehow engage in a partnership with America the largest oil producer at the time, or with Hughes?
Can Mussolini crown himself as Augustus or King since he would be very popular here? Fascism is notoriously unstable especially in regards to succession unlike a hereditary monarchy. Plus the title of king or emperor grants Mussolini legitimacy rather than being A military dictator. Albeit his power is derived in more of a Napoleonic fashion if he crowns himself. How does the Italian army beat the German army? Prussia’s army was inherited by Hitler which was very professionalized and probably the most well trained fighting force during the War. This only changed after he invaded Russia where his logistics and manpower were drained in Russia. If Mussolini got the oil from Libya why doesn’t he sell some to Germany to make a huge profit while staying neutral? Maybe German officers help modernize and train the Italian army.
Can Mussolini crown himself as Augustus or King since he would be very popular here? Fascism is notoriously unstable especially in regards to succession unlike a hereditary monarchy. Plus the title of king or emperor grants Mussolini legitimacy rather than being A military dictator. Albeit his power is derived in more of a Napoleonic fashion if he crowns himself. How does the Italian army beat the German army? Prussia’s army was inherited by Hitler which was very professionalized and probably the most well trained fighting force during the War. This only changed after he invaded Russia where his logistics and manpower were drained in Russia. If Mussolini got the oil from Libya why doesn’t he sell some to Germany to make a huge profit while staying neutral? Maybe German officers help modernize and train the Italian army.
Well the Italian Fascists, they were Republican at heart having had a past with Socialism and Syndicalism as well having some inspiration from the Jacobins in the French Revolution. Mussolini wanted to get rid of the Monarchy and establish a Fascist Republic back from 1918 - 1922, but would renounce Republicanism as the King gave Mussolini power, as well his Fascist Movement having supporters from the Monarchy. Of course his wish would come true 1943 in OTL with the Italian Social Republic, though he would end up a Puppet of Hitler.
marathag
Banned
Even on the 1930s, US Oilmen, from the Majors down to small Wildcatters, swarmed around the Globe, even the USSR till the Purges got rolling, for the search for Oil.
But not in the Italian Sphere, as far as I have been able to ascertain.
Wasn't the only US sector, either. Italy was about the only country to make business difficult enough to close down operations for FoMoCo.
Yeah, Henry Ford, who could make deals with both the Nazis and Communists, and even Japan, gave up under the restrictions that FIAT was able to lobby for.
Same for most other US manufacturers.
That push Italy had for self sufficiency and Autarky did not help, and I don't really see a way around that.