The Final Answer to the "MacArthur Question"

Status
Not open for further replies.
I was about to point out that Patton wasn't assigned to the PTO, and realized that we're looking at this backwards.

The media isn't going to focus on someone because they throw a good press conference. They're going to focus on whoever's at the sharp end (or perceived to be) and willing to talk to them.

So if you want to know who's going to become the replacement media focus, you need to start by listing who's going to be in forward commands instead. Patton almost certainly won't be on that list - too junior to command the PI, and that's the only land mass big enough to warrant a tank expert in the Pacific.

Clark might, and Ike would.
 

Geon

Donor
The media isn't going to focus on someone because they throw a good press conference. They're going to focus on whoever's at the sharp end (or perceived to be) and willing to talk to them.

Gridley

The impression I get from the general atmosphere in the U.S. after the Pearl Harbor disaster followed by the disasters in the Philippines, Guam, and Wake had left American morale badly shaken. There were those who seriously believed Japan was preparing to invade the West Coast or at least to bomb it.

A very shaken, frightened, enraged, and hurting nation was at that time looking for heroes it could turn to. The image of Douglas MacArthur in Australia with the "movie star" image the press gave him plus his willingness to play on that image was, like it or not, a real morale booster for a nation who needed to hear some good news. "I shall Return", became the rallying standard for the Pacific War. With no MacArthur the press and media would be fishing around for someone who would project a "can-do" image to a shaken nation.

Assuming Patton and Eisenhower aren't available was there anyone in the Pacific Theater either in the Marines, Navy, or Army who could project the same image of confidence that MacArthur did, and at the same time be militarily competent?

Geon
 
Assuming Patton and Eisenhower aren't available was there anyone in the Pacific Theater either in the Marines, Navy, or Army who could project the same image of confidence that MacArthur did, and at the same time be militarily competent?

I've mentioned Mark Clark before, and will again now. He was in charge of 5th Army in Italy IOTL, and had his own goddam press corps.
 
So, I've been wanting to ask this for a while, but haven't because I didn't want to kick the proverbial hornets' nest. But here I go. *deep breath*

General Douglas MacArthur. What would've happened if he had NEVER HAD COMMAND OF THE PHILIPPINES?! OR ANYTHING IMPORTANT IN WWII?! :eek:

I honestly don't know, but I'm hoping SOMEone does.

Returning to the OP I'm going to look at a area only tangentally touched here.

The South Pacific campaigns of 1943-44 were largely MacAurthurs creation. they were not considered in the old Orange War Plans, nor in the Rainbow plans active in 1941. Neither did Adm Kimmels WP-46, published in March 1941, give any mention of a South Pacific campaign. US war Pacific plans from the 1920s through 1941 revolved around the primary stratigic thrust being directly at Japan via the central Pacific. It is correct the various plans mentioned 'peripheral' operations to support the main attack, but those were not defined & as in Kimmels WP-46 were stated as 'as opportunity presents'. A look at the USN war games of the era clarifies this. Peripheral operations in those were ops in the north Pacific or the south central Pacific of a diversionary nature. Relatively minor operations & nothing on the scale of what MacAurthur created in 1943-44.

So how did the south Pacific campaigns occur? The earliest involvement came with secret talks between the US commanders in the PI, Adm Hart & MacAurthur and the Brits & Dutch on common defense. This was a predecessor to the ABDA command that was set up in January 1942. Another early event was the diversion of the Pensacola Convoy to Australia & Dutch East Indies. A battalion of that National Guard Artillery Regiment mentioned earlier here by CalBear went to Java. Also sent were a shipload of fighters which were captured disassembled on Java airfields and another that went down when the Langley was sunk. The rest was scattered about Australia.

That was a tiny drop in stratigic terms. Substantial forces came with the establishment of the US 5th AF during the spring of 1942 and the dispatch of US Army & Marine divisions to reinforce the defense of Australia & New Zealand. The collapse of the Dutch defense & the dissolution of the ABDA command saw the responsibility for the S Pac defense devolve to the US. Churchill did not like it but the Brits could not afford supporting a war front there. They were already supporting multiple armies in Africa & the ME & were faced with defending India. The CIGS politely made it clear the US would support Australia or no one would.

Here is where Mac starts to become important. In March 1942 the Allied leaders were pessimistic. Many Australian leaders saw the remaining enclave in new Guinea as a mere delaying action and were thinking in terms of a "Brisbane Defense Line" The USN wrote operational plans for placing defense postions in Fiji, Caledonia, and points east. Wellington NZ was established as the primary USN base in the S Pac. Mac was having none of that & committed US/Australian forces to actually fighting over New Guinea. In the late Spring of 1942 US National Guardsmen found themselves mucking about the fetid jungles of NG. It is not certain another Austrlian or US general would have not seen the possibiity and reinforced the New Guinea defense, some might not have, some might have. But, with Mac a aggresive defense is certain. So this is our first significant PoD, that is the US reinforcements might have sat in Australia far longer before heading out to fight the Japanese.

While Mac favored the attack into the Solomons it would have happened anyway. The construction of the forward base on Tulagi/Guadalcanal was to great a threat to the USN position to the SE. A preemptive strike was seen as essential to forstall the expected Japanese attack towards Fiji. While Ghormley was pessmistic he did not see a good alternative to striking at the Solomons & Nimitz thought it necessary. So the August through
December fight on Guadalcanal occurs Mac or no.

If however there is no major battle in New Guinea then the Japanese 17th Army can attempt to concentrate on this US attack and the battle on and around the Solomons will develop differently.

In early 1943 the residual ops in the Solomons may occur. They were natural follow ups to the Guadalcanal battle. In stratigic terms these ops were of minor significance. They took resources away from other fronts, but not a huge amount. Bottom line is those ops occur with or without Mac.

Where things really diverge in a significant way is in the endless little attacks mac made to: 1. isolate Rabaul. 2. Pave the way to the Phillipines. Those ops run in 1943-44 did suck away large resources. The build up for those ops were underway in early 1943 & grew through the year. They sucked up a huge amount of cargo shipping, due to the distance from the US, expended large amounts of supplies, and required a signifiant amount of amphibious lift, not simply little Higgins boats or a few early LST, but the large blue water transports like the AKA classes. While the ground forces used in these campaigns were not large, the supporting forces were enormous. Aside from amphibious lift & close to one million tons of supplies the US 5th AF was reinforced for large scale offensive ops. In terms of resources these offensive were costly.

My estimates for amphib capability indicate that additional lift for at least one & probbally two corps could have added to the ETO or MTO in 1943. The Amphibs, the ordinary cargo transports, air cover, ect... could have substantially increased Allied striking power in the main theatre. To look at it another way lets look at cargo shipping. At best it took a average of 90 days to deliver & discharge a ton of supplies to the depots in S Pac. The round trip for a cargo ship to the UK was under 30 days & under 45 to major Mediterranean depot ports like Oran or Naples. For every division supplied in S Pac two or three could have been supplied in the ETO/MTO. All this suggests Macs pet S Pac offensive was a major hindrance to the nazis first policy.

So absent Mac & limiting the post 1942 battles in the S Pac to raids & diversions as per the prewar expectations then a significant offensive capability is freed up for use elsewhere. Ponder how things might have gone in Africa, or Italy in 1943 or early 1944 were there a additional corps worth of offensive power, or two additional corps capable of landing on the Axis shores.
 
Top
Status
Not open for further replies.
Top