The fall of Atlanta and Lincoln's re-election: "game changer" or campaign myth?

I have previously questioned whether the fall of Atlanta really saved Lincoln, https://groups.google.com/d/msg/soc.history.what-if/lhaK6kHvIWs/fZctLnZ6d0QJ but this article goes further. I argued that while Lincoln may have been right in the summer of 1864 in thinking his re-election was unlikely, subsequent developments--Fremont's withdrawal, Sheridan's victories in the Shenandoah Valley and the Democrats' adoption of a "peace" platform its own presidential candidate repudiated--would have assured him of reelection even without the fall of Atlanta. This article goes further and seems to argue that even if the election had been held in August, Lincoln would have won. It relies heavily on the fact that Republicans did about as well in 1864 state elections before the fall of Atlanta as afterwards; but given the small number of elections in the first eight months of 1864, I am not sure whether we should let that fact outweigh the pessimistic views of Lincoln and most other Republicans in the summer of 1864.

http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs...lns-reelection-game-changer-or-campaign-myth/
 
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Anaxagoras

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I think this is one of those pieces of conventional wisdom that is actually true: Atlanta really was a political game changer. When you look at what the people at the time were saying in their letters and diaries, there was gloom in Republican circles and optimism in Democratic circles up to the moment Atlanta fell. Afterwards, it was the opposite.

Moreover, had it not been for the fall of Atlanta, McClellan might not have repudiated the peace plank of the Democratic platform. He had had ample opportunity to express his opinion on that issue before and had chosen to remain silent. He had told many of his Democratic confidants that he was willing to enter into peace negotiations. It was only after the fall of Atlanta had changed the military and political picture that McClellan had come out publicly against the idea of a negotiated settlement.
 
Well Lincoln himself thought that he would lose, and so did many Republicans, before the fall of Atlanta.

He did, but one must remember that in those days before modern opinion polling, even shrewd politicians sometimes misjudged how well they would do in elections. TR was uncertain whether he would defeat Parker on the eve of his 1904 landslide victory. To get closer to the immediate question: *as late as October 1864* Lincoln calculated that he would carry the Electoral College by only six votes — three of them from Nevada, a sort of Desert Rotten Borough that had been admitted to the Union precisely for such an emergency. If he so clearly underestimated his prospects in October, maybe he also did so in August...
 
It is hard to say, Lincoln's victory was a big one and he did tend to pessimism. On the other hand Atlanta was a big victory that helped Northern voters see the light at the end of the tunnel. Although I still do think it is the CSA's best chance of gaining independence it isn't quite the sure thing used to think it was.
 
To be fair Lincoln's behavior, especially with the stresses of the war and the death of his son in 1862, has been pegged by a number of modern scholars as characteristic of clinical depression. That does tend to color one's analysis of the situation, as would the Republican Party in general being in the situation of their so far only President having to fight to keep the country intact. It'd be much easier, lacking a major victory, to be seeing inevitable defeat than victory under such circumstances prior to the fall of Atlanta.
 

Anaxagoras

Banned
It is hard to say, Lincoln's victory was a big one and he did tend to pessimism.

To be fair Lincoln's behavior, especially with the stresses of the war and the death of his son in 1862, has been pegged by a number of modern scholars as characteristic of clinical depression.

But Lincoln was far from the only person who thought he would lose the election. Indeed, before Atlanta, Republican leaders from across the United States were gloomy, even despairing, until the fall of Atlanta. Henry Raymond, the editor of the New York Times and the Chairman of the Republican National Committee (a man in a position to know everything, in other words) was so discouraged by Lincoln's odds that he wrote to Lincoln and asked him to open negotiations with the Confederates! His thinking was that at least the Republicans could control the negotiations, rather than the incoming Democratic administration.
 
I think this is one of those pieces of conventional wisdom that is actually true: Atlanta really was a political game changer. When you look at what the people at the time were saying in their letters and diaries, there was gloom in Republican circles and optimism in Democratic circles up to the moment Atlanta fell. Afterwards, it was the opposite.

Moreover, had it not been for the fall of Atlanta, McClellan might not have repudiated the peace plank of the Democratic platform. He had had ample opportunity to express his opinion on that issue before and had chosen to remain silent. He had told many of his Democratic confidants that he was willing to enter into peace negotiations. It was only after the fall of Atlanta had changed the military and political picture that McClellan had come out publicly against the idea of a negotiated settlement.

But IMO if McClellan had not repudiated the peace plank, he would have lost the election worse than in OTL--even if Atlanta had not fallen (provided that there are still the other things I mention--Sheridan's victory in the Valley, Fremont's withdrawal, etc.) The repudiation cost him few if any Peace Democratic votes--he was still obviously by far the lesser evil compared to Lincoln in their view. OTOH, without the repudiation he would have lost a large number of War Democratic votes--War Democrats (and I mean those who had *not* left the Democrats to support the "Union" Party) were still a very substantial element of the party. Even with the repudiation, the plank doubtless cost the Democrats votes; Lincoln was to remark later that if instead of saying the war was a failure they had said *he* was a failure, the result of the election would have been different....
 
He did, but one must remember that in those days before modern opinion polling, even shrewd politicians sometimes misjudged how well they would do in elections. TR was uncertain whether he would defeat Parker on the eve of his 1904 landslide victory.

In 1856, Chief Justice Taney wrote to his son-in-law, predicting the certain victory of either Fillmore or Fremont, both in his opinion enemies of the South.
 
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