The Eternal Flame Dies Out: Rome Loses The Siege of Veii

Chapter II: Masters of The Sea
Part V: The Battle of Delos

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The defeat at Brentesion in 397 had been merely the tipping point for the anti-Spartan coalition that had been building since the end of the Corinthian war in 389(387 BCE). It served to place the Tarentines and their Italiot league firmly into the camp of Thebai and Athenai and embolden the Thebans in particular to challenge Sparta once more. Dissatisfaction with Aegesilaos' performance divided the Spartans at a time when unity was needed. Yet dispite this, the Spartan king managed to maintain his power and prepared for another expedition to be led into Thebai in 398 under the new King Kleambrotos. He reasoned that if Thebai could be put down quickly, the Athenians may be discouraged from assisting against Sparta and leaving Attika open to plundering.


In the event, Aegesilaos had miscalculated Athenian willingness to renew war. The incursion into Boetia, though successful, led to Athenai voting to fully commit themselves to war. They claimed Sparta had broken the King's Peace of 389, which had placed Sparta as the unofficial guarantor of the autonomy of all the Hellenic poleis. A second invasion of Boetia the following year in 399 ended in failure and a hasty retreat. The Athenians, led by their celebrated statesman Chabrias, joined up with the Thebans to blunt the Spartan advance. Chabrias earned his place in the history books by successfully warding off the superior Spartan army as they approached Thebai. While Aegesilaus' army advanced, Chabrias famously ordered his forces, rather than to meet the advance, to stand at ease, spears pointed upward rather than at the enemy and their shields resting against their knee. All his men unquestionably obeyed the command, and the Theban commander Gorgidas, seeing this, ordered his Sacred Band to do the same. As the story went, the Spartans, bewildered and intimidated by this show of contempt, halted their advance, eventually leading to their withdrawal from Boeotia.

Although the story is likely true-all the sources are unanimous on this point and the Athenians at the time praised Chabrias for his order- there were other more important factors at work that forced the Aegesilaos to withdrawal. It was at this point that the Tarentines voted to continue their war with Sparta into Hellas, and sent a fleet of 30 ships under the command of Herakleides to raid the Peloponnesian coast. Unable to protect their coastline while maintaining an army in Boeotia, it was these raids that prompted Aegesiaos' speeded withdrawal. A third, smaller, attempt at bringing the Thebans to a decisive encounter in Boeotia, once again led by Kleambrotos, also ran out of steam quickly. The Peloponnesians were unsuccessful in forcing through the pass at Kithairon, and so no progress could be made, forcing them to return with nothing to show for their efforts.


Sparta now turned their attention to see, hoping success their would allow them to recover from their failures on land. 400 would prove a crucial year in the war, as Sparta put their navy to their first serious test since their disastrous defeat to the Persians during the Corinthian War. If Sparta could achieve naval superiority, as at the end of the Peloponnesian War in 372 [404 BCE], they could starve Athenai once more into submission, and deal with the Thebans separately. Judging the Athenian navy to be the more pertinent threat, the Spartans ignored the the Tarentines along the western coast and focused all their efforts to defeating the Athenians at sea.


Originally, the opposing fleets were unwilling to join in a decisive engagement, wary of getting forced into battle in unfavorable conditions. In command of the Athenian fleet was Chabrias, victor over Sparta at sea in 388 and the same who had successfully repelled the Spartan incursion into Boetia only 2 years before. Although confidant in his fleet's ability to defeat their outnumbered Spartan counterparts, Chabrias wished to leave nothing to chance and maneuvered to force the Spartans into a battle in waters favorable to his ships. The Spartans for their part had seen their fleets repeatedly crushed over the past two decades, and were unwilling to commit, their faith at sea shaken. Through his superior maneuvering and command ability however, Chabrias was able to draw the Spartans out, cutting off their route Delos. Reluctantly, the Spartans gave battle.


The Athenian navy drew up their line of battle with Chabrias in control of the right wing and his protege, the young and capable Phokion, the left. Chabrias held Phokion in great esteem, and consequently trusted him with the crucial flank. The Athenian ships lined up three rows deep on the right flank, two in the center and four on the left flank, where Chabrias put his best hopes for victory. By deliberately thinning out the center and strengthening the flanks, Chabrias was placing immense trust in the superior Athenian seamen to hold the line in the center long enough for superiority to be achieved on the flanks. If the center was defeated before Chabrias and or Phokion could achieve victory, defeat was very likely.

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The Spartan line in contrast, was far less complex. The Spartans spread their ships out in two rows, with a stronger component of three rows in the center, intending on outflanking the Athenians. The battle joined on the 15th of Boedromion on the Attic Calendar, in late summer, the same day the Eleusinian Mysteries began. To everyone's surprise, the Spartans fought extremely well, and in the center the Athenian ships were having serious trouble keeping together. On the right flank, Chabrias was having difficulty as well, as the Spartans, successfully outflanking his fleet, were achieving some success. Only on the left flank under the command of Phokion, where most of the Athenian ships were placed, did the Athenians gain a decisive upper hand. Successfully scattering the inferior Spartan fleet that came against him, Phokion's led his ships directly into the side of the Spartan center. Thus the struggling Athenians in the center were saved at the decisive moment. The Spartans, unable to maneuver their ships around to face the threat quickly enough, were shattered and fled. With overwhelming support from the rest of the fleet, Chabrias was able to route the remaining Spartan navy and began pursuing the fleeing Spartan ships.


Chabrias was now faced with a dilemma as to whether to continue the pursuit and finish off the Spartan navy or risk letting them escape to care for the damaged ships and rescue drowning sailors. The trial of the generals at Arginusae weighed heavily in his mind as he went through his options. They had faced a similar decision after their victory in 372 [404 BCE] and had decided on splitting their fleet, part of it going to relieve Konon at Mytilene, the rest remaining to round up the drowning sailors and salvage the damaged ships. A storm had driven the ships back into the port however, allowing the Spartan fleet to slip away and the sailors to be unable to rescue-their subsequent trial and execution at Athenai was a stark reminder of the impulsiveness of the Athenian democracy.


Despite that threat looming over his head, Chabrias decided the oppportunity to annihilate the Spartan fleet was too much to pass up. Informing the other strategoi that he would take personal responsibility if his decision backfired, he left Phokion with a small detachment of ships to gather up those drowning in the sea and continued his pursuit. He caught the Spartan fleet off the coast of the island of Tinos, and descended on them. Pinned up against the island, many of the Spartan ships were forced to the shore. Many of them were caught and destroyed, the rest, unable to mount any effective resistance, were captured. In Athenai, the Phokion and Chabrias were greatly honored, treated as heroes by the Athenian people. It had been their first solo naval victory since the Peloponnesian War. The Athenians now ruled the waves uncontested. Never before had Athenai been closer to restoring their empire.
 
Happy Easter everyone! New update:

Chapter II: Masters Of The Sea

Part VI: The Athenians Stay The Course

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Kerkyra

Following the Athenian victory at Delos, the coalition took to the offensive at sea. The Thebans, fearing another Spartan invasion of Boeotia, persuade the Tarentines to intensify their raiding of the Peloponnesian coastline, in order to tie down Spartan forces. This coincided with the Athenians themselves sailing around the Peloponnese, and thus preventing the Spartans from taking any action against. Thebai. The Thebans took full advantage of Sparta's paralyzation, defeating the Lakadaimonian garrison at Orchomenos in 401. Having forced the Spartans out of the region for good, they now took the time to reform the Boeotian League, disbanded in the King's Peace, tightening their grip on Boeotia.


Athenai, alarmed by Thebai's growing power, struck a temporary “Common peace” with Sparta that same year, but the peace was barely agreed upon before it was broken. The Athenians supported the Tarentines in their struggle to wrestled control of Kerkyra(Corfu) from the Spartans. The island's democratic faction successfully lulled the Athenians and Tarentines into taking up their cause, by pointing out the island's superb geographic location. From Kerkyra, the Corinthian Gulf, and, more importantly, Messenia, were well within in striking distance. Stirring up trouble in Messenia could cause a general Helot revolt, and the opportunity was too great to pass up.


Raids carried out by the Athenian Iphikrates and the Tarentine fleet under Nikias in 402 were successful in stirring up the Messenians. The raids were enough to bring Sparta to the negotiating table, as well as to catch Persia's attention. Athenai as well wished to make peace, fearing growing Theban hegemony in Hellas as a more pertinent threat now than a weakened Sparta. Yet pressured by the Tarentines, the peace conferences stalled as the Athenian people became divided. In the interim, Sparta managed to successfully reign in Messenia. Then the Argives approached Athenai with an irresistible proposal.

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Map of the Peloponnese

During the Korinthian War, Argos and Korinthos had made a peculiar pact. Following a democratic takeover of the city, a union that joined Argos and Corinth into one state was created. This had been feared by Sparta who aggressively tried to break it up. It came as no surprise then, that when the peace for that war was drawn up, Argos and Corinth were forced to split. This was soon followed by a restoration of the exiled Corinthian oligarchs, as Sparta looked to make sure this threat receded. Argos however never lost their dream of fulfilling that union, and the Argive ambassadors that arrived in Athenai privately informed the Athenians they had already been in touch with the democrats in Corinth.


The delegation arrived simultaneously with the Theban delegation, who were seeking to prevent Athenai from reaching a peace with Sparta. Spartan peace negotiators too were present, and Xenophon records the emotionally charged speeches given by all sides. The Argives, who are recorded as speaking first:


" Athenians, you of all the Hellenes have been most just and consistent in your pursuit of freedom for the Hellenes. Where Sparta has fallen short on her duty, Athenai has never wavered in hers. We say fallen short on their duty, because the Spartans have pledged numerous times to be protecting Hellenic freedom and independence. It was with these words that they fought and won their wars with you, and it was with these words they induced the rest of the Hellenes into signing a peace at the behest of the Medes. Yet what has come of these words? Surely not the freedom of the Hellenes so promised by Sparta? On the contrary, Sparta has repeatedly done just the opposite. When they won their war with Athens, rather than promote the independence of all the Hellenic poleis, they sought to replace the benevolent Delian League with an empire of their own. Instead of allowing the Hellenes the freedom to choose how they governed, they forced all to accept oligarchies and tyrannies against their wishes, so they could maintain their control over the poleis. An unfortunate reality that, I am aware, you Athenians remember all too well when Lysandros established the 'Thirty Tyrants'. When the Ionians pleaded for their help from the Medes, the Lakadaimonian's instead chose to sacrifice them to the Median King, so she could maintain her dominance. Rather than freeing the Hellenes, the true aims of the Spartans were to reduce all of Hellas to helotage, as they have done in Messenia.


Argos has fought Sparta for generations, and as such we never believed the promises of freedom for the Hellenes that the city spread around. While other states wavered in their support for Athenai in the Peloponnesian War, our city remained strong opponents of Sparta, alongside the Athenians[1]. Making peace with the Spartans now would throw away any advantages gained, and only allow Sparta to recover and challenge Athenian power once more. Thebai would almost certainly decide to continue the war, and if abandoned by you, would be crushed by Sparta. With Boeotia firmly under the Spartan boot, what is to stop Sparta from reasserting their dominance over your city?


Making peace now, would be a fools errand. If you may recall, when Sparta had you at their mercy, they chose rather than destroy your city, to let it recover. One must only look at the catastrophic effects that has had for the Spartans to see what the result may be if you Athenians do the same. No better time to finish Sparta off as a major power will exist, I assure you. Thebai is firmly behind you, the Tarentines are raiding leaving the Lakadaimonians powerless on the Peloponnese, and now we, Argos, have approached you with an offer of alliance. A union of our city and Korinthos, rather than serve as a threat to Athenai, would be forever in her debt for aiding in its creation. I would not need to point out the further upsides of continuing the war with our involvement-we posses a prime location to launch an attack into Messenia and Lakonia and break the back of the Spartan state. Before you, Athenians, you possess two choices. Peace, and war. If you choose peace, you will have given the Spartans the time they require to rebuild their strength, and you will only have war later, with a Sparta far harder to defeat. If, however, you choose war, you posess the chance to once and for all vanquish the Spartans as a strong power, and you will achieve piece long term. "

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This oratorical masterpiece served to rile the Athenian people into an anti-Spartan attitude. When the Thebans spoke next, they reiterated the Argives point that Athenai should not let slip this chance to keep the Spartans down and out for good. The Athenians, emotions running high, hardly let the Spartan delegation speak, before they began hurling insults, and soon enough projectiles, at them. The Spartans fled the city, returning to Sparta to report on the turn of events. Athenai soon voted to reject the peace terms they came so near to accepting, and continued on the war. Anti-Spartan sentiment and a yearning for revenge were certainly major reasons in this decision, yet the Argives had also presented them with another motive to continue the war. An Argive-Corinthian union could help serve as a counterweight to the Thebans and their wish to be the hegemon of Hellas. Finding such a balance had been exactly why Athenai had contemplated a peace with Sparta in the first place. Now that the Argives promised to fill the role, the Athenians had less need to end their war prematurely. For Sparta, this was a devastating diplomatic coup.


[1] This is not necessarily true-Argos was not as staunch an ally of Sparta in the Peloponnesian War as their speaker is trying to pretend.
 
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The political climate in Taras itself was entering into a war fervor, as the Tarentines embraced their new political dominance. This was stoked by the fiery populist, Herakleides, who had burst onto the Tarentine political scene a few years previously as the strongest proponent of Taras taking over the Italiot League. Posessing a keen ability to win over the hearts and minds of the people, Herakleides came from a wealthy but politically inactive family. He made it a point early on in his career to live in a modest home by the Agora, where he could be closest to the public heart of the city and thus familiarize himself with Taras' ordinary residents and, more importantly, make himself visible. Herakleides would prove himself a master of politics, able to network and infight with the best of them, making a name for himself as an attorney before running for the archonship. Able to cultivate the support of the poor while simultaneously easing the fears of the wealthy, he was able to dominate Athenian politics with his silver tongue. An Athenian observer would later refer to him as Taras' Themisokles. It is no surprise then, that for the campaign of 397, Herakeides was elected chief archon to lead the campaign.

Athenian politics? Typo, I assume.
 
Chapter II: Masters Of The SeaPart VII: The Battle of Nemaea

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The following year, 403 [373 BCE], could be said to be the year everything turned decidedly against the Spartans. Early in the year, while the armies from both sides waited out the winter, the Argives and Korinthian democrats launched their coup in Korinth. Having secretly won over the support of a majority of the hoplite class who had been alienated by the oligarchs, the democratic coup was a foregone conclusion. On that cold February morning the streets ran red with blood as all the pent up anger at the oligarchs was unleashed. Those oligarchs who quickly grasped the severity of the situation realized remaining in the city would be courting a trip to Hades. Many of them made a hasty retreat to Sparta, where they were welcomed by a shocked Spartan elite.


The coup was a complete success, and when a contingent of Argives entered the city, the union between the two cities was officially restored. Argos and Korinthos were once more to be one state. The peculiar pact, unique among Hellenes, had created a state in the Peloponnese that for the first time could rival Sparta's hegemony over the peninsula. It was Sparta's worst fear come true-and almost immediately after he heard of it, Aegesilaos prepared an expedition to embark and stamp out the union before it could get off the ground.


Neither Athenai or Thebai were inactive either. The Argive-Korinthian union was seen as a perfect springboard to launch an assault into the heart of Spartan territory. In March an Athenian-Theban army gathered at Megara under the joint command of the Theban Epaminondas and the Athenian Iphikrates to prepare to meet up with forces from Argos and Korinthos.


The Spartans however under Kleambrotos had moved faster. Although pressed for men, the Spartans had scraped together what they could and made for Argive-Korinthian territory at the first sign of spring. Unwilling to needlessly confront the Spartan force before their allies arrived, the Argives instead relied on harassment tactics with swift peltasts that made life difficult for the Spartans. Still, the Spartan raid was proving extremely effective, as many Corinthians and Argives watched their farms get destroyed by the marauding soldiers.


When scouts reported the arrival of the Thebans and Athenians in the region, Kleambrotos initially pulled back, unaware of the size of the force they would be facing. Additional scouting would reveal a force of 10,000, 6,000 from Thebai and 4,000 from Athenai. Kleambrotos grasped the importance of not letting the advancing army-which at its present state was nearly equal to his force of 11,000 men-from joining forces with the Argives and Korinthians, who themselves numbered around 5,000. As such, he campaigned aggressively to draw them to battle.


For their part, the Athenian-Theban army were initially unaware of the presence of the Spartan force in the area. Their path to Korinthos lay unimpeded despite Kleambrotos' maneuvering, for even he saw the peril in placing himself between Corinth and the enemy army. Now supplemented by an additional 1,000 Corinthian hoplites, they moved towards Argos where they first encountered the Spartan forces. Kleambrotos stood in their path at Nemaea, and an attempt to maneuver around the roadblock in front of them was countered effectively by the Spartan King to block their advance by bottle-necking the hill passes.


Unable to maneuver around, the Theban and Athenian high command bickered as to what to do. Epaminondas favored drawing the Spartans out onto the plane and giving battle then and there. This was hotly debated among the Boetrarchs[1]. The Boetrarchs were split and Epaminondas appealed to Iphikrates. The Athenian through his support behind Epaminondas, and it was decided that they would attempt to coerce the Spartans to giving battle on the plain.

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It was June 14th, 403 when Kleambrotos finally came down onto the plain to accept battle. The strategy employed by the Theban-Athenian coalition was an entirely unique one. Against the wishes of many of the Thebans but supported by Epaminondas, the Thebans were placed on the less prestigious left flank. It had been difficult for the Boetrarchs to accept this, they were only convinced when assured the 1,000 Korinthians, not the Athenians, would occupy the prestigious right flank. At the wishes of Epaminondas, the Theban left led left flank sacrificed length for depth, making their formation 50 men deep.


In this there was ancient precedent-Miltiades had famously dangerously weakened his center at Marathon in order to reinforce his flanks. It was necessary that if the Thebans were to hold their own against the superior quality forces of the Spartan right flank, depth would be key. The innovation came in what Iphikrates and Epaminondas decided to employ in addition to this massing of forces on one flank. Epaminondas concluded that the Athenian center and Korinthian right flank should be refused in order so that they could bring their superior numbers on the left to bear while the weaker portions of the army held back. The danger in this tactic was the risk of a gap opening up in between the Theban left and the rest of the army. The Athenian strategoi vehemently opposed the idea-credit for the victory could go disproportionately to the Thebans if the strategy was successful. When the Korinthians backed the plan however, the Athenian strategoi backed down and allowed Iphikrates and Epaminondas to execute the attack.

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When battle was joined, the genius in the oblique echelon formation became apparent. Faced with a column of soldiers 50 men deep, the 12 rank deep Spartans were hard pressed to keep themselves from beind overwhelmed. It was then however that an opportunity presented itself that could have changed the tide of battle. While the Spartan right struggled to fend off their opponents, a gap had opened up in between the Theban left and Spartan center. Had Kleambrotos not been in the thick of the fighting, he may have noticed and taken full advantage of this. Yet the Spartans failed to act quickly enough and capitalize on the opportunity. As a result, the Spartan right began to buckle, and as Xenophon explains, was soon overwhelmed. 1,000 soldiers, among them 550 Spartiates, were killed as the Spartan right was hurled back.


It was now that the Theban sacred band wheeled around to the flank of the remaining Spartans. Caught in an unfavorable position while trying to hastily extend their line to prevent such a maneuver, the Spartans were forced back with ease. With the main Spartan force defeated, the remaining Peloponnesians began to withdraw. The Thebans wished to pursue and finish them off, but the Athenians and Korinthians bluntly refused, aware that a total victory would do more to serve the interests of the Thebans than their own cause. A permanent victory trophy was erected and the Peloponnesians were allowed to withdraw after collecting their dead. Although deprived of a chance at following through with their victory, for the first time in history the allies had defeated a Spartan force on land. The balance of power had shifted irrevocable against the Spartans.




[1] Similar to the Athenians, the Boeotian League had a council of commanders rather than one single commander.






 
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1. Wait a minute, if Epamonidas' destiny is changed, wouldn't that also affect the career of the hostage known as Philip Argeaus?
 
1. Wait a minute, if Epamonidas' destiny is changed, wouldn't that also affect the career of the hostage known as Philip Argeaus?

Yes, but all these butterflies are already affecting the destiny of Makedon (Sparta could not intervene to help Amyntas III between 382-379 against the Chalkidian League ITTL for obvious reasons).
 
2. So wouldn't that change the character of Philip Argeaus somewhat/butterfly away Alexander?
3. When will butterflies start hitting the Persians (not counting the Macedonians of course)?
4. So what's Samnium up to in the next few decades?
5. So how has the defeat of Dionysus of Syracuse already affected Carthaginian history? Is Himilco still alive? Will the Magonids remain in power? Will they crown themselves kings? What sort of administration would they lead if they did?
6. So what next regarding the Tarentine State? Will there be reforms and progressive ideals hitting the city from Athenian influence?
7. What next for the Senones of Latium? What sort of campaigns/reforms/building projects will be implemented for the next 30-40 years? Could they figure out a tanistry system?
8. Any changes from OTL regarding the Egyptians before 350 BCE?
9. What would the Senones call Latium, Veii, etc in their tongue, would you guess?
 
Chapter II: Masters of The Sea
Part VIII: Theban Hegemony


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The defeat at Nemaea had been devastating for the Spartans not because they had lost the battle, but because 550 Spartiates lay dead on the field following its conclusion. To a society which had witnessed a large population decline among full Spartiate citizens, the loss of 550 Spartiates was a massive blow to Sparta's military capability. This was recognized by the Athenians, who did not wish to completely destroy Spartan power for fear of the growing strength of Thebai and the Boeotian League. Athenai immediately withdrew their forces following Nemaea, but were as of yet unwilling to repudiate their alliance with the Thebans. Instead they withdrew to the sidelines, urging Thebai to pull out of the Peloponnese for the year and await events, perhaps in the hopes a peace could be made.

Privately, Iphikrates informed Epaminondas of his support for the Thebans continuing onto Messenia and liberating the helots. Such a move would completely undermine the strength of the Spartan state, which rested on the labor of the Messenians. Epaminondas shared this view, but it was a hotly contested topic among the Boetrarchs. Finally, Korinthos and Argos convinced the Boetrarchs to continue their thrust into Messenia and put an end to Spartan hegemony, with the promise of 5,000 troops to accompany them. Argos and Korinthos saw a golden opportunity to once and for all rid themselves of Sparta's oppressive shadow, and to potentially dominate the Peloponnese themselves.

In July Epaminondas led his army through Arkadia and opened the floodgates in Messenia. Unable to respond, Sparta was forced to watch as the Messenians were lifted from their helotage and Messene was re-founded by the victorious Thebans. The coalition now debated whether to march on Sparta itself, a prospect for which the Spartans were hastily preparing to meet. A letter soon arrived however from Thebai's ally, the tyrant of Thessalia, Jason of Pherae, who makes his first significant appearance among many in the chronicles of Xenophon since his assuming the title of Tagus[1] in 401 [375 BCE]. He cautioned, possibly at the insistence of Athenai, that the Thebans not destroy Sparta and instead seek peace now that Spartan power had been irreversibly checked.

Epaminondas relented-Sparta was forced to accept a humiliating peace treaty. The independence of Messenia and its alliance with Thebai was recognized, as was the new Korinthian-Argos union. A new city, Megalopolis, was founded in southern Arkadia as a bulwark against Spartan ambitions. The new pro-Theban Arkadian League it would lead would consistently be a thorn in Sparta's foreign policy. The Athenians protested the harsh terms of the treaty, particularly the establishment of Megalopolis and the alliance between Messene and the Boeotian League. For the moment they fell short of entering into alliance with Sparta, but the coalition of the willing broke up following the Peace of Epaminondas (so named for its architect).

What followed was a period of uneasiness in Hellas as the new balance of power settled in. Over the next two years, Athenai began to solidify their control over their re-awoken Aegean Empire, and Thebai did the same with the Boeotian League. To much outrage from the Athenians, newly re-founded Plataea was obliterated by Thebai in 404 as their tightened their grip on potentially rebellious Boeotian cities yearning to escape the Theban yoke.

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Peltasts

Theban hegemony at this time could be counted among two crucial factors. The oligarchy was led by two highly talented military men, Epaminondas and Pelopidas. Both were dedicated adherents to the expansionist foreign policy that had brought Thebai to its current status and had instituted innovative military reforms that put them ahead of the other powers of Hellas. Chief among these reforms was the use of longer spears, first pioneered by the Athenian Iphikrates and adopted shortly thereafter by Epaminondas. Continuing to follow the example of Iphikrates, the aspis (hoplon) was replaced by the lighter pelte shield, which could be strapped to a hoplite's forearm and thus freeing his left hand up to grasp the now longer and more unwieldy spears. They did not, however, take the extra step that had been taken by Iphikrates and move towards an army of peltasts, still preferring the shock value of the hoplite phalanx. The heavier bronze armor was replaced with a linen cuirass, and combined with the longer spears and lighter shield, it forced Theban and Athenian armies to fight far more aggressively.

These same innovations would be adopted and perfected to great effectiveness by Jason of Pherae, as would another innovation in the realm of phalanx tactics, the wedge formation. The wedge formation, as used at Nemaea, allowed for the Theban phalanx to concentrate on breaking through at a single point in the enemy phalanx, and thus shattering its wall of shields that made it so effective. As mentioned, this was used to a minimal extent for the first time at Nemaea, and would become a mainstay tactic for the Thebans under Epaminondas and Pelopidas, and later under the Thessalian armies of Jason.

As Thebai enjoyed her hegemony of Hellas and Athenai prepared for conflict, forces to the north would completely alter the balance of power and shifting alliances of the Hellenic political and military realm. Jason, the Tagus of Pherae, buoyed by his powerful mercenary army, soon began to make his presence felt. His pan-hellenism and ambitious goals soon began to reveal themselves, as would become abundantly clear following the death of Amyntas III of Makedon in 406 [370 BCE]. It is possible that already at this point, he was circulating rumors about a future invasion of Persia to free the Ionian Hellenes from their yoke. It is to the north that the eyes of the Hellenic world turned towards.

[1] Essentially King.
 
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2. So wouldn't that change the character of Philip Argeaus somewhat/butterfly away Alexander?
You'll have to wait and see. Macedon is going to get bombarded with butterflies before Phillip or Alexander can do anything about it though.
3. When will butterflies start hitting the Persians (not counting the Macedonians of course)?
Very soon.
4. So what's Samnium up to in the next few decades?
Nothing important is happening in Italy at the moment. I'll get back their in time.
5. So how has the defeat of Dionysus of Syracuse already affected Carthaginian history? Is Himilco still alive? Will the Magonids remain in power? Will they crown themselves kings? What sort of administration would they lead if they did?
I don't want to give anything away.
6. So what next regarding the Tarentine State? Will there be reforms and progressive ideals hitting the city from Athenian influence?
Well they have to worry about control of the Italiot League for the time being-which is why after Kerkyra they haven't made an appearance in mainland Greek affairs.
7. What next for the Senones of Latium? What sort of campaigns/reforms/building projects will be implemented for the next 30-40 years? Could they figure out a tanistry system?
Guess you'll have to wait and see.
8. Any changes from OTL regarding the Egyptians before 350 BCE?
Soon enough.
9. What would the Senones call Latium, Veii, etc in their tongue, would you guess?
I'm completely clueless-though it might not matter in the long run. ;)
 
[FONT=Algerian, fantasy]The Eternal flame dies out
Chapter III: The Age of Hellenes
Part I: The Rise of Thessalia

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[/FONT] In the late 4th and 5th centuries [4th century BCE], the region of Thessalia was a prosperous and populous one, perhaps the richest in Hellas. The Thessalians, famous for their horsebreeding and luxury, benefited greatly from the fertile and abundant land they lived on. Grain was a major export and helped fuel the rapid urban growth experienced in the preceding century. The Thessalian aristocracy thrived during this period, and sponsored many poets, tragedians, and philosophers, becoming particularly fond of the philosopher Gorgias and one Eurylochos of Larissa is known to have attempted to convince Sokrates to live in Larissa.


Yet despite their great wealth and military prowess, up until the meteoric rise of Jason of Pherae, Thessalia was repeatedly occupied and ravaged by foreign powers almost with impunity. In 376, the Makedonian King Archelaos intervened in the affairs of Thessalia's chief city Larissa. Only 5 years later the Spartans placed a garrison in Pharsalos, and the following year their King Aegesilaos defeated a Thessalian coalition at Narthakion. A lack of any unified state and the internecine conflict among the Thessalian cities was likely the cause of this inability of the Thessalians to defend themselves. Prior to Jason of Pherae, the Thessalian cities possessed only weak and tenuous ties to each other, and were more interested in one-upping each other than responding to outside threats.


Jason of Pherae came of age in a Thessalian system that was dominated by a small number of aristocratic and elite families that held a virtual monopoly on the political offices of their poleis. This led to prominent Thessalian families such as the Aleuads to pursue different, often opposing agendas, leading them to seek outside help to impose those agendas. Occasional strongmen such as Lykophron of Pherae or Aristippos and Medeios of Larissa, would emerge as Basileios and seize most or even all of Thessalia for a brief period. Jason was all too aware of the perils presented with rule of Thessalia- Lykophron had been his predecessor, and his rise and fall was a warning to what possibly may have awaited Jason. Although he had quashed internal Thessalian forces opposed to him in his bid for control of the entire region, an appeal to outside forces such as the Makedon helped overthrow his rule and confine him to Pherae.


As many, including Jason above all, understood well, Lykophoros had failed in part because he had alienated the Thessalians and turned them against him. Neither was he able, without the support of his co-countrymen, was he able to repel any of the foreign elements looking to subvert his rule. Jason took all of this to heart as he prepared plans to modernize the Thessalian state and improve its military.

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Jason of Pherae
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Born into an aristocratic family, Jason used his family’s wealth well. The maintenance of his original force of 6,000 highly professional mercenaries was covered from the costs of his and his family’s estates. With a force unmatched in its military prowess in Thessalia, he set out on his conquest of the region by seizing city after city with relative ease, offering them generous terms rather than humiliating and possibly alienating their residents. It was this masterful use of diplomacy that became an integral component in Jason’s unparalleled success. He preferred incorporating those he subdued generously into his state, and attaining their gratitude and cooperation, rather than obliteration or other harsh measures. Jason understood perhaps better than else that achieving voluntary cooperation and gratitude from the cities he subdued was the pathway to success. It was a strategy that served him excellently in Thessalia itself, and would be exported to the rest of Hellas, and eventually, the Persian Empire.


Jason’s stratagem of combining overwhelming force with tactful and generous diplomacy that displayed the benefits of cooperation with his regime, achieved spectacular success in Thessalia. His famous dialogue in Xenophon's Hellenica[1] to Polydamos of Pharsalos underscores this point well:
...People who do not know me might reasonably wonder what I am waiting for and why I am not marching against Pharsalos at this moment. The reason, of course, is that I think it is in every way better to have your voluntary, rather than forced, cooperation. If you were under compulsion, you would be planning to do all the harm to me you could, and I on my own side should be wanting to keep you as weak as possible. But if I persuade you to join me of your own accord, obviously we shall both do whatever we can to strengthen each other.”


Due to his innovative diplomatic and military tactics, alongside the preoccupation of the Spartans with Thebai and Athenai, allowed Jason to dominate Thessalia in the last half of the 390's and first half of the 400's [370's BCE]. To legitimize his rule, Jason created an entirely new office, that of Tagos. This new office, stemming from a less important localized office, was given powerful rights increasingly close to that of a Basileos[king]. These included the right to command the entirety of the Thessalian army and control over the perioikoi- the Perrhaebians, Phthiotian Achaeans, Magnetes, and Dolopians. He made sure to legitimize his new position by having himself “elected” by popular consent. By creating a position that was rooted in local governance and tradition, and making it seem like he was being appointed by popular will, Jason managed to, at least for the moment, obscure his tyranny and autocratic rule.


Jason used his newly legitimized position to completely overhaul the Thessalian state. A representative body of the Thessalian cities was established at Pherae, placing the governing of Thessalia more firmly under control. This was a larger element in his creation of a strong bureaucracy capable of efficiently collecting tribute from the perioikoi, and a revamp of the entire Thessalian koionon [league]. An efficient system for army mobilization was also established around this same time, with each city required to supply a certain amount of men to the army.


With his control over Thessalia secure, Jason looked outside of his domains for political opportunities. Already possessing minor authority over the Molossian King Alcetas, Jason turned north and allied with Amyntas III of Makedon in 404. That same year he used the Thebans distraction with the Peloponnese to seize the strategically vital Thermopylae region. Xenophon would remark at this time in his Hellenica,
He controlled great forces of mercenaries, both infantry and cavalry, and these forces had been trained to the highest pitch of efficiency . He was greater still in the strength of his alliances, many states being allied with him already and others being anxious to do so too. When one considers that there was no power on earth that could afford to disregard him, one may say that he was already the greatest man of his times.”
It is estimated that by this point Jason could already field an army of 20,000 highly trained hoplites and 8,000 crack cavalry, along with a significant number of lighter troops, superior in size and quality to any force the poleis of Hellas could muster. He also possessed a fleet that, while not yet the equal of that of Athenai, was a force to be reckoned with.

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Chalkidian League

After concluding his alliance with Amyntas, he helped the Makedonian Basileos attempt to reign in the Chalkidian League. In 394 the Chalkidian League had managed to win the concession of the Makedonian capital of Pella, and without any outside help, Amyntas had been unable to dislodge them. Jason led an army north in 405 [371 BCE] and successfully managed to return Pella to Amyntas. He did not stop there however, and sought the dissolution of the league, a goal left over from the Peace of Nikias during the Peloponnesian War. Answering calls from league members such as Appollonia and Akathos who complained that their participation in the league was not voluntary, Jason campaigned heavily in the peninsula. Potidaea, Appollonia, and Akathos were separated from the league and Olynthos was forced to come to terms. Showing once again his savvy diplomatic skills, Jason forewent dissolution of the League and instead reorganized it and placed himself as its leader. It is unknown what Amyntas' reaction might have been to this interference into what he may have considered his sphere of influence. Nor does it matter, for in 406, Amyntas III died, and a new opportunity presented itself to Jason.



[1] Famous ITTL at least.
 
BTW I would like to bring up this information I found on Roman-Era Climate.

The Roman Warm Period has been proposed as a period of unusually warm weather in Europe and the North Atlantic that ran from approximately 250 BC to 400 AD. Cooling at the end of this period in south west Florida may have been due to a reduction in solar radiation reaching the Earth, which may have triggered a change in atmospheric circulation patterns.
Theophrastus (371 – c. 287 BC) wrote that date trees could grow in Greece if planted, but could not set fruit there. This is the same situation as today, and suggests that southern Aegean mean summer temperatures in the fourth and fifth centuries BC were within a degree of modern temperatures. This and other literary fragments from the time confirm that the Greek climate during that period was basically the same as it was around 2000 AD. Dendrochronological evidence from wood found at the Parthenon shows variability of climate in the fifth century BC resembling the modern pattern of variation. Tree rings from Italy in the late third century BC indicate a period of mild conditions in the area at the time that Hannibal crossed the Alps with elephants.

Basically the current climate ITTL until up around 500-600 AE will be identical (at least temp wise) to modern times. Afterwards until around 1200 AE will be a period much akin to the OTL Medieval Warm Period.

Also how can we attract more viewers?
 
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