Chapter II: Masters of The Sea
Part V: The Battle of Delos
The defeat at Brentesion in 397 had been merely the tipping point for the anti-Spartan coalition that had been building since the end of the Corinthian war in 389(387 BCE). It served to place the Tarentines and their Italiot league firmly into the camp of Thebai and Athenai and embolden the Thebans in particular to challenge Sparta once more. Dissatisfaction with Aegesilaos' performance divided the Spartans at a time when unity was needed. Yet dispite this, the Spartan king managed to maintain his power and prepared for another expedition to be led into Thebai in 398 under the new King Kleambrotos. He reasoned that if Thebai could be put down quickly, the Athenians may be discouraged from assisting against Sparta and leaving Attika open to plundering.
In the event, Aegesilaos had miscalculated Athenian willingness to renew war. The incursion into Boetia, though successful, led to Athenai voting to fully commit themselves to war. They claimed Sparta had broken the King's Peace of 389, which had placed Sparta as the unofficial guarantor of the autonomy of all the Hellenic poleis. A second invasion of Boetia the following year in 399 ended in failure and a hasty retreat. The Athenians, led by their celebrated statesman Chabrias, joined up with the Thebans to blunt the Spartan advance. Chabrias earned his place in the history books by successfully warding off the superior Spartan army as they approached Thebai. While Aegesilaus' army advanced, Chabrias famously ordered his forces, rather than to meet the advance, to stand at ease, spears pointed upward rather than at the enemy and their shields resting against their knee. All his men unquestionably obeyed the command, and the Theban commander Gorgidas, seeing this, ordered his Sacred Band to do the same. As the story went, the Spartans, bewildered and intimidated by this show of contempt, halted their advance, eventually leading to their withdrawal from Boeotia.
Although the story is likely true-all the sources are unanimous on this point and the Athenians at the time praised Chabrias for his order- there were other more important factors at work that forced the Aegesilaos to withdrawal. It was at this point that the Tarentines voted to continue their war with Sparta into Hellas, and sent a fleet of 30 ships under the command of Herakleides to raid the Peloponnesian coast. Unable to protect their coastline while maintaining an army in Boeotia, it was these raids that prompted Aegesiaos' speeded withdrawal. A third, smaller, attempt at bringing the Thebans to a decisive encounter in Boeotia, once again led by Kleambrotos, also ran out of steam quickly. The Peloponnesians were unsuccessful in forcing through the pass at Kithairon, and so no progress could be made, forcing them to return with nothing to show for their efforts.
Sparta now turned their attention to see, hoping success their would allow them to recover from their failures on land. 400 would prove a crucial year in the war, as Sparta put their navy to their first serious test since their disastrous defeat to the Persians during the Corinthian War. If Sparta could achieve naval superiority, as at the end of the Peloponnesian War in 372 [404 BCE], they could starve Athenai once more into submission, and deal with the Thebans separately. Judging the Athenian navy to be the more pertinent threat, the Spartans ignored the the Tarentines along the western coast and focused all their efforts to defeating the Athenians at sea.
Originally, the opposing fleets were unwilling to join in a decisive engagement, wary of getting forced into battle in unfavorable conditions. In command of the Athenian fleet was Chabrias, victor over Sparta at sea in 388 and the same who had successfully repelled the Spartan incursion into Boetia only 2 years before. Although confidant in his fleet's ability to defeat their outnumbered Spartan counterparts, Chabrias wished to leave nothing to chance and maneuvered to force the Spartans into a battle in waters favorable to his ships. The Spartans for their part had seen their fleets repeatedly crushed over the past two decades, and were unwilling to commit, their faith at sea shaken. Through his superior maneuvering and command ability however, Chabrias was able to draw the Spartans out, cutting off their route Delos. Reluctantly, the Spartans gave battle.
The Athenian navy drew up their line of battle with Chabrias in control of the right wing and his protege, the young and capable Phokion, the left. Chabrias held Phokion in great esteem, and consequently trusted him with the crucial flank. The Athenian ships lined up three rows deep on the right flank, two in the center and four on the left flank, where Chabrias put his best hopes for victory. By deliberately thinning out the center and strengthening the flanks, Chabrias was placing immense trust in the superior Athenian seamen to hold the line in the center long enough for superiority to be achieved on the flanks. If the center was defeated before Chabrias and or Phokion could achieve victory, defeat was very likely.
The Spartan line in contrast, was far less complex. The Spartans spread their ships out in two rows, with a stronger component of three rows in the center, intending on outflanking the Athenians. The battle joined on the 15th of Boedromion on the Attic Calendar, in late summer, the same day the Eleusinian Mysteries began. To everyone's surprise, the Spartans fought extremely well, and in the center the Athenian ships were having serious trouble keeping together. On the right flank, Chabrias was having difficulty as well, as the Spartans, successfully outflanking his fleet, were achieving some success. Only on the left flank under the command of Phokion, where most of the Athenian ships were placed, did the Athenians gain a decisive upper hand. Successfully scattering the inferior Spartan fleet that came against him, Phokion's led his ships directly into the side of the Spartan center. Thus the struggling Athenians in the center were saved at the decisive moment. The Spartans, unable to maneuver their ships around to face the threat quickly enough, were shattered and fled. With overwhelming support from the rest of the fleet, Chabrias was able to route the remaining Spartan navy and began pursuing the fleeing Spartan ships.
Chabrias was now faced with a dilemma as to whether to continue the pursuit and finish off the Spartan navy or risk letting them escape to care for the damaged ships and rescue drowning sailors. The trial of the generals at Arginusae weighed heavily in his mind as he went through his options. They had faced a similar decision after their victory in 372 [404 BCE] and had decided on splitting their fleet, part of it going to relieve Konon at Mytilene, the rest remaining to round up the drowning sailors and salvage the damaged ships. A storm had driven the ships back into the port however, allowing the Spartan fleet to slip away and the sailors to be unable to rescue-their subsequent trial and execution at Athenai was a stark reminder of the impulsiveness of the Athenian democracy.
Despite that threat looming over his head, Chabrias decided the oppportunity to annihilate the Spartan fleet was too much to pass up. Informing the other strategoi that he would take personal responsibility if his decision backfired, he left Phokion with a small detachment of ships to gather up those drowning in the sea and continued his pursuit. He caught the Spartan fleet off the coast of the island of Tinos, and descended on them. Pinned up against the island, many of the Spartan ships were forced to the shore. Many of them were caught and destroyed, the rest, unable to mount any effective resistance, were captured. In Athenai, the Phokion and Chabrias were greatly honored, treated as heroes by the Athenian people. It had been their first solo naval victory since the Peloponnesian War. The Athenians now ruled the waves uncontested. Never before had Athenai been closer to restoring their empire.
Part V: The Battle of Delos
The defeat at Brentesion in 397 had been merely the tipping point for the anti-Spartan coalition that had been building since the end of the Corinthian war in 389(387 BCE). It served to place the Tarentines and their Italiot league firmly into the camp of Thebai and Athenai and embolden the Thebans in particular to challenge Sparta once more. Dissatisfaction with Aegesilaos' performance divided the Spartans at a time when unity was needed. Yet dispite this, the Spartan king managed to maintain his power and prepared for another expedition to be led into Thebai in 398 under the new King Kleambrotos. He reasoned that if Thebai could be put down quickly, the Athenians may be discouraged from assisting against Sparta and leaving Attika open to plundering.
In the event, Aegesilaos had miscalculated Athenian willingness to renew war. The incursion into Boetia, though successful, led to Athenai voting to fully commit themselves to war. They claimed Sparta had broken the King's Peace of 389, which had placed Sparta as the unofficial guarantor of the autonomy of all the Hellenic poleis. A second invasion of Boetia the following year in 399 ended in failure and a hasty retreat. The Athenians, led by their celebrated statesman Chabrias, joined up with the Thebans to blunt the Spartan advance. Chabrias earned his place in the history books by successfully warding off the superior Spartan army as they approached Thebai. While Aegesilaus' army advanced, Chabrias famously ordered his forces, rather than to meet the advance, to stand at ease, spears pointed upward rather than at the enemy and their shields resting against their knee. All his men unquestionably obeyed the command, and the Theban commander Gorgidas, seeing this, ordered his Sacred Band to do the same. As the story went, the Spartans, bewildered and intimidated by this show of contempt, halted their advance, eventually leading to their withdrawal from Boeotia.
Although the story is likely true-all the sources are unanimous on this point and the Athenians at the time praised Chabrias for his order- there were other more important factors at work that forced the Aegesilaos to withdrawal. It was at this point that the Tarentines voted to continue their war with Sparta into Hellas, and sent a fleet of 30 ships under the command of Herakleides to raid the Peloponnesian coast. Unable to protect their coastline while maintaining an army in Boeotia, it was these raids that prompted Aegesiaos' speeded withdrawal. A third, smaller, attempt at bringing the Thebans to a decisive encounter in Boeotia, once again led by Kleambrotos, also ran out of steam quickly. The Peloponnesians were unsuccessful in forcing through the pass at Kithairon, and so no progress could be made, forcing them to return with nothing to show for their efforts.
Sparta now turned their attention to see, hoping success their would allow them to recover from their failures on land. 400 would prove a crucial year in the war, as Sparta put their navy to their first serious test since their disastrous defeat to the Persians during the Corinthian War. If Sparta could achieve naval superiority, as at the end of the Peloponnesian War in 372 [404 BCE], they could starve Athenai once more into submission, and deal with the Thebans separately. Judging the Athenian navy to be the more pertinent threat, the Spartans ignored the the Tarentines along the western coast and focused all their efforts to defeating the Athenians at sea.
Originally, the opposing fleets were unwilling to join in a decisive engagement, wary of getting forced into battle in unfavorable conditions. In command of the Athenian fleet was Chabrias, victor over Sparta at sea in 388 and the same who had successfully repelled the Spartan incursion into Boetia only 2 years before. Although confidant in his fleet's ability to defeat their outnumbered Spartan counterparts, Chabrias wished to leave nothing to chance and maneuvered to force the Spartans into a battle in waters favorable to his ships. The Spartans for their part had seen their fleets repeatedly crushed over the past two decades, and were unwilling to commit, their faith at sea shaken. Through his superior maneuvering and command ability however, Chabrias was able to draw the Spartans out, cutting off their route Delos. Reluctantly, the Spartans gave battle.
The Athenian navy drew up their line of battle with Chabrias in control of the right wing and his protege, the young and capable Phokion, the left. Chabrias held Phokion in great esteem, and consequently trusted him with the crucial flank. The Athenian ships lined up three rows deep on the right flank, two in the center and four on the left flank, where Chabrias put his best hopes for victory. By deliberately thinning out the center and strengthening the flanks, Chabrias was placing immense trust in the superior Athenian seamen to hold the line in the center long enough for superiority to be achieved on the flanks. If the center was defeated before Chabrias and or Phokion could achieve victory, defeat was very likely.
The Spartan line in contrast, was far less complex. The Spartans spread their ships out in two rows, with a stronger component of three rows in the center, intending on outflanking the Athenians. The battle joined on the 15th of Boedromion on the Attic Calendar, in late summer, the same day the Eleusinian Mysteries began. To everyone's surprise, the Spartans fought extremely well, and in the center the Athenian ships were having serious trouble keeping together. On the right flank, Chabrias was having difficulty as well, as the Spartans, successfully outflanking his fleet, were achieving some success. Only on the left flank under the command of Phokion, where most of the Athenian ships were placed, did the Athenians gain a decisive upper hand. Successfully scattering the inferior Spartan fleet that came against him, Phokion's led his ships directly into the side of the Spartan center. Thus the struggling Athenians in the center were saved at the decisive moment. The Spartans, unable to maneuver their ships around to face the threat quickly enough, were shattered and fled. With overwhelming support from the rest of the fleet, Chabrias was able to route the remaining Spartan navy and began pursuing the fleeing Spartan ships.
Chabrias was now faced with a dilemma as to whether to continue the pursuit and finish off the Spartan navy or risk letting them escape to care for the damaged ships and rescue drowning sailors. The trial of the generals at Arginusae weighed heavily in his mind as he went through his options. They had faced a similar decision after their victory in 372 [404 BCE] and had decided on splitting their fleet, part of it going to relieve Konon at Mytilene, the rest remaining to round up the drowning sailors and salvage the damaged ships. A storm had driven the ships back into the port however, allowing the Spartan fleet to slip away and the sailors to be unable to rescue-their subsequent trial and execution at Athenai was a stark reminder of the impulsiveness of the Athenian democracy.
Despite that threat looming over his head, Chabrias decided the oppportunity to annihilate the Spartan fleet was too much to pass up. Informing the other strategoi that he would take personal responsibility if his decision backfired, he left Phokion with a small detachment of ships to gather up those drowning in the sea and continued his pursuit. He caught the Spartan fleet off the coast of the island of Tinos, and descended on them. Pinned up against the island, many of the Spartan ships were forced to the shore. Many of them were caught and destroyed, the rest, unable to mount any effective resistance, were captured. In Athenai, the Phokion and Chabrias were greatly honored, treated as heroes by the Athenian people. It had been their first solo naval victory since the Peloponnesian War. The Athenians now ruled the waves uncontested. Never before had Athenai been closer to restoring their empire.