The Eternal Flame Dies Out: Rome Loses The Siege of Veii

Yeah, but not forever, as people in this era, ESPECIALLY Celts, migrate.

Yeah, though there is an argument to be made (I believe LSCatilina makes this one) that the Celts were content with settling the fertile Padus Valley and raiding south rather than settling further south.

Though, as you said, this couldn't go on forever-at some point migrations south will be made, like the Senones into Picenum IOTL.
 
Could Veii get even stronger and form a proper Etruscan confederation (a la Samnite fashion) to protect the entirety of their peoples against invasion?
 
Think of the timeline's future like this image:
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I think you guys will really like this update and the future it holds... :cool:;)

The Eternal flame dies out
CHAPTER VI: ON THE CUSP OF GREATNESS
PART I: THE ITALIOT WAR


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[FONT=&quot] The new wave of Hellenic emigration into the Western Mediterranean in the decades during and following the wars of Jason of Pherai and his successors was due to a convergence of a select few developments that created the necessary conditions for this to occur. The first of these developments, which contributed greatly to the creation of the others, was the booming population growth in the Hellenic states. In and of itself, this proved both a problem and an opportunity, for it threatened economic dysfunction as more Hellenes found the traditional methods of survival insufficient and dispossessed and destitute men sought alternatives. This perhaps meant emigration for some, but after the last great emigration wave, these opportunities were not as widespread as they had previously been. For many others, the economic allure of becoming a soldier of fortune and joining a mercenary band became increasingly attractive.

[FONT=&quot] As a result, an ever growing and seemingly limitless mercenary pool was created for states to draw from. This in turn led to more intense and more frequent warfare, as professional forces were readily available for whoever had the coin. Most states no longer had to rely on their own citizen body to fight in their wars, which itself made war more attractive; without having to worry about losing productive young men to fight in their militaries, and thus not being economically productive at home, there were much less risks associated with waging war.
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[FONT=&quot]The increasing professionalization of armies was the sole driving factor that allowed for Jason of Pherai’s meteoric rise from small time tyrant to Strategos of the Delphic League, and eventually to slayer of Persia. Jason was far from the first Pheraian tyrant to try his luck at controlling all of Thessalia; at least three generations of tyrants from that city had made the attempt before him, and all had failed. What made Jason different was he was living in a time where he could easily bring together a large and professional experienced mercenary force that, when placed under a commander of his caliber, easily outmatched any other army that could be put into the field. While it is true that to truly attain an army large enough to take on Persia he had to supplement this army with citizen Makedonian soldiers, one must be reminded that his conquest of Makedonia was made possible by his professional mercenaries, and that he soon thereafter enacted military and administrative reforms that allowed him to raise his Makedonian recruits to a professional level equal to his mercenaries. The same would be done in his native Thessalia.
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[FONT=&quot]Similar developments occurred a bit later in the Odyrisian Kingdom in Thrakia and in the Molossian Epeirote Kingdom, both due to the same circumstances that allowed Jason’s rise. The important factor to consider here though, is the result of this increased intensity and frequency of war. Intense internecine warfare exasperated the economic and social problems that had led to the glut in mercenaries in the first place. Countryside’s being ravaged, farms being burned and families being displaced were the natural results of this constant warfare. As a result, more people saw joining the ever expanding mercenary market to be a lucrative option, and so a vicious cycle was created, further exasperating the situation.
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[FONT=&quot]This vicious cycle was brought to a temporary halt after Jason of Pherai established dominance over all of Hellas and inaugurated the Delphic League. Although there were a few hiccups in between==namely the two revolts against Jason’s rule==Hellas was mostly spared internal conflict during his rule. Indeed, the pendulum appeared to be turning in the opposite direction as Jason’s invasion of Persia opened up new opportunities and markets to the east previously unreachable by the Hellenes. The possibility that the social and economic problems could be relieved through citizens emigrating and setting up colonies in the now open east was a very promising one. [/FONT][FONT=&quot]
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[FONT=&quot]When Jason’s life met a sudden and unexpected end, this promise died with him. Except for the ambitions of Ptolemaios, which seemed more like megalomaniacal delusions than anything else, none of Jason’s successors had much interest in anything further east than Anatolia, and preferred instead to fight amongst themselves and bring internecine internal warfare back to Hellas. Nowhere was this shunning of the east more apparent than in Babylonia and Susiana, which were left in control of a native Babylonian and an enemy of Kleitos respectively, while he himself headed back west. For the diadokhoi and their soldiers, the west was where the opportunity for power and success lay.
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[FONT=&quot]While neither the Babylonian King Nutesh nor his Aigyptian counterpart were adverse to allowing Hellenic colonists==indeed, many did settle in Mesopotamia and particularly in Lower
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[FONT=&quot]Aigyptos==most looked elsewhere for emigration opportunities. Some decided to settle along the Pontic coast==no doubt encouraged by the dynamic duo of Mentor and Memnon==or in Lydia, but, once more, the opportunities for further settlement were limited. Being largely shut out of the east, most prospective émigrés instead looked west.
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[FONT=&quot]Initially, the new influx of settlers was a welcome respite for the seemingly perpetually under siege city states of Megas Hellas. In the decades following the siege of Brentesion in 397 [379 BCE], Taras’ fortunes, and thus the fortunes of the Italiot League, had waxed and waned. Their politics dominated by the indomitable Herakleides and his jingoistic followers, they succeeded in extending the Italiot League’s control into Sicily, coaxing Syrakusa and her dependencies into joining by 402, and attaining control of Messana in 404. Tarantine power reached its zenith in 407, when they routed the Carthaginian army of Hamilcar at Agrigenton, extending Italiot control deep into formerly Carthaginian territory in Sicily.
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[FONT=&quot]That would turn out to be the high water mark for the Tarantines, and for two decades their fortunes steadily declined. Their success led them to be arrogant, and in their attempts to increasingly centralize control of the Italiot League in their hands, they faced a serious of revolts that drained their resources. Their defeat at the hands of the Lukanoi in 417 led to Herakleides’ enemies to pounce, and he was quickly blamed for the loss and forced into ignominious exile, where he made himself a welcome guest in Athenai. Further humiliation followed, when Taras was unable to prevent the fall of the Hellenic city of Salernon to Oscan forces despite their pleas, prompting neighboring Neapolis to pre-emptively join the Italiot League to warn off a similar fate.
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[FONT=&quot]It was in this backdrop that Hellenes began to head west into the already established colonies in Megas Hellas, Iberia, and around Massalia. To put the influx of new immigrants into context, modern estimates put the population growth for the two largest Italiot cities==Syrakusa and Taras==at around 50% from their original size, between 420-440[356-336 BCE]. While this was not enough to prevent losses in Sicily==Carthage would actually besiege Syrakusa once more in 429==the boost in manpower and wealth it created (including a glut in available mercenaries), allowed the Tarantines to revive their waning fortunes.
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[FONT=&quot] Taras wasted no time recouping their losses. In 425 they launched a war against the Mesapoi, finally subjugating them by 430. This was followed up by a series of wars against the Lukanoi, Bruttioi, and Apuloi, all of whom were decisively defeated by 439.
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[FONT=&quot]Yet if the Tarantines saw their own golden opportunities as a result of this influx, the other Italiot states were reaping the same population benefits, and coming to the same conclusions. By 440 they were ready to try their hand at revolt again. Led by Rhegion, Kroton, and Lokroi, most of the league members on the boot of Italy revolted over the winter of 439-440. Taking advantage of the glut in the mercenary market and the desire for the Bruttioi to seek revenge, they amassed a sizable army and navy. In the sea they managed to take advantage of winter months by going on the offensive, successfully assisting anti-Tarantine leaders in Messana and winning the city over to their cause, while preparing on land for the inevitable Tarantine offensive come spring. [/FONT][FONT=&quot]
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[FONT=&quot]Although they launched a diplomatic offensive of their own on the city of Syrakusa, the rebel alliance was rebuffed by the city more than once. Syrakusa was unique in the Italiot League in being given a larger degree of autonomy, the Tarantines recognizing the need to keep the former juggernaut placated. For the democratic Syrakusan government, the rationale for remaining loyal to Taras was simple; They had a relatively wide degree of autonomy, in exchange for having the weight of the league drawn up on their side to protect against Carthage. In addition, the support of Taras lent a degree of protection to the democratic regime from an aristocratic takeover and a revert to oligarchy or tyranny. Pre-occupation with supporting the rebels also would distract them from the potential for Carthaginian intervention, as they likely desired to profit from the discord in the league as they had done a little over a decade before. [/FONT][FONT=&quot]
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[FONT=&quot]Despite being unable to woo over Syrakusa, the rebels were lifted with some initial success. The Tarantines assembled a formidable army, and they were led west by the son of Herakleides, Timoleon. Although as jingoistic as his father, Timoleon was a more cautious politician, and he worked hard to recoup his family’s position in the decades following his father’s exile. Timoleon however had little military experience, and this presented itself when the Tarantine army was surprisingly routed from the field at the Battle of Petelia, forcing them to abandon their land campaign for the year in their attempts to recover. While achieving notable successes at sea==namely the defeat of the rebel navy off of the Sicilian town of Tauromenion and the subsequent recapture of Messana==the defeat at land was a significant blow to the Tarantines, who hoped to wrap up the war quickly, and lent legitimacy to the rebel cause, who now showed they could actually win. As a result of this development, the Lukanoi and Apuloi took up arms once more on the rebel side, and the Tarantines faced another front to contend with on land. [/FONT][FONT=&quot]
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[FONT=&quot]A far more pressing development for the Syrakusans however, was the intervention of Carthage in the spring of 441. Led Gisgo, the son of Hamilcar The Great==who himself was executed the previous year for attempting to declare himself Malik==the Carthaginians saw a golden opportunity to finally attain their long coveted goal of domination of the entire island of Sicily.
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[FONT=&quot]Rather than moving directly towards Syrakusa as they had in the past, Gisgo led his Carthaginian army towards the northern coast of Sicily, aiming at taking Messana. He felt the best strategy was a more systematic annexation of the eastern half of the island, which would lead to a far stronger grip on Carthaginian gains while he eventually besieged Syrakusa. The siege of Messana occupied most of the year, with the key engagement coming in August when the Carthaginian fleet defeated a coalition navy of Tarantines, Syrakusans, and Messanians at Liparoi, allow them to effectively seal off the city and paving the way for its surrender in early September.
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[FONT=&quot]Gisgo made his move to besiege the city of Syrakusa itself the following year, and what followed was one of the epic sieges in history. As the Carthaginians approached, the Syrakusans dug in for the long haul and sent out envoys pleading with the Tarantines to send a relief army. The Tarantines of course were occupied heavily with their own conflict, and it required the entirety of their army be dedicated towards it. They were only able to provide token naval support alongside blockade runners sneaking in badly needed supplies into the city. The Syrakusans themselves had been reduced to a navy that largely consisted of merchant ships willing to run the Carthaginian blockade, and so supplies only trickled in as the siege got underway and began to tighten.
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[FONT=&quot]Fearing they would eventually succumb to the Carthaginian siege if left on their own, the Syrakusans sent out pleas for assistance everywhere, including mainland Hellas, where they hoped someone would be able to muster together a relief force. Much to their collective relief, their pleas would be taken up by the young King of Epeiros. Alexandros III of Epeiros, son of Philip Argead, had become disillusioned with his prospects for greatness in Hellas. When the Syrakusan envoy arrived in his court in Ambrakia, he felt the call of the west, and immediately began preparing his expedition. [/FONT]
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This vicious cycle was brought to a temporary halt after Jason of Pherai established dominance over all of Hellas and inaugurated the Delphic League. Although there were a few hiccups in between==namely the two revolts against Jason’s rule==Hellas was mostly spared internal conflict during his rule. Indeed, the pendulum appeared to be turning in the opposite direction as Jason’s invasion of Persia opened up new opportunities and markets to the east previously unreachable by the Hellenes. The possibility that the social and economic problems could be relieved through citizens emigrating and setting up colonies in the now open east was a very promising one.

What's with all the '=='s?
 
Apologies for the delay, I've been reading "Cartgage: A History" By Serge Lancel in order to get a better understanding of Carthaginian institutions and society before I moved on going in depth on Carthage. I also decided to split this update in two, since it's very long. Enjoy.


CHAPTER VII: ON THE CUSP OF GREATNESS
PART II: THE SIEGE OF AKRAGAS


Being born to a long line of rulers of Makedonia, one would be forgiven for expecting Alexandros to follow in these footsteps. The decline of the Argeads in the years following the death of Amyntas III, which saw internecine infighting and civil war between just about every person with the slightest claim to the throne accelerated the swift decline of any central Makedonian state authority over their rugged mountain subjects. More importantly, it encouraged intervention by outside powers who looked to profit from the situation. Whether it was the southern Hellenic polities such as Athenai, Thebai, and Sparta looking to impose their own puppet ruler, or the barbarians to the north such as the Illyroi and Paenoi seeking easy loot, the rulers of Makedon had lost all control over their kingdom.

It was Jason of Pherai’s intervention and the crowning himself Basileus following Ptolemaios’ attempted coup that arguably saved Makedon from complete collapse and dissolution. Jason re-established and reformed centralized control over the people of the Makedonian interior, vanquished Makedon’s enemies, and trained her citizens into a highly effective and efficient fighting force. In the process however, he sidelined the last true legitimate Argead heir to the Makedonian throne, Philipos, promising him the succession upon his death publicly, but privately looking to do away with him when he felt secure enough to take that chance.

Philippos of course occupied himself during these years by accompanying Jason everywhere he went, ostensibly to give him experience for when he was to take over as Basileus, but in reality serving as a means for Jason to keep an eye on him at all times. He served as a useful political tool, allowing Jason to cement an alliance with the Molossian house ruling Epeiros through a marriage with Olympias.

Following the death of Jason, few were surprised when Philippos conveniently ended up dead shortly thereafter, since it removed any adult male heir holding a legitimate claim to inheriting Jason’s empire standing in their way of taking it all for themselves. Olympias soon fled to Epeiros with their infant son Alexandros, where there were offered refuge by the young Basileus, Alexandros I. Alexandros, who was busy fighting a series of wars with the rulers of Thrakia and Thessalia for control of Makedonia, agreed to making Olympias’ son his heir, hoping that would remove his nephew from otherwise being a potential rival to his rule.

In the series of wars that followed, Alexandros’ forces would wax and wane, but crucially, he would achieve little lasting success. Although his defeat of Andronikos at Orraon in 427 [349 BCE] led to a successful invasion of Makedon, he struggled to impose his will over Upper Makedon, and his gains were reversed when Kersobleptes was able to finally assemble an invasion force and push him out in 433. Alexandros returned from this war increasingly frustrated, and more importantly, increasingly suspicious of his sister and her son. He feared his defeat placed his hold on power in a tenuous position, and so he sought to pre-emptively remove what he believed to be the main rallying point for any opposition, his young nephew.

In a famous anecdote from history that comes down to us, Olympias was ticked off to the attempted assassination when one of the assassins, sympathetic to Olympias and her son, deliberately dropped his dagger as he approached her chamber, allowing her to hear them coming and make a daring escape with Alexandros out of a second entrance. From there she fled to the court of Kersobleptes, who was all too happy to welcome such a useful asset into his realm.

Kersobleptes, not wanting to waste his opportunity to overthrow a rival in favor of a child, lent them an army of 10,000 to invade, and successfully procured the support of the Aitolians for Alexandros’ claim to the throne. The two armies united outside Kassope, and at the battle that followed they soundly defeated Alexandros I, capturing him and executing him after his soldiers defected. Alexandros Argead was crowned Basileus Alexandros II of Epeiros, with Olympias acting as the de facto regent for her now 14 year old son.

The Aitolians meanwhile began to enjoy their newfound role as kingmaker. After their smashing success with Epeiros, they lent their support to Demetrios’s cause in Thessalia. Over a period of two years, Demetrios, assisted by the Aitolians, eventnually defeated and conquered the lands of Andronikos, forcing him to flee across the Aegean into the realm of Antipatros. Demetrios, buoyed by his victory, then proceeded to turn south and pre-emptively struck his former benefacters in Thebai. In a lightningly swift turnaround from his position a few years previously, Demetrios and the Aitolians shattered the Theban army and subdued Thebai and the whole of the Boiotian League.

This was the state of affairs when Alexandros II reached his majority, the very same year Demetrios and Kersobleptes partitioned Makedon between them. Alexandros had been left out completely, and he swiftly came to the conclusion that he was left no room for glory and greatness in the peninsula. He looked eagerly at developments in the west, always also keeping a sharp eye on affairs to his east lest any new developments arise that he could exploit. A war with Demetrios stretching from 438-441 [338-335 BCE] was successful enough in regaining territory lost by his predecessor, and was enough to at least make him a nuisance to Demetrios’ ever growing ambitions. However this was not enough to satisfy his lust for adventure and glory, so when the Syrakusans envoys came begging him for assistance, Alexandros jumped at the chance.

He threw himself at the task with all his energy and enthusiasm. Using this as an opportunity to paint it to his rivals as the chance to get him out of their hair for good, he succeeded in obtaining ships and men from Kersobleptes, Demetrios, and the Athenians, bolstering his forces enough for him to be confident in his chances of success. Alexandros left Ambrakia early in 443, accompanied by 15,000 soldiers and 60 war vessels, mostly triremes and a small number of outdated penteconters.

His force was large enough to break the blockade, and by the time of his landing, Gisgo called off the siege. The Syrakusans had by this point exhausted all their ingenuity in resisting the siege. Carthaginian siege towers would usually find the ground under them collapsing. Alternatively, if they made it near the walls, they were met with a blistering artillery barrage of flame balls that quickly set them on fire. At one point the Syrakusans gathered all the swine in the city and launched them at the Carthaginian camp via onagers, hoping to spread disease into the camp liked had occurred in previous sieges.

All of this ingenuity and resilience allowed the Syrakusans to hold out long enough for Alexandros to arrive and relieve the siege. Gisgo broke off the siege and fell back to Akragas, where Alexandros hastily followed him, hoping to deliver a quick knockout blow. In the event, the defenses held in Akragas, and Alexandros found himself digging in for a siege, with a relief force from Messana moving to trap him between them and Akragas, and another relief army under the command of Maharbal being gathered back in North Africa.

The Carthaginian army moving up from Messana seized Gela, thus cutting off Alexandros’ supply route by land. In conjunction with the Carthaginian navy, they effectively sealed off all supply lines from Syrakusa. An attempt to open up the sea lanes ended in the battle of Phintias, where the Carthaginian navy under the command of Hanno dealt a defeat to Alexandros’ navy. He was now forced to forage for supplies, which Gisgo duly capitalized on.

Gisgo launched his attack on Alexandros’ army on August 4th, one month into the siege, while his men were foraging for supplies. Gisgo achieved initial success, catching Alexandros off guard and pushing into his camp. There, Alexandros rallied his men by personally throwing himself into the thick of the fighting, his bravery proving an example to the rest, who, rather than breaking, pushed the Carthaginian’s back, forcing Gisgo to call off the operation and retreat back into the city.

With the relief force still at his back cutting his supply lines, Alexandros was weary of a long siege. While he began setting up a series of pickets, ditches, and outposts to encircle the city, he sought out any holes in the defenses that he thought he could exploit to quickly bring this siege to an end. Gisgo too looked for an opportunity to deal a blow to Alexandros, knowing a relief force would soon arrive from North Africa and not wanting to share in the glory of the victory.

An opportunity presented itself soon enough. A Ligurian defector from the Carthaginian camp informed Alexandros of rumors of a large army coming by sea to relieve Gisgo. Realizing he would be placed in an impossible position, Alexandros was spurred into action. Leaving a token force to maintain the siege, he slipped away with 10,000 men under the cover of darkness to go deal with the Carthaginian force at Gela. In a lightning fast march, he arrived there the following day, August 21st, surprising the garrison and swiftly defeating them and forcing their surrender.

By the time Gisgo learned of the deception, he had been masterfully outmaneuvered as Alexandros was already back at the camp, his supply lines now opened. Gisgo, now realizing he had underestimated his opponent, abandoned his hopes for a quick victory, and waited for Maharbal to arrive. Maharbal landed in Mazara on September 6th, and quickly cut a path towards Akragas. Maharbal concentrated his forces west of Akragas, in Heraklea Minoa, and from there attempted to curl around Akragas and once more cut off Alexandros’ supply lines.

Anticipating this, Alexandros attempted another daring maneuver on the night of September 12th. Maintaining a mere 1,000 men to maintain camp fires and make noise in order to not tip off Gisgo, he took the rest of his army overnight and marched to cut off Maharbal’s advance. Maharbal’s men were awoken in the middle of the night to an all out assault on their camp, and in the confusion were completely routed.

For the second time in the siege, Gisgo had been thoroughly out generalled by his young and inexperienced adversary. Now seeing no hope of relief, Gisgo tried his luck at going head to head with Alexandros’ offering battle on October 1st as his supplies began to run low and men began to desert. Despite being able to starve out the garrison, Alexandros eagerly accepted, wishing to push on further before winter. The result was a predictably crushing defeat for Gisgo, who retreated back into his fortress with only a skeleton force remaining. That night he slipped past a gap in the pickets with 5,000 men, being whisked away to sea by Hanno’s navy and effectively surrendering the city to Alexandros.
 
A good update, so we have a new, potentially great young Greek leader making his mark. I hope Alexandros can avoid Jason's fate though the title does imply he will be around for a while at least.
 
A good update, so we have a new, potentially great young Greek leader making his mark. I hope Alexandros can avoid Jason's fate though the title does imply he will be around for a while at least.
Thanks!

I think now is a good time to stress that while Alexander is still the offspring of Philip II and Olympias, he's not necessarily the same person. He has similar qualities-boldness, lust for adventure and knowledge-but he never had the privilege of learning the art of war from his father, so while he shows dashes of brilliance, he has plenty of limitations on his abilities.

That's about all I'll reveal about him now though, since I don't want to give any spoilers. :cool:
 

CHAPTER VII: ON THE CUSP OF GREATNESS
PART III: THE EMPIRE STRIKES BACK


Alexandros followed up his victory at Akragas by dashing towards Eryx, the Carthaginian fortress on the northwestern extremity on the island. By now he had learned that the broken terrain of Sicily and meant that pitched battles held little importance, with the key to controlling it being control of the Carthaginian fortresses dotting the western half of the island. This meant seizing, either by force or diplomacy, Segesta, Selinos, Eryx, Drepana, and the seemingly impenetrable Carthaginian base of operations on Sicily, Motya[1]. Rather than sit through a series of costly sieges, all the while buying time for more Carthaginian mercenary armies to be gathered and sent to face him, Alexandros calculated that by seizing the major fortress in northwesten Sicily==Eryx==Segesta and Drepana might defect. Otherwise, having seen the tide of war on Sicily swing back and forth, always to result in Carthaginian control of the western half of the island, the cities there were unwilling to risk the wrath of the Carthaginians and back a loser. It was a sound strategy except for a key problem; Alexandros lacked a navy capable enough to allow him to take the city.

In a lightning march that saw the quick surrender of Entella==whose garrison was as surprised as everyone else to see his army at their gates==Alexandros laid siege to Eryx as planned. A detachment under the command of Ptolemaios==a fellow exile from a noble Makedonian family and childhood friend of Alexandros== to besiege Segesta, or at the very least prevent the city from hobbling his supply lines over the winter. The siege frustrated Alexandros for the better part of 5 months, as he wasted away the winter watching Hanno’s navy supply the city with impunity as he probed every inch of the mountaintop fortress for a weakness. The defenders were forever alert, as attempts to send small squadrons of picked units to scale the fortress and open the gates were repeatedly discovered and captured or killed, the captured divulging his strategems.In the meantime, his strategoi were busy in the eastern half of the island, overseeing the gathering of another navy that could take on Hanno for control of the seas.

As winter receded into spring and Alexandros gained possession of a navy, his strategy changed. Condeding defeat on taking Eryx for the time being, he now considered his chief aim to be Motya, and focused all his men and resources there. It was his impression now that if Motya fell, being both the symbol of Carthaginian power on the island and their base of operations, the rest of Sicily would fall into his hands with it. Reinforced by native Sikels and Sikans, Alexandros was confident that he now possessed enough forces to make a go for it.

In his great book on geography, the geographer and historian Carthalon described Motya in his time when he visited the city, giving us a great insight into the enormity of the task before anyone who wished to successfully siege it:


“...separated by a shallow lagoon, the walls of the city are at least [2 meters] thick, and no less than [9 meters] high, though lack of space has made the buildings often high enough to allow one to see well beyond the walls…”

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Motya

Although in Carthalon’s time, as in Alexandros’s a narrow mole connected the city to the mainland, the citizens prepared for the siege by first cutting off the mole, thus making the only access to the city by sea.

While Alexandros began the siege, Hanno, in turn, took bold action of his own. With 120 ships packed with well train crews at his disposal, he was able to craft a brilliant strategy. In a similar vein as the Battle of Salamis, where the Hellenes had managed to neutralize the Persian numbers advantage by bottlenecking them into a confined space, Hanno recognized he could use a minimum of ships to keep the Hellenic navy bottled up while he unleashed the rest of his navy for a more daring maneuver. Leaving 60 ships to defend Motya, Hanno outfitted 60 triremes and a few dozen transports with a picked crew, loading as many mercenaries left over from the previous defeats as he could onto his ships, and set sail for Syrakusa. Having heard of the turmoil back in North Africa==where Gisgo, anticipating his enemies back at home attempts to bury him, had bribed his mercenaries to march on the city and seize power for himself==Hanno assumed no assistance would be forthcoming and so was not about to wait around and fight on his opponent’s terms. Instead he set his eyes on the prize, and went on a bold offensive.

Arriving at Selinos by nightfall, Hanno sailed with all speed to Syrakusa. Having prepared in advance, Hanno contributed a new innovation to siege warfare, the Sambuka. In Hanno’s own book on naval tactics, he provides us with an excellent description of his invention[2]:

“It is made of a ladder four feet broad, and of a height to reach the top of the wall from the place where its foot has to rest; each side of the ladder is protected by a railing, and a covering or pent-house is added overhead. It is then placed so that its foot rests across the sides of the lashed-together vessels, which touch each other with its other extremity protruding a considerable way beyond the prows. On the tops of the masts pulleys are fixed with ropes: and when the engines are about to be used, men standing on the sterns of the vessels draw the ropes tied to the head of the ladder, while others standing on the prows assist the raising of the machine and keep it steady with long poles. Having then brought the ships close in shore by using the outer oars of both vessels the machine is let down upon the wall. At the head of the ladder is fixed a wooden stage secured on three sides by wicker-shields, upon which stands four men who will fight and struggle with those who try to prevent the sambuca from being made to rest on the battlements. But when they have fixed it and so got above the level of the top of the wall, the four men unfasten the wicker shields from either side of the stage, and walk out upon the battlements or towers as the case may be; they are followed by their comrades coming up by the sambuca, since the ladder’s foot is safely secured with ropes and stands upon both the ships.”

Sambuke-gelo4.jpg


The sambuka allowed for Hanno to stage a direct assault on Syrakusa from the seaboard side. Seemingly without warning, on the early morning of March 12th, the Syrakusans were awoken to the sound of their fellows yelling about Carthaginian ships with ladders fast approaching the walls. By the time the Syrakusans organized themselves, the Hanno and his men were already beginning to scale the walls, having torched the dozen Syrakusan ships resting in the harbor. The surprise worked out to perfection, as Hanno’s men rapidly gained control of the walls, and began advancing into the city. They encountered fierce resistance, but with Syrakusa’s entire garrison with Alexandros in Motya, the citizen defenders were outmatched. Not having enough men to occupy the city, Hanno instead resorted to sacking it, torching much of the city before withdrawing by nightfall, his victory complete.

 
Great back and forth between the Carthaginians and Greeks in Sicily, and fascinating to read about Alexander's alternate career. I regret missing the updates this summer, and I hope to get an email seeing it's been updated soon! :)


PS: Also hope Lancel was an interesting and useful read. It's a bit dry but I always found him very helpful with my timeline.
 
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