The Epirote Alexander
The Epirote Alexander
(By Practical Lobster)
Fighting the Hydra
In 280, Basileus Pyrrhos Aeacidaes would begin his famous war against the rising power of Rome. The greatest tactician to come in the wake of Alexandros Megas and one of the foremost of the Diadochi, the legacy he would create for himself would be a complicated one. Born in a backwater, raised as a hostage, his rise to power was unlikely. His continued victories beyond that point, and the ease with which he gathered an army with which to achieve them, more unlikely still. When the citizens of Taras provoked war with the local power of Rome, he answered their call, because above all else he was ambitious, as all great men living in the shadow of Alexandros were.
From Thessaly came a certain man, a disciple of Demosthenes, named Cineas who associated himself with Pyrrhos. A minister and friend of the Basileus, it was his oratory that won over the assemblies of Megale Hellas, despite his own personal misgivings, which he expressed at length in private councils.
After assembling an enormous army, at its core some twenty-three thousand foot, three thousand horse, and twenty Asiatic elephants, Pyrrhos landed in Italy promptly and swiftly. Fortune, it seemed, favored him, for two days after his landing the seas were wracked with unseasonable storms, and though some of his ships were ruined his entire army had arrived unmolested and in good order.
In jubilant spirits, Pyrrhos spoke to his Companions, describing the storms as an omen that they must not turn back. The Tarentines, however, quickly soured the Epirote King's mood. Despite their own city being under threat, the number of soldiers they had mustered were far inferior to what they were capable of mustering, and despite excuses from the assembly Pyrrhos realized that little aid would be forthcoming. Accordingly, he seized power swiftly, securing the city and instituting martial law, mustering troops himself.
While these actions were unpopular, they achieved the desired results. Fresh hoplites were raised and Pyrrhos was thus able to move without waiting for further allies. An approaching Roman army under the Consul Laevinus aimed to first suppress the Lucanians and subsequently cut Taras off from the rest of Megale Hellas. It was this force that Pyrrhos aimed to intercept. Making camp on an open plain near the city of Heracleia, Pyrrhos awaited the Roman attack. After a brief council, it was determined that war was inevitable, and the two men, despite a measure of mutual admiration, prepared for battle.
Pyrrhos, observing the good order and discipline of the Roman camp, changed his initial plan, which had been to ambush the Romans mid-crossing with his cavalry. Instead, he allowed a large part of the Romans to cross over, that he might strike their flanks with his cavalry and elephants. The Romans, for their part, were cautious, seeing the clear plan of the enemy, but arranged as they were there was little to do but go forwards. Their horse were quickly swept aside and soon they were under attack from all sides.
The fighting quickly became intense, and despite their best efforts the Romans could not penetrate the Epirote line. Only on the left, where the hoplites of Taras were stationed, did the men waver as Meton, a great worthy of the city and an outspoken supporter of Pyrrhos was slain by a Roman javelin. Here the Romans very nearly broke through, but for the sudden arrival of Pyrrhos himself, who rode amongst the Romans and seemed untouchable, killing many and rallying the Tarantines to ever greater feats of valor.
Pyrrhos' cavalry broke off their assault several times, but with each subsequent charge they inflicted grievous losses on the Roman flanks - the Romans were crowded by the river and incapable of mounting an effective retreat until the entire line became a rout and was ridden down by the Thessalian cavalry. The Roman camp and its spoils were seized and Laevinus himself barely escaped.
Contemporary historians differ on Roman casualties - ranging from nine thousand to fifteen thousand. Many of these losses were prisoners, who were subsequently enslaved. What they do agree on is that Pyrrhos had lost perhaps a few hundred men to inflict such a great slaughter.
Subsequently the Lucanians and Samnites and many of the Greek cities would join Pyrrhos in open rebellion. However, the Samnites themselves could not join Pyrrhos in great numbers, for a Roman army of some twenty thousand was deployed over their territory. Learning of this garrison, Pyrrhos sent Leonnatos the Macedonian and "all the swiftest elements" of his army into Apulia, following close behind. Mistaking this for the main body of his army, the Romans attempted to withdraw and reform, but in the skirmishing that followed, Leonnatos and the Tarantine cavalry distinguished themselves and the Samnites were able to rally a growing army. The Romans retreated for the time being.
Subsequently, as winter set in, the Basileus would send Cineas to Rome with great gifts, and offered generous terms of peace. Although the Senate was intrigued, knowing they had been defeated in a great battle and caused only the slightest suffering to their foes, Caius Fabricius, the other Consul, counseled for war, and had many distinguished voices on his side. It was not being defeated by Pyrrhos which should concern them, he argued, but rather the uprising of their subjects, over whom until recently the Romans had enjoyed total supremacy. Pyrrhos carried with him the spark of insurrection - it was no good to simply make peace, he must be defeated so as to show the clients of Rome that victory was impossible.
When Cineas returned, he again cautioned Pyrrhos. The Romans had assembled an army twice the size of the one he had defeated at Heracleia, and still had two other armies in the north, and further manpower reserves still. Pyrrhos, aware of the risk, displayed a rare moment of caution, gathering his Samnite and Greek allies together and together they came to the decision that the best plan of action was to cross into Campania and draw the Romans into yet another field battle - wagering that in such a decisive action the Romans would surely see the futility of continued conflict.
Pyrrhos' army, scarcely diminished since leaving Eprios, was now augmented to perhaps twice its size by Italian tribesmen and allies drawn from the newly-aligned cities of Megale Hellas, who, having thrown their weight behind Pyrrhos knew that in defeat Rome would come down hard upon them. The Samnites themselves sent a significant but only partial force, fearing a secondary Roman army might come down on their homelands. Pyrrhos' army was enormous and in the hands of a less capable general might have proved unwieldy. However, he was confident that yet another victory would leave the Romans broken.
On a plain south of Beneventum, he would find himself proven otherwise. Pyrrhos went on the offensive from the beginning, but failed to surprise Fabricius, who saw the allied force approaching and deployed his army in good order. This time, he augmented the cavalry, who had broken so swiftly in the last battle, with elements of his third line, the triarii, veteran soldiers with long spears. To counteract the elephants, the archers had been given flaming arrows and the soldiers of the rear lines many javelins to frighten the beasts.
The right flank of the Roman army was anchored on a series of wooded hills to the south, filled with skirmishers and other irregular soldiers. Into this quagmire, Pyrrhos sent the Samnites, who had the most experience with such conditions. Meanwhile, he deployed his phalanx in a single unbroken line and hoped that the Romans once again would beat themselves against his pike while his cavalry struck and elephants provided the hammer blow to ensure victory. The elephants were deployed against the Roman left, as were all his finest troops.
Once again the Roman cavalry was routed, but this time the elephants were thrown into a panic. Three were killed and the rest retreated against the commands of their masters. Only once the Thessalian cavalry cleared the way would they be cajoled back into the battlefield, where they were employed to keep the Roman cavalry from returning to the field.
Cineas, commanding the phalanx, found himself continually hard-pressed to gain even an inch of ground, while Pyrrhos and his cavalry struggled to flank the enormous Roman army. While Pyrrhos was personally inspiring - the Eagle of Eprios, borne on the wings of his cavalry, he was also largely out of touch with the pace of the battle. Unlike in his previous engagements, his personal presence simply could not extend to his whole force, especially to the allied contingents. Without a broad view of the battle, command and control suffered.
The Romans were better able to maintain their organization, and send reserves where they were most needed, allowing exhausted units a chance to recover or be removed from the line entirely. Finally, to Pyrrhos' frustration, it was the Samnites who turned the tide of the battle, despite grievous losses putting the Roman right to rout. In spite of this, however, the Romans retreated in good order - mauled by the battle and continuously harassed by enemy cavalry, their casualties were roughly the same as at Heracleia, only now Pyrrhos' combined force had suffered close to five thousand losses. The Samnites had suffered perhaps the worst, and after decades of brutal losses at Roman hands they felt this latest tragedy acutely.
After Beneventum, the city of Neapolis defected after a council with Cineas - a boon for Pyrrhos, who had little patience for a protracted siege, and would be forced to bring up the equipment from Megale Hellas. However by this point, Pyrrhos was beginning to become frustrated with his victories. The Roman army was recovering to winter at Capua, rapidly coming back to full strength. If Pyrrhos was brilliant and capable, he was also mercurial to the extreme, and those men who had entered into his council by nature of their alliance were beginning to see that and fear for their own security. By the next campaigning season they hoped to march on Capua and expel the Romans from that city, after which point they believed they might have forces enough to assault Rome itself.
And yet certain men from Sicily came forward with designs to place the cities of Akragas, Syrakusa, and Leontinoi under his control - if only he would assist them against Carthage and rid them of their tyrants. While Pyrrhos considered this offer, thinking it might be a way to gain more men and ships to fight against the seemingly inexhaustible armies of Rome, another embassy came to him. Ptolemy Keraunos, Pyrrhos' one time benefactor and the murderer of the Megas Basileus Seleukos, had been captured and killed in battle. While the Makedonian noble Sosthenes held the line, he had no claim to the throne. Pyrrhos was invited to take Makedon for his own, if only he would bring his substantial army as well.
Three courses now lay open to Pyrrhos, and this was not necessarily new. All his life he had defined himself by his willingness to make bold decisions. Even in defeat, the gods granted him new opportunities. Makedon, once stripped away from him, could be his again. Or perhaps Sicily, the rich gateway to Libya would welcome him as a savior. The epithet Soter had always appealed to him... the citizens chanting his name in the streets, rather than the frosty and conflicted response of the Tarantines.
[Don't worry... I'm not stopping the Rise of the White Huns. This is a smaller, more self contained 'holiday' project. I've seen the descriptor "Timeline in a Week" thrown around here. It's not really that. It's just unlike White Huns I don't care to let this get open-ended and global.
I'm relying on Plutarch a lot for this project as well. Hopefully his biography of Pyrrhus is accurate.]