The Epirote Alexander - a short timeline

The Epirote Alexander

The Epirote Alexander

(By Practical Lobster)


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Fighting the Hydra

In 280, Basileus Pyrrhos Aeacidaes would begin his famous war against the rising power of Rome. The greatest tactician to come in the wake of Alexandros Megas and one of the foremost of the Diadochi, the legacy he would create for himself would be a complicated one. Born in a backwater, raised as a hostage, his rise to power was unlikely. His continued victories beyond that point, and the ease with which he gathered an army with which to achieve them, more unlikely still. When the citizens of Taras provoked war with the local power of Rome, he answered their call, because above all else he was ambitious, as all great men living in the shadow of Alexandros were.

From Thessaly came a certain man, a disciple of Demosthenes, named Cineas who associated himself with Pyrrhos. A minister and friend of the Basileus, it was his oratory that won over the assemblies of Megale Hellas, despite his own personal misgivings, which he expressed at length in private councils.

After assembling an enormous army, at its core some twenty-three thousand foot, three thousand horse, and twenty Asiatic elephants, Pyrrhos landed in Italy promptly and swiftly. Fortune, it seemed, favored him, for two days after his landing the seas were wracked with unseasonable storms, and though some of his ships were ruined his entire army had arrived unmolested and in good order.

In jubilant spirits, Pyrrhos spoke to his Companions, describing the storms as an omen that they must not turn back. The Tarentines, however, quickly soured the Epirote King's mood. Despite their own city being under threat, the number of soldiers they had mustered were far inferior to what they were capable of mustering, and despite excuses from the assembly Pyrrhos realized that little aid would be forthcoming. Accordingly, he seized power swiftly, securing the city and instituting martial law, mustering troops himself.

While these actions were unpopular, they achieved the desired results. Fresh hoplites were raised and Pyrrhos was thus able to move without waiting for further allies. An approaching Roman army under the Consul Laevinus aimed to first suppress the Lucanians and subsequently cut Taras off from the rest of Megale Hellas. It was this force that Pyrrhos aimed to intercept. Making camp on an open plain near the city of Heracleia, Pyrrhos awaited the Roman attack. After a brief council, it was determined that war was inevitable, and the two men, despite a measure of mutual admiration, prepared for battle.

Pyrrhos, observing the good order and discipline of the Roman camp, changed his initial plan, which had been to ambush the Romans mid-crossing with his cavalry. Instead, he allowed a large part of the Romans to cross over, that he might strike their flanks with his cavalry and elephants. The Romans, for their part, were cautious, seeing the clear plan of the enemy, but arranged as they were there was little to do but go forwards. Their horse were quickly swept aside and soon they were under attack from all sides.

The fighting quickly became intense, and despite their best efforts the Romans could not penetrate the Epirote line. Only on the left, where the hoplites of Taras were stationed, did the men waver as Meton, a great worthy of the city and an outspoken supporter of Pyrrhos was slain by a Roman javelin. Here the Romans very nearly broke through, but for the sudden arrival of Pyrrhos himself, who rode amongst the Romans and seemed untouchable, killing many and rallying the Tarantines to ever greater feats of valor.

Pyrrhos' cavalry broke off their assault several times, but with each subsequent charge they inflicted grievous losses on the Roman flanks - the Romans were crowded by the river and incapable of mounting an effective retreat until the entire line became a rout and was ridden down by the Thessalian cavalry. The Roman camp and its spoils were seized and Laevinus himself barely escaped.
Contemporary historians differ on Roman casualties - ranging from nine thousand to fifteen thousand. Many of these losses were prisoners, who were subsequently enslaved. What they do agree on is that Pyrrhos had lost perhaps a few hundred men to inflict such a great slaughter.

Subsequently the Lucanians and Samnites and many of the Greek cities would join Pyrrhos in open rebellion. However, the Samnites themselves could not join Pyrrhos in great numbers, for a Roman army of some twenty thousand was deployed over their territory. Learning of this garrison, Pyrrhos sent Leonnatos the Macedonian and "all the swiftest elements" of his army into Apulia, following close behind. Mistaking this for the main body of his army, the Romans attempted to withdraw and reform, but in the skirmishing that followed, Leonnatos and the Tarantine cavalry distinguished themselves and the Samnites were able to rally a growing army. The Romans retreated for the time being.

Subsequently, as winter set in, the Basileus would send Cineas to Rome with great gifts, and offered generous terms of peace. Although the Senate was intrigued, knowing they had been defeated in a great battle and caused only the slightest suffering to their foes, Caius Fabricius, the other Consul, counseled for war, and had many distinguished voices on his side. It was not being defeated by Pyrrhos which should concern them, he argued, but rather the uprising of their subjects, over whom until recently the Romans had enjoyed total supremacy. Pyrrhos carried with him the spark of insurrection - it was no good to simply make peace, he must be defeated so as to show the clients of Rome that victory was impossible.

When Cineas returned, he again cautioned Pyrrhos. The Romans had assembled an army twice the size of the one he had defeated at Heracleia, and still had two other armies in the north, and further manpower reserves still. Pyrrhos, aware of the risk, displayed a rare moment of caution, gathering his Samnite and Greek allies together and together they came to the decision that the best plan of action was to cross into Campania and draw the Romans into yet another field battle - wagering that in such a decisive action the Romans would surely see the futility of continued conflict.

Pyrrhos' army, scarcely diminished since leaving Eprios, was now augmented to perhaps twice its size by Italian tribesmen and allies drawn from the newly-aligned cities of Megale Hellas, who, having thrown their weight behind Pyrrhos knew that in defeat Rome would come down hard upon them. The Samnites themselves sent a significant but only partial force, fearing a secondary Roman army might come down on their homelands. Pyrrhos' army was enormous and in the hands of a less capable general might have proved unwieldy. However, he was confident that yet another victory would leave the Romans broken.

On a plain south of Beneventum, he would find himself proven otherwise. Pyrrhos went on the offensive from the beginning, but failed to surprise Fabricius, who saw the allied force approaching and deployed his army in good order. This time, he augmented the cavalry, who had broken so swiftly in the last battle, with elements of his third line, the triarii, veteran soldiers with long spears. To counteract the elephants, the archers had been given flaming arrows and the soldiers of the rear lines many javelins to frighten the beasts.

The right flank of the Roman army was anchored on a series of wooded hills to the south, filled with skirmishers and other irregular soldiers. Into this quagmire, Pyrrhos sent the Samnites, who had the most experience with such conditions. Meanwhile, he deployed his phalanx in a single unbroken line and hoped that the Romans once again would beat themselves against his pike while his cavalry struck and elephants provided the hammer blow to ensure victory. The elephants were deployed against the Roman left, as were all his finest troops.

Once again the Roman cavalry was routed, but this time the elephants were thrown into a panic. Three were killed and the rest retreated against the commands of their masters. Only once the Thessalian cavalry cleared the way would they be cajoled back into the battlefield, where they were employed to keep the Roman cavalry from returning to the field.

Cineas, commanding the phalanx, found himself continually hard-pressed to gain even an inch of ground, while Pyrrhos and his cavalry struggled to flank the enormous Roman army. While Pyrrhos was personally inspiring - the Eagle of Eprios, borne on the wings of his cavalry, he was also largely out of touch with the pace of the battle. Unlike in his previous engagements, his personal presence simply could not extend to his whole force, especially to the allied contingents. Without a broad view of the battle, command and control suffered.

The Romans were better able to maintain their organization, and send reserves where they were most needed, allowing exhausted units a chance to recover or be removed from the line entirely. Finally, to Pyrrhos' frustration, it was the Samnites who turned the tide of the battle, despite grievous losses putting the Roman right to rout. In spite of this, however, the Romans retreated in good order - mauled by the battle and continuously harassed by enemy cavalry, their casualties were roughly the same as at Heracleia, only now Pyrrhos' combined force had suffered close to five thousand losses. The Samnites had suffered perhaps the worst, and after decades of brutal losses at Roman hands they felt this latest tragedy acutely.

After Beneventum, the city of Neapolis defected after a council with Cineas - a boon for Pyrrhos, who had little patience for a protracted siege, and would be forced to bring up the equipment from Megale Hellas. However by this point, Pyrrhos was beginning to become frustrated with his victories. The Roman army was recovering to winter at Capua, rapidly coming back to full strength. If Pyrrhos was brilliant and capable, he was also mercurial to the extreme, and those men who had entered into his council by nature of their alliance were beginning to see that and fear for their own security. By the next campaigning season they hoped to march on Capua and expel the Romans from that city, after which point they believed they might have forces enough to assault Rome itself.

And yet certain men from Sicily came forward with designs to place the cities of Akragas, Syrakusa, and Leontinoi under his control - if only he would assist them against Carthage and rid them of their tyrants. While Pyrrhos considered this offer, thinking it might be a way to gain more men and ships to fight against the seemingly inexhaustible armies of Rome, another embassy came to him. Ptolemy Keraunos, Pyrrhos' one time benefactor and the murderer of the Megas Basileus Seleukos, had been captured and killed in battle. While the Makedonian noble Sosthenes held the line, he had no claim to the throne. Pyrrhos was invited to take Makedon for his own, if only he would bring his substantial army as well.

Three courses now lay open to Pyrrhos, and this was not necessarily new. All his life he had defined himself by his willingness to make bold decisions. Even in defeat, the gods granted him new opportunities. Makedon, once stripped away from him, could be his again. Or perhaps Sicily, the rich gateway to Libya would welcome him as a savior. The epithet Soter had always appealed to him... the citizens chanting his name in the streets, rather than the frosty and conflicted response of the Tarantines.

[Don't worry... I'm not stopping the Rise of the White Huns. This is a smaller, more self contained 'holiday' project. I've seen the descriptor "Timeline in a Week" thrown around here. It's not really that. It's just unlike White Huns I don't care to let this get open-ended and global.

I'm relying on Plutarch a lot for this project as well. Hopefully his biography of Pyrrhus is accurate.]
 
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Adventures in Makedon

It came to pass that as the embassy of Akragas departed, a Makedonian nobleman by the name of Peucestas arrived in the court of Pyrrhos and entreated him to return to the throne he had been forced to abandon by the armies of Lysimachos. A large faction of the nation would rise in favor of him, and Ptolemaios Keraunos was dead at the hands of the Gauls.

Pyrrhos made his decision with the usual decisiveness. It would not do to turn Carthage against him and his allies while the Romans still posed a threat. Sicily was accordingly off the table - for now. Rather, he would proceed to Makedon, and after saving it from King Brennus of the Gauls, he might turn the resources of that newly liberated country against Rome. Thus, Pyrrhos gave extravagant promises to Peucestas.

The following day, when the Basileus of the Epirotes announced this news to his own companions and the officers amongst his mercenaries, it was well-received. And yet when news spread to the citizens of Taras, their delegates were rightly incensed. Worried that their anger might spell the end of his alliance and in turn cause chaos in Italy, Pyrrhos met with Cineas and drafted a compromise of sorts. A significant portion, perhaps ten thousand men, of the Epirote army would remain in Italy under his son Ptolemaios and defend against the anticipated Roman counter-attack. Cineas would entreat the men of Taras to seek no separate peace but rather trust in Pyrrhos, and for a time the peoples of Megale Hellas were mollified.

Meanwhile, Pyrrhos would proceed with picked units with all haste to Pella. He would arrive at the critical moment. The Gallic armies, dealt a stinging blow by the crafty tactics of General Sosthenes, were regrouping into a single massive force, estimated to be as many as a hundred thousand armed men. However, Brennus commanded not merely an army but a migration. Women, children, and all the associated baggage of a civilization travelled with them. Brennus was forced to remain on the offensive by this simple fact - if he did not either keep moving or settle down, his people would starve.

Pyrrhos needed only to wait. He gathered a large army of Makedonians and his own soldiers, perhaps some forty thousand, and marched to north, gathering allies among the Thracians to augment his ranks. He would intercept Brennus near the small town of Seuthopolis.

Pyrrhos, like Alexandros before him, arrayed his flanks in echelon to draw in the superior enemy cavalry. Having learned from Sosthenes of the Gallic tactic of trimarcisia, wherein reserve horses were quickly brought up to replace loses, Pyrrhos realized that it had a fundamental weakness, namely that it required holding vast numbers of horse in reserve - and if such a reserve was panicked it could seriously hamper the mobility of his foes. Once the Gallic cavalry committed to a double envelopment of his flanks, Pyrrhos' war elephants caused chaos in the Gallic "squire" cavalry as they were trying to reform.

One more the Makedonian phalanx proved unbreakable - even as the Gauls streamed around the flanks, they found their center utterly routed, and Brennus was personally killed by one of Pyrrhos' bodyguards. Pyrrhos lost between one thousand and two thousand men - yet another tremendously lopsided victory. Thousands of Gauls were captured and sold into slavery, and the invading army was wholly broken. Pyrrhos returned to Pella to tremendous acclaim.

However, the Epriote king rapidly squandered his goodwill by draining much of the treasury and raising an army not to finish the destruction of the Gauls but rather to march once more into Italy and become its master. After the battle was over, Sosthenes took an immediate dislike to the adventurer king, perhaps sensing that now that his victory had been won and the spoils claimed Pyrrhos would be returning to Italy. In private, Sosthenes invited Antigonos, who had been biding his time in Asia, to return and claim the Makedonian throne, even going so far as to offer to assassinate Pyrrhos in a coup. However, Antigonos refused, not trusting Sosthenes and not relishing the prospect of another battle with Pyrrhos if the plan failed.

The Basileus, immune to and unaware of Sosthenes' treachery, left him in command of Makedonia as regent. Assembling a fresh corps of mercenaries from the defeated Gauls (especially the tribe of the Trocmi) and augmenting his own army with fresh Macedonian recruits, Pyrrhos returned to Italy. He promised these new recruits fertile land of Italy, despite having little plan for where such land might be acquired, and not owning any of it personally. Indeed, logistics and money were the greatest issues facing Pyrrhos. By now the Epirote treasury was coming under extreme strain, and his accumulated war chest was running dry. Such promises of land as the Basileus made to the Celts and Makedonians were the backbone of the Epirote army, it seemed. While Makedon provided a new source of income, it had its own affairs to manage, and Sosthenes, despite being a capable commander was stretched thin fighting several groups of resurgent Gauls in the north.

While Pyrrhos spent a year destroying the Gallic invasion and moving from spectacular triumph to spectacular triumph, Cineas fought a losing battle. Rome had been emboldened by Beneventum: the Roman commanders had seen not a catastrophic and costly defeat but rather a battle which was nearly won against a roughly equivalent force. Furthermore, with the news that Pyrrhos had left the peninsula, possibly for good, they felt confident going directly on the offensive.

Pyrrhos' son Ptolemaios Aeacidae was in his own right a capable commander. Despite his limited resources, he endeavored to make any Roman advance on Samnite lands as bloody as possible. He harassed the Roman advance around the rocky country of Aesernia and when repulsed from there he simply fell back into the mountains. Ptolemaios realized quickly the value of irregular, less rigid formations - his phalanx formations were unwieldy in this terrain, but by contrast his Celtic and Samnite-style soldiers excelled. It would be a lesson he would take to heart.

However, the numbers simply did not favor Ptolemaios. He was pushed back until, on the plains outside of Bovianum he was forced to fight. The consul Decimus Mus was unable to score a decisive victory (and indeed was killed in battle) but Ptolemaios retreated and the Samnite heartland once again fell under Roman occupation. Ptolemaios' army began to melt away, fleeing to protect their homelands over the protestations of Cineas. By autumn, however, Pyrrhos returned. The city of Taras, which had been rioting, was harshly suppressed and a fresh garrison of Makedonians placed over them. Cineas travelled the cities of Megale Hellas, rewarding their leaders with lavish gifts and hoping to secure their allegiance once more.

The arrival of Pyrrhos was also a blessing. A consular army under Sulpicius Saverrio laid siege to Neapolis, and the city was on the verge of surrendering until fresh Epirote reinforcements and massive shipments of grain arrived by ship. Shortly thereafter the elected assembly was quietly reduced in importance and a companion of Pyrrhos, Alketas the Molossian, was given command of the defense of the city, a task at which he excelled. The Romans were relentless and more than capable in siege craft, but they met their match in Greek engineering. Heavy siege bows such as the gastraphetes could threaten enemy soldiers at extreme range.

With Pyrrhos' permission and oversight, Ptolemaios spent much of the winter reforming some three thousand soldiers into units trained in the "Italian" style, lightly armored and uniformly equipped with heavy celtic shields known as the thureos, javelins, and hoplite spears. The subsequent year, Quintus Aemilius Papus and Cornelius Rufinus were elected consuls, with Rufinus overseeing the north, where the Cisapline Gauls were once again raiding, and Aemilius taking command of the roughly eighty thousand soldiers in the south.

As the campaign season began, Pyrrhos marched north to Neapolis, intending to crush the Roman army once and for all. The remarkable resistance of the Roman Republic had been possible because of manpower reserves which now were becoming thin. The Senate was wavering in their resolve, and the mere fact of Pyrrhos' return had proved to them that the war was far from over. Even their single victory had been qualified at best and cost them the life of a Consul. However, in the army, morale was still high. Despite the long, frustrating siege of Neapolis, news of Pyrrhos' arrival was met with relief by many. Finally, they would get the field battle they craved, rather than long hours of digging siege lines and building the engines of war.

Once again, Pyrrhos was outnumbered, and his local allies and auxiliaries were thin on the ground. Rumors of his crackdown in Taras and the effective coup in Neapolis had made the free Greeks wary of supporting him, and the Samnites were all but gone. Only a few scattered tribes contributed significant manpower, and of these the majority were Lucanians. This was Pyrrhos' war now, for all intents and purposes, the war of a Diadochi monarch against a Latin hegemony of city-states.

The Battle of Neapolis would be a set-piece battle on wide open terrain. A small reserve guarded the city, preventing Alketas from sallying out, but otherwise the entire Roman army committed. The Romans strategy was curious. They had found the pike phalanx formation difficult to penetrate, especially when supported by other troops. Their previous battles with Pyrrhos had each seen the flanks overrun, in spite of superior Roman numbers. Beginning to feel that they could not hold the flanks, they opted to reinforce their center, placing their most experienced veterans who had seen prior engagements with Pyrrhos' pikes there. Knowing that Pyrrhos lacked the tactical flexibility of his allies, they felt that now they could defeat individual phalanx units in detail.

Pyrrhos however had opted for a new plan as well. At intervals in his line he placed a single elephant, supported by a group of peltasts for protection - believing that this would prevent the elephants from coming to panic or disorder as they had in so many prior engagements. On his left he posted the famed Thessalian and Makedonian cavalry, led by his son Alexandros. On his right he posted a lesser force of mixed Celtic cavalry, the theuros-bearers, and his Gallic mercenaries who fought on foot. His archers were arrayed ahead of the common line to harass the Roman advance.

The battle opened with a decisive Epirote cavalry charge led by the King himself, sweeping away the Roman cavalry and allowing the Thessalians and Makedonians to take the Romans hard in the flank. However, as the phalanx advanced to support this attack, they found their own attack blunted. The "checkerboard" Roman formation prevented their phalanx from coming to bear all at once, and the elephants stalled in these gaps in the Roman line, where long spears were employed to gore and aggravate the beasts. On the other flank, the Celtic cavalry were put to rout, leaving the theuros-bearers to distinguish themselves against the remaining Roman and allied cavalry - but the envelopment Pyrrhos sought was not achieved.

As the armies broke apart, Pyrrhos joined the disordered center of his line, reforming his ranks and leading a charge straight into the Roman center, followed by his elite foot companions. In the thick of the fighting Pyrrhos took many wounds but did not cease for a moment his attack. As he became separated from his men, a bodyguard named Neoptolemaios rescued his Basileus at the cost of his own life. On the left, Alexandros' cavalry were forced to close the noose themselves, taking heavy losses but ultimately achieving their objective - several Roman formations began to retreat, leading to general chaos. The Celtic cavalry rallied and chased down the fleeing infantry with the Peltasts, and the very center of the Roman formation found themselves surrounded on all sides and was subjected to a mass slaughter before Pyrrhos, visibly wounded and slumping in his saddle, could regain order and accept their surrender.

The combined Makedonian/Epirote army took some eight thousand casualties, but these paled in comparison to the losses inflicted on the Romans. Fleeing back to their fortified camp, the survivors found that the Neapolitians had sallied forth and, led by Alketas and a unit of Tarantine cavalry, were wreaking bloody havoc in their camp. Thousands more died in chaotic every-man-for-himself engagements such as this. More than just a humiliating defeat, this was a true massacre. In the coming weeks Pyrrhos would arrive at Capua, where the local Prefect had been executed and a cabal of local officials greeted him with cautious optimism.

In Rome, general panic became the order of the day. A war hero named Quintus Marcius Philippus was made dictator, and negotiation with Pyrrhos suddenly seemed the only tenable option. Losses were so significant that general restrictions on who could be called up for the levy were relaxed, and emergency repairs and strengthening projects were undertaken on the walls of Rome, paid for out of the pockets of wealthy citizens.

However, Pyrrhos' position was weaker than it appeared. His army, especially his elite units upon which he defended, were badly bloodied. The spirits of the Samnites were broken after so many defeats against Rome, and it seemed that all of Italy had not yet forgiven his brief adventure in Makedonia. Megale Hellas provided only token support. He squandered his victory by engaging in vain celebrations and creating a monument out of captured Roman shields. Making a great sacrifice to Zeus Areius for further victory, he met with Cineas. Had he suffered such losses and gained little, Pyrrhos said, he might had been inspired to turn back. But though the Gods challenged him, and punished his pride, he now stood at the very brink of victory. How now could any man hold them back from taking Rome? And once all of Italy was theirs, what could be next but Sicily and Carthage? A western Empire lay within their grasp, one which, with the resources of Italy could surely rival the conquests of Alexandros.
 
The only thing

The development of the Battle is quite believable .. giving leeway to random factors that could affect the result.

The only thing, I find strange it's that they have withdrawn from the battle on the run, so often when the Roman defeats often consisted of the death of all legionaries in place by the structure itself of the Legion as a fighting force that can be defeated and massacred but hardly happen to surrender or be defeated to the point that it can become disorganized and lose their cohesion.:(

Besides precisely their commanders and legionaries would try to avoid a repeat of the infamous and disastrous, for all Roman citizen, Furculae Caudinae.

*It's awesome that some Greeks of Magna Grecia, with its history of war against Rome, have had the idea, the means and the skill to try to assault successfully a legionary camp.:confuso:
In a situation like the one described I doubt there is much fear in Rome... there might have are feelings like anger, worry, determination and especially the reaffirmation of the will to keep fighting ... and with good prospects since most of the material and human resources Romans, were not affected by the war in the south of the peninsula, much less, in my opinion of course ,that Rome could become besieged by the forces of Pyrrhos.

Do not forget the size of the territory and the Roman population, to conduct observations on the real capabilities and those perceived by their opponents.


That said the final outcome end is yet to be defined and whether Pyrrhos result can force a commitment to the Romans or must continue to fight a war that even with the Italian Poleis contributing to the war effort, this remains than war of attrition .. ..
 
The only thing, I find strange it's that they have withdrawn from the battle on the run, so often when the Roman defeats often consisted of the death of all legionaries in place by the structure itself of the Legion as a fighting force that can be defeated and massacred but hardly happen to surrender or be defeated to the point that it can become disorganized and lose their cohesion.
Every battle of Pyrrhus equivalent OTL campaign ended in a Roman rout.

Nor was there a meaningful equivalent to Caudine Forks - in my timeline, the harassing of the Romans from the Samnite foothills was a failure that saw the Samnites and their Greek allies pushed back to an open plain and strategically defeated in a tactically inconclusive field battle.

Rome's armies at this point are still relatively early in their evolution. Over the course of the Samnite war they evolved out of the hoplite style tactics, but the manipular structure is very much in its infancy. A capable tactician like Pyrrhos could break it, I think. Especially a Pyrrhos who isn't being worn down by a string of unaccountable failures, but rather still has hope and energy.

It's awesome that some Greeks of Magna Grecia, with its history of war against Rome, have had the idea, the means and the skill to try to assault successfully a legionary camp.:confuso:
The Romans had only recently begun fortifying their camps significantly, and during a relatively confused retreat it doesn't sound illogical that their camp might be overrun - its not as if fortified camps were an original Roman invention, after all. ;)

To answer the last part of your post, I think that the losses the Romans have suffered currently eclipse in proportion those that a much more dedicated Roman army suffered against Hannibal in that war, and have happened much quicker. Plutarch writes that after Heraclea the Romans considered making peace with Epiros. This history's version of Heraclea and Asculum were both decisively better victories for Pyrrhos, so it seems reasonable for the Romans to fear at the least the dissolution of their hegemony on the peninsula - not to mention a resurgent Samnite or Rasna, whether or not that is realistic or actually possible.

Also I believe you're right, besieging Rome would be an almost impossible task. However, that wouldn't necessarily prevent a sort of "Hannibal at the Gates" mentality from developing.


The main point of this TL so far has been to show a history where Pyrrhos won more decisively and accordingly is in a better position to learn from the Romans even as the Romans learn from him.
 
The King with the most elephants...

In Rome the Consuls nominated as Dictator Marcius Philippus, and thus granted him imperium to defeat Pyrrhos and restore order on the peninsula. He counseled the Senate and the people against fear, and led lavish sacrifices to gain the favor of the gods. In a great speech, he rallied the courage of Rome and assured them that Alexandros himself could never have taken their walls. Furthermore, he assembled new forces of great size and vigor during the winter, drawing up fresh reinforcements from the city and its hinterlands. The loss of many southern Roman colonies to rebellion and Pyrrhos, while humiliating from a prestige standpoint, had if nothing else expanded the manpower pool somewhat as refugees fled to the city.

Rome would prove an impossible dream for Pyrrhos. With his ambition and his confidence at a peak after the battle of Neapolis, he marched directly on Rome, only to be reversed after some inconclusive skirmishing and made to retreat. Tactically clever, Pyrrhos recognized almost immediately that to attack the Servian wall with large field armies still opposing him was folly. Investing the city, even if it could be done, would depend upon additional allies and the total collapse of the Roman armies. On the diplomatic front he had seen little advancement. The Etruscans, fearing the wrath of Rome and believing Pyrrhos to be unreliable, refused to betray their Roman "allies". Pyrrhos' loose coalition was alternately exhausted or distrusted him as well. Cities such as Taras provided largely unreliable troops, given their military occupation. The rest of Megale Hellas, despite being unoccupied, was cautious. They favored negotiations, but Rome unconditionally refused the offer, discussing only the ransom of prisoners.

Pyrrhos spent most of the spring of 277 securing his position in Campania, a wealthy Latin region, closely tied to the Romans, whose territory he viewed as an excellent reward for those soldiers who had been promised grants of land. He laid siege to the town of Nola, which fell to an unknown act of treachery after two months. The final assault however was a bloody one, with five hundred of his theuros-bearers slain, and the city itself put to sack. After this he would advance on a series of Roman colonies - Suessa, Vesciam, and Minturnae, burning them to the ground as well.

During this time, the Basileus sent his son Alexandros and the greater quantity of his cavalry north, to raid the fertile lands along the river Tolerus, where many Romans lived. After some inconclusive skirmishing, the Roman army was drawn out into the valley and Pyrrhos moved his whole force to meet them. Pyrrhos was eager for a direct engagement - the months he spent torching and raiding in Campania and Latium were an expression of his wrath at being denied an easy victory by the Romans, but were also part of a calculated plan to draw the Romans out from the relative safety of the north and onto a battlefield of Pyrrhos' choosing - the sort of flat, open plains where his phalanx and cavalry could be put to maximum use.

The battle of Fabrateria, as it became known, was tactically inconclusive. Pyrrhos maneuvered his troops by night so that as dawn broke they were upon the Roman camp - attacking from several directions. However, Marcius Philippus had ensured the camp was well-fortified and repulsed this attack with ease, forming up his legions and sallying out from behind the camp walls, putting isolated Greek units to rout. However, the Romans lacked an overall strategy - owing to their surprise they did not pursue quickly enough to break Pyrrhos' army. Riding among his men, Pyrrhos rallied them once more and the Makedonian phalanx crashed into the disorganized lines of Romans, pushing them back. The battle swung back and forth for the better part of the day, and by nightfall both sides were exhausted.

The Romans refused to cede the field, and the next day both armies arrayed themselves on the same ground, now somewhat muddy from overnight rain. As the Romans advanced in their manipular formation, they came under heavy fire from Pyrrhos' mercenary archers and peltasts - fire which they returned less effectually against the loose formations opposing them. Temporarily bogged down, they pressed the attack and another day of inconclusive fighting commenced. The Epirotes made a stand across a small creek-bed, a position that proved difficult to directly attack but also made it difficult to the Epriotes to meaningfully gain ground. On Pyrrhos' side, the only Celts distinguished themselves, making vicious charges into the tired ranks of Romans and making the most advantage of their light armor and long swords. However, it was insufficient. The Roman maniples broke the Epirote left after a bodyguard of Pyrrhos', wearing his armor in a ruse, was gored by a javelin. Only mutual exhaustion after two days of hard fighting, it seems, saved the Epirotes from being routed or destroyed. Pyrrhos himself standing tall so that his soldiers might see him, rallied the left and pushed back.

Finally, however, it was the allied Hellenic army which retreated, and the Romans held the field. For the first time, they had truly triumphed over Pyrrhos. Historians have questioned the efficacy of Pyrrhos' tactics. Most accounts seem to indicate that his customary genius and personal bravery was lacking. His son Ptolemaios, an excellent tactician and counselor to the Basileus was absent for unclear reasons, and Alexandros' cavalry was of little use in either assaulting the camp or the muddy creek-bed fighting of the second day. Pyrrhos it seems was simply tired - after his scheme on the first day failed, his tactics amounted to little more than a holding action to save face in front of his allies and men.

A demoralized march back along the coast was in order. The Romans pursued, aiming to lay siege to Capua and perhaps force another engagement with Pyrrhos' heavily exhausted forces, which perhaps numbered no more than thirty thousand against a Roman army that was swelled by the arrival of yet another wave of fresh reinforcements. En route to Capua, the destruction of many of their colonies and the general slaughter that had been Pyrrhos' recent policy inspired great wrath in the Roman rank-and-file.

Pyrrhos, knowing that his position was growing weaker, sent instructions to Epiros and Makedonia, demanding fresh reinforcements from Sosthenes. The general refused outright, and this time, Antigonos agreed to return to Makedon, sensing Pyrrhos was on his last legs. The battle of Fabrateria was widely reported as a catastrophic defeat for Pyrrhos, and this may have influenced his decision. Whatever the reason, Antigonos would have barely any time to enjoy his throne. Within mere weeks he would be fleeing into exile once more.

Antiochos, the Basileus of Syria, sailed to Makedon with a great force. He aimed to complete his father's conquests, and having suppressed insurrection at home, he found himself for the first time in a position to do so. On his arrival, Sosthenes offered only token resistance, negotiating all the while for a position within Antiochos' court. When he finally received a minor office and some sizable estates (far from Makedon) he was content and surrendered totally, leaving Antigonos heavily outnumbered. At the sight of the Syrian banners marching on Pella, his army mutinied and Antigonos fled into Illyria with a few loyal companions, barely escaping with his life. Antiochos would round out the year by taking Thrace, fighting a famous battle where his war elephants annihilated the Thracian columns. Pella became a nominal capital of the Syrian/Makedonian kingdom, and Antiochos was now undisputed ruler of almost the entirety of Alexandros' Kingdom.

When Pyrrhos learned of the loss of Makedon, he sent his son Alexandros to petition Ptolemaios Philadelphos for assistance in person, for additional mercenaries and elephants, or failing that coin to raise new soldiers. He was rebuffed. The Basileus of Egypt was deeply afraid of Antiochos, and needed every last man in Hollow Syria. What Ptolemaios Philadelphos could not have known was that Antiochos was only now realizing the extent to which Pyrrhos still had an intact army. The Seleucid army could not return until the threat in Italy was dealt with.

Cineas offered Pyrrhos only hard advice. A significant portion of his army was Makedonian, and Pyrrhos had anticipated that the whole Kingdom would be his son Alexandros' inheritance. However, if he were to leave Italy, the situation on the peninsula would perhaps forever be out of his control. He might leave behind a garrison as he had last time, but if he did so he would be facing all the armies of Syria and Makedon without his own full strength. As the campaigning season drew to a close, Pyrrhos and most of his army found themselves in Neapolis. To their north, a paltry garrison defended Capua, and the Celtic cavalry did their best to interrupt Roman supply lines.

From the high-water mark of 278, where Pyrrhos had believed Rome potentially within reach, the entire situation had deteriorated immensely. If the Romans were tired and scraping the bottom of their manpower reserves together to form legions, Pyrrhos' army had no reserves to call upon, and was significantly demoralized. The myth of Pyrrhos' invincibility had been shattered at Fabrateria, and with it the hope of gathering new allies.

The path ahead was once again unclear.

[So, where to go from here? Without the Galatian threat and with Makedon in much less stable shape than in OTL, Antiochos as we've seen poses a massive threat. Without Galatians, the Egyptian military will also be hamstrung down the line.

I think Pyrrhos will probably return to Makedon, but I'm curious what you guys think he should do. Trying to fight Antiochos seems rather hopeless, doesn't it?]
 
I don't know. He seems to be up against the wall, with no sufficient means to turn anywhere really. Or rather, wasn''t there this Sicilian offer? He might try that...
 
To go up against a Sicilian when death is on the line

All it took to make a King was an army. In the old days it had not been so - men owed their allegiance to tribe and to city. But Alexandros Megas had changed all that. In the bloody aftermath of his short and meteoric life his generals had become kings at spearpoint. Legitimacy was born from strength. Pyrrhos, as a student of history, knew this truth well. Even demoralized, isolated, and overmatched on all fronts Pyrrhos still commanded a veteran, disciplined army which knew well the capacity of their leader.

It was Pyrrhos' companions who would lift the spirits of their lord and king. A league of cities, aligned with Syrakousai had become once again embroiled in a war against the city of Carthage and that war had been going poorly. Pyrrhos might draw reinforcements and new strength from the cities there and still carve out his own kingdom. Makedon could wait - Antiochos was strong now. His soldiers called him "victor" like his dead father. But Antiochos would not be able to remain in Makedon indefinitely, nor did Pyrrhos wager he would cross into the "wintry Dodone" and persecute a war against the tribes of Epiros.

Sooner or later, Antiochos would leave a regent in Pella and set sail once more. The most probable situation seemed to be that he would take his great army and make war on the Lagid garrisons in Koile Syria. Pyrrhos was a thorn in his side, nothing more.

Sending an embassy, Pyrrhos acknowledged Antiochos as "Great King and Hegemon", implying a concession of his claim on the Makedonian throne (not for the first time) and politely informed the King that he would gladly never return to Makedon if only his campaigns in Italy could receive some assistance. Impossibly wealthy and more than willing to compromise, Antiochos provided a great sum of wealth to the embassies, in exchange for assurances Pyrrhos would never make war against Syria or seek to retake Makedon.

With this treaty negotiated, Antiochos returned with the bulk of his army to Syria, stopping only to briefly to assert a loose and politically meaningless hegemony over the Peloponnese. The Epirote embassy meanwhile returned with the spoils of their negotiations, with which Pyrrhos was magnanimous. Critically, he hired fresh mercenaries but also sent lavish gifts to the councils of various allied governments at the advice of Cineas, a potent move which prevented some of the anger that had been felt last time Pyrrhos abandoned Italy.

The campaigning season of 276 opened with Pyrrhos, commanding a combined force of some thirty thousand soldiers and two hundred war galleys, landing in Sicily. First he targeted the Mamertines, a numerous and warlike people who had made tributaries of many of the Hellenic cities in northern Sicily. In several swift battles he overcame them and their collectors, subduing them utterly and leaving a garrison in Messana.

With this foothold, Pyrrhos seemed to regain his previous vigor. He marched quickly on the city of Eryx, and leading personally the assault upon that formidable fortress, he took the city. In the aftermath of this victory he took part in great revels and luxurious sacrifices to the gods. However, the Greeks of Syrakousai greeted him with suspicion and distrust. Sostratos, the local tyrant, felt he had little need of Pyrrhos' aid (which had been two years too late to prevent the humiliating subjugation of many once independent cities) and found his demeanor too imperial and too haughty. But for the time being they put aside their differences and routed an army of Carthaginian mercenaries near Segesta. After this battle, Pyrrhos' troops proclaimed him King of Sicily - yet another insult to Sostratos.

After his easy victory at Segesta, Pyrrhos advanced on Lilybaion, laying siege to it from land and sea. However his fleet, under the command of Ptolemaios, came under attack by the Carthaginian navy, and was forced to retreat. Only once the Sostratos sent his own navy for reinforcement were the Greeks able to rejoin the siege. But as the months wore on, it became clear Lilybaion was too well fortified to be easily taken. It would be midsummer before the city would fall - and once it did, conflict between Sostratos and Pyrrhos was only a matter of time.

The Syrakousian tyrant, would, under any other circumstances, expect almost total hegemony over Sicily to follow from his victory. However, Pyrrhos treated him as yet another subject, viewing Syrakousai as no different than the cities of Megale Hellas. He explained to Sostratos that he would be raising an army from the island, collecting taxes, and then going north to prosecute the war. In his absence, Pyrrhos continued, he would leave his son Helenos as regent and co-King, and Sostratos would be his councilor and first among his ministers.

At this Sostratos became incensed and recalled his fleet to Syrakousai, and decamped with his army, to gather allies among the free cities of the island. Pyrrhos could not afford the delay. In a notable incident, his embassy to the city of Gela was murdered, and the Syrakousai incensed the other free Greeks, leaving him with only uneasy control over the rest of the island, and garrisons only in Eryx, Lilybaion, and Messana. Ironically, the only power to enthusiastically answer his call for troops and ships were the Mamertines, who immediately dispatched forces to Italy after Cineas asked them to raid Latium and offered them whatever plunder they could carry from that territory.

Cineas would spend the rest of the year overseeing the settling Celts and Makedonians on the land freshly seized from the citizens of Carthage. Now of advanced age, he expressed little desire to resume campaigning, and Pyrrhos left him as a minister to Helenos. His plans to leave Sicily, however, had to be put on indefinite hold. The Greeks of Sicily were largely turned against him, especially after hearing word of his plans to settle barbarians on territory they viewed as rightfully Greek. They raised an enormous army, but it was primarily massed ranks of hoplites - lacking in heavy cavalry and the long pike phalanxes of a Successor King, their engagement was a total disaster. Sosthenes himself was killed, and his replacement, Aristoxenos proved much more tractable.

Shortly thereafter, Pyrrhos would leave for Italy, arriving just in time to spend the latter half of autumn and winter in Taras. His army itself was changing rapidly. Fighting against the Romans and Celts had taught him new tactics which he made the most of. The theuros-bearers represented an increasingly large detachment of his forces - new soldiers raised were drilled with the Celtic longshield and with javelins, a cheaper alternative to the heavy hoplites favored by the Greeks of Megale Hellas. His phalanx had adapted as well - employing slightly shorter pikes allowed them to be a more flexible formation on the uneven terrain of Italy. The elephant corps, reduced to half the size it had once been, was now better armored, equipped with heavy leather armor around the sensitive face and front.

In Pyrrhos' absence, Q. Marcius Philippus had made great strides. Reclaiming Capua and Cumae, he had largely secured Campania once more, and a secondary army, under one L. Maximus Corvus had won a sweeping victory against a combined army of Tarantines and Bruttians at Luceria. Once again it seemed only Pyrrhos was capable of winning meaningful victories against the Roman army. With the Tarantines routed and the allies scattered, mostly seeking only to defend their own territory, the situation in Italy had deteriorated much as Pyrrhos had predicted. So long as the Romans remained on the offensive in the south, their typical stubbornness was transformed into an almost fanatical assurance of victory.

On his march north, however, Pyrrhos had gathered fresh soldiers from Kroton, Lokroi, and Thourioi. Ironically, his swift return had done much to restore Greek confidence in him. In the streets citizens cheered his name as Defender of the Hellenes and conqueror of the Carthaginians. The latter was ironic, because Carthage had signed no treaty, and most of Pyrrhos' campaigning had been against Greeks. However, Pyrrhos had done much to cast Sosthenes as a collaborator who worked with the Carthaginians - an easy task given that in 278 he had turned his city into an effective tributary of Carthage in exchange for the position of tyrant. In a rare victory for Pyrrhos' diplomatic acumen, he managed to leave Sicily unsullied by his tyrannical actions, and seemingly in the proper moment to once again stop the relentless march of the Romans.

As a cold winter set in, Pyrrhos met with his adversary, the one commander who had come closest to besting him. Proper negotiations were off the table, but Pyrrhos sought the release of notable Tarantines captured at Luceria, and several Samnite nobles. Magnanimous and confident, Marcius Philippus agreed. He had every reason to be confident. The number of Roman soldiers in the field was at a new height. Pyrrhos' army was still largely the same force that had left Eprios five years previously. No matter what reinforcements he called upon, the best he seemingly could do was replace casualties. Marcius Philippus was perfectly comfortable with this sort of war of attrition. He was a veteran, and he knew that Rome excelled at such long wars.

However the next year would see Pyrrhos move with unexpected speed. Fearing the inexorable advance of two Roman armies, each individually larger than his own, he moved from Taras against Luceria, where L. Maximus Corvus was encamped. By this juncture, Pyrrhos knew the land. He was able to avoid Corvus' attempts to lead him into rough terrain and indeed draw the commander into a battle on his terms by retaking Luceria with treachery and finally sealing the noose by taking Aecae. By the time Q. Marcius Philippus had learned of Pyrrhos' whereabouts and turned north, Corvus was forced into a lopsided battle.

The Roman army fought with remarkable distinction, refusing to break. Thousands were taken prisoner and thousands more massacred after Pyrrhos used the classic hammer-and-anvil tactics, augmented by the flexible theuros infantry whose tactical mobility made the phalanx far more versatile. Flush from this victory, Pyrrhos marched south, engaging Philippus in skirmishing near wooded Asculum but refusing to give battle. As Pyrrhos continued to march south, Philippus did not take the bait and pursue, but rather rallied and unified the two field armies before cautiously pursuing, aiming to drive Pyrrhos south into Calabria and pin him there.

Philippus knew that the Epirote fleet had returned to Sicily, where it was needed to defend against the threat of Carthaginian revenge. Pyrrhos lacked the strategic mobility granted to him by a strong navy, having only the poorly-coordinated allied fleets at his disposal. It was not improbable that his coastal cities could now be properly besieged, if only the Epirote army could be handed at least another qualified stalemate such as at Fabrateria. Pyrrhos had already pushed his men hard - they had suffered and fought hard for five years and yet conquered little.

Philippus finally cornered Pyrrhos as he aimed to cross the Aufidus River, falling on his rearguard at a time that the river was unseasonably torrential and accordingly difficult to cross. With his army divided on each side of a bridge, Pyrrhos found himself engaged in some of the hardest fighting of his life. He seemed to be a man possessed by the gods, personally driving back the Roman assaults. The theuros soldiers distinguished themselves as well, holding the line while phalangites and the elite shield-bearers could be brought up. Meanwhile, a Makedonian named Parmenides with the scout cavalry identified another, lesser crossing away downstream, and brought this to the attention of some of the Royal Companions.

Soon, a large detachment of cavalry and infantry were racing across, allowing the newly-promoted commander of horse, Apollonios, to lead an attack against the Roman horse, drive them off and take the body of Roman infantry in the flank. While they were driven back, the Romans again refused to rout and flee, but rather withdrew in remarkably good order. Casualties on both sides were remarkably light, with few maniples seeing direct engagement due to the crowded nature of the battle. However, Philippus had lost confidence and most of his cavalry, and feared an encirclement such as at Luceria.

This caution would result in his humiliation. The general feeling among the Romans was that they had not been defeated. Philippus' retreat was politically untenable, even if it saved one of the few remaining Roman field armies at a time when there were almost no reinforcements to call upon without seriously harming next year's harvest. Philippus, more acutely than most in his "war faction" saw the danger in squandering another army.

Time was on the side of the Romans. Sooner or later, Pyrrhos would face another opportunity or threat. His fortunes were bound by chaos, liable to change at any moment. That he once again was predominant was irrelevant. He was a consummate gambler, but gamblers always lost eventually...

Meanwhile, in Rome, politics had become single-minded. The humiliations of the early Pyrrhic war had been largely forgotten, and the peace faction had shrunk as frustration and revanchist sentiment grew. Post- Fabrateria, Pyrrhos was proven to be not invincible. Even as Rome's capacity to wage war diminished, its desire for victory grew.

Elsewhere in the world

In 275, Antiochos "Megas" would launch his invasion of Koile Syria, leading perhaps eighty thousand soldiers against Ptolemiaos Philadelphos. His satraps in Asia Minor targeted the Ptolemaic holdings there as well, forcing the Lagid armies to fight on all fronts. While he possessed a powerful navy, the sister-loving king found himself overmatched on land. A string of humiliating defeats would follow, and Antiochos would spend the next three years reducing Ptolemaic fortifications. A stream of fresh Makedonian reinforcements and a powerful navy allowed him to strip the Lagids of all overseas possessions with the exception of Cyprus.

275 also marked the capture of the Ardiaei city of Skodra by the exiled Antigonos Gonatas and a band of Aetolian mercenaries, and the beginning of the Hellenic Illyrian Kingdom. It would prove to be his enduring legacy, moreso than his various abortive attempts to rule Makedon. However for now the small rump state consisted largely of Skodra and environs, and was largely ignored by the great powers of the time period. The clash of the titanic Seleucid and Lagid Empires for control over the Eastern Mediterranean allowed most contemporaries and indeed later scholars to overlook the ongoing process of Hellenization and state formation in Illyria, Thrace, and Dacia.

The Sicilian city of Akragas erupted into open revolt, financed by Carthage. Within a month, a Carthaginian army numbering 40,000 arrived once more, under the command of a general named Hasdrubal, and Lilybaion fell with unexpected swiftness, there being many sympathizers to Carthaginian rule in the city. Against all odds, the Greeks of Sicily seemed remarkably willing to side with Carthage, massacring Epirote garrisons and rising against the barbarian landholders empowered by Cineas.

The old magistrate himself met his end at the hands of soldiers in Lilybaion. Helenos, Pyrrhos' son, fled under pursuit from a brigade of Numidian cavalry, but with few options he came among the Mamertines, who immediately captured him and ransomed him to the deep pockets of the Carthaginians. Almost overnight, there was a new hegemon in Sicily. By the time word reached Pyrrhos, he had just won at the Aufidus.

[Tomorrow I'll be updating the Rise of the White Huns! Today I wanted to keep going with this alternate tale of Pyrrhos' life while I still have inspiration and ideas. Salvador called it, a trip to Sicily was in the cards. Like most things in this timeline, the common theme is that Pyrrhos is in a better position overall. However, Pyrrhos being in a better position doesn't mean much in the long run - he's up against a lot of powerful forces still.

I'm not huge on historical determinism, but Pyrrhos is one of those guys that no matter how hard he tries and how well he does I can't help but see bigger problems down the road for him.]
 
I'm not huge on historical determinism, but Pyrrhos is one of those guys that no matter how hard he tries and how well he does I can't help but see bigger problems down the road for him.

I was actually going to mention that--yeah, he's an amazing general but the fact remains--well, there things that are tough to avoid no matter how many PoDs you grant, and Pyrrhos tendency to try and solve problems by heading out and invading somewhere else... tended to have easily foreseeable effects...
 
I was actually going to mention that--yeah, he's an amazing general but the fact remains--well, there things that are tough to avoid no matter how many PoDs you grant, and Pyrrhos tendency to try and solve problems by heading out and invading somewhere else... tended to have easily foreseeable effects...

Yep. I'm not pretending this timeline doesn't have everything that can go well for Pyrrhos go well, more or less. The problem is that doing that within realistic constraints means Pyrrhos is never going to stop running into problems from some quarter or other.

From the research I did, I quickly discovered a person who was obviously a brilliant tactician and a good leader. But more than his tendency to get distracted or frustrated and go off on adventures, I found a person who tends to leave places resenting him, and I think that was Pyrrhos' big flaw maybe even more than his famously fickle personality. He let his Celtic mercenaries pillage Aigai, he made the Sicilians treat him like a King, he totally ignored the Tarantines and put them down with force when they objected.

Wherever he went he tended to leave masses of enemies behind him.
 
The fall of the Eagles

As another winter came to a close, the fortunes of Rome had reached a low ebb. The Republic had been in a state of almost constant conflict since the beginning of the Third Samnite War, and manpower losses during these two conflicts, especially the Pyrrhic war, would spell the end of their hegemonic ambitions.

After his questionable victory at the Aufidus River, Pyrrhos was determined to give the death blow. He pursued the Romans northwest towards Asculum and then into Campania, which was once again devastated by the advancing allied column. Philippus, for his part, was not able to arrest the Epirote advance and fell back to a defensible position near Praeneste, where he met fresh Roman reinforcements, a motley collection of poorly trained soldiers who included many freed slaves and criminals - a shocking but necessary lapse of the normally strict Roman recruitment standards.

Pyrrhos elected not to pursue Philippus so far as Praeneste. He expected that, as campaigning season drew to a close the Romans would by now be forced to seek terms. Reliable intelligence seemed to indicate that the Romans were on their last legs - it had been an exhausting war for both sides. The experiences of previous years had tempered his normal energy with caution. Attempting to mount a direct assault on Rome was foolish.

Waiting was simpler. Among the Tyrsenoi (who called themselves Rasna) a rebellion finally broke out, owing to the weakness of the Roman hold on their territories. After Aufidus the city of Aritim (Arretium) rose in rebellion against Rome and many others soon followed, reforming the federation which had been called the League of Twelve Cities or Dodecapoli. Their army forced the Roman occupiers and colonists to flee south towards Rome, and finally the city was surrounded. Ptolemaios rode north with an honor guard, circumventing the Roman lines and negotiating a treaty of alliance between Pyrrhos and the Tyrsenoi.

Philippus lost his office shortly thereafter, being replaced by two new Consuls, Cornelius Rufinus and Fabius Licinus. Their strategy was simple, and possessed the traditional Roman stubbornness in the face of overwhelming odds - fight to the bitter end. Pyrrhos was not invincible, nor were his allies. Eventually they would tire.
The next year, Rome was besieged by a combined Tyrsenoi, Samnite, and Hellenic army. However, the two major commanders, Pyrrhos himself and Mamarce, the appointed Tyrsenoi commander quarreled frequently. Mamarce correctly estimated that Pyrrhos' alliance with all of Italy was purely one of convenience. At the slightest excuse he would turn on his newfound allies and expect to rule them as a sovereign king. Accordingly, Mamarce knew he had to be the one to take Rome, or at least ensure that Pyrrhos was too weakened to march north and subjugate his people.

Pyrrhos for his part was equally distracted by news from Sicily, where his son was a hostage and the Carthaginians were utterly dominant. Returning to Sicily, however, was a dangerous prospect. Carthage had recovered their previous territory in Sicily and was in a hegemonic position over almost the entire island. Syracuse remained the only holdout, and even Syracuse was not so much loyal to Pyrrhos as a stalwart enemy of Carthage. Furthermore, returning would only give Rome a chance to rebuild and turn his allies against him.

Rome itself was a tough nut to crack. Starvation would take time that Pyrrhos simply did not have. He urged his men on bloody assault after assault against the Severian Walls, with minimal success - but each time he attacked, Mamarce was forced to throw his own men against the defenses, lest the city fall solely due to Pyrrhos' efforts. The Rasna general would much rather have let Rome starve, but Pyrrhos was on a stricter timetable than that. By midsummer, Syracuse had signed a separate peace treaty with Carthage[1], and the Epirote feared that the Carthaginians might intervene in Italy so as to weaken him further. Shortly after the treaty was signed, a Carthaginian ambassador travelled to besieged Rome. Upon seeing the weakening state of the defenses, Pyrrhos impressed upon him the futility of aiding Rome, and pled for the return of his son. He agreed to abandon his claims to Sicily and pay a large indemnity in a year's time.

Finally, Hellenic engineering prevailed. An enormous ramp, built at the cost of some thousand allied lives, allowed the Greeks to assault the walls directly. Pyrrhos' elite infantry were first into the breach, led by the general himself and his son Alexandros. As the Romans diverted men to stem the breach, the Tyrsenoi gained their own footholds in several places. Tyrsenoi hoplites captured much of the northern half of the city before a fire began to engulf the city. Both the allied Greeks and the Rasna retreated temporarily, allowing the fire to burn out before resuming what quickly became a chaotic sack. In the chaos small skirmishes between various allied contingents developed. Pyrrhos' bodyguard and cavalry commander, Apollonios, was dispatched to try to end the fighting but he was struck on the head with a roof-tile and slain.

Finally, by midday the next day the Rasna withdrew from the city entirely. Rome was devastated. Many of the city's notables had died in the fighting, and the Epirote soldiers, especially those who had served for the duration of the war, took great pleasure in exacting their brutal revenge on the Romans. The wealth of Rome and the value of its people sold as slaves more than refilled the Epirote war-chest. However, it would not be enough to meet the Carthaginian ransom, or to provide the army Pyrrhos intended to use immediately thereafter to destroy Carthage.

He sent Ptolemaios north with half his army and most of the cavalry, and Alexandros south as a diplomat, to gather additional soldiers and to place Epirote garrisons in the great cities of Campania and Megale Hellas - that he might rule Italy as a Basileus and maintain that rule even in his absence. Of these tasks, Ptolemaios' was the easier - the Rasna had dispersed after the allied victory over Rome and in doing so had made themselves easy prey. The League made a token showing of resistance near Volscini, but was defeated, and the cities were made to pay tribute and accept Epirote garrisons.
As he travelled north, Ptolemaios hired additional soldiers from among the Boii, and in his treaties with the Rasna he often seized extensive land which would make the basis for future land grants - much as in Sicily. Unlike in Sicily, however, Ptolemaios had the luxury of garrisoning the cities and instituting Pyrrhos' dominion without pretension or any claim to democratic ideals.

Alexandros had the far harder task. Cities such as Taras were immediately proven correct - Pyrrhos had no desire to vacate Italy. In the main, the Italic tribes were so exhausted from the constant warring with Rome that they quickly fell in line, but they had few soldiers to supply. Alexandros was forced to send back to Epiros a great quantity of treasure and coin, that the Regent there might send over fresh mercenary soldiers recruited from among the Epirotes and the Illyrians.

In consultation with Alexandros, Pyrrhos made governors over the regions of Italy. Ptolemaios was given authority over all the Tyrsenoi. Leonnatos the Makedonian was given authority over Samnium. Sosibius, son of Cleitos, a friend of the King, was given authority over the cities of Campania. Alcetas who had been Pyrrhos' bodyguard was given Lucania. The cities of Megale Hellas were not included in this division, because they did not consent to have what was effectively a Satrap placed over them. After meeting with the King, the assemblies of many cities, chief among them Taras, Thourioi, and Rhegion, came to the conclusion that Pyrrhos was their enemy.

While Taras was unable to raise arms against Pyrrhos, owing to its substantial garrison, the others began to do so, seeking out aid from Carthage and Antiochos' Royal Secretary in Makedon to raise mercenaries and oppose him. However, only token support was forthcoming, and within several months a great contingent of Illyrian soldiers, perhaps five thousand in all, arrived. The cities realized they were overmatched and began negotiations once more, agreeing that Pyrrhos might be called King of Italy but that their own sovereignty would be respected, that they would be part of a "Tarantine League" with Pyrrhos but would not be directly ruled, and that they would provide the ships and tribute Pyrrhos needed to wage war against Carthage.

With Pyrrhos' new dominion roughly established, he was already growing restless. No sooner did he effect the return of his son Helenos than he gathered an army of twenty-five thousand men and another four thousand horse, including many large allied contingents (he knew from past experience that he must leave many of his own men to guard Italy, and not entrust that task to his allies) and crossed the straits to Sicily. Upon arrival he defeated the Mamertines and after securing his victory he torched Messana to the ground.

Hasdrubal, hearing of this, sent the Carthaginian fleet north (along with allied contingents from many of the Greek cities on Sicily), and engaged the Greeks near Mylae. Despite the best efforts of the Epirote admiral, their navy was badly bloodied and forced to retreat. Pyrrhos, now cut off from reinforcement or support, found himself heavily outnumbered by the advancing army. He made a stand on the coast near the town of Tyndaris.

Pyrrhos' forces were distinctly unlike those which had given him his victory over Rome. Eleven elephants had survived his campaigns, but apart from them, the Thessalian cavalry, and his own companions, both mounted and on foot, his entire army was relatively untested, composed of allied Greek contingents which had seen little fighting in his long war against Rome, and freshly raised Illyrian and Celtic mercenaries who for the most part were veterans of various tribal conflicts but had never fought under him until now.

It seems that at Tyndaris, this army was simply not capable of what Pyrrhos expected of them. The battle opened auspiciously enough - Hasdrubal's smaller African elephants were unwilling to engage or challenge Pyrrhos' fewer but larger elephants. The Thessalian cavalry even appeared to drive off a large contingent of Numidian horse. However, shortly after battle was joined Pyrrhos' line began to collapse in several places. He charged into the thick of the fighting, hoping to drive a wedge in the Carthaginian line, but his enemies were numerous and his horse was gored by a spear and when the beast fell his leg was crushed. Rising again with great pain and difficulty he showed his soldiers that their Basileus still lived, but a great brazen hoplon caught him in the side and crushed his armor, driving the wind from his lungs.

His bodyguards and companions fought like lions to rescue their King, the great Molossian Eagle without whom their campaign was surely doomed. Pyrrhos fought on, but the tide of Carthaginians was too fierce. He was pierced by many spears before Helenos and his companions could reach him and carry his body from the field. Still living, Pyrrhos demanded that his son carry on the fight, but as word spread that Pyrrhos was slain that army collapsed entirely. The allied contingents broke almost instantaneously, and in the fighting retreat that followed, the Thessalians were enveloped by their swifter Numidian opponents and slaughtered, as was most of Pyrrhos' army. The elephants were captured or killed, and most of the Epirote fleet was sunk.

However, Helenos, along with most of the companions, managed to escape to Rhegion. The Epirote eagle was killed. If his legacy would endure was another question altogether.

[1] A remarkably lenient one at that. Carthage clearly wanted an end to the war, and essentially allowed Syracuse to re-assert the status quo. There is also some speculation that the Carthaginian commander Hasdrubal wanted to subdue the Mamertines as well. This leniency seems to have worked against Pyrrhos quite well - Carthage was willing, at least for the time being, to let the Greeks live as they always had. By contrast, Pyrrhos intended to rule with Kingly privilege.

[Is it over? Not yet! Questions and comments? I'm curious what people will think about this, particularly if my scenario for Rome being sacked is plausible.]
 
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Great update. In regards to the plausibility of Rome being sacked i don't see why not. They were at the end of their strength, having gone through lengthy and damaging wars, so there is a good reason for Rome's fall. At this point Rome wasn't the juggernaut it would later become, and your changes to the TL should be enough to justify the Rome's fall.

I really hope that Pyrrus' legacy manages to survive and Carthage is willing to stop with Sicily. Hopefully the sons of Pyrrus allow time for consolidation.:D
 
*shamelessly bumping*

While Carthage is now the undisputed local power, I can't exactly see them suddenly developing imperial ambitions beyond their trading colonies.
 
Rome's destruction is a lasting legacy. Even if it resurges, it will have a disrupted history and have learnt from the episode.
 
The King of Hesperia

Helenos, after his father's death fled to Rhegion and then furthermore on to Capua, where he met Alexandros. The two brothers there took private counsel and sent north a request for their half-brother Ptolemaios to join them. Like the great conqueror in whose shadow Pyrrhos had always lived, the Basileus who had subjugated Italy left little clear instruction as to how his will should be executed. There had always been a vague notion of different sons inheriting different kingdoms, but in practice who would receive which kingdom was unclear. Furthermore the Pyrrhos had always assumed that Sicily would be theirs, if not all of North Africa.

Ptolemaios meanwhile, rode south, fresh from his subjugation of the Tyrsenoi. He had carved out a great kingdom for himself, subduing the divided polities he encountered and raising fresh armies from among the Boii. When he arrived he exchanged harsh words with Helenos, cursing him for doing nothing to save either their father or their armies from death and ruin. At this, Helenos, incensed, departed for Eprios, an upon arrival he would crown himself Basileus and to seal his union, he married his half-sister, Olympias.

Ptolemaios, for his part, could not come to any agreement with Alexandros. Unaware of Helenos' intent, he assumed that Alexandros should content himself with Epiros and perhaps in time Makedon, and not disturb his ambitions on the peninsula. But Alexandros feared the power of Antiokhos and the regent in Makedon, and wished to remain far from Hellas. Their dispute was ended when Ptolemaios gained the support of the companions and Alexandros realized his position was untenable - he fled, first to Hellas but then to Egypt, where the Lagids hosted him as an honored guest.

Ptolemaios now controlled the whole of the peninsula, and was Basileus of Hesperia, the land of the setting sun. And yet no sooner was he named Basileus than did the peoples who were ostensibly his subjects plot rebellion. In the south, the citizens of Kroton spoke ill of this new development. Had Pyrrhos overthrown the Romans and departed, he might have been called Soter, but he had left his sons to be tyrants over them instead. They incensed their fellows by explaining that the Aeacidae sought to rule both Italia and Hesperia as the Syrian King ruled his subjects - not as hegemon but as an autocrat.

The assembly of Kroton sent many ambassadors to their fellow cities, and even to the Tyrsenoi, wagering that they could assemble a broad coalition against Ptolemaios. They were partially successful. The Tyrsenoi were a people freshly conquered, and like many once great peoples whose find themselves under a fresh yoke, they were newly overawed and occupied. They turned the ambassadors over to their new King.

Ptolemaios was now forewarned of the treachery brewing beneath him. He left some of his companions to train contingents of armed auxiliaries among his Italian subjects while proceeding south to meet with assembled delegations from all the cities arrayed against them. He showed a level of political acumen far beyond anything his father had ever demonstrated - imploring those who might consider rebellion to refrain from doing so. He was not Pyrrhos, and he had no desire to play the role of an oriental despot over Megale Hellas. But was it not, as Aristotle said, "meet for Hellenes to rule over barbarians"? He promised wealth and land for those who would work with him, appealing to the base and material desires of his rivals and turning them to allies. Furthermore he assured them that their cities would be allowed to govern themselves, and that such tribute as he collected from them would go to the common defense and the prosecution of their shared interests.

What those shared interests was left suitably ambiguous.

Pyrrhos laid the groundwork for the Hesperian Empire, there can be no doubt of that. However, it was Ptolemaios who had the charisma and strength of will to meld together the multitude of conquered peoples on the peninsula into a single state. A reformer and an innovator, Ptolemaios adopted the theuros-bearer as the standard soldier of his armies, and drilled his Greek and Celtic soldiers equally in its use. Unlike his father, he was a deliberate and contemplative man. Revenge against Carthage was a goal of his, and yet he did not demand it come immediately. Rather, he preferred to bide his time, knowing that sooner or later he could draw the African giant to his south into a war on his terms...

While Ptolemaios consolidated his control over his new territories, in the heartland, along the Tiber, major changes were underway. Much of the best land was depopulated and accordingly granted to mercenaries and those who had served the longest in the Epirote army. The city of Rome itself would not recover quickly - many who had escaped the sack of the city had fled instead upriver to Capena, or south to Tusculum near Lake Albanus. Several miles from the Sabine city of Tibur, near the confluence of the Anio and the Tiber, a new capital was founded, called Neapolis. After a few years to avoid confusion with the more prominent city-state to the south, it became called Ptolemais after its founder.

Ptolemais would swell rapidly, especially as many refugees from Rome returned and found that certain royal edicts made it simply easier to loot building materials from their old capital and move them upriver to this new royal city. The city had a truly cosmopolitan feel, home to a mixed population of Greeks and Celts and Italians.

The Great King of the Makedonian Empire

The collapse of the Lagid "dynasty" was perhaps inevitable. Despite the defensibility of Egypt and the strength of the Ptolemaic state, Antiokhos, after taking Makedon, simply had an unending flow of reinforcements and the allied navies of many subordinate Greek polities at his command. By 272, Ptolemaios Philadelphos was reduced to Egypt, and most of his best soldiers were on the verge of open mutiny due to their feckless king's utter mismanagement of the war. After the fall of Gaza in late autumn, the subsequent year would see the army turn Ptolemaios over to Antiokhos' mercy, and in turn be scattered into the east to serve as distant provincial garrisons.

In a single stroke, Antiokhos had reunited the empire of Alexandros. A single Hellenic state sprawled across the territory of the old Persian Empire. Ironically, with the capture of Ptolemaios and Alexandria came the young Epirote prince Alexandros as well, who had fled to Egypt a year previously. Now a prisoner rather than an honored guest, he would be transported north to Antiokheia.

Antiokhos would spend the rest of his life attempting to rule the vast territory he found himself with. His eldest son, Seleukos was made co-Basileus and given Makedon and Hellas to govern, and the west was rather peaceful for the time being. It was in the East where Antiokhos devoted his energies, growing paranoid in his old age and frequently replacing and executing Satraps on suspicions of rebellion. Finally, his second son, Antiokhos, was executed on charges of conspiring to overthrow the Megas Basileus and this was the final straw for Seleukos, who had loved his brother dearly and feared that his father's growing madness would mean the end of their dynasty.

Seleukos, through certain subtly crafted letters, incited his father to grow suspicious of the growing power of Pergamon, and in 269, Antiokhos acted, marching against the city and besieging it. As the siege wore on, the Megas Basileus called for Seleukos to send reinforcements and his son arrived in person. There can be little doubt as to why Antiokhos died several days later under mysterious circumstances, although nothing was ever definitively proven. Shortly thereafter, Seleukos made peace with Pergamon on terms that left the city humiliated but intact.

The empire Seleukos won was a fragile one. The dominion Antiokhos had won through force of arms was not easily maintained. His reign would be preoccupied with rebellions and would see the slow atrophy of royal control over the periphery. Because of the sheer size of the Makedonian empire, it posed almost no existential threat to powers beyond its borders - its rulers were more concerned with maintenance than expansion. The Western Mediterranean was left as a wrestling ground for the Hesperian Basileus and the Carthaginians.
 
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