The entire Italilan Campaign - was it necessary?

This is inspired by the 'Anzio - was it necessary' thread.

Rommel did not want to see a drawn-out campaign in Italy, but rather a retreat to the Alps.

Kesselring opposed this, claiming that he could stall Allied forces for months on end and zap them of their strength which otherwise would have been available for Overlord (or an earlier version of Overlord).

Kesselring was also concerned about leaving air fields too close to the Vaterland.

Brooke wanted to have as many German troops 'locked up' in Italy as possible. The transportation across the Alps was a bit more difficult than any East-West movement in Germany and any North-South in France.

A strategic trap. Italy was not supposed to be an end in itself.

So, the big question WHAT IF:

Salerno goes in as planned.

September 1943:
1) Mussolini is out of the picture anyway.
2) Hitler planned on the retreat from Italy if things went bad. No diluting forces in the East (Kursk)
3) Everything out of Italy: defensive line -> Alps only
4) Rommel and Kesselring are now available for something else

Consequences:
1) No strategic trap in Italy
2) Hitler can build up his strategic reserve
3) Kursk might be even more bloody, but probably with the same result?
4) Allied air forces can now reach everything in Germany etc. UNLESS Germany wrecks it all on the way out.

Other options?

Ivan
 
Derek Jackson said:
Ideally Italy would have been bipassed, Sardinia followed by much earleir operation Dragoon, southern france
This.
ivanotter said:
Salerno goes in as planned.
This is the major flaw: the invasion of the mainland. Once you do that, you're pretty much committed to every other strategic SNAFU associated with Italy.:rolleyes:
ivanotter said:
Rommel did not want to see a drawn-out campaign in Italy, but rather a retreat to the Alps.

Kesselring opposed this, claiming that he could stall Allied forces for months on end and zap them of their strength which otherwise would have been available for Overlord (or an earlier version of Overlord).

Kesselring was also concerned about leaving air fields too close to the Vaterland.

Brooke wanted to have as many German troops 'locked up' in Italy as possible. The transportation across the Alps was a bit more difficult than any East-West movement in Germany and any North-South in France.

A strategic trap. Italy was not supposed to be an end in itself.
If that's true, invading Sardinia & Corsica after Sicily (with a landing at Messina to prevent the German escape, if needed--& judging by how buggered things were, it probably is:rolleyes:) is a better option. Then operate MTBs, MGBs, & commandos, plus fibos & bombers, up & down the length of both of Italy's coasts. Make the Germans feed & pacify the Italians, while the Allies do everything they can to encourage Italian hostility to Germany--including forming a Free Italian Army, out of all those POWs?

Save thousands of tons of shipping for the buildup to what is, one presumes,:rolleyes: the primary objective: liberating France by landing at Normandie...:rolleyes:
ivanotter said:
1) Mussolini is out of the picture anyway.
...
Consequences:
1) No strategic trap in Italy
2) Hitler can build up his strategic reserve
3) Kursk might be even more bloody, but probably with the same result?
4) Allied air forces can now reach everything in Germany etc. UNLESS Germany wrecks it all on the way out.
Yes, there may be fewer than OTL numbers of Germans in Italy. There would be many more Allied troops in France in 1943, IMO. Recall, for the duration of the Italian Campaign, the Allies outnumbered the Germans about 2:1.:rolleyes: (Needless to say, this isn't quite what Brooke had in mind.:rolleyes:)

The continuous raiding will make Hitler especially susceptible to rumors (per Mincemeat) of invasions from Cyprus or Crete, or through Yugoslavia, however preposterous they might be. (Just don't let on to Winston you're even thinking about Yugoslavia.:eek::rolleyes:) The need to occupy & pacify will tie up Germans at no cost to Allies for shipping to supply Italian civilians--instead, the Germans will have to do it. (This is a good thing for the Allies; it strains an already overburdened transportation system.)

If the Allies are smart, they'll be interdicting rail & river transport, making it even harder to supply Italy, with beneficial knock-ons for the Allies: even an Italian Resistance? (I find that a bit much; it is Italy, after all.:p)

As already suggested, less waste of shipping means faster buildup for Overlord/Neptune, which IMO could go off in (perhaps) July 1943. (That may be too ambitious.)

In any case, when Neptune goes ashore, it will feature combat experienced Canadians (which were thin on the ground OTL), & this makes taking Caen & closing the Falaise Gap easier. (Does it mean First Canadian Army does better? Maybe. Does it mean Monty actually listens when Simonds suggests clearing the Scheldt? Well...knowing Monty, probably not.:rolleyes: I live in hope.:p He could always get run over by a Jeep.:p Butterflies & all...:p)
 
Yes, correct: If Salerno goes in, then the commitment is there to carry on. Let us therefore also cancel Salerno out of the picture.

It is a difficult one: If no Italian campaign would Overlord have been attempted in 1943? IMO no. The planning was simply not in place.

Yes, the amount of troops in Italy could have been used better somewhere else. The break-out springs to mind.

Would raiding the Italian mainland have tied down substantial German forces? Again, I believe it could have. And therein lies the profit for the Allied.

A bit cynical to leave feeding Italy to Germany, but in all likelihood it would have been the right thing to do.

The question is: What about the Eastern front in 1943 if Italy had been left alone? Would Germany have been able to allocate more to the East?

Ivan
 
If the Allies are smart, they'll be interdicting rail & river transport, making it even harder to supply Italy, with beneficial knock-ons for the Allies: even an Italian Resistance? (I find that a bit much; it is Italy, after all

https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Italian_resistance_movement

Indeed there was quite a strong Italian resistance IOTL.
Now Mussolini will still fall on the 25th of July, and this means that Italy will try to get a separate peace sooner than later, especially with the probable extensive campaign of bombings that will hit major Italian cities and industrial areas.
But this will also mean that Italians will be seen as traitors by the Germans and their occupation will be harsh, thus creating fertile ground for an insurgency. Even though the Germans will probably put Benny back to power, so a RSI extended to the whole peninsula, with the Royal Family and Badoglio fleeing in Sicily.

Without hope of liberation from the allies however this will be tragically doomed. Maybe the cost for the Italian population will be higher than OTL.

No cobelligerance will probably cost Italy territories in the north east, possibly Trieste will end up Yugoslavian. On the other hand the monarchy will be thoroughly discredited in the south too, Maybe the communists will have a better electoral success?
 
nearly every single book on the Italian campaign that I have read argues this

it seems to depend on who you ask

Atkinson (Liberation Trilogy) seems to think it was vital in teaching the US Army how to fight the Germans, and as a useful diversion for a lot of high quality German units. If I recall correctly Keegan and Hastings seem to agree in their works. John Ellis in his work "Brute Force" thinks it was a waste and cost the Allies more than the Axis and delayed victory

so it really does depend on the historian

I tend to side with Atkinson, as I don't think the US and British Army were ready in 1943 to fight in France. It also gave the Allies more time to gain air superiority over Germany and Air Supremacy over France. It was also politically necessary, as we had to fight the Germans somewhere, successfully, in order to keep Stalin and the Soviets convinced the West was serious about fighting the Germans (he didn't seem to count the Bomber Offensive) and a disaster or serious stalemate in France would have not done that.

Plus the British at the time didn't think the Western Allies were ready yet, and at the time had more political clout than they would later

so yes, in my view the Italian campaign was necessary
 
...
Atkinson (Liberation Trilogy) seems to think it was vital in teaching the US Army how to fight the Germans, and as a useful diversion for a lot of high quality German units. If I recall correctly Keegan and Hastings seem to agree in their works.

I've never been able to follow this. So few US Army units fought the Germans before June 1944 it seems insignificant. By June 5th 1944 only nine were even in combat, and some like the US 2d Armored Div had less than three weeks actual combat experience. Of those nine six were still in Italy, with the 1st Inf Div, 2d Armored Div, and 82 AB Div the only division size formations with any combat experience at all. Bradley & the US 1st ID were the only two generals in 12th AG with any experience from the Mediterranean battles. Of the corps commanders Collins had a few months experience fighting the Japanese. Later another corps of veterans were added in Patches 7th Army

More important is I cant find much evidence the lessons learned in Africa and Italy were effectively transfered to the US 12th Army Group. Bradley brought many experience staff and some subordinate commanders from the mediterranean front, but they seem to have been making the same mistakes again. ie: weak Close Air Support methods. there was no excuse for that one as the problem was made clear in Africa, and the more advanced example of the British was at hand.


... It also gave the Allies more time to gain air superiority over Germany and Air Supremacy over France.

The Axis & Germans did suffer severe air losses in the west in 1943. It does appear in simple terms it took much of the year to attrition away the strength of the Axis air strength. A closer exame suggets this was because the Gemans withdrew & refused a number of battles to preserve strength. Early in the year they were shot out of the air over Tunisia, and again defeated over Sicilly and south Italy. Before the end of 1942 the German AF had conceded western France and Belgium & offered battle only when the circumstance were very favorable, or when Germany itself was attacked.


It is correct they won some impressive tactical victories, but in stratigic & operational terms they were repeatedly defeated through 1943. The final destruction of the German air strength did not occur until 1944. That was in part the Allies did not press harder. A more aggresive ground campaign would give the German air leaders a choice of fighting under unfavorable circumstances as in the Med. Or, declining battle to conserve strength.

Conversely without a Italian campaign the German air losses may be far less, unless some other ground action forces their hand. So in that sense the italian campaign, or at least the 1943 portion of it was usefull in defeating the German air force.
 
ivanotter said:
YesIf no Italian campaign would Overlord have been attempted in 1943? IMO no. The planning was simply not in place.
Except you can't treat them in isolation: the planning for Neptune wasn't in place because there was an Italian Campaign. The senior planning people weren't idiots. They knew it wasn't possible to do both.
ivanotter said:
Yes, the amount of troops in Italy could have been used better somewhere else. The break-out springs to mind.
For all the value the troops deployed had, the bigger, more important factor is the enormous waste of shipping to supply them--& to supply the Italian civilians, too.
ivanotter said:
A bit cynical to leave feeding Italy to Germany, but in all likelihood it would have been the right thing to do.
War means hard choices. Winston was willing to bomb France,:eek: let alone leave Italians to starve.
ivanotter said:
The question is: What about the Eastern front in 1943 if Italy had been left alone? Would Germany have been able to allocate more to the East?
That's the best question, IMO. I'd say not, if it's done right--if Italy is hostile enough, & raiding is comprehensive enough, the perceived need (if not the real one) will tie up as many German troops in Italy as OTL.

What would be better still (& IDK enough to say) would be if troops were pulled from France & sent to Italy.

If the numbers in Italy are less than OTL & they went East, meaning the war ends with the Sovs nearer their prewar borders, I'm fine with that, too.
 
Except you can't treat them in isolation: the planning for Neptune wasn't in place because there was an Italian Campaign. The senior planning people weren't idiots. They knew it wasn't possible to do both.

It's not quite that simple. IIRC the decision for Salerno and the Italian campaign was not made until after the landings in Sicily, but a landing in Normandy in 1943 had been effectively ruled out much earlier at Casablanca (mainly due to the delay in clearing Africa).

Part of this was the lack of U.S. forces in Britain, and lack of shipping to get them there as they had both been diverted to the Pacific; and the fact that it needed roughly 9 months to transfer the necessary US invasion forces to Britain.

The Italian campaign happened by default; it was either no serious fighting against the Germans for 9 months or invade Italy.
 
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