The Empire Strikes Back: No british aid to Greece,instead invasion of the Dodecanese!

My point was exactly that you cannot say the available British troops would be enough if you don't know how many troops the Italians had, now can you?
...
Now on to the Italian garrison. I have only incomplete information, but I can tell you that the Regina division was strongly reinforced, having to garrison many islands. In June 1940, it could count on some 25,000 men, counting the attached coastal defense units and army batteries. The figure does not include Regia Marina and CCNN personnel
The British can certainly outnumber each single garrison in detail, possibly even the Rhodes garrison itself – provided they can land a lot of those troops at once. If they can't, they can still overcome the defenses of some minor island, but I doubt they would be able to do so on Rhodes.
I happen to have details on the armored units. A poster said that the CCCXII Battaglione Carri had the Fiat 3000s. It was a Misto (mixed) battalion, and it actually had 4 M11/39s, 24 L3s (two 8-vehicle companies and 2 independent platoons; I suppose these would have been detached on other islands than Rhodes) and a recon platoon with 6 ancient 1ZM armored cars. The Fiat 3000s, some of which certainly in the B (cannon-armed) version, were 2 platoons belonging to the 3° Compagnia GAF (border guard), but most of these would have been broken down.
None of these are a problem for a Matilda Mk II – but then again, the question remains whether the British would be able to land these.
Good points made here and thanks for the info on the Italian forces.

The British deployed almost 60,000 men to Greece in OTL, so if these forces could be made available sooner, they would stand a very good chance at taking most of the Dodecanese. I agree that taking Rhodes would be difficult with a direct assault, but I believe that the correct strategy for taking the Dodecanese would be to make a longer rather than a shorter campaign.
In other words, the RN would have to project power and cut the islands off. This should be doable and with the deployment of a couple of RAF squadrons to Eastern Crete the Italian Navy should be reluctant to project power there. If they did bring their heavy units out (those that were left following Taranto) they would probably see them sunk anyway.
Then in the beginning of 1941 small British forces would try to capture the smaller islands of the Dodecanese, while the Royal Navy would have to make sure that the Rhodes troops did not try to reinforce the other islands. With Kos, Leros or Karpathos captured, the British would have a new airport to operate out from in the local area.
These operations should take place in February-March 1941, combined with a builup of forces in the Dodecanese. Then in late April 1941 the British can try to capture Rhodes, which by then cut off for 3 months should be low of fuel+ammunition.
The Germans would surely arrive then, taking Greece by storm, perhaps a couple of weeks earlier than in OTL (bear in mind that a much sooner German campaign would have lots of butterflies on Bulgaria+Yugoslavia).
Once the Dodecanese were secured, the British can send some reinforcements to Crete.
 
I believe that the correct strategy for taking the Dodecanese would be to make a longer rather than a shorter campaign.

Maybe you are right, but the british could muster enough troops to pursue an aggressive and long strategy in Greece, while defending in North Africa at the same time?
Given Suez importance, I would say that defence would have been preferred.

As for using the Royal Navy in greek waters, I think could be an excessive risk: the italian navy has just to be lucky once and the defence of Suez could be in jeopardy.

Well, maybe I am too pessimistic, but I would have given precedence to North Africa.
 
one of the big questions of this campaign is: if the Brits didn't go to Greece and finished conquering Libya, what would Hitler do? Would he still dispatch the Afrika Korps (probably having to send it to French N. Africa), or will he just write it off as a bad venture? If Rommel and the AK does go, won't the Brits be better prepared, not having sent so many men and machines off to Greece and Crete? And won't the Germans have atrocious supply problems, having to send ships all the way to French NA?
If the Germans don't go to NA, then the Brits have some freedom of action... what might they do? If they can get control of the Med, then they can go island hopping all over. Or even land in Italy, assuming Hitler still goes haring off into Russia. And then there's what the US will do when it enters the war, with no preliminary practice landings in N. Africa...
 
Didn't the Allies tried that a few years later?

IIRC the Germans threw the Allies out of the Dodecanese within months in 1943? I fail to see the British managing better 3 years earlier.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dodecanese_Campaign

Indeed the British did try this 3 years later. However they tried it against the Germans. In this ATL they are giving it a shot against the Italians.
This means no Luftwaffe and no German crack troops. Just Italian troops.
 
This means no Luftwaffe and no German crack troops. Just Italian troops.
I don't think that germans had a lot of air support in Greece in 1943 and you may surprised to learn that german and crack troops aren't sinonimous.
Yes there was only italian troops, which would have been enough, in my opinion.

And the british command agreed with this idea, since they didn't even tried...
 
German air support in 1943 was one of the main reasons the entire Dodecanese campaign failed.
The Allies did not have any airfields nearby so CAPs were very diffciult to preserve over the battlefield.
Only when the Allies captured Kos did they have an airfield to operate from. The Germans then simply focused their air power there, destroyed the airfield and enjoyed thereafter air superiority over the battlefield. Numerous Allied ships were lost in the campaign because of German attacks.

Italian troops sucked bigtime in WWII.
They managed to lose EVERY single time they faced serious Allied attack.

The same cannot be said for the Germans.

For example Rhodes fell to the Germans in 1943, after 8000 Germans managed to force 40000 Italians to surrender.
 
Indeed the British did try this 3 years later. However they tried it against the Germans. In this ATL they are giving it a shot against the Italians.
This means no Luftwaffe and no German crack troops. Just Italian troops.

I know.
I didn't mean the initial assault but more what happens after that.
Just like in '43 either Italy or Germany can throw these forces out later IMHO.

Doesn't that make it just as pointless in a military view as sending troops to the mainland of Greece as irl?
 
Italian troops sucked bigtime in WWII.
They managed to lose EVERY single time they faced serious Allied attack.

The same cannot be said for the Germans.

If you look at this statement carefully, you'll see it's fully meaningless.

It all depends on the definition of "serious", that's why it is meaningless.

For instance, the Folgore parachute division was attacked at El Alamein and did not budge. But you can keep the claim standing by defining that British attack as "not serious" (which is basically what Alexander did, after the fact, historically). Or we can come up with standards for seriousness that include only the Allied attacks in which the Germans were defeated, every time.

You have better getting more informed about the Italian performance in WWII before you make such generalizations.



For example Rhodes fell to the Germans in 1943, after 8000 Germans managed to force 40000 Italians to surrender.

A bad example, evidently. You seem to be once again skipping the fact that the Germans had been allies until the day before. Plenty of Italian troops chose to keep fighting _alongside_ the Germans and against the Allies. This should give you an inkling that maybe the Italian troops in Rhodes just chose the halfway measure, and did not surrender simply because each German supersoldier is worth 5 Italian ones.
 
I concur that my statement was an overreaction.

However Italian performance in World War II was (if taking into account the size of forces the Italians had and the equipment they used) very often well below what a neutral observer would expect to happen.
Typical examples would be the Italian performance in N. Africa and in the Eastern Front.
A further example would be Italian performance against Greece in Albania.

When I said that 8000 Germans managed to beat 40000 Italians I was not pointing out that 1 German is worth 5 Italians.
Much more I was trying to demonstrate that the Italians often decided to quit fighting or start a very sudden and rather less organized retreat. The morale was generally not particularly high among Italian units.

Therefore one could very well propose that Italian troops, cut off by the Royal Navy in Rhodes, being attacked by British forces and far away from all other Italian forces may very well decide to quit or surrender, once the British made some gains. The Germans wouldn't be part of the general picture yet, since they would not have invaded Yugoslavia or moved through Bulgaria to the Greek-Yugoslav border.
At the same time, with Operation Compass still taking place you would have another major Italian retreat in Northern Africa (pushing the nearest Italian troops from them further away), while the winter offensive in Albania would be failing again.

As far as the Germans are concerned and any attempts they may undertake to recapture the Dodecanese, one should not forget one major factor: Barbarossa.
The timetable is tight already, Luftwaffe is desperately needed in the Eastern Front from June 1941. So the Germans only have a couple of weeks to pull of a stunt like that and they have to recapture the Dodecanese AND take Crete if they want to get the job done right.
Do you think they have the time to do it?
I think not.
Do you think Hitler is going to postpone Barbarossa because he can't capture Crete or the Dodecanese?
I think not.
In OTL he didn't hesitate to invade the Soviet Union, while Britain was still at war and Sealion never happened. So why should he be worried now?
A second front in the Balkans (by a British landing there) was less probable than a Cross-Canal invasion anyway and he still had the capability to mount a North African campaign. If the North African campaign succeeded in removing the British from Egypt, then the strategic importance of Crete and the Dodecanese in British hands is diminished.

One major factor to think of here is the fact that Germany in 1941 has less capabilities to undertake an invasion of the Dodecanese than in 1943. The reason for this is a big lack of naval forces. In 1941 the Greeks have just evacuated Greece, taking anything that floated with them. Lots of ships were left behind, since they were either half-sunk in ports by Luftwaffe raids or damaged. These ships were later reraised or rebuilt by the Germans, while other civilian ships were confiscated and modified for war use. All these craft are not available in 1941. The Germans effectively have zero combat ready ships in the Aegean in April 1941. The Italians have furthermore just taken a heavy beating by the Royal Navy. Airfields are not ready to host a large number of Luftwaffe bombers for a prolonged campaign against the islands and the Luftwaffe does not have good anti-ship capabilities (including guided weapons) or much of experience at this point.
The whole Dodecanese counter-campaign by the Germans is starting to look to me more and more as feasible as a mini-Sealion. I wonder if they would use river barges for it. :)
 
However Italian performance in World War II was (if taking into account the size of forces the Italians had and the equipment they used) very often well below what a neutral observer would expect to happen.
Typical examples would be the Italian performance in N. Africa and in the Eastern Front.
A further example would be Italian performance against Greece in Albania.


In a word, no.

On the Eastern Front, the Italian performance was definitely no worse than that of the average German units having the same kind of equipment, and in some cases better. Sure they got overrun by the Soviet offensive. If you studied the troop densities and the force ratios by whatever indicator you wish to choose, you'd see that the neutral observer would not be surprised.

In Albania the Italian performance was indifferent but not below average. Sure they got pushed back by the Greeks. But a _well-informed_ neutral observer would notice that the Italians had attacked in _numerical inferiority_. Yessir. One usually wants a 3:1 numerical superiority for the attacker, if one wants the attacker to have some serious chances. Instead the Italians started with something like 0.8:1. Then it got worse. The Greek army was small, but it could deploy reserves. The Italian army was larger, but its planners had not noticed that the handling capacity of the Albanian ports was abysmal. This goes to show what a moron the local commander Visconti Prasca was, what a spineless yes-man Badoglio was, what a wishful thinker Ciano was, and what a stupid Mussolini was. But it says nothing about the troops.
Indeed, once the Greeks lost their numerical superiority, their offensive petered out. This is not to say the Greeks were worse; they were way better, through a combination of several factors, and indeed a 2:1 superiority isn't that much – but certainly it helps, and these facts don't show that the Italians were below average.

In North Africa, the Italian performance in January 1941 was very bad, but it was definitely the exception and not the rule. Even then, while they did have numerical superiority, in the desert having huge numbers of walking infantrymen isn't exactly a plus when faced by a nearly wholly motorized force, even if this is smaller. Sure the Italians surrendered in the tens of thousands, having been hopelessly surrounded, cut off from any reasonable hope of withdrawal, and in some cases without water. Note that in similarly hopeless situations, Allied troops also surrendered in the tens of thousands: Soviet troops in Kiev, British troops in Singapore, US-Filipino troops in the Philippines.
The rest of the North African campaign saw quite a different Italian performance. But the British propaganda, after this initial offensive, had portrayed the Italian soldiers as buffoons, and could hardly backpedal. Luckily, the Germans had arrived; so when the British got a black eye, it always was because of Rommel.
This is, however, just that, propaganda. There's plenty of situations where the Italians in North Africa performed creditably, and a few where they actually saved the Germans' skins and Rommel's reputation. The Germans were fully motorized, and could withdraw quickly when they thought it better to do that. The Italians were on foot, with the obvious consequence. But there's more than that general situation. At Bir El Gobi, the British would have taken Rommel with his pants down had it not been for the Italian resistance and counterattack. Much later, on the Mareth Line, the British failed to break through the Italian positions (here's another "serious" attack where the Italians held their ground) and were successful in their bypassing move – which was countered, unsuccessfully, by German troops. And I could go on.

As late as December 1944, the weak Monterosa alpine division, with all the shortcomings in equipment and armaments that come at that time and for a unit of a German puppet state, attacked and pushed back for a while the 92nd Division, of the US Army –the most lavishly equipped army at the time.
 
looking at a map, I wonder, if the Brits conquered in Africa and Germany didn't send the AK, would the Brits go after Sardinia and Corsica? If Germany is stuck into Russia, and Italy is neutralized in the Med, holding these two islands would give them solid control of the Med, particularly if they moved some air groups onto them...
 
looking at a map, I wonder, if the Brits conquered in Africa and Germany didn't send the AK, would the Brits go after Sardinia and Corsica? If Germany is stuck into Russia, and Italy is neutralized in the Med, holding these two islands would give them solid control of the Med, particularly if they moved some air groups onto them...

They would make good bases once taken, but they are harder to reach than Sicily - and by that I'm not talking about ships and landing craft, I'm talking about the range of the fighter cover necessary to accompany those.
Since you are considering Corse, you have no qualms about deploying troops into Vichy territory, so you can carry out Husky from Tunisian ports and air bases as well, just like in OTL. Much more comfy than from Tripoli.

The valid alternative would be some place to the East. Again less central than Sardinia, but for that very reason closer to Ploesti, for those bomber squadrons.
 
not sure why, but I find the idea of the Brits doing their own version of island hopping in the Med to be really interesting... :)
 
In Albania the Italian performance was indifferent but not below average. Sure they got pushed back by the Greeks. But a _well-informed_ neutral observer would notice that the Italians had attacked in _numerical inferiority_. Yessir. One usually wants a 3:1 numerical superiority for the attacker, if one wants the attacker to have some serious chances. Instead the Italians started with something like 0.8:1. Then it got worse. The Greek army was small, but it could deploy reserves. The Italian army was larger, but its planners had not noticed that the handling capacity of the Albanian ports was abysmal. This goes to show what a moron the local commander Visconti Prasca was, what a spineless yes-man Badoglio was, what a wishful thinker Ciano was, and what a stupid Mussolini was. But it says nothing about the troops.
3 to 1 is fully illusional.
Only in very little cases did a 3 to 1 numerical superiority exist in World War 2.
The Germans didn't have 3 to 1 in the Eastern Front during the first 2 years and yet they managed to pull it off. Neither did they have 3 to 1 superiority in France on North Africa.
The Americans had 3 to 1 or even more at some point in World War 2 and the Soviets did also have losts of troops at some places, but come on, 3 to 1?

Furthermore the Italians did have superiority at the beginning of the offensive, before the Greeks mobilised. The Greek mobilisation was not quick and their equipment sucked big time. Almost no planes, little artillery, almost no anti-tank guns. The Italians simply failed to make a breakthrough. Why?
Because their tactics sucked and because their troops were not effective. That's all.
You can always find some occasions when they got their act together, but usually they started running away from their enemy.
Look at the British when they launched Compass. They had LESS troops than the Italians and still managed to rout them. Now why did that happen?


Indeed, once the Greeks lost their numerical superiority, their offensive petered out. This is not to say the Greeks were worse; they were way better, through a combination of several factors, and indeed a 2:1 superiority isn't that much – but certainly it helps, and these facts don't show that the Italians were below average.

In North Africa, the Italian performance in January 1941 was very bad, but it was definitely the exception and not the rule. Even then, while they did have numerical superiority, in the desert having huge numbers of walking infantrymen isn't exactly a plus when faced by a nearly wholly motorized force, even if this is smaller. Sure the Italians surrendered in the tens of thousands, having been hopelessly surrounded, cut off from any reasonable hope of withdrawal, and in some cases without water. Note that in similarly hopeless situations, Allied troops also surrendered in the tens of thousands: Soviet troops in Kiev, British troops in Singapore, US-Filipino troops in the Philippines.
The rest of the North African campaign saw quite a different Italian performance. But the British propaganda, after this initial offensive, had portrayed the Italian soldiers as buffoons, and could hardly backpedal. Luckily, the Germans had arrived; so when the British got a black eye, it always was because of Rommel.
This is, however, just that, propaganda. There's plenty of situations where the Italians in North Africa performed creditably, and a few where they actually saved the Germans' skins and Rommel's reputation. The Germans were fully motorized, and could withdraw quickly when they thought it better to do that. The Italians were on foot, with the obvious consequence. But there's more than that general situation. At Bir El Gobi, the British would have taken Rommel with his pants down had it not been for the Italian resistance and counterattack. Much later, on the Mareth Line, the British failed to break through the Italian positions (here's another "serious" attack where the Italians held their ground) and were successful in their bypassing move – which was countered, unsuccessfully, by German troops. And I could go on.

As late as December 1944, the weak Monterosa alpine division, with all the shortcomings in equipment and armaments that come at that time and for a unit of a German puppet state, attacked and pushed back for a while the 92nd Division, of the US Army –the most lavishly equipped army at the time.[/QUOTE]
 
3 to 1 is fully illusional.
Only in very little cases did a 3 to 1 numerical superiority exist in World War 2.
I think he was talking about single engagements, not the whole front (or am I misreading?).

Furthermore the Italians did have superiority at the beginning of the offensive, before the Greeks mobilised. The Greek mobilisation was not quick and their equipment sucked big time. Almost no planes, little artillery, almost no anti-tank guns. The Italians simply failed to make a breakthrough. Why?
I would say because they received few reinforcement and supplies: the albanian ports could not sustain a major shipping... This demonstrate that the italian high command should have been hanged and quartered, in my humble opinion.

You can always find some occasions when they got their act together, but usually they started running away from their enemy.
Yet they fought for more time that a lot of other countries. I wonder why? :D

Look at the British when they launched Compass. They had LESS troops than the Italians and still managed to rout them. Now why did that happen?
Because in desert warfare having a large motorized force is far better than having an afoot one. Or so I am told.

This is a very old argument. If italians were such pushovers, how Rommel could inflict so many defeats on the british, while having an army mainly composed by italians? You can say that germans were better soldiers than british (but, if so, why did they lost the war?), or that after all italians weren't so bad.

To clarify: it's true that during operation compass italians surrendered en mass, but when you are in the desert, cut off from your lines by a more mobile force and with little water, you don't have a lot of choices.
 
Yet they fought for more time that a lot of other countries. I wonder why? :D
Because they embarked on a war of aggression and invaded other countries, before they got invaded themselves. And once they did it didn't take a lot of time before they decided to quit and switch sides.
Switching sides in the middle of a conflict is another Italian-typical-doctrine. Look at WWI for example.

As far as the Greek-Italian war is concerned:

During the first offensive the Italians attacked with 85,000 troops. The Greeks had about 35,000 combat ready troops on the border with Albania. Well, that's not 3:1 but it's like 2,5:1, so not so bad after all for the Italians.
Did they manage to break through?
Nope.

Then the Greeks counterattacked with 250,000 troops against 150,000 Italians. Did the Greeks have 3:1 advantage? Nope. They had more like 1,6:1
Did they manage to break through?
Yes.

And all that with a Greek Army that lacked a functioning air force, was not mechanized at all, did not have tanks or anti-tank weapons and relied on horses and troops to move artillery, etc around.
On the other hand the Italians had total air supremacy, trucks, tanks and mechanized forces.
 
A 3 to 1 superiority is not what I prescribe; it's what the military handbooks prescribe.

As another poster mentioned, we're talking about superiority in the specific area of attack. One can achieve that, and even much more than that, even if on the front overall there isn't such a superiority, and even if on the front overall there is an inferiority. But in order to do that you need good LOCs and logistics, usually better than those of your opponent, good strategy, good mobility. Generally speaking, if you start with something like a 2:1 superiority overall, achieving a 3:1 in the area you chose to attack is a very easy.
For comparison purposes, when the Soviets broke through the Italian VIII Armata in the winter of 1942-43, they had a 12:1 local superiority.

This is not the end of the story. What we were talking about was mountain operations. In a territory so forbidding that the availability of motorized mobile units is irrelevant.
Now, if you have heard about Blitzkrieg, you will understand that mobile units, especially armored but not necessarily only armored, act as a force multiplier. Exactly because, among other things, you can be quicker in concentrating your effort and, therefore, you can achieve local superiority before the enemy can react.

The British offensive of the winter of 1940-41 in the desert is a case study of that.
The British force was much smaller – but it was almost entirely motorized.
The Italian force was much larger – but it was almost entirely on foot.
Over the huge distances involved in the desert, this means the British could achieve a local superiority wherever and whenever they wanted; they moved on motor vehicles.
All of that would have counted for zilch in the Albanian mountains, because of the terrain. But the British used their mobile formations in suitable terrain.

Let's look at another example, shall we. The history of the British-Italian campaigns in East Africa is, apart from the initial Italian success in British Somaliland, a tale of woes. Of course, once again, the British had more motorized units than the Italians (though here the British forces were by no means all or predominantly motorized). The one bright spot after Somaliland: the defense of Keren. That's on the edge of the plateau, in other words, it's a mountain zone. The Italian defenders, though outnumbered there too, resisted for two months.

Got that now?

As to the Germans in the initial stages of the Eastern Front, they did not have an overall 3:1 superiority, but they a) had significant mobile formations and b) did have numerical superiority overall. Figures from Glantz: June 1941: Soviet troops in all the Western districts: 2,680,000, Axis troops committed: 3,200,000. October 1941: Soviet troops on the front: 2,200,000, Axis troops on the front: 2,960,000.
Then the Germans did not manage to keep going. What happened? Well the weather and… Guess what was the ratio of forces in December 1941? Soviets: 4,195,000, Axis: 2,840,000.
I hope you can see the point.

As to the Greek campaign, neither side ever "broke through", if by that we mean the kind of situation where one side reaches operational depth. Both sides did carry out traditional plodding advances. It is true the Italians initially had a marginal superiority – and in fact the Italians did initially advance, entering into Greek territory. You seem to believe they never made a step forward.
Coming now to the figures, let's see. For the Greeks, you count the "combat-ready troops" on the front. And for the Italians? You count _all the troops_ present in Albania at the time. The total figure is more like 87,000, that is 2,000 more than what you counted – if one adds the three divisions that were held back, two in reserve and one guarding the Yugoslavian border. That's 31,000 men. So the initial advance by the Italians was carried out by _56,000 men_, not 87,000 as you believed.
They did have an overall superiority over the Greeks – and indeed, they did advance.

But where did they advance less? In the most critical axis of advance, Koritza to Florina. And what was the ratio of forces there? For the Greeks, 22 battalions and 3 recon battalions, for the Italians, 17 battalions and an Albanian militia battalion. This is attacking _in numerical inferiority_ from day one, in a terrain where no Blitzkrieg or Guerra Celere tricks will ever work. And these figures come from the official history of the war… _by the Greek_ army staff's historical office. Since that huge work seldom underestimates the italian forces, rather the contrary, you can bet they are not doing it here.

Sure the Italians had tanks - that is, tankettes, the MG-armed sardine cans, that any old heavy MG could pry open. They counted for nothing anyway, given that the offensive never reached open ground. Sure the Greeks were short on AT guns - which, for the reasons above, did not matter. Sure the Italians had air superiority - to do what? They could bomb the rear areas, and they did - with less accuracy and less effectiveness than any other such bombing at the time. Having a battlefield effect was of course out of the question, due to a combination of: bad weather; altitude; lack of suitable aircraft; lack of suitable doctrine; lack of suitable C3I.
 
Because they embarked on a war of aggression and invaded other countries, before they got invaded themselves. And once they did it didn't take a lot of time before they decided to quit and switch sides.

Yet, the british needed three years and american help to reach Sicily. If italians were so bad why the royal navy didn't storm italian beaches in 1940?

Switching sides in the middle of a conflict is another Italian-typical-doctrine. Look at WWI for example.

And you should read about WW1 history before saying idiocies like this. The triple alliance was a defensive agreement; the moment the germans declared war the agreement was null and void, freeing Italy by any tie. If german and AH diplomats had more intelligence than pride, they could have realised that Italy was one of the keys for the central powers to win the war, but they thought that Italy was useless...
(Anyway this argument has been discussed in a lot of threads)
 
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