The empire march against Ricimer

Who would become emperor?


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Had this idea recently: let’s assume that after Majorian’s death, his generals ( Aegidius, Marcellinus and Nepotianus) decide to launch an attack against Ricimer during the period of interregnum between Majorian and Libius Severus ( which provoked their secession). OTL the Visigoths represented a problem for two of these general, however would it be possible for them to march against Italy and punish Ricimer? After their victory who would become emperor ( their are all eligible for the title but they could also appoint a neutral personality)? Would this stronger western empire ( no secession of Gaul, Spain and Illyria) be able to attempt a second invasion of Africa with better luck?
 
Very broadly, they couldn't : they're divided and have to deal with their own local issues (hence why Majorian appointed/confirmed regional leaders, would it be only to held in check the rebellious foedi). Don't forget that their position within the Empire depended from their relation with Majorian, and that they didn't have much ties in Italy proper which was definitely the support base of Ricimer (don't forget that, as far as senatorial elites were concerned, Ricimer's Italy WAS the Empire).
If the tentative of Ricimer to bribe Marcellinus' troops to his service (and the subsequent withdrawal of Marcellinus in its Dalmatian lands) is any indication, they're position in their own territories wasn't spectacularily affirmed.
The same goes for Aegidius that had to deal not only with foedi, but with a Gallo-Roman nobility that never really was thrilled by Majorian's reign and Avitus' demise.

If you want to deal with Ricimer, and preserve most of Majorian's management of local Romance rulers and relatively obedient foedi, I think a Britto-Gallo-Romance victory at Déols in 469 might be the way to go : outside the maintain of an imperially-sanctioned (if largely independent) Britto-Gallo-Frankish alliance in Northern Gaul, and the possibility of preserving Gallo-Roman Auvergne in a similar position (especially if Euric's death lead to an important Gothic crisis), Anthemius could see himself in a much better position, and Ricimer in a worst one.
If the latter die, and while most of western Romania would be largely independent, (altough ITTL, not just as foedi but as autonomous commands in Gaul, Spain and Danube), the Roman Empire would be in a relatively good shape (even if at this point, it means that Ravenna is sattelited by Constantinople rather than Barbarians would it be only due to the ressources and support needed to hold it together).
 
Very broadly, they couldn't : they're divided and have to deal with their own local issues (hence why Majorian appointed/confirmed regional leaders, would it be only to held in check the rebellious foedi). Don't forget that their position within the Empire depended from their relation with Majorian, and that they didn't have much ties in Italy proper which was definitely the support base of Ricimer (don't forget that, as far as senatorial elites were concerned, Ricimer's Italy WAS the Empire).
If the tentative of Ricimer to bribe Marcellinus' troops to his service (and the subsequent withdrawal of Marcellinus in its Dalmatian lands) is any indication, they're position in their own territories wasn't spectacularily affirmed.
The same goes for Aegidius that had to deal not only with foedi, but with a Gallo-Roman nobility that never really was thrilled by Majorian's reign and Avitus' demise.

If you want to deal with Ricimer, and preserve most of Majorian's management of local Romance rulers and relatively obedient foedi, I think a Britto-Gallo-Romance victory at Déols in 469 might be the way to go : outside the maintain of an imperially-sanctioned (if largely independent) Britto-Gallo-Frankish alliance in Northern Gaul, and the possibility of preserving Gallo-Roman Auvergne in a similar position (especially if Euric's death lead to an important Gothic crisis), Anthemius could see himself in a much better position, and Ricimer in a worst one.
If the latter die, and while most of western Romania would be largely independent, (altough ITTL, not just as foedi but as autonomous commands in Gaul, Spain and Danube), the Roman Empire would be in a relatively good shape (even if at this point, it means that Ravenna is sattelited by Constantinople rather than Barbarians would it be only due to the ressources and support needed to hold it together).
Was it possible for the ERE to actually send an expeditionary force to take out Ricimer?
 
Was it possible for the ERE to actually send an expeditionary force to take out Ricimer?
Technically, I think they could.
But Leo I never really tried to get rid of emperors they saw as usurpers and rogue militias' masters safe by proxy. There's a lot of reasons for this, but I think it more or less boils down to the costs involved (the expedition of 468 was exceptional in its size), the religious troubles and to their own problems with Barbarians and commander-in-chief wannabees (Aspar being essentially Constantinople's Ricimer) and Zeno (himself not too dissimilar to the rulers in the West on several respects) elected as well a less heavy-handed and costly approach.
So, while possible, it's not plausible IMO, except some important and earlier changes in Constantinople's policies which would be enough to butterfly at least part of the situation in WRE.
 
Technically, I think they could.
But Leo I never really tried to get rid of emperors they saw as usurpers and rogue militias' masters safe by proxy. There's a lot of reasons for this, but I think it more or less boils down to the costs involved (the expedition of 468 was exceptional in its size), the religious troubles and to their own problems with Barbarians and commander-in-chief wannabees (Aspar being essentially Constantinople's Ricimer) and Zeno (himself not too dissimilar to the rulers in the West on several respects) elected as well a less heavy-handed and costly approach.
So, while possible, it's not plausible IMO, except some important and earlier changes in Constantinople's policies which would be enough to butterfly at least part of the situation in WRE.
How many soldiers would theoretically be needed for the ERE to get rid of someone like Ricimer?10k?20k?I was under the impression that the WRE would be hard-pressed to muster 10,000 foederati at in this period,and that other WRE generals will probably join the ERE to attack Ricimer when they got the chance.
 
How many soldiers would theoretically be needed for the ERE to get rid of someone like Ricimer?10k?20k?9
Thing is, it's not the military part which is the main obstacle (although it's to be considered), but the political and logistical cost : think Justinian conquests' aftermath-scale and then some more (due to troubles in Eastern Romania, among other things)
Eventually, it wouldn't be about getting rid of Ricimer, but its allies too, the person that would replace him, etc.
 
Thing is, it's not the military part which is the main obstacle (although it's to be considered), but the political and logistical cost : think Justinian conquests' aftermath-scale and then some more (due to troubles in Eastern Romania, among other things)
Eventually, it wouldn't be about getting rid of Ricimer, but its allies too, the person that would replace him, etc.
Size of the expedition correlates with the cost of the expedition.Would the ERE actually require anything as big as the 468 expedition to get rid of Ricimer? Considering Ricimer’s shaky legitimacy,would it actually have been that hard to get rid of him at all? In otl,he fought months against Anthemius,despite his control over the army.More importantly,would a small show of force alone be enough to actually induce defections from within Ricimer’s own army?

As for who to appoint as emperor,couldn’t one of the Western Roman generals who helped take out Ricimer do?
 
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Size of the expedition correlates with the cost of the expedition.
It correlates with the initial campaign : one you get bogged down in a long conflict (or even in a low-intensity conflict) the cost inflates.
Would the ERE actually require anything as big as the 468 expedition to get rid of Ricimer?
Assuming they got the idea of attempting it, which is really dubious (while technically doable), it wouldn't require something similar in size for sure, but at least it's worth mentioning how they would need to maintain troops directly there (because if they don't, it's just a particularly costly and inefficient way to have the same result they got with Julius Nepos) and how they couldn't really count on western Romania's armies.
Again, the problem isn't how to pull the initial expedition, it's how much of a political-military black hole it would be.Which is probably one of the big reasons it was never really considered.

Considering Ricimer’s shaky legitimacy,would it actually have been that hard to get rid of him at all?
Ricimer's legitimacy was essentially dubious from Constantinople's and provincial autonomous rulers' point of view : at some point, we have to take in account that for a good part of political and military elites in Italy, Ricimer was as legitimate they could get in his position, or he wouldn't have lasted this long just because of his good looks.

In otl,he fought months against Anthemius,despite his control over the army.
Anthemius' troops consisted importantly of Barbarian troops under Bilimer's (a Barbarian, probably Gothic, leader in the Roman army) command and what remained of dalmatian troops formerly under Marcellinus' command.
It took months essentially because Anthemius remained in Rome and Ricimer had to besiege him, patiently waiting his opponent to run out of food. That's pretty much the opposite of an epic fight for supremacy.
 
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It correlates with the initial campaign : one you get bogged down in a long conflict (or even in a low-intensity conflict) the cost inflates.

Assuming they got the idea of attempting it, which is really dubious (while technically doable), it wouldn't require something similar in size for sure, but at least it's worth mentioning how they would need to maintain troops directly there (because if they don't, it's just a particularly costly and inefficient way to have the same result they got with Julius Nepos) and how they couldn't really count on western Romania's armies.
Again, the problem isn't how to pull the initial expedition, it's how much of a political-military black hole it would be.Which is probably one of the big reasons it was never really considered.


Ricimer's legitimacy was essentially dubious from Constantinople's and provincial autonomous rulers' point of view : at some point, we have to take in account that for a good part of political and military elites in Italy, Ricimer was as legitimate they could get in his position, or he wouldn't have lasted this long just because of his good looks.


Anthemius' troops consisted importantly of Barbarian troops under Bilimer's (a Barbarian, probably Gothic, leader in the Roman army) command and what remained of dalmatian troops formerly under Marcellinus' command.
It took months essentially because Anthemius remained in Rome and Ricimer had to besiege him, patiently waiting his opponent to run out of food. That's pretty much the opposite of an epic fight for supremacy.
With that in mind,is it fair to say that if a Pagan like Marcellinus was to get rid of Ricimer and proclaim himself emperor,the Eastern court would have just ignored the prospect of a pagan restoration?
 
Very broadly, they couldn't : they're divided and have to deal with their own local issues (hence why Majorian appointed/confirmed regional leaders, would it be only to held in check the rebellious foedi). Don't forget that their position within the Empire depended from their relation with Majorian, and that they didn't have much ties in Italy proper which was definitely the support base of Ricimer (don't forget that, as far as senatorial elites were concerned, Ricimer's Italy WAS the Empire).
If the tentative of Ricimer to bribe Marcellinus' troops to his service (and the subsequent withdrawal of Marcellinus in its Dalmatian lands) is any indication, they're position in their own territories wasn't spectacularily affirmed.
The same goes for Aegidius that had to deal not only with foedi, but with a Gallo-Roman nobility that never really was thrilled by Majorian's reign and Avitus' demise.

If you want to deal with Ricimer, and preserve most of Majorian's management of local Romance rulers and relatively obedient foedi, I think a Britto-Gallo-Romance victory at Déols in 469 might be the way to go : outside the maintain of an imperially-sanctioned (if largely independent) Britto-Gallo-Frankish alliance in Northern Gaul, and the possibility of preserving Gallo-Roman Auvergne in a similar position (especially if Euric's death lead to an important Gothic crisis), Anthemius could see himself in a much better position, and Ricimer in a worst one.
If the latter die, and while most of western Romania would be largely independent, (altough ITTL, not just as foedi but as autonomous commands in Gaul, Spain and Danube), the Roman Empire would be in a relatively good shape (even if at this point, it means that Ravenna is sattelited by Constantinople rather than Barbarians would it be only due to the ressources and support needed to hold it together).
Italy is the empire, but Italy alone has not the resources available to Marcellinus, Aegidius and Nepotianus. Surely they need to deal with local issues, Nepotianus should be busy with the Suebis while Aegidius need to deal with Theodoricus II, but this is only a couple of years after Majorian’s campaign in Gaul and Spain. We should also consider that in addition to the local armies (doesn’t matter here barbarian or Roman) there was still the army that was supposed to invade Africa with the emperor. It wouldn’t be impossible to see one of the three generals hire again these troops ( as Aegidius did with some of these troops). Furthermore the bribery of soldiers can work both way, there is no reason to assume that the Italian army would stay loyal to Ricimer until the end ( especially considering that his position as master of the empire is recent). The senate ( or at least a faction) would certainly represent a problem during the war and maybe after the war, but a solution could be to appoint Olybrius as puppet emperor ( to appease the senate) while the real power would be in the hand of these generals.

Your proposal of a different Déols is interesting ( considering the misterious nature of Rhiotamus) but I would like to explore the possibility of one of Majorian’s general (or all of them) avenging his emperor and by the time of Déols all of them had died ( and most of Spain is now in gothic hand).


Thing is, it's not the military part which is the main obstacle (although it's to be considered), but the political and logistical cost : think Justinian conquests' aftermath-scale and then some more (due to troubles in Eastern Romania, among other things)
Eventually, it wouldn't be about getting rid of Ricimer, but its allies too, the person that would replace him, etc.
But would the war really last so long (and devastating)? Especially when it was so common for the Romans to leave the losing side in favour of the winner. What happens next would need to be carefully handled by the next western Roman emperor, but I don’t think it is impossible to reach a situation of internal stability. Anyway I would prefer to see a scenario where the western Roman generals manage to remove Ricimer by themselves, possibly with little eastern Roman involvement ( nothing against Anthemius, I just want to see what could the western Romans accomplish by themselves).
With that in mind,is it fair to say that if a Pagan like Marcellinus was to get rid of Ricimer and proclaim himself emperor,the Eastern court would have just ignored the prospect of a pagan restoration?
I think he would proceed carefully, he is surrounded by christians and he can’t allow additional problem. But if he avoid drastic measure I think he would be accepted by the ere ( as it happened when it was the independent ruler of Dalmatia).
 
But would the war really last so long (and devastating)? Especially when it was so common for the Romans to leave the losing side in favour of the winner. What happens next would need to be carefully handled by the next western Roman emperor, but I don’t think it is impossible to reach a situation of internal stability. Anyway I would prefer to see a scenario where the western Roman generals manage to remove Ricimer by themselves, possibly with little eastern Roman involvement ( nothing against Anthemius, I just want to see what could the western Romans accomplish by themselves).
I agree. Ricimer,while having a working relationship with the Italian elite,was far from being seen as legitimate,that's why he often had trouble with various emperors and generals of the WRE.As soon as things go south,he's screwed.People will just desert him.
 
It correlates with the initial campaign : one you get bogged down in a long conflict (or even in a low-intensity conflict) the cost inflates.

Assuming they got the idea of attempting it, which is really dubious (while technically doable), it wouldn't require something similar in size for sure, but at least it's worth mentioning how they would need to maintain troops directly there (because if they don't, it's just a particularly costly and inefficient way to have the same result they got with Julius Nepos) and how they couldn't really count on western Romania's armies.
Again, the problem isn't how to pull the initial expedition, it's how much of a political-military black hole it would be.Which is probably one of the big reasons it was never really considered.
I think only a small force is required for long term maintenance,like 5,000 soldiers perhaps,to protect the Western Emperor until he can build up his own supporters. The point of such a small force is only to remind potential opportunists that the ERE is ready to defend the Western Emperor and that they will react violently to a potential usurpation.As long as the ERE seems ready to back the Western Emperor militarily,it will change things a lot.
But would the war really last so long (and devastating)? Especially when it was so common for the Romans to leave the losing side in favour of the winner. What happens next would need to be carefully handled by the next western Roman emperor, but I don’t think it is impossible to reach a situation of internal stability. Anyway I would prefer to see a scenario where the western Roman generals manage to remove Ricimer by themselves, possibly with little eastern Roman involvement ( nothing against Anthemius, I just want to see what could the western Romans accomplish by themselves).
I agree. Ricimer,while having a working relationship with the Italian elite,was far from being seen as legitimate,that's why he often had trouble with various emperors and generals of the WRE.As soon as things go south,he's screwed.People will just desert him.
 
With that in mind,is it fair to say that if a Pagan like Marcellinus was to get rid of Ricimer and proclaim himself emperor,the Eastern court would have just ignored the prospect of a pagan restoration?
It's not really clear if Marcellinus was pagan or not.You might say it's a bit irrelevant, giving that it's a convenient accusation as it was with Anthemius.
As for Constantinople, Marcellinus could pull a Julius Nepos without real problem, as long he gets Constantinople's agreement.

Italy is the empire, but Italy alone has not the resources available to Marcellinus, Aegidius and Nepotianus.
Which is irrelevant, tough : there's no real way that the various Gallo-Romans leaders and Dalmatia could poll their ressources all together.. Italy, for all the crisis and issues it had, srill had important resources comparatively and, which is significant, enough legitimacy to recieve support from immediate neighbours and foederati which none of the aformentioned provicial rulers really could (while still depending more or less largely from Barbarian auxiliaries/mercenaries whom loyalty wouldn't be obvious).

Surely they need to deal with local issues, Nepotianus should be busy with the Suebis while Aegidius need to deal with Theodoricus II but this is only a couple of years after Majorian’s campaign in Gaul and Spain.
Agreement with Barbarian petty-kings and the empire was mostly considered by the former as personal agreements : meaning that by the death of Majorian they considered their position at best as open to renegociation, if not allowed to enforce directly their own interests.
Note that provincial roman elites, especially in Gaul and Spain, were more than open themselves to negociate directly with Barbarians, due to a lack of sense of loyalty or legitimacy with Ravenna's : it's basically how Burgondians managed to go this much south IOTL.

We should also consider that in addition to the local armies (doesn’t matter here barbarian or Roman) there was still the army that was supposed to invade Africa with the emperor.
This army was quickly disbanded, and was mostlymade up of foederati and mercenaries. That they wouldn't consider themselves tied to the Empire for the time being, and more close to their own direct rulers is decisive into understanding Barbarian politics in the Vth, and why foederati managed to get back territories they lost during Majorian's reign so quickly. egidius' exemple is particularily interesting in that he couldn't count either on foederati, either on a significant part of Gallo-Roman elite, his rule in Northern-Gaul being more of a sanctuarisation of territory than anything, one he had to fight for constantly since 461. You should not underestimate the network of conflicting loyalties in provinces that generally played against Imperial unity from one hand, or even regional unity (Auvergne, while a "national redoubt" of Romania in Gaul never acknwowledged Aegidius)

It wouldn’t be impossible to see one of the three generals hire again these troops ( as Aegidius did with some of these troops).
They wouldn't have the resources for that : Aegidius raised Barbarian mercenaries and made alliance with Franks and Britto-Romans, but these weren't the same troops raised for the African campaign in all likeness.

Furthermore the bribery of soldiers can work both way, there is no reason to assume that the Italian army would stay loyal to Ricimer until the end ( especially considering that his position as master of the empire is recent).
While improverished, Italy still had more resources than what remained of provincial authority : that Marcellinus couldn't copete with Ricimer's bribery temptatives of his army is, IMO, implying this just well enough. Note that Ricimer's authority isn't just based on these resources : his position might be recent but it's a strong one and sanctioned by the Senata, meaning it's still more legitimate for many than semi-roguish provincial rulers not acknowledged entirely by Constantinople. Ricimer's authority? It's as what foederati and most were concerned the imperial authority wheater it was respected or not. Marcellinus or Aegidius' authority? Not the imperial authority, and generally not respected and considered at best as on part with petty-kings'.

You could call this a legal fiction (altough, IMO, it's really not) but it helps making the difference at an institutional and political level.

Your proposal of a different Déols is interesting ( considering the misterious nature of Rhiotamus)
The most solid assumption on Riothamus IMO (which is probably a surname, giving it basically means high-king) is associating him with the historical Ambrosius Aurelianus.

but I would like to explore the possibility of one of Majorian’s general (or all of them) avenging his emperor
At this point, they basically have to save themselves against a general pressure due to Majorian's death : not just against Ricimer but basically every opportunist attack. You'd need first to ensure their political-military survival as they did IOTL before going on a rampage (assuming they can treat with foederati and Barbarians in the way)

But would the war really last so long (and devastating)?
Such an expedition would break a lot of the status-quo in western Romania : Ricimer demonstrated time and time again he was resourceful enough that Constantinople preferred to deal with him rather than "deal with him". Ricimer would benefit from senatorial and military support due to an outright invasion, plus alliances with relatively strong foederati : the Gothic Wars is a good example on how just throwing troops at Italy doesn't mean an easy, flowery and joyous campaign. Note that Ricimer may be killed/taken care of relatively quickly but the vaacum power wouldn't benefit Constantinople at this point, and having a Barbarian king as Gondioc appearing as the legitimate alternative against Constantinople literally trampling over Ravenna would certainly play a lot : at this point Byzzies would have a choice, either managing the situation which would mean maintaining troops and campaigning in north Italy and Gaul, either acknowledging what they probably realized immediatly IOTL that the whole situation was complex and that it was better to manage it via proxy. In the second choice, the whole expedition would be effectively more limited, but as I said above, only a costlier, more destructuring and wholly unefficient way to pull a Julius Nepos.

It was crystal clear for Leo that searching an agreement with Ricimer was war more efficient to ensure Imperial authority than overdosing on testosterone.

Especially when it was so common for the Romans to leave the losing side in favour of the winner.
That's really oversmplistic : what happened in the provinces does shows that conflicting loyalties and refusal of imperial authority played a major role in abandonment of whole regions to Barbarians.

I agree. Ricimer,while having a working relationship with the Italian elite,was far from being seen as legitimate
And yet, he was : having troubles doesn't mean being illegitimate (if it was no emperor in Roman history was legitimate giving the records of revolts or usurpation). His own support base was of course not particularily strong but it wasn't weak either. That it was based on institutional matters doesn't make it less true.
Again, we're talking of someone that made his way trough the troubles without major campaigns to assert his rule (one that he might have attempted in Gaul in the 460's essentially failed, without major repercussions). The idea that Ricimer was an opportunist Barbarian that only managed to get in charge because he murdered everyone while Italians were too lazy/frightened to act is...well, obsolete.

I think only a small force is required for long term maintenance,like 5,000 soldiers perhaps,to protect the Western Emperor until he can build up his own supporters.
Even Julius Nepos benefited from more than that. At some point, it should be clear that neither Ricimer and Italo-Romans, or Barbarians were push-overs. Frankly, if the solution was so obvious, don't you think it would have, I'm not saying attempted, but at least be considered IOTL?

The point of such a small force is only to remind potential opportunists that the ERE is ready to defend the Western Emperor and that they will react violently to a potential usurpation.
Or more likely they would merge with the general Barbarian mercenariate and support either a WRE usurper (regardless if they pulled him or not) with the commander acting on its own, especially as things got to change in Constantinople. Remember that such army would be essentially made up of Barbarians mercenaries and foederati.
As long as the ERE seems ready to back the Western Emperor militarily,it will change things a lot.
Indeed, it would make people frowning upon Constantinople's meddling mucb more polarized, and foederati seeing it as a likely threat, in the tune of "It could happen to you too", making Visigoths looking less threatening by comparison.
 
And yet, he was : having troubles doesn't mean being illegitimate (if it was no emperor in Roman history was legitimate giving the records of revolts or usurpation). His own support base was of course not particularily strong but it wasn't weak either. That it was based on institutional matters doesn't make it less true.
Again, we're talking of someone that made his way trough the troubles without major campaigns to assert his rule (one that he might have attempted in Gaul in the 460's essentially failed, without major repercussions). The idea that Ricimer was an opportunist Barbarian that only managed to get in charge because he murdered everyone while Italians were too lazy/frightened to act is...well, obsolete.
As I've mentioned,there's a difference between people working with him for their own convenience and seeing him as a legitimate ruler.Just how many Italians were actually willing to die and fight for Ricimer?In this period,with the exception of Stilicho,who did the Italians actually rise up and fight?Warlords just come and go.Unlike previous periods,most Italians were just apathetic to who rules,so long as their rule didn't interfere with their interests.

Even Julius Nepos benefited from more than that. At some point, it should be clear that neither Ricimer and Italo-Romans, or Barbarians were push-overs. Frankly, if the solution was so obvious, don't you think it would have, I'm not saying attempted, but at least be considered IOTL?
I definitely do believe that the Italo-Romans were definitely pushovers in this period. There were few native Roman soldiers in the army,and regimes just come and go,and there was just general apathy as to who exactly was in charge.The Roman populace in the Eastern Empire definitely gave a better performance in terms of mob violence. As for Ricimer and the barbarians,I'm not saying they are pushovers,but as you've mentioned,their rule rested upon very weak foundation. And they too lacked the level of organization and equipment available to the wealthy Eastern Empire.
Or more likely they would merge with the general Barbarian mercenariate and support either a WRE usurper (regardless if they pulled him or not) with the commander acting on its own, especially as things got to change in Constantinople. Remember that such army would be essentially made up of Barbarians mercenaries and foederati.
The Eastern Empire still had plenty of native troops in this period,which was why the barbarian elements of the army was eventually purged.
Indeed, it would make people frowning upon Constantinople's meddling mucb more polarized, and foederati seeing it as a likely threat, in the tune of "It could happen to you too", making Visigoths looking less threatening by comparison.
They were apathetic enough to accept people from the likes of Odoacer and Theodoric as actual rulers,but rise up when Eastern Romans try to meddle with the WRE?
 
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As I've mentioned,there's a difference between people working with him for their own convenience and seeing him as a legitimate ruler.
Not really : you can't make a clear cut difference between understood self-interest and legitimacy, because both support each other. We can argue that institutionality played no role, the problem is that it's more of a gut feeling mostly unsupported by sources.
It's the same reasoning with every ruler or political event, at the end : we can always debate about what people deeply felt in their own inner-self, but that's eventually not much relevant if it doesn't have some source or rational basis for it.

Just how many Italians were actually willing to die and fight for Ricimer?I
I think you're holding Ricimer to standards that even the greatest Roman emperors couldn't easily reach : "how many Italians were actually willing to die and fight for Majorian/Aetius/Aegidus", etc. for the sake of it, to be honest : Roman military essentially fought for both payment and (which appear in sources, a sense of patriotic duty), rather than a Tolkienesque attachement for their captain.

I definitely do believe that the Italo-Romans were definitely pushovers in this period.
And I think it comes down to, as you said, belief : IMO, you focuses too much on their supposed "apathy" right from the start to really find a political and cultural reason why they supported Ricimer (up to arguing "mob violence" being a sign of dynamic society.)
It might have been understable from Gibbon to play the decadence tune, but we have now a greater array of sources and analysis that, I'm sorry to say, you don't use and prefer "belief" which by definition, I can't argue against.
It have to be stressed that Ricimer was directing not as much his own personal interests (again, he wouldn't have lasted as long as he did, as self-obvious this remark might be) but the general interest of Italo-Romans elites : separating both is, IMO, eventually failing to understand late imperial Italy. Even Leo, who had little reason to hold him dearly, went trough this : considering him as a mere warlord is wrong.

Note that the Barbarian elements in Eastern Roman armies remained dominant even after Leo's reign : it was not about purging the army on ethnic lines (especially as Germanic elements were partially replaced by Isaurians, which weren't tought this much better about) but preventing leaders as Aspar to achieve the same status than a Ricimer : the absence of strong foederati allies and Sassanians being busy with Hepthalites certainly represented a huge asset for Leo.
Any army sent by Constantinople in Italy would be importantly made of Barbarian troops, because that's what the eastern emperor could pull and did pull historically (to mention the famous quote, even if it have to be nuanced : "Justinian armies had an international aspect")

They were apathetic enough to accept people from the likes of Odoacer and Theodoric as actual rulers,but rise up when Eastern Romans try to meddle with the WRE?
I can't make it clearer that Ricimer, Odoacer and even more Theodoric (due to Imperial sanction) were seen as legitimate rulers of Italy by the senatorial elites and remnants of roman armies (as Barbarian kings were seen, altough with a much greater fusion of elites eventually elsewhere) because they were seen as the protectors of Roman Italy and that the failure of doing just that was the end of Odoacer and Gothic Italy. By sacrificing provinces to preserves Italy, Ricimer did not had an another role.

Similarily, considering that Roman elites, Italian or provincial, had a closer kinship or relationship with Constantinople than their immediate partners is yet again unsupported by sources : in fact, a good part of Anthemius' weakness was that he was perceived as a "Greek" client of Constantinople both by Ricimer and his provincial opponents.
For most political and institutional matters in Italy, Ricimer was a legitimate ruler as much one could be in troubled times, and did incarned Italian interests the same way his successors did. It doesn't mean he wasn't ruthless, and that his policy were systematically sound, but they're rather a geopolitical evolution than a departure from warlordism (if anything, Aegidius or Marcellinus could rather be considered as Roman warlords).

May I advise you reading this summary if you're interested on understanding Ricimer's position in late imperial Italy?
 
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The most solid assumption on Riothamus IMO (which is probably a surname, giving it basically means high-king) is associating him with the historical Ambrosius Aurelianus.
Minor off-topic: Could you please give me some more info about Riothamus and his role? Assuming that Déols went differently what would happen to Gaul and Anthemius in your opinion?
At this point, they basically have to save themselves against a general pressure due to Majorian's death : not just against Ricimer but basically every opportunist attack. You'd need first to ensure their political-military survival as they did IOTL before going on a rampage (assuming they can treat with foederati and Barbarians in the way)
Ok let’s try a different approach: all these three general secure their own territory first, survive some more years after 465/468, while trying to preserve Majorian’s conquests. Meanwhile they work diplomatically with the east to gain the recognition of their power and even the title of emperor ( the most likely candidate for a ere supported emperor would be Marcellinus IMO). They ignore for some years Ricimer and his puppet-emperor as they focus on their territories, while once again fighting against the rebellious foedi ( you stated that after Majorian’ s death they would be freed from previous treaty, however they would still be weakened by the recent defeats) and avoiding the fall of Narbo.
Would they be able to defeat Ricimer after spending some years on consolidating their power militarily and diplomatically ( without just waiting the natural death of Ricimer)? Assuming that the war is successful what would happen next? Would the empire benefit from the rule of one of the aforementioned generals?
 
I think the essential question is, how those three generals would be able to cooperate, in short to communicate between each other? While not extremely impossible, with the opportune connections - but also likely luck and sufficient loyalty from their part (because, if their aim would be overthrow Ricimer, their inner circles must be totally trustworthy), the three men should have enough humility to convene personally, "Ricimer is a threat for the Empire, we must work together, and then we will see how to solve the Imperial succession without arriving to point our swords without each other."

I was thinking, if even the three commanders would manage to a base agreement, how to legalize it... And there is only a solution which may be effective and scary at the same time:

Triumvirate.

But in the end, the Dominate was a revised form of that far institution...

Granted, in desperate times for the WRE, it may be salvation or the final nail of the Empire. But after all the original triumvirate was the death of the Republic and the genesis of the Empire so who would ever know...
 
Minor off-topic: Could you please give me some more info about Riothamus and his role?
It's diversely agreed on : it may be tied with Ricimer's policy in Gaul if we assume that the Odoacer fought by Paulus and Chilperic was the Odoacer whom forces were sent or recruited to fight Alans established in Gaul, and eventually Paulus and Syagrius in the mid-460's, and eventually gained Franks to his side while replacing Alans with Britto-Romans on the Loire and Armorica at large (meaning including Normandy). In this perspective, Riotamus could be associated with Riatham, grandson of Riwall, of Dummonia, probably the part of the kingdom on the mainland.
Minor on-topic, this would stress the importance of Ricimer besides its italian role.
https://www.persee.fr/doc/abpo_0399-0826_1993_num_100_1_3465

If we consider the Odoacer fought by Gallo-Franks a different ruler and probably a Saxon king, the situation would be rather similar, but more chaotic and with Riotamus being possibly a king of Dummonia still but on the island.
Riotamus would be then at least the leader of Britto-Roman armies responsible of the protection of North-Western Gaul after Paulus' death (leaving Syagrius with a Noyons-Soissons territory before Clovis' conquest). The Armenian Genocide page does makes a good summary of the reasons why to associate him with Ambrosius Aurelianus.

Assuming that Déols went differently what would happen to Gaul and Anthemius in your opinion?
Having Paul (with Riotamus) and Syagrius essentially sharing the lead in Northern Gaul, while not splitting the alliance with Chilpéric (the idea that Chilperic might have opposed Paul is mostly coming from Gregory's succinct style, and doesn't make this much sense) at least in a first time, as a continuation of late 450's situation with a rough Britto-Gallo-Franco-Roman ensemble divesely managing the region while being reasonably imperially-sanctioned., including the key regions of Upper and Middle Loire.
If Euric dies, it could even lead to a Gothic succession crisis at least halting their expension in Gaul and Spain (maybe up Suevi and Burgondian extension on them). Auvergne remains essentially under local management that while not hostile to Anthemius, wouldn't be under its control. Basically post-Majorian system surviving, mixing Roman local commands with non-hegemonic foederati.

Note that Anthemius' prestige would be reinforced (especially without defeat face to Euric in Provence ITTL) and that Ricimer's policy of alliance with Goths is a sounding defeat : it might be enough to have Ricimer being dealt with by Anthemius, and Imperial Italy firmly being sattelited by Constantinople, while various provincial roman commands acting as de facto independent exarchates.
Ok let’s try a different approach: all these three general secure their own territory first, survive some more years after 465/468, while trying to preserve Majorian’s conquests.
Easier said than done for Gaul : while reduced to their original foedi by Majorian, Goths and Burgundians really managed to tie alliances and network in Roman Gaul, which never entirely supported Majorian or Anthemius (Arvandus being the prototype of such tendency). The insistance of Euric to appear as a Barbarian just coming out of Tacitus' Germania was essentially a facade : he was essentially a Roman ruler as ruthless as Ricimer and even less subtle about what he wanted than his brother. Gothic pressure on Loire and Northern Gaul was pretty much the immediate threat for Aegidius, so much he had to abandon his plans to go for Italy.
So, first things first, you'd need to deal with Goths in Gaul as soon as possible : problem, they weren't really crippled by Majorian, and remained a remarkable force in western Romania. Maybe if you could prevent Euric to kill Theodoric II, you might end up with a lesser pressure but he nevertheless did attempted to do the same thing than Euric IOTL.

Now, you could just kill off Ricimer with an attack or something, and then reduce a bit visigothic pressure further, but that kind of would defeat the OP purpose.
 
It's diversely agreed on : it may be tied with Ricimer's policy in Gaul if we assume that the Odoacer fought by Paulus and Chilperic was the Odoacer whom forces were sent or recruited to fight Alans established in Gaul, and eventually Paulus and Syagrius in the mid-460's, and eventually gained Franks to his side while replacing Alans with Britto-Romans on the Loire and Armorica at large (meaning including Normandy). In this perspective, Riotamus could be associated with Riatham, grandson of Riwall, of Dummonia, probably the part of the kingdom on the mainland.
Minor on-topic, this would stress the importance of Ricimer besides its italian role.
https://www.persee.fr/doc/abpo_0399-0826_1993_num_100_1_3465

If we consider the Odoacer fought by Gallo-Franks a different ruler and probably a Saxon king, the situation would be rather similar, but more chaotic and with Riotamus being possibly a king of Dummonia still but on the island.
Riotamus would be then at least the leader of Britto-Roman armies responsible of the protection of North-Western Gaul after Paulus' death (leaving Syagrius with a Noyons-Soissons territory before Clovis' conquest). The Armenian Genocide page does makes a good summary of the reasons why to associate him with Ambrosius Aurelianus.
I’ve to admit that I find the situation in Gaul a little confusing. I will try to read more about the topic.
Having Paul (with Riotamus) and Syagrius essentially sharing the lead in Northern Gaul, while not splitting the alliance with Chilpéric (the idea that Chilperic might have opposed Paul is mostly coming from Gregory's succinct style, and doesn't make this much sense) at least in a first time, as a continuation of late 450's situation with a rough Britto-Gallo-Franco-Roman ensemble divesely managing the region while being reasonably imperially-sanctioned., including the key regions of Upper and Middle Loire.
If Euric dies, it could even lead to a Gothic succession crisis at least halting their expension in Gaul and Spain (maybe up Suevi and Burgondian extension on them). Auvergne remains essentially under local management that while not hostile to Anthemius, wouldn't be under its control. Basically post-Majorian system surviving, mixing Roman local commands with non-hegemonic foederati.

Note that Anthemius' prestige would be reinforced (especially without defeat face to Euric in Provence ITTL) and that Ricimer's policy of alliance with Goths is a sounding defeat : it might be enough to have Ricimer being dealt with by Anthemius, and Imperial Italy firmly being sattelited by Constantinople, while various provincial roman commands acting as de facto independent exarchates.


This would happen after the failure of the African expedition. Assuming that a victory at Déols lead to Ricimer’s death and to a crisis inside the gothic kingdom, would it be feasible for Anthemius to attempt a partial recovery of Gaul. An imperial army led by Anthemiolus was defeated by Euric after Déols, but without the gothic king, what would this army be able to accomplish?

I am also thinking about the fact that Spain was not entirely subjected to the Goths by this time, so what are the limits and the possibilities of the empire here?

After the Goths what is the next threat ( internal and external) that Anthemius should face?
 
I wonder if it would be possible to see the ERE have local support, rather that simply invade. i.e. rather than Ricimer, have a faction that would rather have Constantinople be in charge, expecting a sort of "Catepanate", or "Exarchate" (I know anachronisms) style approach. Effectively distant rule, but truly Roman. None of these Foedi bossing them around. (Forgive the fluff).

If we had a PoD that was effectively the rise of a "Submission to Constantinople" faction, could that be enough to have Constantinople send support, or take charge?
 
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