OKW was not especially eager to invade and the Kriegsmarine was understandably horrified by the idea. As for 'scooping' the fleets, what was the point of suggesting it? The French fleet is not going to fall into Hitler's hands and the Italian fleet is completely irrelevant, nor can it do anything in the Channel.
OKW was far more horrified of two front war in the east, so they were supremely motivated.Raeder was horrified because the very thing he feared from the start was happening , so his angle was to turn east since that would cost the KM nothing.Why should he be made a scapegot for Hitlers utter neglect of the KM. Politics
I think I stated the captured warships would be brought into replace losses after the fact... The Italian example was brought up as a point of historical comparison...I thought that would have been obvious
The French fleet could not be scooped up. Beyond all of the ships held in British territory, virtually all of the remainder are in North Africa and may turn to the British when Hitler starts scooping, or in southern France and completely unable to get out of the Med and all the way to Germany.
Since 60% of the French fleet was in southern France and Atlantic France, the bulk of this would fall into German hands. In Norway the Germans scooped most of the warships and 25% of the merchant fleet, so the predicted French figures are probably good enough. In every ones plans nothing goes wrong , but in the real world things are always gray not black and white. So again go to the histories to see compariable events. The French were still burning over the RN sinking of their battleships, that they just might look the other way or only make half hearted attempts to follow scuttling orders.
The Stuka, besides being extremely vulnerable to the RAF, was available in numbers between 300-350 for the Battle of Britian so they won't be around for long. In fact, in most actual and serious attempts to gaming the invasion the Stukas are either withdrawn after 2-3 days or all but exterminated within a week. Neither will this small number be held back endlessly in hopes of seeing the Royal Navy when the Luftwaffe has many missions for every plane.
Don't use gaming to prove anything, its not a reliable source. Most wargames grossly exagerate the peronnel bias of its authors. As long as the Stuka remain operating in the channel they are out of reach of RAF interceptors , due to the limitations of British radar, until RAF fighters patrol over their fleets in the channel. In order for the RAF to do that, they must strip off fighters from other fronts diluting their forces when they are themselves against the ropes under attack. At this time losses were 1:1 over all, so RAF will be hard pressed to cover all bases with out suffering a reversal in their air to air kill ratios. When the Stuka struck in the channel over July and August, the RAF was no were to be seen and the RN were very bitter about the whole experience.
BTW The Stuka were withdrawn from the BoB because they were needed for the army cooperation mission once the troops were ashore.
A quarter of the Stukas is a pathetic 70-75 planes, facing the RN, British anti-aircraft artillery in the strongest locations AND the RAF fighters. And if the invasion has to be delayed for several weeks then it is all over. Another month of new equipment and American/Canadian supplies is going to enhance the British Army infinitely more than any benefit the Germans have received.
The forces that were unleshed in July/Aug were only about 70-80 Stuka,so they will do considerable damage and suffered only a few dozen lost . However in the context of Sealion they would not do enough damage in 8 days. That is why after the first week the Germans will probably commit the bulk of the 300+ and then the RN in the channel would be in big trouble.
By October(a month's delay) the British have produced new equipment for another tank division and several infantry divisions. Have the Germans added anything significant to the invasion?
Meanwhile the destruction of a large portion of the invasion fleet means German industry is crippled for several months, as it was those barges and tugs which supply most of German industry with coal, iron and other vital materials. Until they are replaced there can be no expansion of production or even maintaining of existing production levels. Not to mention the iron and coal needed to produce the replacement craft. Where replacements for the trained and experienced crews will come from is another question.
Having the tanks for an armored division doesn't = having an armored division. It can = replenishing an existing division thats suffered losses ,but cannot create a 'new division'. That takes 1/2 a year or more of training to achieve. As General Brooks pointed out 1/2 of his divisions were in no condition for combat and he was doubtfull about his chances since he had to defend a frontier as long as the french front with 1/4 of the forces. All more armaments will mean is they can last longer in battle before the break.
What have the Germans achieved in the mean time, well another 150 barges are motorised to start with and the British coastal fortifications are reduced to rubble through other slant bombings. Meanwhile each front line infantry divisions completes their reinforcment to semi motorised infantry levels along with tanks and nebelwaffers and extra engineering battalions and heavy artillery battalions for the armies.
Since the invasion barges were mostly captured their losses would not cripple German industry.The entire barge argument was a device Raeder brought up to stall the operation as where his figures for operational warships. All done to put the brakes on the invasion. Again Politics
The entire 10 day count down to Sealion was supposed to be kick started instead of bombing London, the 2-3 week delays would be through the first couple of weeks in September 1940, not October.Once the Germans are ashore it will only take them a month to over run the country.
The statistics given for RN versus KM battle losses are also meaningless. The only relevant stats would be German light forces competing gainst their British counterparts. Given the vastly superior numbers available to the Brits in September 1940, there is little reason to be hopeful. And beyond this wild assumption of the Luftwaffe being able to achieve far more against the RN than in OTL, not for lack of trying, two or three weeks of BRITISH bombing means the German invasion fleet has not only lost all reserve ships but can not even launch the planned first waves of roughly one brigade from each of the nine divisions in the first wave. In effect, the invasion is collapsing before the first wave can even set sail.
Germans had 18 CL/DD/TB and another dozen WW-I /captured TB models plus ~ 300 hundred Mineboot/VBoot/Rboot/Sperrbrecher/Fboot. While the south coast RN fleet has 56 DD/CL & 500 armed trawlers/ Minesweepers. However while the RN , DD/CL could be held back on alert, the RN trawlers/minesweepers would have to rotate to keep constant patrols . That means at most 1/3 would be at sea or about 175 , so the German fleet in the channel could actually out number the RN in the south coast region, before the Stuka have their way with them....and then those exchange ratios all of a sudden become critical.
RAF coastal command was useless at bombing anything. After a week bombing of the barges , they only destroyed 65 barges and lightly damaged another 100. The damaged would be repaired and returned in a matter of weeks , while the 65 destroyed would not. But thats 2-3 x 65 out of a fleet of 2175 , plus maybe a couple of hundred being repaired. Since the Germans had 300 extra barges in reserve,they still would be left with ~ 1800+ barges plus ~ 100 returning the next week. The first wave required 1500 barges , while follow on waves required only 400 , however another 400 barges were to be left on each side of the channel to facilitate rapid loading and unloading of the merchant transport ships.
The mine fields are not remotely comparable to US operations against Japan's merchant marine and appear dense because they involve a very small area dependent on Otto Ruge with 30 minelaying craft, which were also tasked to help with supplying the invasion. Ruge himself was quite clear that the mine fields had not the slightest hope of stopping the RN. As to why RN warships, with so many minesweepers on the spot, would suffer losses remotely as severe as the Japanese merchant marine against a much larger and more extended operation when the Japanese air force was no longer viable...not to mention comparing careful operations to clear mines wholesale after the war with clearing a few small lanes in time of war. Also RN warships and armed auxiliaries INSIDE the proposed minefields might may have something to say about Germany's small number of minelayers
Vessels inside the invasion corridor would not last long as they would be first targeted by air and given the sector they would be out numbered by German auxiliary warships. Thats what happened at Dover and the RN had to vacate the port or lose all of its warships. As I already mentioned these mineclearing ops were to be escorted and would trigger RN/KM clashes...which is why I reported the kill ratios

But you would already know all about that
I would guess one of the prime targets of such Stuka attacks would be minesweepers attempting to clear the mine barriers.Its likely aircraft could deliver alot of the mines once the operation begins.Ruge is right that mine field by itself would not stop anything , but part of an overall system it would have done its part.
Heres another site , with a mere 327 German mines the resulted in 40 port days closed and 11 ships sunk or crippled.
http://www.pioneer.navy.mil/mine_warfare.htm
Hard to know who I'm speaking with,so I will try to explain it again. If the Minesweepers do nothing , the RN can expect to lose at rate of destruction similar to Japanese experience, just on chance ship/mine contacts. If the minesweep is done its going to take time. Every one will chime in with how much time to clear based on whos flag they are waving. The only objective realistic option is to go to the histories and see what happened and what didn't happen in such operations.
These mines would be covered by coastal gun batteries that if nothing else will be able to help direct air and Schnellboot attacks into any concentration of ships at the mine barriers, slowing mineclearing ops. It could end up taking forever to clear path or really costly to clear. The other end of the scale would be to assume they have to rush the barrier to force a clearing. If so the other end of the example was an indicator of the damage that can be done. The truth would lay some where in the middle
Did the mines stop enemy ships? No, but they slowed ops and made passage costly and had psychological impacts out of proportion to their relative merit. The Americans reported having to sweep Cherbourg harbor 85 times after they occupied it. Either way obstical to be overcome and the sources are clear that it takes 200 times longer to clear a mine than it does to plant one. When combined with mounting fatigue and fog of war and dodging airbombarments and coastal artillery bombardments, the minefield could take a considerable toll of enemy vessels especially since 1/2 of all ships lost during the war were due to mines. Like relying on the weather to magically make the channel crossing impossible, its down right silly to dismiss mines in any density.... Its just one more of those unknowns.
Individually none of the elements mentioned above could have stopped the RN/RAF, but incombination with the invasion and the country being overrun, they could very well have. RN can't function with out ports and the RAF can't function without operational airfields. The more of those that fall into German hands the more the battle swings their way. The combined arms aspect of this would probably have overwhelmed the british, just as it did in Norway.