Matthew Craw said:
Technically, wasn't the Whermacht a large conscript army from a "less humanitarian inclined nation"?
Heh, yes, you'r right, but the Germans did nonetheless place great value on well-educated and trained troops. Germans for all their other shortcommings and insane ideas didn't usually waste soldiers - they knew they had to few as it was. That's my point Chinese and Russians allways knew they had plenty, so why conserve them?
Matthew Craw said:
and btw, the 1944 german army of 1944 was a great deal stronger than that of 1941 in leadership, equipment and tactical doctrine. the russians thrashed them anyway.
Yes, and no. On paper, perhaps, lots of new divisions and lots of new wonder weapons. The reality was that most of the experienced soldiers were dead. Still NCO's and officers tried, and did, their best. On a whole the Germans trained their men better then the Soviets, but replacements were as far as I know sporadic and few in numbers (and not in formed units). Command and Control was better than the Soviets, but that really didn't matter that much, since the Germans just had to stand and take what the Soviest dished out (the fixed defence thingy). The many divisons were for most parts down to regiment size. Regarding the new weapons; well, the Germans never had enough of the old ones. To generalize one could say, that the Germans efficient combat strength on the Eastern Front declined from day one...
Matthew Craw said:
If you want to compare the armies by 1944 you can easily just look at loss ratios, which were MASSIVELY in the Soviets' favour by that point, despite their being on the offensive against a very well dug in opponent. Or compare the skill in operational planning displayed in Soviet preparations for bagration with the German staff's efforts for Kursk.
They Germans might be well dug in, but there were never enough troops manning those defences. Look at the number of troops available and then at the mileage of front they were holding... That's one of the reasons why a flexible defence would have been better - concentrate your combat power and strike at the enemy's flanks ect etc. Loss ratios? The Soviets lost something like 5 men for each German killed. Numbers were probably higher, but not high enough to matter. The Soviets leadership threw men away, like they were paid to do so!
Matthew Craw said:
To look at the quantity vs. quality arguments, yes the soviets had quantity, but nothing like the sort of numerical advantages the Anglo-Americans enjoyed by later 1944.
I'm not sure to Allies outnumbered the Germans more then the Soviest did out East. Their airforce however was much, much stronger, but besides that the number of actual combat troops on the Western Front was rather low in comparison.
Matthew Craw said:
Moreover, the really decisive battles that turned the tide in the east, basically Stalingrad and Kursk, were while won the Soviet advantage was, although real, still much less than overwhelming.
Yes, besides the fact that the Soviest knew where and when the Germans would attack and just happened to have a few Tank Armies in reserve to throw at the Germans when they were fully committed... It's a wonder and a great cadeau to the Germans that they nearly won!
Matthew Craw said:
For too long Western histories of the eastern Front were written without the benefit of much by way of Russian sources (...)Time these myths were laid to rest, by 1944 the red Army was BETTER (...) The 1944 saw the Soviets run rings around the germans at relatively little cost (...)
Again, the reason why the Red Army could "run rings around the Germans" was that the Germans just stod there and got hammered. Hitler hurt his own army more than the Soviets did. Even the greatly admired Zhukov was very hammer-like in his ways (he actually reminds me of U.S.Grant). Subtle never was, or is, a very used word in russian. And of course the Red Army got better, but they never god that good - you need a different mentality for that. Just look at Russian operations uptil and including today - hammer it flat and then shot it some more and finally swarm it with poorly led and trained conscripted troops.
But as I've said before, the Red Army was closer to the breaking point than people usually think. A Manstein-like flexible defence would most likely have brought it closer to, if not actually over that edge...
Oh, and there are plenty Soviets sources, but few that are very trustworthy. Everything published during the Communist period in Russina history is tainted by the leaderships fear of looking weak, silly or what not!
Matthew Craw said:
It's also worth pointing out that Soviet advances inside the Rodina were not made over a green and pleasant land, but rather territories at least as ruined central Europe, and by 1945 the Germans too had reached the limits of theiur military potential.
Never said it was, but the further the Red Army advanced the greater the strain on their logistics, which never were close to being reasonable good in the first place. When the Soviets crossed the old border many began to see the war as over, hence the rising problems with moral among the troops - they wanted to go home.
Regards and all!
- Mr.Bluenote.