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Prior to WWII, the Imperial Japanese Navy had a strong group of senior officers who believed in a doctrine of a decisive battle, to be fought between the battle-lines (battleships and battlecruisers) of the USN and IJN. This idea lasted well into WWII.

A thought entered my head earlier today that Japan opened the war with their decisive battle, with the slight quibble that their battle-line wasn't there: Pearl Harbor.

Adm. Nagumo is frequently criticized by historians (both amateur and professional) for not launching a third strike at Pearl Harbor. The standard counter argument is that such a strike would have been a grave risk. I understand that position but disagree with it; the IJN could only win the war by taking risks. Contrary as it runs to the blood of a naval officer, sometimes a fleet must roll the dice against long odds.

What if Nagumo got the idea that Pearl Harbor, despite being conceived as a raid and despite lacking the IJN battle-line, was in fact the decisive battle? That his objective was not to lame the enemy and cripple their battle-line, but to utterly destroy the entire fleet and all its support structure, even at the cost of his own force? The notion that he was in command of his nation's forces for that glorious decisive battle would be a tempting one for a warrior.

What if, in short, he'd launched not a last gasp of a third wave, but lingered in Hawaiian waters and launched a pair of strikes on the 8th, and continued until his ordnance was exhausted or he was out of aircraft?

What casualties would he suffer (ships as well as aircraft)? How much additional damage could he do? How much longer (or shorter, if the IJN loses its carrier strike force) is the war?
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