Part 1- The Treaty of Prague and Resumption of War
Part 1: The Treaty of Prague and Resumption of War
The Balkans aren't worth the life of a single Pomeranian grenadier!’- Otto Von Bismarck, 1866.
Chapter One: The Treaty of Prague and Resumption of War
The War with Austria was deceptively decisive. Engineered by Otto Von Bismarck, this war was intended to drive out Austrian influence in Germany, to make sure that Prussia is not incorporated into some Greater German State. If German unity was to be inevitable, it must unite under Prussia, and not Austria; this war would pave the way for that, whilst making a ‘Kleindeutschland’, where Prussia- and more broadly Prussian Junkers- could dominate, possible. And at first it seemed as if the gamble worked. Although most of the German Confederation lined up against Prussia, Bismarck’s skilful diplomacy kept foreign powers out of the struggle. Prussia’s efficient and disciplined troops crushed the Austrians, already weakened by the 1859, decisively at Sadowa. But it was after that success, only 3 weeks into the war, that ruptures began to emerge.
The fruits of victory were showered too fast onto Prussia. The victory at Konnigratz opened the door to the occupation of Vienna, and after all they’d only been at war three weeks. But Bismarck already agitated for a ceasefire. The terms of this ceasefire would see Venetia ceded to Italy and Austria kicked out of German affairs entirely, but not a foot of territory would be taken from the Hapsburgs. This was due to Bismarck’s calculation that such a territorial annexation would be unnecessary- after all, it had little direct influence on German territorial security and would only serve to make co-operation with Austria impossible, driving them into the arms of the French. The military and monarchical authorities both questioned this; why should Prussia respond to complete victory with such a tepid peace? Moltke was strongly against it and urged the King to continue his advance, to seize a sizeable buffer of territory and to ensure Austria would not be in a position to resist further Prussian advances.. Bismarck implored, pleaded and supplicated; breaking down into tears and smashing objects in the room, Bismarck insisted that the King would be responsible for a horrible and bloody escalation of the war if he was to continue to advance. In what many consider to be the turning points of Prussia’s fortunate, Wilhelm I did not listen. A usually compliant Wilhelm I was convinced by the recommendations of his advisors and decided to take a stand against Bismarck. “Any peace with the Austrians must constitute a victor’s peace, not this strange political concoction. It is insulting to Prussian honour to accept otherwise.”. Thus, Moltke won out and Prussia pushed for an annexationist war against Austria and decided to continue onto Vienna, much to the incredulity of the French. Bismarck, traumatised and distraught that Wilhelm I had destroyed his intricate plans, was forced to resign. The war continued.
The war lasted little over a month longer, but began to set in motion a serious and unwise escalation in international tensions. Wilhelm I successfully occupied Vienna without much resistance, as the Austrian army, battered from defeats, could not. But aside from the military concerns, the spectre of Prussian troops overrunning Vienna was deeply unwise. It was seen on the international stage as an unnecessary escalation and provoked outcry in Austria, and was seen as a permanent stain on the honour of the Austrian state. Bismarck remarked in discuss that ‘Moltke has thrown away all of my work to ensure a stable international order in this war in the course of a single aftermath. This occupation would not be forgotten by a fuming Kaiser Francis Joseph.
The peace treaty was likewise harsh, both to German states that had so fatefully sided with the Austrians and to oppose Prussian expansion, which had the effect Saxony and Hanover were annexed into the Kingdom of Prussia, along with Hesse-Kassel, Hesse-Darmstadt, Nassau, Saxe-Meiningen, Frankfurt, Reuss-Greiz, and Holstein. This was to send the clear message that autonomy was only to be accepted if German states were to be compliant with Prussian demands. States that backed Prussia were forced into the “North German Confederation”, which was heavily controlled by the much enlarged Prussia. The South was left broadly alone, but was assumed to be in the sphere of influence. Prussia also annexed the “Saxon Corridor” from Austria- a strip of territory running across Bohemia which included the town of Karslbad and Austrian Silesia. These are annexed into Prussia as the province of "New Silesia"- harking back to the days of Fredrick the Great, and was rationalised as providing a launching post from which the Prussian state could threaten Vienna if necessary. Venetia and some of Istria are lost to Italy.
Central Europe, 1867. The New North German state now dominated the German world, and had annexed "New Silesia", brining the borders close to Prague and Vienna.
This Treaty caused international outcry and was seen as shockingly harsh. This railroading of tradition and vast annexations suddenly meant that the “lesser Global power” was a threat to national security for the Great Powers, especially France. In Britain, the expansion of power of Prussia began to alert politicians to concerns about its expansion. In France, the reaction was militantly hostile. France was promised a part of the Rhineland which she never received and was infuriated at this vast expansion of Prussian power; although the French army was too weak to intervene in 1866, a series of reforms initiated in 1867 onwards began to stabilise and modernise the army. Napoleon III was furious about the betrayal of the promises and was concerned about any further power of the Prussian state; he saw a failure to intervene in 1866 as a mistake that he was not willing to repeat. A rapprochement with Prussia was quite out of the question; Napoleon III now bitterly distrusted the Prussians, and as his domestic support began to look increasingly unstable in the aftermath of the growth of liberal opposition and the subsequent concessions and the lasting aftershocks for his authority for the Mexican debacle Napoleon III was increasingly convinced that giving into Prussian pressure would be the death knell for his empire and a victory against them could save it. Only Russia seemed to take Prussia’s side; although there were Pan-Slavic objections to this strong German power, their co-operation over Poland had convinced the Tsar that they were a better partner that the Hapsburgs, who had betrayed them in the course of the Crimean War. Moreover, the Tsar was more preoccupied with the Balkans that Central Europe, and he knew a weakened Austria would give him a free hand in the Balkans. Prussia and Russia continued to work constructively, with Prussia increasingly promising vast rewards in the Balkans
Franz Joseph originally wished to avoid any more bitter and destructive wars with Prussia, believing them to be unwinnable. He was forced to sign the compromise of 1867 under domestic pressure, turning his empire into a dual monarchy and granting what were once unthinkable concessions on his own autonomy to the Hungarians. The large indemnity payment demanded by the Prussians also produced crippling financial and political pressure on the new system; with four governments collapsing within two years. But as the possibility with war with France grew, Franz Joseph began to reconsider. First, it was looking like under the current political reality, it was only a matter of tiem before the state itself would implode under the strain and all would be lost. Secondly, the French looked like they had a good shot at winning- and if any prestige was to be won back, along with the wealthy territories and role were to be regained, attempting to align would not be a bad bet. Thirdly was the result of increasing political pressure. In the febrile political atmosphere, politicians were gaining ground on a stance of taking a hard line against Prussian encroachment and winning back lost Austrian prestige after the shame and humiliation of the occupation of Vienna. This led to increasing calls for the emperor to stand up for Austrian interests and take a harder stance against Prussian influence in Southern Germany. The territorial loses are too hard to bear; they will be rectified; The large indemnity payment is also causing economic suffering, fuelling worries about a revolutionary collapse of the empire; the common enemy, Prussia, was needed to bring Austria together.
The result of this mutual hostility was a mutual defence pact, with the aim of preventing further German encroachment in Southern Germany. By 1869 the French and Austrians have agreed a mutual defence pact, clearly pointing the empires towards war, but with a more clear aim of containing the expansion of Prussia into South Germany.. The French are dead set on containing Prussia; the domestic troubles convincing Napoleon III that he needs a foreign enemy. The situation in Austria is more complex. The Hungarians lobby against war, but German liberals, who are concerned about the triumph of an illiberal Prussia, and aggravated nationalist minority who want to row back the 1867 compromise and rectify national hour after the humiliation of 1867. It’s a hard decision for Franz Joseph, but the pro-war lobby wins out, or at least in the limited way of convincing the emperor to sign the pact.
The Spark for the war comes from growing crisis about the role of Southern Germany in the new North German state. The background to the crisis was the Spanish Crisis, where a Prussia Hohenzollern was nearly crowned King of Spain, before backing down in the face of French pressure. Tensions were still simmering because Wilhelm I had not given a personal guarantee that he'd never endorse a Hohenzollern candidacy again, but the crisis humiliated Prussia. National opinion with Prussia was outraged. As Moltke commented wryly: "How could a nation that could defeat the Austrian Empire in 6 weeks back down to a Napoleon doppelganger's every little demand?". Wilhelm I was growing increasingly frustrated with the Franco-Austrian demands. At the same time of growing outrage and jingoistic anger in France, a delicate set of international negotiations were occurring at the Mainz conference between the enlarged Northern Germany and the Southern Germany about deepening co-operation, or even unification. France made it very clear during 1866 that annexations of these states would lead to war, and thus they were not incorporated into the North German Confederation. The conference, before the Spanish crisis, appeared to be coming to a resolution in which Southern Germany would be more tightly economically integrated, mutual defence would be agreed but unification would not be achieved. But Wilhelm I, needing a victory after the Spanish humiliation, re-opened the issue. A communique sent on the 12th September 1870 to Bavaria and the other Southern German states offered some autonomy (greater than the Northern members) if they'd agreed to broad economic and foreign policy alignment, going far further than the previous set of assumptions at that conference- effectively de facto unification. This outraged France, who was operating on the assumption that such an agreement would not bring Prussian troops to the border. This diplomatic outrage provoked fury in France and was too much for Wilhelm I. France stated that they were willing to guarantee the independence of the South German states, with Austria adding that "The Austrian government, which has always shared a spiritual connection with fellow Southern German states, stands wholeheartedly in defence of Catholic Germany in response to Northern Prussian aggression". As a result of the assurances from France and Austria the Southern German states all declined the proposal except Baden, whose rulers was close to Prussian interests, and agreed to Prussian deployment. Negotations at Mainz collapsed on the 29th September 1870. The concept of Prussian troops being deployed in Southern Germany crossed a French red line. As Prussian troops began to arrive in Baden France issued an ultimatum that they must immediately withdraw or face war. As war drew closer Wilhelm I took a defiant stance, and addressed his cabinet thus:
"Gentlemen, I will be cowed by the Bonaparte family no longer. For all of my childhood, the French rampaged through our homeland, took our resources and starved us dry. But Prussian honour and ingenuity won the day at the miraculous victories at Leipzig and Waterloo. It was because the German people united together against common aggression, and I believe that spirit still exists. The German people will rise to this challenge. We will not accept Bonaparte's dictat."
The British government attempted to organise a mediation at London but such a proposal was declined by all powers. France declared the deployment in Baden as an attack upon her people and declared war on the 4th October 1870. Austria followed on the 7th October after growing domestic pressure, signalling that it considered the deployment in Baden an attempting to intimidate the south into acquiescing to Prussian unification. For the third time in six years, the German world was at war. This time, it would be far more contracted, bloody and tragic than the lightning victories of 1864 and 1866.
-----POD and author's note---
The Point of Divergence is in 1866, where Moltke wins out in the cabinet room fight between Moltke and Bismarck about whether the war should be continued and Prussia should annex Austrian territory and march on Vienna. This creates a climate of national outrage as described which drives Austria to align itself more closely with France, which combined with the focal point of the crisis being South Germany, a point of contention between Austria and Germany, draws them into the war.
This is a re-write with details of the crisis changed of my Nov 2019-July 2020 timeline, which I will enclose. I hope my writing and AH skills have somewhat improved since then!(1) WI: WW1 happened in the 1860s/1870s over German unification? | alternatehistory.com
The Balkans aren't worth the life of a single Pomeranian grenadier!’- Otto Von Bismarck, 1866.
Chapter One: The Treaty of Prague and Resumption of War
The War with Austria was deceptively decisive. Engineered by Otto Von Bismarck, this war was intended to drive out Austrian influence in Germany, to make sure that Prussia is not incorporated into some Greater German State. If German unity was to be inevitable, it must unite under Prussia, and not Austria; this war would pave the way for that, whilst making a ‘Kleindeutschland’, where Prussia- and more broadly Prussian Junkers- could dominate, possible. And at first it seemed as if the gamble worked. Although most of the German Confederation lined up against Prussia, Bismarck’s skilful diplomacy kept foreign powers out of the struggle. Prussia’s efficient and disciplined troops crushed the Austrians, already weakened by the 1859, decisively at Sadowa. But it was after that success, only 3 weeks into the war, that ruptures began to emerge.
The fruits of victory were showered too fast onto Prussia. The victory at Konnigratz opened the door to the occupation of Vienna, and after all they’d only been at war three weeks. But Bismarck already agitated for a ceasefire. The terms of this ceasefire would see Venetia ceded to Italy and Austria kicked out of German affairs entirely, but not a foot of territory would be taken from the Hapsburgs. This was due to Bismarck’s calculation that such a territorial annexation would be unnecessary- after all, it had little direct influence on German territorial security and would only serve to make co-operation with Austria impossible, driving them into the arms of the French. The military and monarchical authorities both questioned this; why should Prussia respond to complete victory with such a tepid peace? Moltke was strongly against it and urged the King to continue his advance, to seize a sizeable buffer of territory and to ensure Austria would not be in a position to resist further Prussian advances.. Bismarck implored, pleaded and supplicated; breaking down into tears and smashing objects in the room, Bismarck insisted that the King would be responsible for a horrible and bloody escalation of the war if he was to continue to advance. In what many consider to be the turning points of Prussia’s fortunate, Wilhelm I did not listen. A usually compliant Wilhelm I was convinced by the recommendations of his advisors and decided to take a stand against Bismarck. “Any peace with the Austrians must constitute a victor’s peace, not this strange political concoction. It is insulting to Prussian honour to accept otherwise.”. Thus, Moltke won out and Prussia pushed for an annexationist war against Austria and decided to continue onto Vienna, much to the incredulity of the French. Bismarck, traumatised and distraught that Wilhelm I had destroyed his intricate plans, was forced to resign. The war continued.
The war lasted little over a month longer, but began to set in motion a serious and unwise escalation in international tensions. Wilhelm I successfully occupied Vienna without much resistance, as the Austrian army, battered from defeats, could not. But aside from the military concerns, the spectre of Prussian troops overrunning Vienna was deeply unwise. It was seen on the international stage as an unnecessary escalation and provoked outcry in Austria, and was seen as a permanent stain on the honour of the Austrian state. Bismarck remarked in discuss that ‘Moltke has thrown away all of my work to ensure a stable international order in this war in the course of a single aftermath. This occupation would not be forgotten by a fuming Kaiser Francis Joseph.
The peace treaty was likewise harsh, both to German states that had so fatefully sided with the Austrians and to oppose Prussian expansion, which had the effect Saxony and Hanover were annexed into the Kingdom of Prussia, along with Hesse-Kassel, Hesse-Darmstadt, Nassau, Saxe-Meiningen, Frankfurt, Reuss-Greiz, and Holstein. This was to send the clear message that autonomy was only to be accepted if German states were to be compliant with Prussian demands. States that backed Prussia were forced into the “North German Confederation”, which was heavily controlled by the much enlarged Prussia. The South was left broadly alone, but was assumed to be in the sphere of influence. Prussia also annexed the “Saxon Corridor” from Austria- a strip of territory running across Bohemia which included the town of Karslbad and Austrian Silesia. These are annexed into Prussia as the province of "New Silesia"- harking back to the days of Fredrick the Great, and was rationalised as providing a launching post from which the Prussian state could threaten Vienna if necessary. Venetia and some of Istria are lost to Italy.
Central Europe, 1867. The New North German state now dominated the German world, and had annexed "New Silesia", brining the borders close to Prague and Vienna.
This Treaty caused international outcry and was seen as shockingly harsh. This railroading of tradition and vast annexations suddenly meant that the “lesser Global power” was a threat to national security for the Great Powers, especially France. In Britain, the expansion of power of Prussia began to alert politicians to concerns about its expansion. In France, the reaction was militantly hostile. France was promised a part of the Rhineland which she never received and was infuriated at this vast expansion of Prussian power; although the French army was too weak to intervene in 1866, a series of reforms initiated in 1867 onwards began to stabilise and modernise the army. Napoleon III was furious about the betrayal of the promises and was concerned about any further power of the Prussian state; he saw a failure to intervene in 1866 as a mistake that he was not willing to repeat. A rapprochement with Prussia was quite out of the question; Napoleon III now bitterly distrusted the Prussians, and as his domestic support began to look increasingly unstable in the aftermath of the growth of liberal opposition and the subsequent concessions and the lasting aftershocks for his authority for the Mexican debacle Napoleon III was increasingly convinced that giving into Prussian pressure would be the death knell for his empire and a victory against them could save it. Only Russia seemed to take Prussia’s side; although there were Pan-Slavic objections to this strong German power, their co-operation over Poland had convinced the Tsar that they were a better partner that the Hapsburgs, who had betrayed them in the course of the Crimean War. Moreover, the Tsar was more preoccupied with the Balkans that Central Europe, and he knew a weakened Austria would give him a free hand in the Balkans. Prussia and Russia continued to work constructively, with Prussia increasingly promising vast rewards in the Balkans
Franz Joseph originally wished to avoid any more bitter and destructive wars with Prussia, believing them to be unwinnable. He was forced to sign the compromise of 1867 under domestic pressure, turning his empire into a dual monarchy and granting what were once unthinkable concessions on his own autonomy to the Hungarians. The large indemnity payment demanded by the Prussians also produced crippling financial and political pressure on the new system; with four governments collapsing within two years. But as the possibility with war with France grew, Franz Joseph began to reconsider. First, it was looking like under the current political reality, it was only a matter of tiem before the state itself would implode under the strain and all would be lost. Secondly, the French looked like they had a good shot at winning- and if any prestige was to be won back, along with the wealthy territories and role were to be regained, attempting to align would not be a bad bet. Thirdly was the result of increasing political pressure. In the febrile political atmosphere, politicians were gaining ground on a stance of taking a hard line against Prussian encroachment and winning back lost Austrian prestige after the shame and humiliation of the occupation of Vienna. This led to increasing calls for the emperor to stand up for Austrian interests and take a harder stance against Prussian influence in Southern Germany. The territorial loses are too hard to bear; they will be rectified; The large indemnity payment is also causing economic suffering, fuelling worries about a revolutionary collapse of the empire; the common enemy, Prussia, was needed to bring Austria together.
The result of this mutual hostility was a mutual defence pact, with the aim of preventing further German encroachment in Southern Germany. By 1869 the French and Austrians have agreed a mutual defence pact, clearly pointing the empires towards war, but with a more clear aim of containing the expansion of Prussia into South Germany.. The French are dead set on containing Prussia; the domestic troubles convincing Napoleon III that he needs a foreign enemy. The situation in Austria is more complex. The Hungarians lobby against war, but German liberals, who are concerned about the triumph of an illiberal Prussia, and aggravated nationalist minority who want to row back the 1867 compromise and rectify national hour after the humiliation of 1867. It’s a hard decision for Franz Joseph, but the pro-war lobby wins out, or at least in the limited way of convincing the emperor to sign the pact.
The Spark for the war comes from growing crisis about the role of Southern Germany in the new North German state. The background to the crisis was the Spanish Crisis, where a Prussia Hohenzollern was nearly crowned King of Spain, before backing down in the face of French pressure. Tensions were still simmering because Wilhelm I had not given a personal guarantee that he'd never endorse a Hohenzollern candidacy again, but the crisis humiliated Prussia. National opinion with Prussia was outraged. As Moltke commented wryly: "How could a nation that could defeat the Austrian Empire in 6 weeks back down to a Napoleon doppelganger's every little demand?". Wilhelm I was growing increasingly frustrated with the Franco-Austrian demands. At the same time of growing outrage and jingoistic anger in France, a delicate set of international negotiations were occurring at the Mainz conference between the enlarged Northern Germany and the Southern Germany about deepening co-operation, or even unification. France made it very clear during 1866 that annexations of these states would lead to war, and thus they were not incorporated into the North German Confederation. The conference, before the Spanish crisis, appeared to be coming to a resolution in which Southern Germany would be more tightly economically integrated, mutual defence would be agreed but unification would not be achieved. But Wilhelm I, needing a victory after the Spanish humiliation, re-opened the issue. A communique sent on the 12th September 1870 to Bavaria and the other Southern German states offered some autonomy (greater than the Northern members) if they'd agreed to broad economic and foreign policy alignment, going far further than the previous set of assumptions at that conference- effectively de facto unification. This outraged France, who was operating on the assumption that such an agreement would not bring Prussian troops to the border. This diplomatic outrage provoked fury in France and was too much for Wilhelm I. France stated that they were willing to guarantee the independence of the South German states, with Austria adding that "The Austrian government, which has always shared a spiritual connection with fellow Southern German states, stands wholeheartedly in defence of Catholic Germany in response to Northern Prussian aggression". As a result of the assurances from France and Austria the Southern German states all declined the proposal except Baden, whose rulers was close to Prussian interests, and agreed to Prussian deployment. Negotations at Mainz collapsed on the 29th September 1870. The concept of Prussian troops being deployed in Southern Germany crossed a French red line. As Prussian troops began to arrive in Baden France issued an ultimatum that they must immediately withdraw or face war. As war drew closer Wilhelm I took a defiant stance, and addressed his cabinet thus:
"Gentlemen, I will be cowed by the Bonaparte family no longer. For all of my childhood, the French rampaged through our homeland, took our resources and starved us dry. But Prussian honour and ingenuity won the day at the miraculous victories at Leipzig and Waterloo. It was because the German people united together against common aggression, and I believe that spirit still exists. The German people will rise to this challenge. We will not accept Bonaparte's dictat."
The British government attempted to organise a mediation at London but such a proposal was declined by all powers. France declared the deployment in Baden as an attack upon her people and declared war on the 4th October 1870. Austria followed on the 7th October after growing domestic pressure, signalling that it considered the deployment in Baden an attempting to intimidate the south into acquiescing to Prussian unification. For the third time in six years, the German world was at war. This time, it would be far more contracted, bloody and tragic than the lightning victories of 1864 and 1866.
-----POD and author's note---
The Point of Divergence is in 1866, where Moltke wins out in the cabinet room fight between Moltke and Bismarck about whether the war should be continued and Prussia should annex Austrian territory and march on Vienna. This creates a climate of national outrage as described which drives Austria to align itself more closely with France, which combined with the focal point of the crisis being South Germany, a point of contention between Austria and Germany, draws them into the war.
This is a re-write with details of the crisis changed of my Nov 2019-July 2020 timeline, which I will enclose. I hope my writing and AH skills have somewhat improved since then!(1) WI: WW1 happened in the 1860s/1870s over German unification? | alternatehistory.com
