The death of Conrad and the victory of the Habsburgs (a WW1 TL)

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Deleted member 1487

Here is my new TL about the death of Conrad von Hötzendorff, the head of the Austro-Hungarian army just before the start of WW1. All feed back is welcome, especially praise ;).
Constructive criticism is also welcome, as I would like to make this a somewhat realistic story.


Multiple tragedies befell the Habsburg Empire within the period of six weeks, enough to seem as though a pox had fallen upon the ancient austrian house. The deaths of the Chief-of-Staff of their armies and the heir to the throne were heavy blows, but the European tragedy, which then followed, overshadowed these deaths. The three events are inextricably linked and determined the course of the war for the Habsburg Empire.

When Conrad von Hötzendorff died in mid-June 1914, the Habsburg army mourned the passing of “their genius”, none more than Franz Ferdinand, the inspector general of the army who had championed the fallen general as the revitalizing force needed to save the military. There was another “genius” waiting in the wings, working as governor of Bosnia. Appearing as though he was the only choice to assume the top post in the army in 1906, Oskar Potiorek was denied what he felt was his rightful promotion. Having been the previous chief’s aid (Friedrich Beck), Potiorek by all rights should have been appointed his successor, but the intervention of Ferdinand raised the junior officer Conrad to the top slot. Bitter and locked into his position, Potiorek felt that he was doomed to a life of undistinguished service. When given the military governorship over the newly annexed province of Bosnia-Herzogovina, he took up his task of suppressing dissent with a gusto. The civilian governor had let the natives run wild in his opinion, which led him to brutal repressive measures to reduce disloyalty.

When informed of the death of Conrad in a riding accident and his appointment to the head of the army (mainly thanks to his contacts at the imperial court) Potiorek was overjoyed. Aware that Ferdinand was not an ally, having been Conrad’s benefactor instead, Oskar extended an olive branch to demonstrate his good work to the Archduke. He invited the royal couple to Sarajevo to tour the city and see the order that was imposed on the rebellious populace. However, the trip proved disastrous as the royal couple was killed along with the mayor of the city when a bomb was thrown into their car while on parade through the streets. Fury filled the empire at the dastardly deed, which soon was channeled at the small nation of Serbia. It became apparent that the assassins were armed and directed by members of the Black Hand, an organization made up of radical members of the Serbian military. As the politicians debated and accused, the continent found itself at the brink of war. Potiorek demanded immediate war with the Serbs in revenge (Stafexpedition), some say out of intense guilt at having put the heir to the throne in the situation that led to his death. Regardless of his motivation, he was given the opportunity to lead a war against Serbia on the 28th of June when war was declared.

However, the alliance system of Europe took hold, as Russia mobilized for war against the Austrians against the demands of the Germans, which in turn prompted their declaration of war on both Russia and France, Russia’s ally. War soon came to much of the rest of the continent as Belgium was invaded and Britain joined in. Back in the Habsburg Empire Potiorek was left with several options, none of which were particularly safe. The entry of Russia into the war left the Empire with a very vulnerable flank and too few forces to decisively fight in both theaters of battle. Conrad’s pre-war plans called for concentrating three armies against Serbia or sending all armies into Galicia, but no plans for fighting in both areas. This would leave adaptation, something that the Austrians did not prove especially adept with, as the Germans would come to realize and denigrate with the world Schlamperei, or sloppiness.

There was much confusion in the AOK, the Austrian General Staff, about the path to take. The Russian threat was enormous and the battleground, the province of Galicia, produced 1/3 of the grain the empire consumed, meaning it would have to be defended for economic reasons. At the same time the Serbian theater was also vulnerable, as there were fears, mainly by Potiorek, that the Bosnian would revolt if the Serbs were allowed to attack. Furthermore there were also the Potiorek’s feelings of revenge and the will of the nation to crush Serbia. Ultimately Conrad’s Serbian plan was activated, which would send the 5th, 6th, and 2nd armies to the Serbian theater where they would be reinforced by Landsturm brigades. The remainder of the army, the 1st, 3rd, and 4th armies, would be sent to Galicia where they would join with the Germans to strike into Poland and encircle the protruding province. Mobilization orders were sent out and men collected. The first hiccup came on August 3rd when Moltke notified Potiorek that the Germans were sending the bulk of their armies West and would only reinforce the East in 40 days.
Stunned by this revelation and realizing that the Habsburg armies in Galicia were nowhere near as strong as they needed to be to fight the Russians themselves, Potiorek panicked. Troops were starting to stream into Galicia, preparing for an offensive that couldn’t be supported. Frantically AOK moved to halt the deployment of troops beyond the San and Dniester rivers. If the Germans were not going to help fight the Russians, than it was every man for himself. Potiorek sent Moltke a telegram stating that Serbia was to be the main focus of the Habsburg armies and that the remaining troops would stand on the defensive in the East until German troops were available to take the offensive. AOK realized that defending Galicia with three armies against what looked like would be four Russian would not be anywhere near enough. As it was, a Russian division was half again as large as the Austro-Hungarian equivalent and a Russian corps possessed a 90% advantage in light artillery and 260% advantage in heavy howitzers. Additionally the Russians would have at least ten more divisions in the theatre than the Austro-Hungarians. There was simply no way that the vast area of Galicia could be defended with such as weak force as was available. Given the disadvantageous strategic situation AOK decided the only way to survive was to quickly assault and conquer Serbia with the necessary forces and transfer the victorious armies to Galicia to reinforce the forces there tasked with defending the empire’s flank. Coupled with this, diplomatic overtures were to be made to Bulgaria to coax that nation to invade Serbia from the south, hopefully shortening the campaign and freeing up more troops for Galicia. Playing his cards close to his chest, Potiorek passed his request to the diplomatic corps with the strongest possible suggestions that any demand Bulgaria made should be fulfilled. For the moment the Imperial court and the civilian administration was kept in the dark regarding AOK’s gamble to finish Serbia before Russia could overrun the Carpathians. Even though Archduke Friedrich was ostensibly the head of the army in wartime, he was oblivious to the strategic debate, as he was more concerned with hunting, riding, and carousing to do any real work. For the moment this kept politics from interfering with war planning, but that was soon to change.
 
While I am interested in ATL about the Austro-Hungarian Empire, I wouldn't mind seeing more clearly delineated paragraphs.
 
While Potiorek was a promising candidate for replacing the deceased Conrad, would he really have been Franz Ferdinand's man?
Potiorek had excellent connections to the Vienna Court, something that would have made him highly suspect - and very unattractive - to FF.
So, if P. was appointed by Franz Joseph, against FF's resistance, would FF have followed an invitation by P. to visit the Bosnian manoeuvres and the town of Sarajevo?

Conrad and FF had seriously clashed in 1913, in case of Conrad's death, FF might have wanted to recall Blasius von Schemua, who at least had been cooperative (to FF) during his term, although he did not have Conrad's drive. Nevertheless, Schemua had done a lot to shape up the Austro-Hungarian military.
 
I know Conrad had some struggles in the beginning of the conflict like many generals but given AH's prewar refusal to spend enough money on the army or put the necessary amount of men through drafted service (they had a much larger ersatz reserve than even Germany) I never found him to be totally incompetent on the scale of a Sarrail or Cadorna
 

Deleted member 1487

While Potiorek was a promising candidate for replacing the deceased Conrad, would he really have been Franz Ferdinand's man?
Potiorek had excellent connections to the Vienna Court, something that would have made him highly suspect - and very unattractive - to FF.
So, if P. was appointed by Franz Joseph, against FF's resistance, would FF have followed an invitation by P. to visit the Bosnian manoeuvres and the town of Sarajevo?

Conrad and FF had seriously clashed in 1913, in case of Conrad's death, FF might have wanted to recall Blasius von Schemua, who at least had been cooperative (to FF) during his term, although he did not have Conrad's drive. Nevertheless, Schemua had done a lot to shape up the Austro-Hungarian military.

Schemua had several strikes against him, which had actually led to the recall of Conrad in 1912. Namely, he was a lackey with no vision of his own that did whatever Ferdinand told him. Franz also recalled Conrad because he was "a man I would want running the army in wartime". Basically FF did not trust Schemua to be in charge when war came. Of lesser importance, but still significant in the Catholic empire, was that Schemua was part of a pseudo-Eastern cult, one that would later provide intellectual underpinnings for the Nazis.

So I could see Schemua getting passed over because of this and Potiorek's connections at court. Not to mention that he had significant support in the military too. Holger Herwig mentions that Potiorek was also listed as a "genius" by the military brass as well.

As to FF not coming to Sarajevo, he did want to come OTL either. He was forced to by FJ who less than delicately reminded his heir that as emperor he would have to connect with his subjects. I could see this argument being had again, with an added theme about accepting Potiorek's olive branch.

@BlairWitch:
Conrad's ineptitude is something of a subtler variety. He typically had good plans that would have functioned spectacularly if one had an excellent army and terrain/logistics did not matter. He failed worse that either Sarrail or Cadorna because of this. His campaign in Galicia and the Carpathians caused his army nearly 2 million casualties from August-March 1915, completely wiping out the pre-war army and the first call up of recruits.

At first he had his outnumbered and outgunned army march across their own territory (having dropped them off in Przemsyl and marched them to Tarnopol!) causing them to be exhausted before marching them into enemy territory, which gave the more rested Russians break. Having them repeatedly charge into massed artillery caused hedious casualties and commanders to flee the scene, leaving their men to figure out what to do. He refused to dismiss these men for cowardice or incompetence despite having an abundance of reasons to do so.

Russian casualties were less than half of Austrian one in this sector and, once winter came, more men were lost to weather than enemy action because he had them attack into blizzards and in conditions where they could not be supplied in the mountains. Entire attacks fell apart before they even reached the enemy because casualties become to heavy just from the weather!

He is one of the top five worst generals of WW1 IMHO
 
@BlairWitch:
Conrad's ineptitude is something of a subtler variety. He typically had good plans that would have functioned spectacularly if one had an excellent army and terrain/logistics did not matter. He failed worse that either Sarrail or Cadorna because of this. His campaign in Galicia and the Carpathians caused his army nearly 2 million casualties from August-March 1915, completely wiping out the pre-war army and the first call up of recruits.

At first he had his outnumbered and outgunned army march across their own territory (having dropped them off in Przemsyl and marched them to Tarnopol!) causing them to be exhausted before marching them into enemy territory, which gave the more rested Russians break. Having them repeatedly charge into massed artillery caused hedious casualties and commanders to flee the scene, leaving their men to figure out what to do. He refused to dismiss these men for cowardice or incompetence despite having an abundance of reasons to do so.

Russian casualties were less than half of Austrian one in this sector and, once winter came, more men were lost to weather than enemy action because he had them attack into blizzards and in conditions where they could not be supplied in the mountains. Entire attacks fell apart before they even reached the enemy because casualties become to heavy just from the weather!

He is one of the top five worst generals of WW1 IMHO

Might there not be some sort of curve though. In 1914 there weren't really any Germans under the age of 75 who had combat experience. A lot of commanders on both sides in 1914 made big mistakes and marched into artillery barrages (Francois and Ludendorff managed to get quite a few people killed unecessarily along with many of the entente commanders). Conrad had to fight with an army that had over half a dozen languages in it and his second Serbian offensive (led by Mackensen) and his pre Caporetto northwestern Italy offensive (can't remember the exact name of the battle) both went pretty well. Unlike a lot of the entente commanders he showed improvement in his handling of his army over time. He also had to go against the best Russian commanders (Brusilov in particular) as opposed to the ass clowns like Jilinsky on the northern front
 

Deleted member 1487

Agreed, there were some mitigating circumstances, but he attacked in a situation (Galicia 1914) where he knew he was outnumbered (thanks to very accurate intelligence), outgunned, and outmaneuvered. The defensive would have been the only option when it became apparent that the Germans were leaving him alone and not helping with the pincer move to bite off Poland, but he slavishly stuck to ideology and his original battle plans. Also, it is beyond me how he could march his troops across their own country next to rail road tracks that should have been carrying them to the battlefield, causing them to arrive exhausted and disorganized with the inferior artillery trailing miles behind.

He major flaw was not in his battle plans, which were often quite good when modified by more realistic generals. Rather, he had no conception of the flaws of his army nor the terrain, so did not take them into account when planning. The best example of this was in the Assiago offensive of 1916. This was a plan that was a personal obsession. He denuded the Eastern front of men, guns, and munitions to get this attack ready (in the process making the Brusilov offensive a smashing success when the Austrians had nothing left to defend with). He ignored the rough terrain and had his men attack into the teeth of Italian defenses, which they succeeded at against all odds. Then logistics took hold, which stopped the offensive several miles in. In the worst case 1,000 men were killed in an avalanche while bringing up supplies across the mountains. While all this was going on, Conrad sat in a castle designing new coats of arms to represent his victory in said battle!

It is true that he had a flawed instrument to work with, but a decent general understands the capabilities of his army before sending it into battle. Nothing in his later battles really makes me thing more highly of him. Besides the Serbian battle was not run by him, nor was the plan especially his-Potiorek devised it as his next offensive. When he was forced to resign he passed it on with his advice about how to fight in the theater.
 
Mh, Schemua perhaps was better than his reputation, his term saw some substantial improvements for the outdated Austro-Hungarian Army, and he had a better link to Moltke than Conrad ever had had and would have.

I agree that Potiorek is the most probable successor to Conrad in this scenario, however, he then is no longer in charge in Bosnia, there must have been another chap already been appointed.

IOTL, Conrad visited the Bosnian manoeuvres together with FF, but then did not accompany him to Sarajevo.
This could also be the case with Potiorek. - Then, however, the new man would already have been responsible for the security in Sarajevo (even if P. comes along with FF in order to show his grandiose achievements).
P.'s security measures were as incompetent as could be. The new man an incompetent idiot as well?
 
Agreed, there were some mitigating circumstances, but he attacked in a situation (Galicia 1914) where he knew he was outnumbered (thanks to very accurate intelligence), outgunned, and outmaneuvered. The defensive would have been the only option when it became apparent that the Germans were leaving him alone and not helping with the pincer move to bite off Poland, but he slavishly stuck to ideology and his original battle plans. Also, it is beyond me how he could march his troops across their own country next to rail road tracks that should have been carrying them to the battlefield, causing them to arrive exhausted and disorganized with the inferior artillery trailing miles behind.

He major flaw was not in his battle plans, which were often quite good when modified by more realistic generals. Rather, he had no conception of the flaws of his army nor the terrain, so did not take them into account when planning. The best example of this was in the Assiago offensive of 1916. This was a plan that was a personal obsession. He denuded the Eastern front of men, guns, and munitions to get this attack ready (in the process making the Brusilov offensive a smashing success when the Austrians had nothing left to defend with). He ignored the rough terrain and had his men attack into the teeth of Italian defenses, which they succeeded at against all odds. Then logistics took hold, which stopped the offensive several miles in. In the worst case 1,000 men were killed in an avalanche while bringing up supplies across the mountains. While all this was going on, Conrad sat in a castle designing new coats of arms to represent his victory in said battle!

It is true that he had a flawed instrument to work with, but a decent general understands the capabilities of his army before sending it into battle. Nothing in his later battles really makes me thing more highly of him. Besides the Serbian battle was not run by him, nor was the plan especially his-Potiorek devised it as his next offensive. When he was forced to resign he passed it on with his advice about how to fight in the theater.


Attacking when you are outnumbered was done numerous times in WW1 the 1914 versions went poorly but with the right tactical skill and know how it could go quite well (Caporetto, Riga, Offensive into Rumania). I wouldn't put Conrad anywhere near the level of super successful commanders like Mudra, Petain, or Mackenson but his stupid moves were well within the confines of WW1 commanders (poor reserve allocation and indifference to the suffering of infantry and lack of coordination in the artilley).

Haig, Sarrail, Cadorna, Nivelle, and Jalinsky should easily occupy the top 5 terrible commanders of WW1
 
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