The Crusades — possible PODs?

The problem wasn't Alexios, and probably never really was. Apart from Raimond IV, nobody really felt they were bound to any kind of pledge to the basileos, didn't as much as flinched an eye before the depradation caused by a large number of unruly men (on which 10, 000 men is below the most conservative guesstimates I saw myself for the Battle of Ascalon alone, Ferdinand Lot accounted for 9,000 footmen and 1,000 miles : something between 20,000 and 30,000 is more credible, accounting for footmen,pilgrims, and all the show) especially after the damages caused by the previous expeditions.

Long story short, there was no way to turn Crusader lords as vassals of the emperor, not a chance to see Alexios (the PoD having byzantine support in Antioch is interesting, tough, and discussed there and in another threads) wasting his men and ressources to fund unruly mercenaries past Antioch when he realize that they don't work for him.

These are many of the reasons that I was interested in the Peoples Crusade, not the Nobles Crusade. Peasants can be co-opted. It isn't a whole new Crusader-Byzantine Army. It was approx 30k Men and Women - so expecting 8k of those to be men that could be trained to fight whilst the rest worked their Pilgrimage was me trying to be realistic. Heck, its enough of a trope in fiction and fact that minority communities in an Empire form a niche - a German Pilgrim community turning up on the doors of the Roman Empire, and being embraced and trained could form one of those very military communities, that despite being Catholic, could be very loyal to the Empire.

But yeah, Nobles be a nope. Not until geopolitical realities sink in, and the Roman Empire is in a stronger position than IOTL.
 
These are many of the reasons that I was interested in the Peoples Crusade, not the Nobles Crusade. Peasants can be co-opted.
If you were interested on the popular Crusade, you might have remarked that they weren't an acephalic ensemble (rather a polycephalic ensemble), or popularily led.
Gautier Sans Avoir, for instance, was an important lord of France (in its narrower meaning of Ile-de-France), as were Thomas de Marles, Guillaume le Charpentier (viscount of Melun and Gâtinais), etc. Of course, you had as well an important group of imperial nobility, such as Hugues of Tubingen, Bertold of Leifen, etc.

Most of early crusade preaching, similarily, wasn't made by half-educated clergymen* : Pierre l'Ermite was probably issued from the class of miles that were most attracted by the ideal of crusade,and possibly educated in religion at or near Amiens.
I won't make the whole name-dropping, but the difference between the popular and the nobiliar crusade is much, much less clear that XIXth century historiography made it.

The main distinction might come, rather, from the lack of preparation, the greater part of poor pilgrims, and the populist part (which made some tentatives of crusader turning quickly into expedition of plunder against Jews but as well Christians as in Mainz). Because of this, the logistics and suppliments were treated as an after-tought, which caused a lot of conflicts and skirmish whenever and wherever they passed trough a country (which didn't helped later Crusades to buy their suppliment).
While Byzantines were kinda used to small bands of pilgrims that were led by people knowing a bit the regions, the mass of plunderer whom depredations announced them way before they entered in Romania, really wasn't welcomed.
As they plundered the sub-urbs (up to plundering churches), and were counter-attacked by Greeks, Alexios had to move them forcibly out of Thrace (under military supervision, after Byzantines had to fought the Crusaders), and resettle them in Anatolia, even as he initially preferred to have them remaining close to Constantinople to both limit damages and to wait for the other crusaders. From them they continued to act as a barely held army, without supplies (as they decided to not wait for the emperor) and eventually the whole thing pitfully ended.

It's not that Alexios didn't tried to more or less keep them under scrutiny : but they had no intention to obey him, nothing to buy their suppliment, no will to wait for the other crusaders, and were simply too much to be kept in Thrace.

*Not to say you did not have some really weird stuff tough, such as peasants venerating gooses because they tought they will lead them to Jerusalem (as it happened in Cambrai), but it generally get more pointed and laughed at than really curbed down


its enough of a trope in fiction
Even in fiction (I think we'd agree that if we have to call TVTropes at the rescue there, it's that the sheer implausibility of it is obvious), it works when both are agreeing : Alexios tried to reason, without success, because they simply didn't want to really negociate.

But, again, I think you're having a rustic vision of these crusaders : while poor, even the piétaille had weapons (and remember you did have miles and nobles in signficiant numbers there), that Alexios forced them to abandon when crossing the Bosphorus. Certainly they still had some when in Anatolia, altough it did them no good.
 
If you were interested on the popular Crusade, you might have remarked that they weren't an acephalic ensemble (rather a polycephalic ensemble), or popularily led.

I would have if I knew what those words meant.

(For anyone else that didn't know)
Acephalic : having or recognizing no ruler or leader
Polycephalic : Many leaders. (at least in this context).

Gautier Sans Avoir, for instance, was an important lord of France (in its narrower meaning of Ile-de-France), as were Thomas de Marles, Guillaume le Charpentier (viscount of Melun and Gâtinais), etc. Of course, you had as well an important group of imperial nobility, such as Hugues of Tubingen, Bertold of Leifen, etc.

Most of early crusade preaching, similarily, wasn't made by half-educated clergymen* : Pierre l'Ermite was probably issued from the class of miles that were most attracted by the ideal of crusade,and possibly educated in religion at or near Amiens.
I won't make the whole name-dropping, but the difference between the popular and the nobiliar crusade is much, much less clear that XIXth century historiography made it.

The main distinction might come, rather, from the lack of preparation, the greater part of poor pilgrims, and the populist part (which made some tentatives of crusader turning quickly into expedition of plunder against Jews but as well Christians as in Mainz). Because of this, the logistics and suppliments were treated as an after-tought, which caused a lot of conflicts and skirmish whenever and wherever they passed trough a country (which didn't helped later Crusades to buy their suppliment).
While Byzantines were kinda used to small bands of pilgrims that were led by people knowing a bit the regions, the mass of plunderer whom depredations announced them way before they entered in Romania, really wasn't welcomed.
As they plundered the sub-urbs (up to plundering churches), and were counter-attacked by Greeks, Alexios had to move them forcibly out of Thrace (under military supervision, after Byzantines had to fought the Crusaders), and resettle them in Anatolia, even as he initially preferred to have them remaining close to Constantinople to both limit damages and to wait for the other crusaders. From them they continued to act as a barely held army, without supplies (as they decided to not wait for the emperor) and eventually the whole thing pitfully ended.

It's not that Alexios didn't tried to more or less keep them under scrutiny : but they had no intention to obey him, nothing to buy their suppliment, no will to wait for the other crusaders, and were simply too much to be kept in Thrace.

*Not to say you did not have some really weird stuff tough, such as peasants venerating gooses because they tought they will lead them to Jerusalem (as it happened in Cambrai), but it generally get more pointed and laughed at than really curbed down

Arms, armour and logistical support couldn't co-opt them? Not even land to settle on regardless of their success? I find it hard to believe that there was NOTHING they'd accept in order to co-operate.

Even in fiction (I think we'd agree that if we have to call TVTropes at the rescue there, it's that the sheer implausibility of it is obvious), it works when both are agreeing : Alexios tried to reason, without success, because they simply didn't want to really negociate.

But, again, I think you're having a rustic vision of these crusaders : while poor, even the piétaille had weapons (and remember you did have miles and nobles in signficiant numbers there), that Alexios forced them to abandon when crossing the Bosphorus. Certainly they still had some when in Anatolia, altough it did them no good.

Hmm, ok, so maybe they didn't need arming. Bugger. I wouldn't say that (as I imagined it) was totally implausible. After all, the Byzantines DID have the Varangian Guard for a reason. It isn't like diaspora communties haven't carved a niche for themselves in other polities.
 
I would have if I knew what those words meant.
Oops, sorry. I'm anaspeptic, phrasmotic, even compunctuous to have caused you such pericombobulation.

Arms, armour and logistical support couldn't co-opt them? Not even land to settle on regardless of their success? I find it hard to believe that there was NOTHING they'd accept in order to co-operate.
In what appear in sources (and while latin sources could be arguably biased, byzantines sources such as the Alexiad are relatively clear on this), they were really not going to accept anything else than free supplies.
Again, what Alexios witnessed was a large, excitable, group that caused a lot of damages and conflicts on the road, and continued to do so : he did offered them relatively fair conditions, such as having towns opening doors to them (safe the imperial city), enforcing fair prices, and a small overmanagement and protection. To no avail.
Even when pushing them in Anatolia, he still offered them supplies and water, on a regular basis. To no avail.

I think he was pretty much reasonable with them historically : anything more would have certainly be frowned upon in Constantinople, and giving that the crusaders had no intention to serve the basileos in any way, it would be, again, to no avail.

After all, the Byzantines DID have the Varangian Guard for a reason. It isn't like diaspora communties haven't carved a niche for themselves in other polities.
Varangian guards were skilled nobles and warriors, coming from Slavic and Scandinavian (I tend to include the Anglo-Saxon service there) backgrounds with a long history of direct relationship with Constantinople (politically, commercially, religiously, etc.), that not only were willing to serve the basileos, but saw this service as something prestigious. They came in relatively small numbers, and were little civil trouble.

On the other hand, we have a large group with fierce nobles not really acknowledging their own suzerain authority when they could avoid it, leading a sub-warrior class whom way of life was based on extortion, and a mass of quasi-hobos. All of them having at best a faint idea of what was before them, and that lived on the land in a way that only fighting them could deal with. Oh, and they didn't cared for their life, litterally, about what the basileos could say, and went growingly disunited.

There's...well, there's some differences at work there.
I'm not saying that some crusaders couldn't have find an employment in Constantinople (altough it backfired already at this point), but I don't think it would be from this expedition.
 
Some interesting POD's for the fourth crusade.
1: The crusaders don't set sail from many different ports, and all group up in venice. This would help alleviate their debt somewhat and increase the numbers of crusaders by thousands of men, which would improve the situation of the latin empire after the crusade, if the crusaders do take constantinople for themselves.
2: Simon de montfort does not get the city of zara to avoid surrendering. Without the sacking of zara (due to the city peacefully surrendering to the venetians and crusaders) the crusader army does not splinter, and the excommunication of the entire army does not happen. This would seriously improve things, and allow for an intact crusader army.
3: In the first siege of constantinople, when paraded at the walls, Alexios IV is able to inspire a revolt against Alexios III, who is overthrown when the rebels open the gates to the crusaders, letting them in. This would prevent much of the casualties from the first siege from being killed, and would greatly legitimise alexios IV, as the people would probably support him. Not entirely sure about this one, as it sounds slightly ASB, but someone could probably make it work.
With these PODs, I believe the fourth crusade would have probably been able to actually go to eygpt, after getting byzantine support. The Alexios IV was able to raise a moderate amount of funds for the crusaders, although it wasn't actually enough. But, with the better financial situation of the crusade due to papal support and a united crusader army, it probably would have sufficed. Byzantine military support would not have helped terribly much, but it would be welcome.

Had these POD's all happened, a mostly united crusader army with papal and byzantine support could possibly have succeeded in taking eygpt.
Additionally, another POD could have helped much, much more. If baldwin IV of jerusalem had not contracted leprosy, he probably would have been able to greatly strengthen jerusalemite rule in outremer, and although he may have not taken jerusalem, his support to the fourth crusade would be huge.

Not sure if that one is compatible with the others, however.
 
Oops, sorry. I'm anaspeptic, phrasmotic, even compunctuous to have caused you such pericombobulation.

Blackadder would be proud sir. Very proud.

In what appear in sources (and while latin sources could be arguably biased, byzantines sources such as the Alexiad are relatively clear on this), they were really not going to accept anything else than free supplies.
Again, what Alexios witnessed was a large, excitable, group that caused a lot of damages and conflicts on the road, and continued to do so : he did offered them relatively fair conditions, such as having towns opening doors to them (safe the imperial city), enforcing fair prices, and a small overmanagement and protection. To no avail.
Even when pushing them in Anatolia, he still offered them supplies and water, on a regular basis. To no avail.

I think he was pretty much reasonable with them historically : anything more would have certainly be frowned upon in Constantinople, and giving that the crusaders had no intention to serve the basileos in any way, it would be, again, to no avail.

Well. Blast.

Varangian guards were skilled nobles and warriors, coming from Slavic and Scandinavian (I tend to include the Anglo-Saxon service there) backgrounds with a long history of direct relationship with Constantinople (politically, commercially, religiously, etc.), that not only were willing to serve the basileos, but saw this service as something prestigious. They came in relatively small numbers, and were little civil trouble.

On the other hand, we have a large group with fierce nobles not really acknowledging their own suzerain authority when they could avoid it, leading a sub-warrior class whom way of life was based on extortion, and a mass of quasi-hobos. All of them having at best a faint idea of what was before them, and that lived on the land in a way that only fighting them could deal with. Oh, and they didn't cared for their life, litterally, about what the basileos could say, and went growingly disunited.

There's...well, there's some differences at work there.
I'm not saying that some crusaders couldn't have find an employment in Constantinople (altough it backfired already at this point), but I don't think it would be from this expedition.

1) I need to see PoDs involving Roussel De Bailleul. He sounds epic. Hell, the idea of a Normano-Turking Anatolian Highlands with a Roman lowlands is a picture of historical daftness on the lines of Thebes rise to dominance.

2) I wonder if it would have been possible, if the 'Peoples Crusade' was a bit more, well, calm. It gives me an (audacious) idea:

As much as it wasn't Alexios aim, if he chose to include this as part of his request to the Pope - a 'Pilgrims Path', for the Kings of Europe to benefit from - essentially a road for a Christian Hajj - through Germany, Austria, Hungary, and then Rhomanion. Obviously it would need to be couched correctly, but a Christendom-supported path for pilgrims could be an interesting PoD for the Crusades - mainly because it makes securing the Holy Land part of establishing this path - AND if successful creates a route for travellers to any resulting Crusader State having a welcome route for poor travellers to reach Jerusalem.

Although, it wouldn't be cheap, it would be interesting. Plus, rather than the Peoples Crusade needing to be a great hulking nightmare, the Pilgrims path could in theory have food stocks and such provided (Funded by Rome and Constantinople?) so as to keep them peaceful and well fed. Plus, odd as it is, having those pilgrims would probably stimulate the economies of those countries it passes through. Even if it stops being so much a road as a transport route down the Danube and round to (suitable) Chalcedon, where the pilgrims can be asked to contribute either gold, or their service to maintain and protect the route - which just so happens to go to the closest secure port in Roman/Christian control - before leading to Jerusalem.

It wouldn't be hard to convince those pilgrims, on their way back from Jerusalem, or even on their way their, to settle or to sign up to assist reconquering the Anatolian Plateau.
 
More crusaders, as the aformenioned successful 1100 and 1101 situation could create by carrying small bands of peasants with them. Of course, that would be minor, and most of the clearly latinized parts were found along the coastal towns.


That's because, all respect due, you don't have a very good perception of medieval societies. The distinction between serf and fre-tenant tended to be growingly juridical, and while people there tend to assume maniorial society was akin to Old South when it came to chasing running off peasants, it was relatively rare witnessing so. I'll pass the details, between more or less legal salvetats or clearings, the more or less active poaching of serfs by neighbouring lords, etc.
Now, it wasn't widely common to have serves moving in numbers before the XIIth century, but it have something to do with the fact they were tied to work land to subsistance, and that risking to loose a land you couldn't be deprived of (contrary to a free-tenant) could be problematic, especially if (as it happened in many cases), your family slowly increased the land they worked trough various relationships (there's cases of a serves being trusted, in addition of his land, other manioral and abbotal lands).
All sources I have read indicates that the serfs were tied to the land and that the break up of the serf class didn't occur in Western Europe until the Black Death.Sources I have read also indicates that a lot of serfs tried to escape by fleeing to cities, and that after living there for a while they could be granted free status.
 
All sources I have read indicates that the serfs were tied to the land and that the break up of the serf class didn't occur in Western Europe until the Black Death.
Then your sources are wrong, or at the very least obsolete or incomplete : the movement of emancipation of serfs began before, as points the Edict of Louis the Quarreler in 1315 that formally ended servage and slavery within the royal demesne, but even there, serfdom had already largely declined in Western Europe, the XIVth century virtually mercy-killing it in most of it.

Among earlier features, which I partially mentioned, you had

- Sauvetés/Salvetats/Bastides : which as their names indicate, were a safe space, protected by the Church in the wake of Peace of God movement, on which fugitives gained their freedom. While it's mostly a French feature (altough that giving the sheer demographical weight of medieval France, it's really hard to simply ignore it), it was a part of the great clearings of the XIth/XIIth centuries, and was followed by the more lay (but more institutionalized) bastidal movement. Speaking of which...

- Clearings : the growth of productive lands was made possible by cutting down woods, and trough the appearance of new villages, generally supported by the lords or other manioral masters. It could either take the form of new franchises (such as in villefranches in France) of manumissions, or not uncommonly, by "illegal" clearings where serfs lived as free tenants de facto, a situation that was eventually maintained.

- Manumissions, the freeing of serves, began to be more widespread in the XIIth century, due to a cultural and social pressure (I'll come back to this below). Now, it did not meant that the franchised serves were really freed but rather put in a situation of semi-servage in fact, still being tied to the lord without most of protective features of serfdom strictly speaking (such as the unremovable usus of the land), and while it eventuallt went into a growing freedom of peasantry as a whole in the long term, as relaxing the direct link, it also explain why you have movement to salvetats, villefranches and bastides. With time, you see more and more charts of manumissions and enfranchisement of populations, nothing sudden and radical, but gradual and more widespread.
The abandon of servage in Brittany in the XIth may be either related to this, or to social conflict.

- which is something that is often underrated, probably because it goes against the self-evident fantasy of a stagnating Middle-Ages were the peasant revolts : 996 in Normandy saw two revolts happening, one being made by peasants. Interestingly enough, servage in the regions becomes harder to discern afterwards (altough the franchises were more limited than in other places, probably the result of a status-quo). Without resorting to full-fledged revolt (as it happened as well in XIVth century England), the constantly shitfing balance and strength displays certianly played its role into the creation of franchises or acknowledgement of freedoms.

- Eventually, monetarization of the medieval economy with the XIIth century played an interesting role : as said above, "freedom ain't free", and any franchisement was payed. It happens that classical and late medieval lords had a constant need of fillng their treasury, and freeing serves by the hundred or the thousand was a good mean as any to do so, while keeping the peasants into their clientele. By the time the economical crisis loomed in the end of XIIIth century, it only because stronger (hence, among other reasons, the aformentioned 1315 edict)

Does that means that serfdom disappeared overnight in the XIIth century? Of course, not, as it doesn't mean that maniorial coercition didn't applied (altough certainly not in a Daaaaaark Aaaaages booo! fashion). But the XIIth century (and earlier in some regions), it already began to decline into semi-servage and/or franchised peasantry. Sooner in some regions (Normandy, Brittany, France, Italy) and significantly later in other (such as England, which always was kind of backwards for what matter medieval socal-institutional frames; or Germany where ancient "hard" servage got mixed up with its appearance in XVIth central Europe (such as in Poland).

I think you're looking far too much at the formal happenance and survivance of "serfdom" as a legal concept, and not nearly enough to the actual social-economical situation, to be bluntly honest, as well as I wonder what these sources might be, to not mention all of this. What about Dominique Barthélémy's works?

Sources I have read also indicates that a lot of serfs tried to escape by fleeing to cities, and that after living there for a while they could be granted free status.
You might want to make up your mind : either serves were unable to leave their land because the customs said so (I'd love to see a FH timeline where future historians would argue that drug consumption was unknown in XXIth century because it was against the law, BTW), either they did had a physical and social mobility.

Now, the rural exodus is more something appearing in the XIIIth and XIVth centuries. he majority of the emancipations was probably rural-based in most of Europe until then, altough you certainly had serves running into cities. How much and how long they gained free status is really context dependent : the statutes of the city of Toulouse in the XIIth considered a citizen whoever entered within the limits of the city, but it wasn't that common (altough not unique).

---

Sorry for this aparté, people, back to Crusades and PoDs.
 
Some interesting POD's for the fourth crusade.
1
I'm not sure what you meant there : the bulk of the Fourth Crusade did went to Venice, precisely because other main harbours refused the transportation contract.
There was good reason for that : Crusaders initially accounted for far too much people (30,000 men, something comparable only to the First Crusade, or the Mongol Invasions for what matter sheer numbers) that would gather, and when their obviously inflated expectations failed to materialize, they were largely indebted to ever really manage to pay in full.

To quote Jacques Heers, "pure madness" : they couldn't hope to pay up the more or less discounted price of 94 000 marks in first place, and they were barely 2,000 men at first. The lack of men wasn't due to the crusade being scattered (because it was not), but simply because the time of nobiliar crusades was past as soon as the First Crusade ended : most of the Crusaders were French, from the north-eastern aprt of the kingdom because the rest of Western Europe was kinda at war (or recovering from), and mostly mobilisable by their own rulers.

Not that the huge disrpency wasn't more or less concious, possibly as nobles crusaders wanted to stress theys could re-edit the epic of the First Crusade and that they didn't needed the king and more importantly the emperor (see the Crusade of Henry VI) to do so. It was still ludicrous.

Zara didn't as much surrendered than falling after three days of siege by a powerful fleet and thousands of men. You can argue that the city could have surrended peacfully ITTL, but it's not really likely to happen : the population tought the pontifical and royal protection were enough to make Crusaders (if not Venetians) think twice before storming a Christian city, and it partially worked out as several crusaders refused to continue.

But the conditions of delaying the debt were pretty clear : Zara was to be taken, and if crusader needed another motivation, Dandelo reminded them that the fleet was to be harboured somewhere during the winter and it wasn't going to be in Venice.
And taking the city wasn't about offerring them candies and hugs, as demonstrated by Venetian sacks of Constantinople, but to make a demonstration of strength to anyone that would get the wrong idea that they could meddle with the Serenissima.

The only way to save Zara and to keep Crusaders more or less unified would be to tell Venice that they wouldn't want to do so. Which, giving that the city more or less owned their asses trough loans and delayed debts...
They would still have the Balkanic road, but without being able to pay for supplies, which are necessary until Constantinople (which wasn't, at all, going to give them a warm welcome) and vital for Anatolia...

While I could see a more legitimized Alexios IV, I think the problem is not there.
Alexios IV made a lot of promises to Crusaders : namely, 200 000 silver marks, support them with all the ressources and men he would have, to pay for the Venetian fleet for a whole year, to give 10 000 men to Jerusalem, and to supply everything. I don't think it's necessary to point how it was a lot of pie-crust promises.
Once it appears that Alexios IV simply told us what they wanted to ear, and as they were already extremely suspicious of Greeks (for several reasons ranging from the Massacre of Latins, to being high on chivalric accounts of the Aeneid and Homer), it would turn as IOTL : if there's a justice, they wouldn't benefit from the favourables winds that allowed them to capture the city IOTL, and they'd recieve defeat for undergoing their half-assed, barely planned, expedition.

From what we know they didn't wanted to conquer Egypt as such or trade it against Jerusalem as it was tought during the Fifth Crusade, but advancing in a more fertile and less mountainous road than Turkey up to Palestine and make junction with the Kingdom of Jerusalem, crushing Ayyubid bases in Egypt along the way.
Now let's have the Crusade finding somehiw its way to Egypt and the shoddy plan reavealing itself in all its glory.The chances of al-Adil's Ayyubid Sultanate to suffer from a disorganized and not that impressive (numerically speaking) are reduced, to say the least. I'd expect something along the Fifth Crusade, but fizzling more or less quickly.

Not sure if that one is compatible with the others, however.
The main problem there is that, as discussed above, Ayyubid pressure would be still pretty much life-threatening for Latin States. Baldwin being leprosry-free would certainly help to withstand it more as IOTL, but you'd still have a really weakened yerosolemite kingdom, unable to really support Crusaders (the whole idea of Crusades being more to support the Latin States at least technically, that said).

1) I need to see PoDs involving Roussel De Bailleul. He sounds epic. Hell, the idea of a Normano-Turking Anatolian Highlands with a Roman lowlands is a picture of historical daftness on the lines of Thebes rise to dominance.
A failed First Crusade along the aformentioned lines could probably end up like this, IMO. How long would it last, tough...
But I admit the idea is intriguing.

2) I wonder if it would have been possible, if the 'Peoples Crusade' was a bit more, well, calm.
Ah. I should have insisted a bit more on its populist and visionary character, maybe.
While not millenarist stritcly speaking, the excitation of the "popular crusade" was certainly something : people painting or tatooing cross all over their bodies; preachers calling everyone including old men, women, childs, deafs, blinds to go; people litterally following geeses before someone told them it was better to follow the army; and generally evangelical calls to purity and cleansing.

Rather than "popular" (altough the word isn't illegit), we may consider it as "extra-institutional", "anti-establishment", or something akin to radical Anabatists were to Reformation.

I think that, in order to calm it, you'd need some serious series of injections. Or meteoric rain.

As much as it wasn't Alexios aim, if he chose to include this as part of his request to the Pope - a 'Pilgrims Path', for the Kings of Europe to benefit from - essentially a road for a Christian Hajj - through Germany, Austria, Hungary, and then Rhomanion.
Well, you already had pilgrims along the Danubian and Roman road IOTL : it's precisely the way that were used by Crusaders which were, after all, a king of armed pilgrims. It's how some lords actually knew the region, and why some could communicate with natives at first.
That said, yerosolemite pilgrimages never really involved big groups, but rather small ones led by guides and bishops, altough it was more regular with time : their importance was more issued from the news and tales they gave in their return.

It doesn't help, eventually, that with the rise of Italian maritime dominance in the XIth, the maritime road was eventually preferred to an unsafe crossing of Anatolia or Egypt.
The great pilgrimage of 1064, an armed pilgrimage coming from Germany, did passed trough Anatolia, but was harassed and extorqued so much that merely 2,000 reached Jerusalem, and eventually elected to return by sea.
You'd simply had no incitative or reason to have a maintained suppliment for pilgrims, and even if you had, its capacities would be over-stretched by the ten of thousands of the popular crusade (at best 15 000, probably more like 30,000. It was a logistical nightmare)

Now, Alexios could ask for anything, giving that Rome, and the lot of roman bishops in Europe, themselves condamned the popular crusade for its deeds without as much as a blip on the radar...
Simply said, Rome had no, absolutly none, control over these nobles, milites and poors Crusaders. (Rome already had trouble having an influence over the nobiliar Crusade)

It would require some significant knowledge of Latin Europe for Alexios furthermore, as he merely expected some armed groups, as Roussel de Bailleul or Varangian recruits, rather than the unmanagable hulking masses (not just once, but twice) that, according the Alexiad (rarely prone to undermine Alexis' prestige) "terrified him".

A minor point : Rhomaion to name the Byzantine Empire is kind of a false pedentism. It litterally means "of the Romans", and I suppose it evolved out of an edgy hyper-correction.
You may prefer Rhomania or Romania, or even Rhomais, giving these were actual historical names.
 
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On wikipedia, I read that because there wasn't an actual agreement on where to go, the crusade kind of splintered and set off from different ports, dividing their armies and their funds. So, that's what I meant. And, as for zara, if it surrendered simon de montfort and the other skeptics probably wouldn't have reacted as badly to the diversion to constantinople, as attacking zara, a christian city, kind of pissed them off. They chose to look past it, but when they decided to go to constantinople, simon left. Could they have looked past going east if zara was not attacked, and instead surrendered without a fight?

And, I suppose jerusalem would probably be too weak to give any meaningful support, yeah. But even baldwin IV helping command the crusaders could help enormously, as he was apparently quite the general. And, he'd take precedent over boniface of monferrat to lead the crusade if he wished, being a king and all.

And, regarding the whole strategy of the crusade. They didn't really have all that much of a plan, yes, but if baldwin took command he could develop one. From the looks of it, it seems that the best decision would be to divide the army/fleet in two, crusaders attacking alexandria and venetians attacking damietta, and afterwards marching down the nile to cairo.
If they succeeded in that, they would probably try to go east to palestine. But what if they faced the saracens in a battle in the sinai, and gained a pyrhic victory? They would destroy the saracen army, making it unable to attack into eygpt, but at the same time weaken the crusaders enough where offensive operations would be cancelled.
 
On wikipedia, I read that because there wasn't an actual agreement on where to go, the crusade kind of splintered and set off from different ports, dividing their armies and their funds
It didn't represented a that significant part of the Fourth Crusade, hence why I said "the bulk" of.
While it's hard to really appreciate their number (the whole "neglected majority" is more of a shock title IMO), they certainly doesn't account for the large gap between the expected 30,000 and the final 12,000, while some (arguably few) of them eventually joined the Crusaders already present at Venice before embarking, such as Louis de Blois.
Not that it would do anything to cancel the debts, again : it come from grossly exaggerated guesstimating, and assuming the, say at best two thousands, that didn't embarked at Venice does, it wouldn't be remotely enough.

And, as for zara, if it surrendered simon de montfort and the other skeptics probably wouldn't have reacted as badly to the diversion to constantinople
Zara did surrendered IOTL, which was kinda the problem.
While the unconditional surrendering of the city was set, a group of "skeptical" crusaders went to excite Zara's citizens, with everything going downhill from there, with a three-sided battle happening when it came to the spoils of war and who should have them.
It's pretty clear that Venice wouldn't take "no" from an answer to the (relatively limited) group of skepticals that elected to leave, less because the expedition went to Constantinople, than because of the battle that happened between "muteens" and Monfterrat's crusaders, and the sack of the city. They certainly didn't look past it (altough Enguerrand de Boves) possibly did) since Renaud joined the Hungarian forces before Alexios was crowned in Zara (altough I'm not sure about the date of this event, it happened during the wintering).

Could they have looked past going east if zara was not attacked, and instead surrendered without a fight?
Would Zara hold to its surrender (and still being, if "peacefull" plundered along the negociated division, Venetians in the harbour, Franks the city proper) and without the violent conflict within its walls, Simon de Monfort or Renaud de Montmirail may not decide to leave immediatly, but they will with the expedition going to Constantinople, tough, IMO. There's only so much they could give up.

And, I suppose jerusalem would probably be too weak to give any meaningful support, yeah.
it's not as much the problem of being too weak, tough : the various crusaders that did managed to reach the kingdom IOTL were more or less as clueless as their counterparts : they refused to follow the orders of the king, refused to garrison anything, and eventually pulled a Leroy Jenkins on Egypt that Amauri II tried to conciliate.

But even baldwin IV helping command the crusaders could help enormously, as he was apparently quite the general.
I'd rather think that having Baldwin IV alive and fecund (maybe not that long tough) would likly butterfly away the Fourth Crusade as we know it, would it be because of the changes in the Third Crusade.

And, he'd take precedent over boniface of monferrat to lead the crusade if he wished, being a king and all.
That's not going to work : the poulains and crusaders always had trouble to reach an agreement, but as said above, the Fourth Crusader fancied themselves as a re-edition of the First, and even the crusaders that refused to go in Romania acted independently in Syria, making the whole thing fizzling harder than a second-rate beer, ending with prisoners, second-hand reinforcement in Armenia, and of course a majority realizing that carving its own land in Romania wasn't that a bad idea.

And, regarding the whole strategy of the crusade. They didn't really have all that much of a plan, yes, but if baldwin took command he could develop one.
The problem is that the thing that passed for a plan was already causing several issues, the least not being the gross overestimation made by the envoyees in Venice. Whoever reigns in Jerusalem isn't going to make an a priori plan for them, assuming the whole of crusaders would even listen.

But what if they faced the saracens in a battle in the sinai, and gained a pyrhic victory? They would destroy the saracen army, making it unable to attack into eygpt, but at the same time weaken the crusaders enough where offensive operations would be cancelled.
I think you really underestimate the ressources at hand in Egypt, as how they were used and displayed during the Fifth Crusade for exemple : even if, somehow, crusaders are able to utterly destroy the Ayyubid army, if they loose would it be only half of men as their foes, they would only be crushed harder with the unavoidable following egyptian campaign.
 
Huh. So, the fourth crusade was fucked if it went to eygpt?
Still, my POD's combined would probably improve things for the latin empire if it still went as otl, as it would have more crusaders available to settle there, so more men to face nicaea and bulgaria with. Additionally, boniface of montferrat would make a hell of an emperor if the venetians had not vetoed him. He had lots of connections in the east and he was reasonably well-liked by the ex-byzantine nobility, so he could probably gain their support. He was also an experienced commander, and he wouldn't fuck up as badly as baldwin did. Perhaps, this could butterfly away adrianople, or atleast change its outcome somehow.
 
Huh. So, the fourth crusade was fucked if it went to eygpt?
Let's say that neither crusaders that went to Romania, neither the ones that went to Syria displayed a great deal of competency. (I'd briefly mention the crusaders that went in Sicily with Guillaume de Brienne, because of its "1. Conquer Sicily. 2.???? 3. Crusade!" part).
They ignored much, if not all, of local politics and ignored the royal authority as long they could, because they were obviously right, and the king was obviously wrong.

Still, my POD's combined would probably improve things for the latin empire if it still went as otl, as it would have more crusaders available to settle there, so more men to face nicaea and bulgaria with.
Thing is, the majority of crusaders that went to Syria, after having defeated, decided to went in Latin Romania to take their share of the takeover : Renaud de Montmirail, one of the main opponents to Boniface de Montferrat in 1203, or Etienne du Perche, didn't really hesitated doing so in late 1204 (and both died at Adrianople, IRRC) and Baudouin I wasn't ashamed to ask for them and latin lords and knights of Syria to come in Romania where they would gain lands and titles.
It apparently worked fairly well (it's hard to give numbers, but chronicles mention thousands) because, exchanging a dangerous and somehow precary existence in Syria to a relatively wealthy and safe (their opponents were "only" Greeks, after all) was an attracting prospect. (Admittedly, when I said the Fourth Crusade was only a waste of time, I forgot about this poaching)

Simply said, you had more men than just the crusaders present in 1204 at the Battle of Adrianople : it didn't helped. As said above, Baudouin I focused more on beating up Boniface de Montferrat, than really preparing his empire to defense (the territory he really controlled was particularily small, eventually). It doesn't help that Greeks began to rebel, and that his army began to be decimated by epidemics in Macedonia.
The reason of the defeat of the Latin Empire is less a problem of numbers, than poor decisions, choices and politics (Bulgaria was at first more or less leaning to the Latin side, for Athe's sake). As crusaders decided to get rid of as much byzantine administration and structures they could get away with, they made their own feudal fantasy significantly weaker than either Latin States or any Byzantine successor.
Heck, Crusaders split the whole of the Empire, including parts they had no-one there, let along conquered regions : Duchy of Philadelphia, Duchy of Nicea, County of Konya (that was not held by Byzantine sinces a century), Kingdom of Andremite (Edremit), Duchy of Philippopolis...
It was either wishful thinking, either a more or less elaborated scam.

It doesn't help that they virtually never recieved reinforcement from later crusades or crusader expeditions : not to say that Latin Romania had a bad reputation (altough it did), but few sax the point of it : at the exception of Angevins and Italian maritime city-states (and their respective geopolitical interests) almost nobody saw the point to maintain the Latin Empire on life support.

Additionally, boniface of montferrat would make a hell of an emperor if the venetians had not vetoed him.
The problem is that nobody wanted him (altough Venetians no less than most of the "great electors" : his connections to the imperial family were, for what matter crusaders, not a positive feature but at the contrary played fully against him. It's why Boniface de Montferrat didn't played a main role in the occupation of the city, being stuck in the encampment.
His connections to the Latin States in Syria didn't made him any good either, as he had connections to people that still needed reinforcement that crusaders weren't willing to give anymore.

Eventually, as mentioned in the firsts posts, Boniface de Montferrat was a vassal of the Holy Roman Emperor, that crusaders (mostly composed of French nobles and knights) refused to be subservient or even considering the possibility of it. The Latin Empire, for all intents and purposes, was a French and (ironically) an anti-imperial structure (in the sense of a more or less tight ensemble).

And that would be assuming that, even elected, he would have been obeyed : giving that the emperors IOTL barely managed to rule their own demesne, and giving the suspicious Boniface de Montferrat recieved, we can say more or less safely that he wouldn't have been more powerful, probably even less than Baudouin I, which is something.
 
Not much : even before the falling out with Baudouin, Siculo-Norman Crusaders weren't exactly that represented in the First Crusade. Altough one of its main component, it was probably less than what Hugues de Vermandois and Raimond de Saint-Gilles gathered each. It was possibly an exceptional (politically-wise) efforts since when the Principalty of Antioch was threatened, altough it was only nominally part of the Yerosolemite Kingdom, Siculo-Normans doesn't seems to have cared, in spite of the kinship they shared with its ruler.

Eventually, Norman Sicily was more focused in Romania (as it was the case since decades) and in Africa : that they had their own Mediterranean interests, as Byzantine did, didn't made them more likely to support Latin States, but relatively less so.


How? The Yerosolemite Kingdom was concieved, since the beggining, as an "idealized" feudality, complete with largely independent nobility. At the very least, taming it would require a political takeover. Even within his realm, Roger II had to fight hard against an independently minded nobility : Jerusalem was this up to eleven.


Remember that southern Italy wasn't exactly overpopulated then, giving away settlers would have meant weakening more or less its kingdom. Note that reinforcement wasn't usually "loaned" by rulers, but a charge taken by nobles or miles out of social-religious duty. More powerful the king, more likely royal intervention (as in the Third Crusade) rather than gradual reinforcement.

Eventually, the problem wasn't transportation (Maritime communi did that quite well as well as the suppliement), than the cost of it and the motivation of Latins nobles to stay in Syria (generally, the crushing majority didn't remained long).
In fact, a better PoD could be having southern Italy remaining divided in various principalties, offering a situation closer to what existed in traditional crusading pools of France and western Germany.

What I mean is that while the Normans weren't very interested in Outremer normally, Roger II would gain Kingship of Jerusalem when Baldwin I died. This was the agreement Adelaide made with Baldwin in exchange for money and troops. What would be the point of making that arrangement if Roger was going to mostly ignore Outremer? I'd assume his plans were cut off when Adelaide was divorced.

The lords of Outremer were in a rather precarious situation no? For example, the Battle of Ager Sanguinis allowed Baldwin II to ride to the rescue and take over the regency of Antioch. IIRC Roger II even had a valid claim to Antioch so he might not even settle for a regency in this ATL. There's also the fall of Edessa...I assume Roger would trade his OTL focus on South Italy for a focus on Jerusalem (fulfilling your idea?)? Perhaps focusing on taming Sicily and opportunistically intervening in Outremer when he could gain advantage. Furthermore, Roger has an outside source of power in the form of fairly prosperous Sicily and so doesn't have to rely on the relatively meager resources of Jerusalem alone. I assume this is why the nobility wanted to prevent Rogers ascension to the throne. He was fairly successful in taming the nobility of Sicily and South Italy OTL and unlike those, Outremer is directly threatened by Muslims on both sides. Adelaide came with a bunch of muslim archers so even then there was apparently troops to spare. It would be interesting to see how Sicilian support would effect attacks on the muslim states.

In terms of settlers, Roger II apparently settled Christian and Muslim Sicilians in Norman Africa (Anglo-Norman Studies VII p 36). Perhaps he could also offer free transport for pilgrims?

EDIT: I'm not intending to speak from a position of authority here. I haven't really researched this time and place properly. This is more about exploring options to see if they hold up.
 
What I mean is that while the Normans weren't very interested in Outremer normally, Roger II would gain Kingship of Jerusalem when Baldwin I died.
Even if the marriage held and didn't produced an heir (which is, after all, not unlikely), this isn't really obvious. Even a quick look at the yerosolemite nobility points that they at least resisted importantly before a succession they wouldn't agree with/ Most of them, then, clearly favoured a succession that would put someone close to them (either socially, culturally or politically) and rather from France than Italy, as it was usually the case. The repudiation of Adelaide had much to do with the opposition of the Patriarch and main nobles IOTL, and I wouldn't see these just giving it up.

If you add to this that Roger was essentially focused on southern Italy, and would probably remain so for a while as IOTL, I doubt he would have been able to enforce his claims efficiently.

What would be the point of making that arrangement if Roger was going to mostly ignore Outremer?
Were Roger II or Adelaide fully aware of the political realities of Syria? Even as it stabilized itself, it was still an ensemble of troubled ambitions, military shenanigans and nobiliar opposition.
I wouldn't ignore as well Adelaide's own ambitions and policies : while she was quite (obviously) tied with her son's position, she wasn't just a tool of siculo-norman policy, and she had her own agenda

Eventually, it's possible (quite possible IMO) that what was the main prize for Adelaide and Roger (at least in a first time) was less the kingship of Jerusalem, than the kingship itself. The whole operation IOTL allowed Roger to assert himself as "son of the queen Adelaide" in siculo-norman lands, and therefore to strengthen the establishment of what would become the Kingdom of Sicily.
Constance de France may have pulled something similar in Apulia, styling herself queen as she regented the principalty for Bohémond.

I'd assume his plans were cut off when Adelaide was divorced.
I don't think there was much set plans at this point : Roger II barely began his personal reign, and was, so to speak, "open" to many possibilities.
Much of what he did up to the late 1110's was a slow build-up in Sicily and southern Italy, at the expense of local nobility (especially second and third waves settlers) and ecclesiastical-pontifical power : not to say that he didn't harboured ambition in Latin States, but I don't see actual preparation to assert these. It's telling that Roger II never seriously claimed the yerosolemite kingship in the 1120's, IMO : he was not exactly a graceful loser, and history is full of unenforcable claims making their way to style.

The lords of Outremer were in a rather precarious situation no?
Yes, and no. The Latin States underwent a period of stabilization that really ended with Baudouin II's reign, but the precarious situation was the factory settings of the Latin States, with an independent minded nobility and a regular pressure on their borders. It never prevented them to assert their own political views.

IIRC Roger II even had a valid claim to Antioch so he might not even settle for a regency in this ATL.
If you meant by this that the Princes of Antioch and the Counts of Sicily were kindred, yes.
But Roger II never shown a real interest dealing with the principalty of Antioch, even if doing so would have allowed to curb down Jerusalem's power (the yerosolemite suzerainty over Antioch was quite limited) : he didn't really cared for Bohémond's rights in Antioch, if it meant he could occupy Tarento and Apulia as he did.

EDIT: I'm not intending to speak from a position of authority here. I haven't really researched this time and place properly. This is more about exploring options to see if they hold up.
Heh, that's fine : I myself try to base my own posts on what I find (for exemple Houben's books), and this is a discussion board.
Still : I think that Roger II couldn't do otherwise than to focus on southern Italy, would it be only to assert its local power against italo-norman nobility, especially if he wasn't the only one attempting to do so (for exemple, Constance de France and Bohémond II, altough in a less strong position). Not that litterally everything Roger would pull would be dictated by this policy (altough the pragmatical mindset of Roger makes me think that it would be in most of things), but considering the geopolitical situation in southern Italy from one hand, and the Almoravid presence in the other hand (altough less an existential threat for Sicily, and more a blunder for its ruler's ambition), I don't think there's room for a real syrian policy for Roger II, that would have been trading an efficient build-up and mobilisation of ressources, to a far expedition without real guarantee of success.

I still think your best chance for regular italo-norman participation to Latin States reinforcements and Crusades would be to prevent the establishment of a Kingdom of Sicily or its equivalent, and to keep it divided.
 
For the III Crusade the biggest POD is the safe arrival of Emperor Barbarossa and his German host: with more manpower and an authority figure that should be able to position himself as superior to both Philippe and Richard (and of course the varios "imperial" barons) can Jerusalem be taken? How longer could it be held though, with no more fortifications?

I think that, if he had not died untimely, William II of Sicily would have joined the Crusade (for example a Sicilian fleet had been harrassing and patrolling the levantine coasts since 1187), how could his participation have shaken up things? Maybe just changing the chronology a bit avoids the storm and the whole Cypriote diversion: maybe the Kingdom of Cyprus is not created ittl?

Other divergences, that would however cause more effects in Europe than in the Levant are the death of Philippe Auguste at the siege of Acre (iirc he was taken ill for some time) or Richard choosing a different route or beung more lucky and not ending up in captivity.
 
@LSCatilina So, assuming Baldwin I died of his OTL severe illness in 1117, he wouldn't have been able to divorce Adelaide. What do you see happening regarding Roger and the KoJ?
Roger II would still be busy in southern Italy, struggling against the pontifical opposition and the independent Italo-Norman principalties. Altough I could seem him styling himself as king, it wouldn't be acknowledged by Rome or others, and it might impair his cause when it comes to pontifical mediation temptatives between Roger and other lords, not to mention at least significantly delay the sicilian build-up in Italy, or the mediterranean policy if Roger II tries to enforce his claims in Syria. But that he didn't attempted this IOTL altough his rights would be roughly similar, makes me thinks he wouldn't likely do so ITTL.

As for what matter Jerusalem, I can't really see them accepting Roger as king, or rather, I'm not really seeing who would have supported him as king. That said, whoever succeeds Baudouin I (likely either Eustache de Boulogne or Baudouin d'Edesse) might have a more difficult time asserting its power, especially if they didn't spoke too much against Adelaide.
 
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