The course of the Battle of the Somme without German counterattack doctrine

  • Thread starter Deleted member 1487
  • Start date

Deleted member 1487

In 1916 during the fight on the Somme the Entente managed to amass a large advantage in artillery and men and flung them against the German lines, punching bulges into that German contemporary defense doctrine required immediate counterattacks to deal with. Regardless of what the actual numbers were in the end, there is a fair bit of dispute, the Germans suffered terrible losses in these hasty counter attacks due to British and French massed artillery that broke them up. Based on all the narratives about the subject I could find they were pretty pointless and unnecessarily costly and eventually led to the innovation of the elastic defense doctrine to cope with this increased Entente firepower advantage. But it was pretty clear early in the battle that the counterattacks would run into massed British artillery, as reclaiming the lines taken by the Entente were within range of these massed guns, so what if commanders basically dropped doctrine and just formed new defensive lines rather than throw their men wastefully against captured positions and watch them be slaughtered? What kind of savings in manpower would result and how much deeper would the Entente get and to what end had counterattacks been discontinued early in the campaign?
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_the_Somme
 
It wasn't the 'counter attack' doctrine yet, but the 'hold the line at all costs' doctrine still that was executed at the Somme. - First you man your first line with most of your combat force, have them smashed by enemy artillery, then you send your reinforcements in to establish your old frontline again.
It was indeed very costly, but state of the art at that time. Falkenhayn wasn't accused of this doctrine, which almost all German field commanders thought was good, but because he didn't send in reinforcements fast enough, leading to a 'burn out' of the troops deployed.

And also the 'counter attack' doctrine introduced in 1917 didn't call for trading space for people. It assumed that finally the initial front line would be retaken, if only with less overall casualties. - That didn't work either, at least not in Flanders in the final phase. - In a word: the riddle how to reduce casualties hadn't been solved. Defending the line was as costly as attacking, the defensive stance taken in 1917 hadn't saved any blood.
 

Deleted member 1487

It wasn't the 'counter attack' doctrine yet, but the 'hold the line at all costs' doctrine still that was executed at the Somme. - First you man your first line with most of your combat force, have them smashed by enemy artillery, then you send your reinforcements in to establish your old frontline again.
It was indeed very costly, but state of the art at that time. Falkenhayn wasn't accused of this doctrine, which almost all German field commanders thought was good, but because he didn't send in reinforcements fast enough, leading to a 'burn out' of the troops deployed.

And also the 'counter attack' doctrine introduced in 1917 didn't call for trading space for people. It assumed that finally the initial front line would be retaken, if only with less overall casualties. - That didn't work either, at least not in Flanders in the final phase. - In a word: the riddle how to reduce casualties hadn't been solved. Defending the line was as costly as attacking, the defensive stance taken in 1917 hadn't saved any blood.
I don't agree at all with your characterization of the 1917 elastic doctrine.

http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/cgsc/carl/download/csipubs/lupfer.pdf
This document provided general guidance for the conduct of the defense and, with subsequent editions, became the German doctrine of defense for the rest of the war. OHL officially rejected the principle of holding the forward line at all cost. The regulations now stated that the objective of defense was to force the attacker to frustrate and expend himself, while the defender pre- served his strength. The Principles related the purpose of the defense entirely to the enemy and did not mention retention of terrain as the basic objective. The principles for achieving the objective were:
o The defender must not surrender the initiative to the attacker. e
The defense must rely on firepower, not large numbers of troops. l
The defender must not hold ground at all costs (a controversial principle). 0
The defender must consider depth for all construction and positions.50

Previous concern with the inviolability of the front line had caused the Germans to strengthen that part of the battlefield within range of Allied artillery and where the Allies applied their maximum power to achieve a pene- tration, that is, on the forward edge. The range of artillery and the fieIds of artillery observation favored the Allied concentration of artillery on the Ger- man forward edge. With the new German doctrine, the Allied concentration of firepower was on a forward edge held by relatively few German troops. Ger- man strength no longer directly confronted Allied strength. As the Allied attack advanced, its relative power would deteriorate as the distance from its artillery support increased because the attack outran its inflexible communiea- tions system and eventually exceeded the range of its supporting artillery. As the Allied advance became more confused and weak as it progressed, German power increased, for the Germans positioned their forces in tiers or echelons which became stronger as the distance from the front line increased.

The outpost zone served a purpose similar to outposts in open warfare: to contain enemy raids and patrols, to provide warning of major attacks, and to disrupt those attacks. Behind the outpost zone was the front trench system, usually three successive trench lines, called the main line of resistance (MLR). This main line of resistance was the forward edge of the battle zone. The battle zone extended back, depending on terrain, fifteen hundred to three thousand meters, with a second trench line, the artillery protective line, as its rear boun- dary. Behind this trench system was the rearward zone, although the Germans later extended the battle zone to create even more depth. The artillery was organized in great depth behind its protective line.51

The major defensive battle would occur in the battle zone. The new regula- tions recognized that a massive enemy attack could overrun the MLR, but the regulations also stated that a counterattack in the battle zone would recover the MLR. Several factors favored the defender in this critical struggle. In keep- ing with the philosophy of using firepower to inflict maximum enemy casual- ties, the Germans fully integrated artillery into the defense. The PrincipZes (1 March 1917 edition) devoted more pages to artillery than to any other combat arm. The tactical considerations for selecting defensive positions were not placement of infantry units, but “observation and positions for artillery, andcommunications with the rear,“s2 which clearly established the role of artillery as crucial in the defense. German artillery observers would have the battle zone under observation, but Allied artillery observers would be unable to direct their own artillery fire because of the masking terrain concealing the German MLR. As the Allies advanced beyond the range of their own artillery support, the Germans responded with carefully planned, timely artillery fire.

The German soldiers in the outposts and the main line of resistance, how- ever, were not simply given carte blanche to evacuate their positions and head for the rear at the first opportunity. The defense was aptly called elastic, for it was to resist, bend, and snap back. The Principles stressed tenacity of defense, for ““stout hearted men with iron nerves form the real backbone of defense.“53 The flexibility given to soldiers in the forward areas was practical: they were to shift to escape the artillery fire, and survive in order to inflict casualties on the subsequent enemy infa’ntry assault. This shifting to escape Allied artillery could be to the flanks, to the rear, or to the front,54 and it usually occurred in the numerous shell holes. The Somme experience had shown that large elabo- rate positions had disadvantages under heavy artillery fire. The trenches were necessary for daily living, but once detected they were lathered with prepara- tory fire and barrages. Deep dugouts in forward areas were also impractical, for soldiers remained in them too long after the enemy barrage lifted and were often captured. Therefore, under heavy fire, the forward German soldiers evac- uated their trenches and shifted from shell hole to shell hole, avoiding concen- trations of fire and escaping the detection of aerial artillery spotters.

The Allied advance would first encounter resistance from pockets of Ger- man survivors in shell holes. Having been concealed from aerial observation, units positioned on the reverse slope would then open fire unexpectedly.55 The Allies would also encounter fortified strongpoints (Widerstandsnester). These strongpoints were not deep dugouts as before, but less elaborate fortified posi- tions (of earth, wood, old buildings, or anything else available) for squads or machine gun sections, carefully sited to avoid Allied observation. Placed mostly in the battle zone, they were built to provide for all-around defense and they engaged the attackers, whenever possible, with devastating enfilade fire.s6 The strongpoints would remain fighting even if cut off by the enemy advance.
The ideal scenario was:
A fragmented, exhausted Allied attack force reaches the battle zone. They hope that their thorough artillery preparation has killed all the Germans, but they encounter several Germans firing at them from shell holes in the torn ground. Sudden fire from the German main line of resistance has slowed the Allies and their sheduled artillery barrage has crept forward without them, according to a timed sequence of fire they cannot modify. They feel helpless without artillery support. The Allies finally have taken the main line of resis- tance at great cost, but now they are in unfamiliar ground, under fire from concealed enemy machine gunners and riflemen. German artillery, which the Allies expected to destroy in the preparatory fires, now appears uery active.

The Germans concentrate their artillery fire behind the Allied advanced units, cutting them off from reinforcements and supplies. For the next feu! minutes, the Allies have a tenuous hold on a few acres of ground, but by advancing into the battle zone, the Allies are most uulnerable, and have exposed themselves to the counterattack, the soul of the German defense. The immediate counterat- tack, well coordinated with accurate artillery fire, destroys, captures, or ejects the Allied unit before it can consoh‘date its gain,s. The coherence of the German defense is restored.


The counterattack was still there, but only at the MLR, which was quite a bit deeper and not at the outpost line and outside the range of Entente artillery observation/range.

Nevertheless, what I am suggesting is that they don't even do that, they just accept that ground is lost because counterattacking only means unnecessary losses unlikely chance of retaking it.
 
Last edited by a moderator:
I don't agree at all with your characterization of the 1917 elastic doctrine.
http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/cgsc/carl/download/csipubs/lupfer.pdf
The counterattack was still there, but only at the MLR, which was quite a bit deeper and not at the outpost line.
Nevertheless, what I am suggesting is that they don't even do that, they just accept that ground is lost because counterattacking only means unnecessary losses unlikely chance of retaking it.
[/FONT]

The outpost line meant sending detachments forward, almost to the enemy MLR, which then fell back. The own MLR had to be masked by this measures, just to deceive the enemy (and his guns). Outposts falling back and reinforcments coming in were to converge on the MLR, which was to be held. No trading of ground.
Giving up ground leads you to what? Suing for unconditional peace? - Defence means holding ground and annihilating enemy. If you accomplish neither, what's the point in fighting on?
 

Deleted member 1487

The outpost line meant sending detachments forward, almost to the enemy MLR, which then fell back. The own MLR had to be masked by this measures, just to deceive the enemy (and his guns). Outposts falling back and reinforcments coming in were to converge on the MLR, which was to be held. No trading of ground.
Giving up ground leads you to what? Suing for unconditional peace? - Defence means holding ground and annihilating enemy. If you accomplish neither, what's the point in fighting on?
The outpost line was to be abandoned and the MLR moved back once that became the effective new outpost and the enemy moved up his artillery to occupy the captured ground before the MLR.

Trading some ground in 1916 at the Somme to save lives and bleed out the enemy while dragging him deeper into a salient is worthwhile, especially as the end result in 1917 was the abandonment of the Somme area anyway for the Hindenburg Line. As it was the British were bled out in the advance, not in the German counterattacks.
 
Initial concept in Flanders 1917: outpost line falling back, reserves coming up, outcome - MLR held. This concept did work in the initial phases, when the British were still aiming at major pushes.
Late phase, terrain turned into a swamp: British jump for 200 metres only, don't lose contact with own artillery; German counter attacks are disastrous and bloody without achieving anything. Result: elastic defence failed.

The German commanders knew they had to save lifes, but all attempts to do that were futile. It didn't work. One had to switch to the offensive, which was costly as well, but at least promised to exert influence on the enemy's will to fight on.
 

Deleted member 1487

Initial concept in Flanders 1917: outpost line falling back, reserves coming up, outcome - MLR held. This concept did work in the initial phases, when the British were still aiming at major pushes.
Late phase, terrain turned into a swamp: British jump for 200 metres only, don't lose contact with own artillery; German counter attacks are disastrous and bloody without achieving anything. Result: elastic defence failed.
It sounds more like a misapplication of the spirit of German doctrine and a reversion to the 1915-16 holding ground at all cost concept.

The German commanders knew they had to save lifes, but all attempts to do that were futile. It didn't work. One had to switch to the offensive, which was costly as well, but at least promised to exert influence on the enemy's will to fight on.
They were clearly not trying if they were trying to stop bite and hold attacks of 200 meters with counterattacks.
 
Initial concept in Flanders 1917: outpost line falling back, reserves coming up, outcome - MLR held. This concept did work in the initial phases, when the British were still aiming at major pushes.
Late phase, terrain turned into a swamp: British jump for 200 metres only, don't lose contact with own artillery; German counter attacks are disastrous and bloody without achieving anything. Result: elastic defence failed.
The core of the problem for everybody in WW1 was communications - the infantry and the artillery couldn't talk to one another. In the end bite-and-hold was a poor solution, but it was the only one that could work at all under the circumstances.

The German commanders knew they had to save lifes, but all attempts to do that were futile. It didn't work. One had to switch to the offensive, which was costly as well, but at least promised to exert influence on the enemy's will to fight on.
Quoi qu'on fasse, on perd beaucoup de monde

It sounds more like a misapplication of the spirit of German doctrine and a reversion to the 1915-16 holding ground at all cost concept.
The problem is, what if they don't bring up reserves? The British just carry out "peaceful penetration" attacks on the outpost line and then their jumping off point is right in front of the MLR, which gets malleted by a deliberate attack with lots of artillery. By 1917 or so nobody could stop a determined and prepared attack dead unless the attacker was utterly exhausted (as the Germans were by summer 1918, and the French by 1917) - what you can do is make it too costly for them to sustain, maybe. There really isn't much you can do about bite-and-hold though apart from make it a very, very slow process.

They were clearly not trying if they were trying to stop bite and hold attacks of 200 meters with counterattacks.
What else are they going to do apart from just concede the ground?
 
Now, the hard fought gains of 3rd Ypres were swiftly abandoned in spring of 1918 - when the British were squeezed at a sensitive spot farther south (by the small-scale Georgette offensive, in this case, threatening Hazebrouck).
This is in the same variety as the French La Malmaison offensive of October 1917, which forced (or rather persuaded) the Germans to abandon the whole mountain range of the Chemin des Dames (they could have tried to take the lost area back - at staggering cost).
There were ways to achive something without indulging in frontal blood baths, even on the Western Front. But when the enemy forced you to engage in such a head-on battle, there was little choice but fighting it out. - You couldn't do one Alberich after another, that quickly would have led you back to the initial deployment areas of August 1914.
 

Deleted member 1487

The problem is, what if they don't bring up reserves? The British just carry out "peaceful penetration" attacks on the outpost line and then their jumping off point is right in front of the MLR, which gets malleted by a deliberate attack with lots of artillery. By 1917 or so nobody could stop a determined and prepared attack dead unless the attacker was utterly exhausted (as the Germans were by summer 1918, and the French by 1917) - what you can do is make it too costly for them to sustain, maybe. There really isn't much you can do about bite-and-hold though apart from make it a very, very slow process.
Peaceful penetration only worked when the Germans were much thinner on the ground; the outpost line in 1917 was quite tough nut to crack without a major push. Plus once taken the Germans can shell it and make the attackers pay. WW1 was an attritional war and making the enemy pay for the ground he took in blood while sparing your own was the way to win.

What else are they going to do apart from just concede the ground?
Bleed the enemy in his attempts to push forward; you cede lost ground to avoid further losses in a situation where the enemy has artillery cited on said ground.
 

Deleted member 1487

Now, the hard fought gains of 3rd Ypres were swiftly abandoned in spring of 1918 - when the British were squeezed at a sensitive spot farther south (by the small-scale Georgette offensive, in this case, threatening Hazebrouck).
This is in the same variety as the French La Malmaison offensive of October 1917, which forced (or rather persuaded) the Germans to abandon the whole mountain range of the Chemin des Dames (they could have tried to take the lost area back - at staggering cost).
There were ways to achive something without indulging in frontal blood baths, even on the Western Front. But when the enemy forced you to engage in such a head-on battle, there was little choice but fighting it out. - You couldn't do one Alberich after another, that quickly would have led you back to the initial deployment areas of August 1914.
I don't think you know what quickly means in this context.

But aside from that I'm talking about tactical acceptance of not trying to retake lost ground, that strategic abandonment of terrain. Just not counterattacking a position that was lost and is zeroed by enemy artillery concentrations. Let the Brits or French come at the next position and husband strength for a prepared counteroffensive with lots of artillery support and where it could suppress enemy artillery sufficiently so you're not sending your infantry to the slaughter.
 
So essentially the Artois Loos offensive is a success. The weight of artillery on the Entente side is so preponderant in 1915/early 16 as to invalidate the OTL Somme scheme of defence and the entire strategic conception surrounding Verdun.


Invisibly.
 

Deleted member 1487

So essentially the Artois Loos offensive is a success. The weight of artillery on the Entente side is so preponderant in 1915/early 16 as to invalidate the OTL Somme scheme of defence and the entire strategic conception surrounding Verdun.


Invisibly.
What are you talking about? First of all the topic is about the Somme first and foremost. Second the Entente didn't really develop substantial fire superiority until the Somme. But the scheme of defense used at the Somme didn't take that into account and still conducted counterattacks as though the Entente didn't have massive artillery concentrations waiting to beat of any counter thrust.
 
I don't think you know what quickly means in this context.

But aside from that I'm talking about tactical acceptance of not trying to retake lost ground, that strategic abandonment of terrain. Just not counterattacking a position that was lost and is zeroed by enemy artillery concentrations. Let the Brits or French come at the next position and husband strength for a prepared counteroffensive with lots of artillery support and where it could suppress enemy artillery sufficiently so you're not sending your infantry to the slaughter.

Quickly means quickly in this context. There wasn't much depth, the Germans held only a rather tiny part of France.

Now, letting them come and wearing them down is a nice concept - if you have tanks, APCs, radio, mobile artillery, airplanes, etc.
Under WW1 conditions, this begs for disaster. Your communications will be gone very quickly (and again, quickly means quickly), and without comms the infantry-artillery co-ordination is gone. Delaying action is not a form of combat you can do with foot-marching men and gunners with horse-drawn guns, who talk to each other over telephone lines.
 

Deleted member 1487

Quickly means quickly in this context. There wasn't much depth, the Germans held only a rather tiny part of France.
Seizing a couple of miles depth every 6 months isn't quick.

Now, letting them come and wearing them down is a nice concept - if you have tanks, APCs, radio, mobile artillery, airplanes, etc.
Under WW1 conditions, this begs for disaster. Your communications will be gone very quickly (and again, quickly means quickly), and without comms the infantry-artillery co-ordination is gone. Delaying action is not a form of combat you can do with foot-marching men and gunners with horse-drawn guns, who talk to each other over telephone lines.
What did throwing men away in counterattacks achieve on the Somme other than perhaps soaking up shells and bullets? Counterattacks like what were launched on the Somme required comms and all of the above stuff you mention. Holding ground stubbornly and smartly is what I'm suggesting, just not the part where then the pointless bloody hasty counterattack is launched and then consumed by enemy artillery and MGs to little gain.
This book really highlights that with a bunch of primary accounts of the fighting and prompted me to start this thread:
http://www.amazon.com/German-Army-Somme-Jack-Sheldon/dp/1844155137
 
Engage brain.

The 1917 defence model is adopted as a response to the Entente artillery tactics of 16. Without that need what is the driver to change the defensive scheme?

Up to that point unless there is a rapid reaction a comparatively small breach in the defensive position could compromise the whole. Which is exactly why the later schemes emphasised the need to react quickly at the MLR.

The issue that develops at the Somme is that the availability of ammunition, numbers of guns and accuracy of the fire combined with the MLR being so close to the Entente artillery means massive casualties. Until that happens to adopt an outpost, MLR, reserve position in depth runs severe risks.

In the particular case of the Somme it either means a preparatory offensive to clear space for the Outpost line and keep the OTL position as the MLR or the establishment of the MLR some distance behind and leaving the good observation positions of the Somme as the outpost line. Which ofc requires construction of the line with attendant labour etc.

But generally unless the outpost line contains sufficient firepower to be able to defend itself it’s going to be lost, quickly, in a big raid.

The key to this is the numbers of machine guns available. Without MG the only way you can put firepower into the line is to put men into the line, or have the position covered by visually observed artillery – but the techniques of massing impromptu artillery fire on command were beyond the german in 45 much less 16 and the observer has to have a line of sight to his target.

Up to August 16 a German infantry regiment could have between 6 and 25 MG,. In 17 its 6 ( rising to 12 through the year) per COMPANY.

Essentially a German outpost line of 2x Co in 17 is the same in firepower terms as a regiment in 16.

That's what makes the outpost line strong enough to require a substantial attack.
 
Top