The Consequences of a Surviving Stresemann

Okay, I'm reading Gustav Stresemann: Weimar's Greatest Statesman [1] right now, and th author has a bit of a counterfactual about his survival.

First, He might have been no more successful in keeping the DVP in the grand coalition., but he might have remained foreig minister in teh Bruning government. This would have been significant, since he would have focused on maintaining Franco-German cooperation, which might have made a significant difference.

France made a number of proposals, from having joint companies exploit the Saar for plans to have German firms participate in major construction projects in France, to short and logn term loans.

Instead, the German foreign minister of OTL spurned French officers, and instead proceeded with plans for an Austro-German customs union. France got, ah, annoyed, and ended its officers; precipiating the banking crises in Austria and Germany in 1931. So no banking crises and Franco-German cooperation in the Saar.

However, Stresemann would hae had trouble maintaining his base. The DVP joined the Brunnig government, but the party continued to hemorrhage votes; by 1930 the NSDAP won more votes in the Saxon Landtag than the DVP, and in the 1931 elections the DVP share of the vote fell dramatically to 4.5 percent.

Yet Stresemann would have been powerless to prevent the dismissal of Bruning in 1932, or the intrigus which led to the appointment of Hitler as chancellor in January.

However, before his deathk, Stressemann toyed with running for the elections for Reich Presidency in April 1932. Could he have won, if he did so? Would he have? Or would it have led to Hitler winning?

[1] Can you guess how he feels about him?
 
Okay, I'm reading Gustav Stresemann: Weimar's Greatest Statesman [1] right now, and th author has a bit of a counterfactual about his survival.

First, He might have been no more successful in keeping the DVP in the grand coalition., but he might have remained foreig minister in teh Bruning government. This would have been significant, since he would have focused on maintaining Franco-German cooperation, which might have made a significant difference.

France made a number of proposals, from having joint companies exploit the Saar for plans to have German firms participate in major construction projects in France, to short and logn term loans.

Instead, the German foreign minister of OTL spurned French officers, and instead proceeded with plans for an Austro-German customs union. France got, ah, annoyed, and ended its officers; precipiating the banking crises in Austria and Germany in 1931. So no banking crises and Franco-German cooperation in the Saar.

However, Stresemann would hae had trouble maintaining his base. The DVP joined the Brunnig government, but the party continued to hemorrhage votes; by 1930 the NSDAP won more votes in the Saxon Landtag than the DVP, and in the 1931 elections the DVP share of the vote fell dramatically to 4.5 percent.

Yet Stresemann would have been powerless to prevent the dismissal of Bruning in 1932, or the intrigus which led to the appointment of Hitler as chancellor in January.

However, before his deathk, Stressemann toyed with running for the elections for Reich Presidency in April 1932. Could he have won, if he did so? Would he have? Or would it have led to Hitler winning?

[1] Can you guess how he feels about him?

Personally I have a fairly high opinion of Bruning's political ability but think he was overtaken by events.

Bruning's whole foreign policy is about tacking to the right in the face of the DNVP/Nazi joint campaigning. He has to adopt a more aggressive stance to try and win any popular support. Streseman would need to do the same, unless co-operation achieved some rapid economic benefits I do not think it would make any difference. He would be caught between an expanding far-right and the machinations of Schleicher.

Now killing off him might do some good.
 
Bruning's whole foreign policy is about tacking to the right in the face of the DNVP/Nazi joint campaigning. He has to adopt a more aggressive stance to try and win any popular support. Streseman would need to do the same, unless co-operation achieved some rapid economic benefits I do not think it would make any difference. He would be caught between an expanding far-right and the machinations of Schleicher.

Now killing off him might do some good.

The problem of course is that he didn't gain the support of the right, whereas Stresemann's policy would have gotten Germany the Ruhr earlier, and he would have had the victory of getting the French out of the Rhine.

(And of course Bruning was able to use the threat of the Nazis to woo support from the British).
 
The problem of course is that he didn't gain the support of the right, whereas Stresemann's policy would have gotten Germany the Ruhr earlier, and he would have had the victory of getting the French out of the Rhine.

(And of course Bruning was able to use the threat of the Nazis to woo support from the British).

It's possible but...

But then you have to consider the madness of the German right. They depicted the Young Plan as perpetual slavery, and will no doubt find a way to depict any deal over the Ruhr as a concession giving a permanent French interest when the place is due to come back to Germany.

I actually want to find a good book on Bruning's policy. I found a few articles on JSTOR last year but little seems to be written.
 
It's possible but...

But then you have to consider the madness of the German right. They depicted the Young Plan as perpetual slavery, and will no doubt find a way to depict any deal over the Ruhr as a concession giving a permanent French interest when the place is due to come back to Germany.

But the extreme right is already actively opposed to a surviving Weimar, and will therefore oppose the government regardless.
 
I thought I'd post some information from Economic Crisis and French Foreign Policy, 1930-1936hat sheds some light on the possibilities of Franco-German collaboration. Apologies for the rambling.

By 1929, France was running a not insignificant trade deficit with Germany, on the order of a billion francs. From March of 1928 to March of 1929, German exports to France increasd about 43%, and at the end of the year dditional tariff reductions were implemented, in accordance with a 1927 treaty. Significantly, Germany was sending a lot of machinery and machine tools to France, while France was sending mostly consumer goods. (There's an odd comment about how the French were concerned because the Germans stopped exporting foie gras).

Meanwhile, by the beginning of 1931 it was clear that Germany's economy was facing severe troubles. Bank failures battered the economy, and even the leader of the the Deustche Bank recognized the need for French assistance. (France, for a variety of reasons, was sitting on a massive gold reserve and was actually toying with a loan to Germany, but the Austro-German customs union scuppered it, and led to a run on the banks, making it worse....)

Meanwhile, as one way to deal with the situation, the Director of Commercial Relations in the Reich Foreign Ministry was exploring the idea of a Franco-German customs union, but the foreign minister at the time, expressed disapproval with it. Meanwhile there was an attempt in France to form a German-French parliamentary economic committee to deal with the problem. The French actually established the committee in the summer of 1931, and it debated giving Germany access to French markets in the colonies. There were discussions about Franco-German cartels in textiles, steel, and other industries sufficient to make Britain concerned.

(It's worth noting that nobody in France was interested in an all out customs union, of course, but that was still several decades after the EU's formation anyway).
 
I doubt Stressmen equals no Nazi Germany, after all sound, long-term economic planning is hardly an antedote to populist nationalism when it comes to the ballot box.

However perhaps a more delayed take over? Perhaps more a broad right-wing coalition takes power ala Franco's government, seeing Hitler's excesses diluted, eventually being thrown out as the Nazi surge dies down alongside economic regrowth
 
I doubt Stressmen equals no Nazi Germany, after all sound, long-term economic planning is hardly an antedote to populist nationalism when it comes to the ballot box.

I too find it unlikely that better economic conditions and a government doing more to actively combat economic problems would stop the Nazi takeover, especially given that their percentage of the vote was already in decline by the end of 1932.
 
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