The Confederates take back New Orleans

The Battle of Baton Rouge seemed to be a building to a Confederate victory, until the failure of the Arkansas to arrive forced Breckinridge to withdraw. I believe Baton Rouge was supposed to be the first step to eventually capturing New Orleans, but none of Van Dorn and Breckinridge's plans came to fruition.

But let's say the Arkansas manages to arrive, allowing Breckinridge to attack the Union positions. Van Dorn can probably bring his troops down the NOJ&GN RR to meet Breckinridge. Attacking New Orleans would likely require cutting the railroads leading into the city and laying siege, which would probably require more troops than the Confederates have.

How many troops did the Union have in and around the city in late 1862? Interestingly, President Davis issued a bill of attainder calling for Ben Butler's execution should he be captured, which could cause problems if the Confederates manage to do so.

Alternatively, there's Richard Taylor's 1863 plan to move down the Bayou Teche and recapture New Orleans which Kirby Smith disapproved of. Losing NOLA during the spring of 1863 would almost certainly force Banks and Grant to change their plans.

@Arnold d.c
 
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Union Army in 1862 had the West Gulf Blockading Squadron to call on, and Banks with his 30,000 troops, after Butler was kicked upstairs in November
CSS Arkansas also had to worry about the ironclads and Tinclads of the Mississippi Squadron, plus some of the ships captured at New Orleans and brought back into service, like Barataria

No, the Confederates had enough trouble holding onto Vicksburg, let alone striking past Baton Rouge
 
Union Army in 1862 had the West Gulf Blockading Squadron to call on, and Banks with his 30,000 troops, after Butler was kicked upstairs in November
CSS Arkansas also had to worry about the ironclads and Tinclads of the Mississippi Squadron, plus some of the ships captured at New Orleans and brought back into service, like Barataria

No, the Confederates had enough trouble holding onto Vicksburg, let alone striking past Baton Rouge

This! Other than taking Richmond, controlling the Mississippi was a major priority for the Union. It'll simply shift more resources and assets in successive efforts.
 
Interestingly, President Davis issued a bill of attainder calling for Ben Butler's execution should he be captured, which could cause problems if the Confederates manage to do so.

Jefferson Davis didn't issue General Order 111 until December 24, 1862 4 months after the battle of Baton Rouge. It didn't just call for Bytler's execution if captured, it also called for the execution of any officer serving under Butler and that all back Union troops and their white officers be treated as part of a servile insurrection. Fortunately, Confederate troops only occasionally indulged in these war crimes.
 
Union Army in 1862 had the West Gulf Blockading Squadron to call on, and Banks with his 30,000 troops, after Butler was kicked upstairs in November
CSS Arkansas also had to worry about the ironclads and Tinclads of the Mississippi Squadron, plus some of the ships captured at New Orleans and brought back into service, like Barataria

No, the Confederates had enough trouble holding onto Vicksburg, let alone striking past Baton Rouge
I'm not sure, but hadn't most of Banks' command gone to Port Hudson by this point?
Jefferson Davis didn't issue General Order 111 until December 24, 1862 4 months after the battle of Baton Rouge. It didn't just call for Bytler's execution if captured, it also called for the execution of any officer serving under Butler and that all back Union troops and their white officers be treated as part of a servile insurrection. Fortunately, Confederate troops only occasionally indulged in these war crimes.
Thanks for correcting that!
 
The best I could find on Butler's strength is the "Abstract from returns of the Department of the Gulf... for March 1862." According to N. P. Banks, there were no more abstracts until his arrival (and my search thus far seems to agree with him.) As my knowledge on the Trans-Mississippi Theater is fairly dim (and little information is available), I don't know if Butler received any reinforcements between March and August, but a total loss of William's Brigade would mean the destruction of 41% of Butler's manpower (according to the returns). However, Butler was successful in recruiting men to the Union cause. Within weeks of Baton Rouge, Butler raised 1,200 recruits of loyal Louisianan infantry, adding one and a half infantry regiments to his command along with Unionist cavalry companies to hunt partisans. After the OTL battle of Baton Rouge, Butler stated "if it (Confederate attack on New Orleans) becomes at all imminent, I shall call upon Africa to intervene, and I do not think I shall call in vain." While freedmen were mostly used for labor the 1st Louisiana Native Guard (1,000 man strong) had already been formed and was ready to serve for the Union cause. IOTL, Butler had 13,000 men at the end of August (according to Fire in the Cane Field).

On the other side, the District of Louisiana (with Taylor arriving in late August) was not prepared for Taylor's bold schemes. The army was lacking significant artillery, having dumped heavy guns into the waters during the panic that followed the Yankee invasion. The soldiers were surprisingly apathetic to the prospects of reclaiming lost territory but the return and arrival of new units brought some more willing and experienced troops to the army. The command was still severely overstretched in spite of reinforcements.
Sources:
https://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=coo.31924077730178;view=1up;seq=719 (Abstract from returns of the Department of the Gulf... for March 1862)
 
From what I can find, Taylor intended to fight in the Lafourche District. This proved rather difficult given the lukewarm secessionist sympathies in southern Louisiana. Taylor reported some 4,600 men ready for duty and another 1,100 AWOL. Confederate provost marshals apparently identified a staggering 8,000 men in his district as deserters or fugitive conscripts. Given the serious defeat at Georgia Landing, serious time and effort was needed to forge Taylor's army into a competent fighting force.
 
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Jefferson Davis didn't issue General Order 111 until December 24, 1862 4 months after the battle of Baton Rouge. It didn't just call for Bytler's execution if captured, it also called for the execution of any officer serving under Butler and that all back Union troops and their white officers be treated as part of a servile insurrection. Fortunately, Confederate troops only occasionally indulged in these war crimes.

It is a good thing for the rebels that they didn't carry out General Order 111. If they were murdering soldiers an job lots, then there would have been, at a minimum, hangings a-plenty both in the course of the rebellion, and after.
 
In regards to the 1863 attempt to seize New Orleans, I'd argue that Taylor had a shot. During the Siege of Port Hudson, Taylor achieved the capture of Brashear City and came within 16 miles of New Orleans, which was occupied by only a 250 man detachment from the 42d Massachusetts, on July 10. The capture of Brashear City provided great dividends for Taylor: 11 heavy guns, 2,500 stand of small arms, 200 wagons and 300 tents and $3 million dollars worth of quartermaster, commissary, ordnance and medical stores were captured. In addition Taylor successfully interrupted the Banks' line of communication north of New Orleans through the use of land batteries. Emory, the commander in charge of the city, admitted to Banks that he had to choose between Port Hudson and New Orleans. The question, however, is whether or not New Orleans could be held. Richard Taylor's OTL force was, at best, a division (Mouton's and Green's infantry brigades and a 650 man Texas cavalry brigade). Walker's Texas Division could be sent, but it was needed for the relief of Vicksburg.

The main problem in this scenario is E.K. Smith's and Richard Taylor's differing views on what should be done. E.K. Smith focused on reclaiming North Arkansas and seizing Missouri, on the other hand Taylor insisted on the liberation of the lower Mississippi. In the context of May 1863, Banks had forced Taylor's army to retreat, considerably demoralizing the Rebels and resulted in E.K. Smith asking Pemberton for reinforcements by detachments from the Port Hudson garrison (which was not realistic given the lack of adequate naval transports). As a result Walker's Texas Division performed a realistic reenactment of D'Erlon's Corps at 16 June: marching 300 miles back and forth, vacillating between reinforcing Taylor or severing Grant's line of communication in Louisiana. Banks' decision to withdraw from Alexandria to operate against Port Hudson provided E.K. Smith and Taylor to come up with a solution to relieve Vicksburg.

E.K. Smith wanted Walker to sever Grant's lines of communication, while Taylor insisted on a march to New Orleans. E.K. Smith's plan would have worked if Walker had been sent up the Tensas early in May to interdict traffic between Young's Point and New Carthage. However, on 12 May, Union engineers completed a road from the base of the DeSoto Peninsula connecting Young's Point with Bowers' Landing, opening a new supply line beyond the reach of E.K. Smith's forces. Taylor's plan also had merit. If Taylor had gotten in between New Orleans and Port Hudson, Banks would have been forced to abandon the siege and chase Taylor away. Taylor's scheme would have allowed Gardner to follow Johnston's order of marching away with about 8,000 men to Jackson, Mississippi. Gregg's arduous march from Port Hudson to Jackson took 8 days, but that was extended by the damage inflicted onto the New Orleans, Jackson & Great Northern Railroad by Grierson's raiders. The main problem here is that Gardner's troops are now commanded by Johnston and I'm fairly certain that Johnston will do nothing even with Gardner's reinforcing troops. Johnston believed that the only way to relieve Vicksburg was on E.K. Smith's side of the river and E.K. Smith was in full agreement.
 
@Arnold d.c:
If EK Smith's plan is enacted, would it have forced Grant to change any of his plans? It seems it would have been only another setback, of which there had plenty over the past six months.

Interestingly, Johnston castigated Theophilus Holmes for not aiding Vicksburg with his "55,000" troops in his memoirs. Where he got this figure I have no clue.
 
If EK Smith's plan is enacted, would it have forced Grant to change any of his plans? It seems it would have been only another setback, of which there had plenty over the past six months.
If Walker was present to menace Grant's lines of communication in May, Grant might have been forced to wait for detachments from Hurlbut's XVI Corps to arrive and secure his bases or wait until the engineers completed the bridge on May 12 and free up John McArthur's Division. Contrary to popular belief, Grant did not completely sever his supply lines. Grant's method of resupply was to have a large wagon train resupply his army from time to time. IOTL, Grant had a wagon train accompanied by Blair's Division resupply him a few days prior to Champion Hill and another 200 wagon train accompanied by McArthur's Division joined him with ammunition and hardtack after the battle. Even then the army reached the gates of Vicksburg hungry, resulting in the famous chant for hardtacks.
Interestingly, Johnston castigated Theophilus Holmes for not aiding Vicksburg with his "55,000" troops in his memoirs. Where he got this figure I have no clue.
Where in hell did Johnston get those numbers from? The force Holmes used for the Helena Campaign consisted of an infantry division commanded by Maj. Gen. Sterling Price, the ex-governor of Missouri, and two cavalry divisions, Brig. Gen. John S. Marmaduke's and Brig. Gen. Lucius M. Walker's. Holmes' army was, like Taylor's, in fairly miserable condition. His men desperately needed arms, ammunition and equipment of all types, which were being held up by the enemy possession of the river. As Grant stripped Helena's garrison for reinforcements, there was merit in attempting to reclaim it, as it served as crucial staging ground and supply depot for operations in the Mississippi Valley. One could, however, argue that the campaign was over before the first gun had sounded. Helena was a city surrounded by hills and ridges, outcroppings of the nearby Crowley's Ridge. These had been fortified with rifle pits and four batteries, A, B, C, and D, with C occupying the ominously named Graveyard Hill. Inside of the ridges was the recently completed Fort Curtis.
 
IOTL, Grant had a wagon train accompanied by Blair's Division resupply him a few days prior to Champion Hill and another 200 wagon train accompanied by McArthur's Division joined him with ammunition and hardtack after the battle. Even then the army reached the gates of Vicksburg hungry, resulting in the famous chant for hardtacks.
How did these wagons reach Grant? Overland from Grand Gulf?

Furthermore: if the first train was also 200 wagons, that would be 400 wagon-loads to supply 32,000 men: 80/wagon-load. How much could a wagon carry? 1,000 lbs? What would be required for the two weeks or so between leaving Grand Gulf and Bruinsburg and reaching the Yazoo?
 
How did these wagons reach Grant? Overland from Grand Gulf?

Furthermore: if the first train was also 200 wagons, that would be 400 wagon-loads to supply 32,000 men: 80/wagon-load. How much could a wagon carry? 1,000 lbs? What would be required for the two weeks or so between leaving Grand Gulf and Bruinsburg and reaching the Yazoo?
Blair's Division brought 200 wagons from Grand Gulf on May 11, made it to Auburn on the evening of May 13 to link up with A.J. Smith's Division of XIII Corps and distributed the goods on May 15. The second wagon train departed Grand Gulf of May 13 under the protection of John McArthur's Division and joined the army just as the fighting died down at Champion Hill on May 16. In addition, it would be more accurate to note that Grant's army was composed of 45,000 men and officers, not including John McArthur's arriving Division (4,203 men and officers). The number of 32,000 only considers the divisions Grant brought to Champion Hill, which excludes Steele's and Tuttle's Division.

Typically, a wagon could carry more than 1,000 lbs. The amount carried varied between armies. In the March through the Carolinas, 2,000 lbs of material was the maximum load for the Army of the Tennessee while the wagons of the XXV Corps carried 1,700 lbs on average. 150 wagons were needed to feed the Army of the Potomac on a daily basis and Sherman, at war's end, stated that each corps required 600 wagons to haul the material needed for 20 days of marching away from sources of supply. The wagon train possessed by Grant was a motley one, a collection of anything with wheels. The initial wagon train was composed of 200 wagons, Sherman brought over at least 120 wagons from Milliken's Bend and the rest of the 500 wagons were confiscated property. Grant's staff, with the help of Sherman, stocked Grand Gulf with 2 million rations.
 
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