The Confederacy Winning The Battle of Gettysburg.

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Sherman's Adventures Hold The Key; Lincoln's Decision to Re-Supply Fort Sumter, was The MOST Important Action of The Whole War, Ever Siince Then, Whiile The Initiative has Lain wiith The Confederacy, The Union has Enjoyed The Luxury of Tiime, to Be Truly Successful, a Southern Strategy has to Regain it ...


Actually the MOST important action of the whole war was Polk's stupid invasion of Kentucky: because in doing so he ensured the CSA was doomed. The ACW was going to happen anyway, regardless of Lincoln's decision to resupply Fort Sumter.


There are Two Ways, to Do Thiis: Viisiting The War Upon The Union, Partiicularly in The Election Years of 1862 and 1864, And Drawing The British into The War on The Confederate Siide, Especially if they Briing The French wiith them; Confederate Strategy from Harpers Ferry to Gettysburg, is Predicated Upon these Dual Notions, However, they Do it in The Wrong Theatre!


Election year in 1862? That's only a Congressional one. Now considering the USA was getting their butts kicked in 1862, clearly the election results didn't change Lincoln's policies. Meanwhile 1864 is too late as the OTL shows. But regardless what the CSA may achieve in either year, neither France nor Britian are going to get involved whilst the CSA champions slavery. Believing that either European power would do otherwise is simply wishful thinking on behalf of the Confederacy.


Only in The Western Theatre, is The Countrysiide Vast Enough to Allow an Army to Melt into it, Whiile There a Confederate Army Can Liive Off The Land, Muuch as Sherman Diid in OTL, Furthermore, in The Cities are Rations and Ammunitition that Can Be Stolen By Any Army Bold Enough to Enter, Particularly in Chicago, Whiich at Thiis Time, Not Only has Hundreds of Southern Prisoners of War, But Also a Corps', if Not a Diivision's, Worth of Rations, in The Form of Beef on The Hoof ...


Well the experience of the OTL clearly shows differently. And this is despite the fact that the CSA has zero chance of making it Chicago in the first place. My goodness, even when Sherman opened the door for Hood, in 1864, he got no further than Nashville before having his army slaughtered. And even, through some miracle, they did make it to Chicago, they'd be surrounded & then annihilated. The western Confederacy is then open to invasion, as a result, two years earlier than the OTL. Consequently the ACW is over two years earlier with a Union victory.


However, The Main Reason to Invade Chicago, And Even More So Detroit, is Clandestiine Supply Liinks Can Be Set Up, Under The Guise of Normal Lake Traffic, wiith The British Liikely to Be as Creatiively Incompetent in Stamping them Out, as they Were wiith The Whole CSS Alabama Debacle, Moreover, if Simultaneously a Small Force of Confederates, Can Ensconce themselves in The Woods of Northern Minnesota, Raiding wiith Impunity from The Safety of The Canadian Border, it Puts The British in The Untenable Position, of Choosing, to Intern them, to Forcibly Remove them, or to Defend them, wiith The Last One Serving, to Ultimately Drag The British Government into The War on The Southern Siide, Kiicking and Screaming, if Necessary!


As I said, this CSA army has to get to Chicago first which I give zero chance of taking place. And if they do, the USA army will surround them, starve them out, then force them to capitulate. So kiss goodbye to the main western CSA army leaving the entire western Confederacy open to invasion. Total defeat for the CSA takes place about 12-18 months later juding by what happened from early 1864 onwards.
 
It's really too late for that, even if A.S. Johnston survived. It simply comes down to a numbers game out west. If, however, only one theatre existed, even with superior Union numbers, there's only so many troops the Union could cram onto a battlefield. And as the ANV showed, until the last year of the war, it could hold back the Union with lessor numbers, thanks to the short distances involved. But open the vast regions of the western theatre, & the Union can thus exploit their great advantage in numbers & basically overwhelm the CSA defenders (which is what basically happened). Of course having an idiot like Hood destroy the one & only surviving CSA army out west was far from helpful.

It's only too late because apart from Longstreet and to some degree Kirby-Smith, the Western Theater was was home to some of the greatest morons in military history (broad brush, but difficult to disagree with) after A.S. Johnston's death. The Western Theater had loads of potential, something even Joe Johnston was showing before the micromanager Davis sacked him in favor of General Idiot (Hood).

It was also inevitable that the Western Theater of the war would be opened. One of the major goals of the Union was to secure the Mississippi River. Assuming they could capture New Orleans without the buildup for Shiloh, the Federals would provoke Confederate action in the Western and Trans-Mississippi Theaters in order to secure the Mississippi River. Could it be more favorable for the Confederates if the Union failed to take New Orleans? Maybe. That wouldn't stop them from trying again.
 
The orders Stuart recieved from Lee for the Gettysburg campaign have always seemed to be in doubt. Stuart claimed that Lee's orders were vague and didn't give him any instructions as to what he was supposed to be doing and how often he should keep in contact with Lee while Lee and officers on his staff claim the opposite.

Either Stuart was blinded by pride or Lee just wasn't clear enough as to what he wanted from the Cavalry officer but regardless Stuart wasn't at Gettysburg for a long time.


Nevertheless, Lee's orders to everyone, not just Stuart, where far from the standard from previous campaigns. That much is evident. Lee should have made his orders clear, regardless who said what afterwards, because if they're not then mistakes take place. As far as Stuart understood, his orders were to wage a major raid to act as a diversion, so that the rest of the ANV could move in secret. Now that's a lot different than having orders to conduct a major reconnaissance of the enemy & keep Lee informed of their movements & deployments. And that comes down to the fact that Lee's orders ensured a mistake. Afterall Stuart doesn't have telekinesis. He can only make a judgement call based upon the orders he can read.


And you cant blame Lee for Stuarts actions simply because he was a superior officer. It would be like giving Lincoln credit for everything Grant or Sherman did or blaming him for McClellans uselessness.


You're comparing apples & oranges. Lincoln is an elected civilian to the position of President. Lee is a general in charge of a field army. And you can blame Lincoln for McClellan because he appointed him in the first place. Mind you Lincoln also took the responsibility, of McClellan's mistakes, by sacking him in the end. But it's not, all the same, Lincoln's job to issue detailed orders to all & sundry. Rather he issues strategy decrees, if I may call them that. It's then up to the general of his army to issue direct & clear orders to his subordinates & either then enjoys success or gets the blaim if his army fails.


Stuart was a human being and made his own decisions. Even if Lee's orders were vague then Stuart should have realised that he was irreplacable to the ANV and made an effort to keep in contact himself.

By not doing so he robbed the ANV of it eyes and ears.


He is an army officer & he obeys his orders. That comes first & foremost regardless of his personal feelings. If his orders are vauge, completely unclear, or he interprets them differently to the original intent, because they're poorly written, then don't be surprised if he does something different from that indented. Always issue clear & precise orders - that's officer school 101 before you even get your first pip on your shoulder, even if it was some 18 years ago for me & much of the rest of OCTU has faded with memory... ;)



For the best Generals of the American Civil war my top five looks something like this; Lee, Jackson, Longstreet, Thomas and Sherman So I hold Longstreet in very high regards as far a civil war generals go.


What? No Grant? :eek:


As for the changing Lee's mind...well I suppose that is another incident where Jackson is missed. He Jackson been alive and agreed with Longstreet then Lee would have listened.


I completely agree here.


Lee was not a man to care for his own legend. He was a humble man and only endeavored to do his duty for his home and family, so being caught up in his own legend is not really an option. I would suggest that either, as you said, he was more ill than anyone knew or he was suffering for fatigue from years of almost non stop war.


Well, I wouldn't completely ignore the legend business as success, such as that which Lee enjoyed, can get to one's head after a while. Having said that, I too am more inclined to go with the sickness hypothesis as we do know for a fact that he wasn't overly well, plus he had been injured by a fall from his horse a few weeks before, & he was somewhat shaken at Fredericksburg, if memory serves, from a nearby canon exploding. And yes, there's the fatigue angle as well to consider, which wasn't even considered as an illness in the period in question.



Perhaps this decision of Lee's is a sign of fatigue in the Grey Fox or perhaps he believed that there was no other option than engaging his enemy at Gettysburg. He had been moving north with the intention of threatening the captiol or other northern states but after the first days clash he may have worried that the opportunity to continue north without futher engagement was lost and that he would have to fight at Gettysburg.

Lee no doubt worried about the AOTP's numbers and may have worried that if he began to retreat or even continued his march north then the Union Army would overwealm him and, as Grants army did, gradually wear down his own numbers with a series of conflicts as the campaign went on.



Well don't forget the meeting of the armies at Gettysburg was by chance. Plus he had already turned the ANV around from their northern advance, which got as far as Harrisburg. To hazard a guess, I'd dare say he was heading for a spot to threaten Washington DC. Now whether it was fatigue, or maybe some arrogance (which is what I suspect a tad), we'll never really know, but he was determined to fight there, not only in defiance of Longstreet's advice, but also against his original orders & presumably plans.




But given the ANV's past record against the AOTP Lee would have held out hope that his army could overcome the Union advantages as they had before and manage to defeat them. In the back of his mind there would always be the thought that if he managed to defeat the Union's premier Army in Union territory then it may stir anti-war parties to become more vocal in their opposition and make Lincolns government more unstable than it already was.



Well again this sounds a bit like arrogence on behalf of Lee. He should have known, from his experience at Antietam, that he should have erred on the side of caution which, if he had followed his original orders/plans, may have ensured a completely different outcome for the campaign, wherein a CSA victory could indeed spur on what you've said above.



I want ot get off this Longstreet thing as it is clear we dont share the same point of view about him at Gettysburg and if this continues we will just be going round and round in circles.

To summarise I understand why Longstreet did what he did at Gettysburg but that doesn't mean that I agree with it.


Fair enough.



I didn't mean that Longstreets reputation was stained directly after Gettysburg but it was stained because of his attitude at Gettysburg. For over 100 years Longstreet was the focus of the blame for the Confederate loss. Ewell and Early used his conflict with Lee and dissagreeable mood to lay almost all the blame on his shoulders.

With Stuart dead Longstreet was the main target for the post-war citicsism of Gettysburg.

Lee never has had his reputation stained because of Gettysburg. He remains to this day one of the most celebrated Generals in histroy and perhaps the most celebrated General in American history along with Jackson and Washington while Longstreet enjoyed a reputation as the most controversial general of the Civil War.


Well, to be honest, this blaiming (or call it what you will) of Longstreet for Gettysburg is actually news to me. If anything, it's Pickett who often gets the blaim, especially from members/commentators of the general public as well as historians. In turn, Pickett had always blaimed Lee for getting his division killed & not Longstreet (granted the two were close friends). But far more importantly was Lee's reaction. Immediately afterwards, as I'm sure you know, he rode out to the retreating troops & proclaimed to the all that it was his fault. Furthermore, when the army got back to Virginia, Lee offered his resignation to Davis, again claiming it was all Lee's fault. So again I can't see how Longstreet cops the blaim.


However before Jacksons death and before Gettysburg the ANV didn't have to face the full bulk of the Union numbers. When Grant came east he got a bloody nose from Lee and decided that he couldn't beat Lee in open battle so instead he would beat him in a war of attrition.

Lee lost most of the battles after Jackson death, with the exception perhaps of Gettysburg, because he was totally outnumbered and was quickly running out of supplies, ammunition and men.


Well, in truth, the ANV hardly ever had to face the full weight of the AOP. During Grant's drive on Richmond/Petersurg, XXIInd corps was always based in Washington. Then you had Sheridan chasing Early throughout the Shennandoah with three infantry corps & a cavalry corps. Hooker's corps, meanwhile, was deployed out west along with other reinforcements for Sherman. Yet, even with superior numbers, Grant's offensive was always in trouble, & if Jackson was still around, the first major battle in the Wilderness would have ended up in a rout of the AOP akin to so many times before. Lee on this occasion, however, didn't have a general like Jackson to take advantage of Grant's right flank which had been smashed. And Cold Harbor, if Grant had made it that far, could have ensured the end of Grant let alone the AOP if Jackson was still around.


I doubt even with Jackson there that the ANV would have been able to over turn those odds. In fact I doubt that had the ANV had Wellington, Napoleon, Lee and Jackson that they would have been able to triumph against the Union after Gettysburg.


Now I will agree here, but Union victory won't come about thanks to the stalemate which would probably occur on the eastern theatre. It'll come about, as it really did anyway in the OTL, through Union success in the western theatre. So whilst the ANV & AOP are locked in a death struggle, Sherman bascially burns the CSA to the ground, then marches on the rear of the ANV from North Carolina. The ACW probably lasts 6 months longer than the OTL.
 
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It's only too late because apart from Longstreet and to some degree Kirby-Smith, the Western Theater was was home to some of the greatest morons in military history (broad brush, but difficult to disagree with) after A.S. Johnston's death. The Western Theater had loads of potential, something even Joe Johnston was showing before the micromanager Davis sacked him in favor of General Idiot (Hood).


No arguement from me here. And don't forget Bragg was the worst of all. Add Polk to the list too for starting it all off. After Longstreet, Joe was the best as he understood the only option in 1864 was to conduct a fighting withdrawal & wait for a chance for a mistake from Sherman. In fact it happened once, but Sherman's defeat wasn't strong enough.


It was also inevitable that the Western Theater of the war would be opened. One of the major goals of the Union was to secure the Mississippi River. Assuming they could capture New Orleans without the buildup for Shiloh, the Federals would provoke Confederate action in the Western and Trans-Mississippi Theaters in order to secure the Mississippi River. Could it be more favorable for the Confederates if the Union failed to take New Orleans? Maybe. That wouldn't stop them from trying again.


I'm far from convinced that the western theatre, one that's a repeat of the OTL, is inevitable. Instead it becomes a small affair in Missouri & Arkansas. A Union invasion of Kentucky is very unlikely as Linolin was completely against it. Oddly enough, Davis wasn't keen on the idea either. Consequently, Union operations to control the Mississippi become immeasurably harder. Tennessee holds out for the most part, Vicksburg never falls, there is no Battle of Shiloh hence New Orleans doesn't fall as its garrison remains to defend the town, & Sherman never gets the chance to march on Atlanta nor to conduct his March to the Sea. Thus the dynamics of the ACW change completely. Lee, with far more reserves avaliable in both men & equipment, should have little trouble holding back the AOP.
 
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The confederates could have won the battle by doing what the Union did... getting to all the high ground first and then holding it in the face of Union attacks... this assumes that the Union would attack the high ground as Lee did... he wasn't at his best at Gettysburg...

Meade say THANK YOU! and moves his army so it blocks all roads leading south and then continue to surround Lee and force him to either attack Meade from his position to break out or surrender
 
This is of course assuming that Lee would have allowed Meade to surround him. Lee was no fool. He would always leave room for escape if he had any say in the matter.

Also the political situation at the time has to be judged. Yes Grant was winning his Vicksburg campaign at the time but that took a back seat to the fact that the Army of Northern Virginia had invaded the north and were threatening the Capitol. The north would watch the Union generals movements against Lee carefully and criticise anything they deemed wrong.

The Union government was in no position at the time to allow Meade to lay seige to Lee, nor ((destroying my own theory)) to withdrawal. Meade would have to attack. Just like Burnside at Fredericksburg Meade had no choice but to defeat Lee or be removed.

The battle of Gettysburg was decided by who took and held the hieghts. In the OTL Meade held the hieghts and Lee's forces failed to gain ground against them ((due mainly to poor co-ordination between the Generals)). Had Lee gotten the heights first then Meade would have spent the rest of the battle trying to get them away from Lee.

I dont think Meade would have charged 15000 men like Lee did over a open field in a way that almost never works
 
Nevertheless, Lee's orders to everyone, not just Stuart, where far from the standard from previous campaigns. That much is evident. Lee should have made his orders clear, regardless who said what afterwards, because if they're not then mistakes take place. As far as Stuart understood, his orders were to wage a major raid to act as a diversion, so that the rest of the ANV could move in secret. Now that's a lot different than having orders to conduct a major reconnaissance of the enemy & keep Lee informed of their movements & deployments. And that comes down to the fact that Lee's orders ensured a mistake. Afterall Stuart doesn't have telekinesis. He can only make a judgement call based upon the orders he can read.

So both Lee and Stuart must share some of the blame for Stuarts absence. Lee for not being clear enough in what he wanted and Stuart for running off and leaving the ANV blind.

You're comparing apples & oranges. Lincoln is an elected civilian to the position of President. Lee is a general in charge of a field army. And you can blame Lincoln for McClellan because he appointed him in the first place. Mind you Lincoln also took the responsibility, of McClellan's mistakes, by sacking him in the end. But it's not, all the same, Lincoln's job to issue detailed orders to all & sundry. Rather he issues strategy decrees, if I may call them that. It's then up to the general of his army to issue direct & clear orders to his subordinates & either then enjoys success or gets the blaim if his army fails.

And yet Lincoln was the commander in chief of the Union forces, as Lee eventually became for the CSA, and a lot of the responsibility of the eastern theatre ((as the West is often overlooked in referance to Lincoln except for a few moments)) falls on his shoulders.

As for McClellan, well Lincoln could not have been expected to know that the general who much of the north called the Young Napoleon early in the war would prove to be as bad a general as he was. I wouldn't blame Lincoln for McClellan as Little Mac deserves all the blame to fall on his own shoulders.

What? No Grant? :eek:

Nope, no Grant. I judge my list on whether or not the generals in question would have done as well had the roles been reversed. Sort of if Lee, Jackson and Longstreet had the Union advantages and Thomas, Sherman or Grant were in the Confederate position.

Lee and Jackson without a doubt would have done much better than the Union generals had they had the Union advantages. With the men and supplies they would have had they could have ended the war quite quickly.

Longstreet similarly would have been able to showcase his genius properly had he had the numbers and supplies that the Union force did.

Sherman had good grasp of tactics and strategy and was fully prepared to take the war to any of the people opposing him, no matter what he had to do or the concequences that came from his actions. While I dont personnaly like Sherman there is no denying his ability.

Thomas I concider to be the best Union general. He was excedingly good at man-management, very good at organising his supplies and had an very good grasp of strategy and tactics. What is more Thomas not only stemmed the tide of the Union rout at Chickamauga he destroyed a Confederate army completely Nashville, which regardless of whether or not he face Hood is impressive. I think had Thomas ever faced Grant or Sherman in battle he would have won.

Grant however relied heavily on his superior numbers to gain victory. You could point to the Vicksburg campaign as the one that showed Grants genius however I would lay his victory more on the fact that Pendleton and Joe Johnston were not up to facing him. He may have been one of the better generals of the Civil War but he wasn't really one of the best, he just happened to be in the right place at the right time. I believe that had Grant been moved east instead of Pope then Grant would have been defeated like Pope and buried in the history books just like Pope is.

Well don't forget the meeting of the armies at Gettysburg was by chance. Plus he had already turned the ANV around from their northern advance, which got as far as Harrisburg. To hazard a guess, I'd dare say he was heading for a spot to threaten Washington DC. Now whether it was fatigue, or maybe some arrogance (which is what I suspect a tad), we'll never really know, but he was determined to fight there, not only in defiance of Longstreet's advice, but also against his original orders & presumably plans.

Actually his army only got close to Harrisburg. Ewell, who was closest to Harrisburg, was ordered to move to Gettysburg when the initial clashes began.

As I said after the initial conflict Lee may have believed that he had no choice but to fight there. As we know now he could have left Gettysburg without many problems and remained a treat in Pennsylvania for a bit longer but Lee didn't know that at the time. He didn't know where all the Union forces were or how many men they had and that was something Lee normally worried about.

Well again this sounds a bit like arrogence on behalf of Lee. He should have known, from his experience at Antietam, that he should have erred on the side of caution which, if he had followed his original orders/plans, may have ensured a completely different outcome for the campaign, wherein a CSA victory could indeed spur on what you've said above.

Perhaps it was a bit of arrogence from Lee however with the intelligence he recieved throughout the battle he would have believed that victory was posible. It just didn't help that the intelligence was wrong.

Well, to be honest, this blaiming (or call it what you will) of Longstreet for Gettysburg is actually news to me. If anything, it's Pickett who often gets the blaim, especially from members/commentators of the general public as well as historians. In turn, Pickett had always blaimed Lee for getting his division killed & not Longstreet (granted the two were close friends). But far more importantly was Lee's reaction. Immediately afterwards, as I'm sure you know, he rode out to the retreating troops & proclaimed to the all that it was his fault. Furthermore, when the army got back to Virginia, Lee offered his resignation to Davis, again claiming it was all Lee's fault. So again I can't see how Longstreet cops the blaim.

You may be familiar with the Lost Cause movement. In this movement Longstreet bore the brunt of the attack from former Confederate generals, mostly Early, and Longstreet reputation was dragged through the mud repeatedly for a long time after that.

That is why Longstreet got the blame leveled on his shoulders.

I do indeed know of Lee's reaction and his reaction to the Gettysburg loss is no doubt the reason his reputation survived the battle. If he had gone blaming Longstreet or Stuart or anyone else his reputation would have been destroyed but Lee accepted full responsibility for the Gettysburg loss and did try to resign but Davis did not accept his resignation, as you said.

Well, in truth, the ANV hardly ever had to face the full weight of the AOP. During Grant's drive on Richmond/Petersurg, XXIInd corps was always based in Washington. Then you had Sheridan chasing Early throughout the Shennandoah with three infantry corps & a cavalry corps. Hooker's corps, meanwhile, was deployed out west along with other reinforcements for Sherman. Yet, even with superior numbers, Grant's offensive was always in trouble, & if Jackson was still around, the first major battle in the Wilderness would have ended up in a rout of the AOP akin to so many times before. Lee on this occasion, however, didn't have a general like Jackson to take advantage of Grant's right flank which had been smashed. And Cold Harbor, if Grant had made it that far, could have ensured the end of Grant let alone the AOP if Jackson was still around.

Yet Lee's forces were facing an army of almost double their numbers. An army that was far better supplied than his own and didn't face the ANV's problem of desertion.

I will admit that had Jackson been alive at that time then Grant would have suffered more defeats than he did in the east however it would only be a minor set back for the superior Union forces.

Now I will agree here, but Union victory won't come about thanks to the stalemate which would probably occur on the eastern theatre. It'll come about, as it really did anyway in the OTL, through Union success in the western theatre. So whilst the ANV & AOP are locked in a death struggle, Sherman bascially burns the CSA to the ground, then marches on the rear of the ANV from North Carolina. The ACW probably lasts 6 months longer than the OTL.

Your right that the west would still be the key to Union Victory.

Though actually, having thought it through, if the CSA had Wellington and Napoleon they would have been employed in the west in place of Hood and Johnston and Thomas wouldn't have been able to gain victory and Shermans march to the sea would have been halted.
 
I dont think Meade would have charged 15000 men like Lee did over a open field in a way that almost never works

However had Meade lost the height he would have to try and remove Lee from them. The problem for Meade however would have been the politicians in Washington demanding him to take action against Lee. He would either be forced into an attack or withdrawal.

As Lee's army proved Gettysburg was an extremely good natural defensive area and favored the army on the heights in almost every situation.

Whether or not Meade would have tried a large scale infantry assault against an entrenched Lee I do not know but he would have to have tried something either at Gettysburg, if he chose to fight there, or at another battle field.
 
So both Lee and Stuart must share some of the blame for Stuarts absence. Lee for not being clear enough in what he wanted and Stuart for running off and leaving the ANV blind.



I'll agree here, although Lee should have made it clear, considering the vital importance of Stuart's mission in this campaign, what he wanted from Stuart in his orders.



And yet Lincoln was the commander in chief of the Union forces, as Lee eventually became for the CSA, and a lot of the responsibility of the eastern theatre ((as the West is often overlooked in referance to Lincoln except for a few moments)) falls on his shoulders.


Nevertheless Lincoln isn't a professional soldier. He doesn't directly control an army in a battle or even during a campaign. That's Lee's job. Thus they have different roles to play & thus different duties to attend.


As for McClellan, well Lincoln could not have been expected to know that the general who much of the north called the Young Napoleon early in the war would prove to be as bad a general as he was. I wouldn't blame Lincoln for McClellan as Little Mac deserves all the blame to fall on his own shoulders.


Yet it soon became obvious that McCellan was no Napoleon. He ignored requests, even orders, from the President to get into action. He basically sat on hs butt & moaned & moaned he didn't have enough this, that, or something else. Grant, at the same time, got on with his job & was thankful for whatever he got, then made the most out of his opportunities & troops. It was only when Lincoln was getting ready to sack him, that McCellan finally did something. So the warning signs were appearing long before Fair Oaks. But more importantly, in the end, Lincoln sacked him & moved onto another general. And kept on moving on until he got to competent ones.



Nope, no Grant. I judge my list on whether or not the generals in question would have done as well had the roles been reversed. Sort of if Lee, Jackson and Longstreet had the Union advantages and Thomas, Sherman or Grant were in the Confederate position.


I'm sure you're just winding me up about Grant... :D


Lee and Jackson without a doubt would have done much better than the Union generals had they had the Union advantages. With the men and supplies they would have had they could have ended the war quite quickly.

Longstreet similarly would have been able to showcase his genius properly had he had the numbers and supplies that the Union force did.


Yet they would have been hamstrung by all the incompetent underlings in the AOP in the first years of the war. So they may not have gained the same high regard as you may think.


Sherman had good grasp of tactics and strategy and was fully prepared to take the war to any of the people opposing him, no matter what he had to do or the concequences that came from his actions. While I dont personnaly like Sherman there is no denying his ability.


Actually Sherman had a mixed war in regards to true success. Yes he was competent at First Manassas, then they locked him up because he went nuts, & the debacle of the Union's first day at Shiloh rests solely with Sherman. He, though, learnt from his mistakes & Grant was prepared to give him a second chance. Still, Sherman's attack at Kennesaw Mountain (1864) was a blunder.


Thomas I concider to be the best Union general. He was excedingly good at man-management, very good at organising his supplies and had an very good grasp of strategy and tactics. What is more Thomas not only stemmed the tide of the Union rout at Chickamauga he destroyed a Confederate army completely Nashville, which regardless of whether or not he face Hood is impressive. I think had Thomas ever faced Grant or Sherman in battle he would have won.


Thomas was good, but he wasn't the Union's best. Yes he was the Rock of Chickamauga, but he was able to do so thanks to the prepositioning of Granger's Union Reserve Corps & then Granger using his own initiative in supporting Thomas' position on the second day. In doing so he ensured that Thomas had enough to conduct his famous rearguard stand. But it wasn't necessarily all thanks to Thomas. More to the point, Thomas forgot to order his US Regulars Brigade (King's 3rd Brigade/1st Div) to withdraw. In doing so Thomas ensured their annihilation. The next thing is, Thomas' famous victory at Nashville was all thanks to the Union victory at Franklin - a battle which Thomas had no influence over whatsoever.


Grant however relied heavily on his superior numbers to gain victory. You could point to the Vicksburg campaign as the one that showed Grants genius however I would lay his victory more on the fact that Pendleton and Joe Johnston were not up to facing him. He may have been one of the better generals of the Civil War but he wasn't really one of the best, he just happened to be in the right place at the right time. I believe that had Grant been moved east instead of Pope then Grant would have been defeated like Pope and buried in the history books just like Pope is.


Every Union general relied on superior numbers for victory. Yet no other union general has such a long list of victories as Grant. Vicksburg is merely one of them. There's also Fort McHenry & Fort Donaldson - both won whilst no other Union general was winning such important battles. Then he snatched victory from defeat at Shiloh, again whilst the more fancy Union generals were lossing. And again there's Chattanooga in 1863, which was the battle that more or less ended hopes for a CSA victory in the western theatre. And all this before he ventured east to defeat Lee in the only way Lee could have been defeated. But the fundamental strength of Grant was he didn't scare. And he was also prepared to slug it out for weeks on end, as he did in the OTL, although he'd rather have a battle of manoeuvre anyday I'm sure. He is by far the best Union general.



Actually his army only got close to Harrisburg. Ewell, who was closest to Harrisburg, was ordered to move to Gettysburg when the initial clashes began.


It got close enough to Harrisburg to identify that location. Otherwise I don't see the point of pedantically saying it got some 2 miles or so to the south of Harrisburg before turning towards the south-west... :rolleyes:


As I said after the initial conflict Lee may have believed that he had no choice but to fight there. As we know now he could have left Gettysburg without many problems and remained a treat in Pennsylvania for a bit longer but Lee didn't know that at the time. He didn't know where all the Union forces were or how many men they had and that was something Lee normally worried about.


I can't see how he had no choice when an entire corps wasn't even at the battlefield on the day in question & he had little knowledge as to where the rest of the AOP was either. Plus, as I've said before, his orders to the army were to avoid any major engagement until the ANV had concentrated together. Now on 1 July that certainly wasn't the case. Ewell's corps was heading south from Carlisle, where it had stayed on the 29 June, although Early's Div was coming back from a raid in York, which spread Ewell's corps out even more; Hill's corps was just to the north-west of Gettysburg; whilst Longstreet's corps was back past Cashtown. That is far from great deployments of major units, if one is considering fighting a major action against an army which is even larger than yours.



Perhaps it was a bit of arrogence from Lee however with the intelligence he recieved throughout the battle he would have believed that victory was posible. It just didn't help that the intelligence was wrong.


Actually he didn't receive much intelligence at all, but that which he did, as you point out, wasn't too good.



You may be familiar with the Lost Cause movement. In this movement Longstreet bore the brunt of the attack from former Confederate generals, mostly Early, and Longstreet reputation was dragged through the mud repeatedly for a long time after that.

That is why Longstreet got the blame leveled on his shoulders.


Oh I don't take any notice of that bunch of morons for an accurate historical analysis of Longstreet's behaviour at Gettysburg. More to the point, the real reason why they attacked Longstreet was for political recriminations after the ACW, where Pete had joined the Republican Party in 1868, then supported Grant's Presidential campaign, not to mention his Administration. Then Longstreet went on to work for Grant as a general of the Union militia in Louisiana. In truth Gettysburg had nothing to do with it - it was just the excuse they used in order to attack Longstreet.


I do indeed know of Lee's reaction and his reaction to the Gettysburg loss is no doubt the reason his reputation survived the battle. If he had gone blaming Longstreet or Stuart or anyone else his reputation would have been destroyed but Lee accepted full responsibility for the Gettysburg loss and did try to resign but Davis did not accept his resignation, as you said.


Which indicates Lee knew what really happened, regardless what Ewell, Early, & company argued otherwise after the war which, as I've just said above, had nothing to do with Gettysburg.



Yet Lee's forces were facing an army of almost double their numbers. An army that was far better supplied than his own and didn't face the ANV's problem of desertion.


Which again wasn't overly new in the experience of the ANV.


I will admit that had Jackson been alive at that time then Grant would have suffered more defeats than he did in the east however it would only be a minor set back for the superior Union forces.


Depends how bad the defeat is. Afterall if another Chancellorsville takes place, even Grant maybe forced to withdraw & think again. And in 1864, time does start to become even a factor for Lincoln if there aren't any battlefield successes.



Your right that the west would still be the key to Union Victory.


Especially if Grant is making no headway in the east. Whether it's enough to save Lincoln's Presaidency is, though, an interesting issue. So what if Lincoln loses the election, Grant is in stalemate, yet Sherman is burning the CSA to the ground, has reached Savannah & has begun his march into South Carolina - does President elect McClellan continue or send out peace initiatives regardless that the USA may win the war in mid to late 1865?


Though actually, having thought it through, if the CSA had Wellington and Napoleon they would have been employed in the west in place of Hood and Johnston and Thomas wouldn't have been able to gain victory and Shermans march to the sea would have been halted.


Wellington is too slow. Sherman will outflank him easily. And it depends which part of Napoleon's career we're talking. Afterall his latter years weren't all that flash... ;)
 
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Let's not forget that if Kentucky had remained neutral courtesy of Polk being elsewhere that might have left US forces under Grant opening up a different front into Arkansas and south, which the CSA would have found even harder to hold. By 1862 Arkansas and Louisiana might already have fallen and and advance along the Gulf Coast well underway.
 
Let's not forget that if Kentucky had remained neutral courtesy of Polk being elsewhere that might have left US forces under Grant opening up a different front into Arkansas and south, which the CSA would have found even harder to hold. By 1862 Arkansas and Louisiana might already have fallen and and advance along the Gulf Coast well underway.


1862 is way too early for this to be achieved as Grant would be too busy fighting the Missouri civil war taking place within the American civil war. So that has to be quelled before any adventures into Arkansas can begin which, in the OTL, was pretty much able to hold on with minimal help. Now, although here more emphasis may indeed be placed on Union designs over Arkansas, the entire western theatre will be limited to a front of about 300 miles instead of about 1 000 miles. That makes, in itself, a lot easier to defend as a consequence for the CSA.

On the other hand, for the Union, they'll be operating at the end of very long supply lines, which at any moment could be threatened by Reb partisans still operating in Missouri. Meanwhile, the Reb defenders in Arkansas can get immediate help from Texas, not to mention a lot of help from Tennessee which hasn't got to deal with fighting a losing battle on their own territory. And last, but not least, considering A.S. Johnston hasn't been bumped off at Shiloh, he'll be alive to make life very difficult for any Union invasion of Arkansas.

Consequently, any Union invasion of Arkansas could get bogged down in Arkansas, & we could see a lot of advances & withdrawals, akin to the first few years of the eastern theatre for the duration of the war.
 
I'm sure you're just winding me up about Grant...:D

Nope. I find Grant to be very over rated... :D

Yet they would have been hamstrung by all the incompetent underlings in the AOP in the first years of the war. So they may not have gained the same high regard as you may think.

They have been hampered by incompetent underlings however it is unlikely as I would imagine that Lee, as he did in the OTL, would restructure his army after the first few engagements to remove general he believed to be the worst of the bunch and put men he believed he could trust in higher positions. Hence Jackson and Longstreet rise to prominence in the ANV.


Actually Sherman had a mixed war in regards to true success. Yes he was competent at First Manassas, then they locked him up because he went nuts, & the debacle of the Union's first day at Shiloh rests solely with Sherman. He, though, learnt from his mistakes & Grant was prepared to give him a second chance. Still, Sherman's attack at KennesawMountain (1864) was a blunder.

I would still consider Sherman to be an extremely talented general, regardless of his mistakes, after all every general makes mistakes it is whether they can come back from those mistakes that shows their class.


Thomas was good, but he wasn't the Union's best. Yes he was the Rock of Chickamauga, but he was able to do so thanks to the prepositioning of Granger's Union Reserve Corps & then Granger using his own initiative in supporting Thomas' position on the second day. In doing so he ensured that Thomas had enough to conduct his famous rearguard stand. But it wasn't necessarily all thanks to Thomas. More to the point, Thomas forgot to order his US Regulars Brigade (King's 3rd Brigade/1st Div) to withdraw. In doing so Thomas ensured their annihilation. The next thing is, Thomas' famous victory at Nashville was all thanks to the Union victory at Franklin - a battle which Thomas had no influence over whatsoever.

My decision of calling Thomas the best general of the Union may be more through my own personal feelings than his achievements, though I consider Sherman better than Grant and Thomas better than Sherman regardless. Thomas happened to be a general that wasn't involve in political aspects of the job or the publicity aspects of it and thus his rise to prominence was slower that Grant or Sherman’s but, all in all, he was very competent as a commander and didn’t seem to have the personal problems that the other two had. Also he had a poor relationship with Grant which stand him in good stead with me as I dislike Grant with and even greater intensity that I dislike Sherman or Robert the Bruce or Bonnie Prince Charlie, who are amongst my most disliked historical figures.


EveryUnion general relied on superior numbers for victory. Yet no other union general has such a long list of victories as Grant. Vicksburg is merely one of them. There's also Fort McHenry & Fort Donaldson - both won whilst no other Union general was winning such important battles. Then he snatched victory from defeat at Shiloh, again whilst the more fancy Union generals were lossing. And again there's Chattanooga in 1863, which was the battle that more or less ended hopes for a CSA victory in the western theatre. And all this before he ventured east to defeat Lee in the only way Lee could have been defeated. But the fundamental strength of Grant was he didn't scare. And he was also prepared to slug it out for weeks on end, as he did in the OTL, although he'd rather have a battle of manoeuvre anyday I'm sure. He is by far the best Union general.

Again the decision about Grant is partly made on my own personal feelings toward him.

Grant was a man who was in the right place at the right time. Had he been in the east he would not have rose to the great heights of fame that he did. He did have a stubborn attitude that allowed him to rally his troops but Shiloh was only a Union Victory because after Johnston died Beauregard failed to capitalize of Johnston’s early success and again I consider the Vicksburg campaign to be more of a victory cause by the poor CSA generals than Grants genius.

The question I will pose to you is could Grant have gotten half the amount of victories against the Confederates had he had the same amount or similar numbers to his opponent?


It got close enough to Harrisburg to identify that location. Otherwise I don't see the point of pedantically saying it got some 2 miles or so to the south of Harrisburg before turning towards the south-west...:rolleyes:

There was a point to it. Had the Confederates been able to enter the Pennsylvania state capitol then no doubt they would have lost more men in the process meaning that they would have less men for Gettysburg. They may have been able to get a few more supplies but that would hardly make up the loss of men.


I can't see how he had no choice when an entire corps wasn't even at the battlefield on the day in question & he had little knowledge as to where the rest of the AOP was either. Plus, as I've said before, his orders to the army were to avoid any major engagement until the ANV had concentrated together. Now on 1 July that certainly wasn't the case. Ewell's corps was heading south from Carlisle, where it had stayed on the 29 June, although Early's Div was coming back from a raid in York, which spread Ewell's corps out even more; Hill's corps was just to the north-west of Gettysburg; whilst Longstreet's corps was back past Cashtown. That is far from great deployments of major units, if one is considering fighting a major action against an army which is even larger than yours.

If you look I said Lee may have believed, LEE not me. I know that there was an alternative to fighting at Gettysburg but Lee, fatigued or ill as he may have been, may not have seen an alternative.


Actually he didn't receive much intelligence at all, but that which he did, as you point out, wasn't too good.

The whole plan for Longstreet’s attack was based on that faulty intelligence. He Lee known accurately where the Union flank was before he had deployed Longstreet corps then he would have ordered Longstreet to attack further right and perhaps he would have been more inclined to believe Longstreet's reports and trust his judgment.


Oh I don't take any notice of that bunch of morons for an accurate historical analysis of Longstreet's behaviour at Gettysburg. More to the point, the real reason why they attacked Longstreet was for political recriminations after the ACW, where Pete had joined the Republican Party in 1868, then supported Grant's Presidential campaign, not to mention his Administration. Then Longstreet went on to work for Grant as a general of the Union militia in Louisiana. In truth Gettysburg had nothing to do with it - it was just the excuse they used in order to attack Longstreet.

I didn't say it was accurate I just said that was the cause of Longstreets damnation. And Grants response to the Lost Cause movement only enforced its power.

Which indicates Lee knew what really happened, regardless what Ewell, Early, & company argued otherwise after the war which, as I've just said above, had nothing to do with Gettysburg.

Of course Lee knew what really happened. He had been a soldier for most of his life so surely he knew whose shoulders the blame should fall on and Lee was not the type of man to shirk his responsibility in regards to such things.

Which again wasn't overly new in the experience of the ANV.

But the fact was felt more as the war drew to a close as more men deserted and supplies lessened and the Union forces grew.

Depends how bad the defeat is. Afterall if another Chancellorsville takes place, even Grant maybe forced to withdraw & think again. And in 1864, time does start to become even a factor for Lincoln if there aren't any battlefield successes.

There wouldn’t be another significant Confederate victory at this time. Gettysburg and Vicksburg effectively killed the confederate cause. It wouldn't matter if Jackson was there to give the Union forces a few scare or not the Union could simply regroup and send in more men as the Confederate forces got smaller and smaller.


Especially if Grant is making no headway in the east. Whether it's enough to save Lincoln's Presaidency is, though, an interesting issue. So what if Lincoln loses the election, Grant is in stalemate, yet Sherman is burning the CSA to the ground, has reached Savannah & has begun his march into South Carolina - does President elect McClellan continue or send out peace initiatives regardless that the USA may win the war in mid to late 1865?

It is hard to see McClellan, such a man that he was, being willing to give the CSA peace and freedom at this late stage in the war. He would allow Grant, Sherman and Thomas to crush the Confederate forces then he would would triumphantly ride through Richmond and proclaim a Union victory then have everyone in the future know that it was simply because of McClellan that Union victory was possible.


Wellington is too slow. Sherman will outflank him easily. And it depends which part of Napoleon's career we're talking. Afterall his latter years weren't all that flash...

It would have to be Napoleon before the Russian campaign and definitely before he fought Wellington otherwise he isn't really much use in this sort of situation. Though really he would be more suited for the Union given his preference for large numbers.

I defy you to find a moment in his career that Wellington ever lost a defensive battle. Wellington was arguably the best general of the 1800's, contested closely with Napoleon. Being the well rounded General that he was he would be more than a match for Sherman, though he would be annoyed that Sherman didn't leave the civilian population out of it. Wellington tended to dictate the battle before him and would rarely be caught out by his enemy so Sherman, whose basic plan was to march straight to the coast, would not have caught Wellington unprepared.
 
heres my theory on how the confederacy wins at gettysburg....first we've got to go back a few months before gettysburg and jackson miraculously doesnt get hit during his fated night patrol or only gets superficial wounds and ends up missing the rest of the battle but recovers in time to lead his men during the invasion of the north. jackson in charge of his units captures the heights beyond gettysburg and gets his best artillery units entrenched on the heights (during the battle the federals would need buckets to catch the lead). the army of northern virginia entrenched on high ground in northern territory scares the hell out of union officials (confederates on northern soil scarred the north during the war) and lincoln orders meade to attack and he carries out his orders and just like at fredricksburg northern units are cut to shreads during the first two days of battle destroying more than 2/3rds of the army of the potomac, despite this fact lincoln orders meade to attack again and in so dutifully carrying out said orders the last remnants of the army of the potomac is captured or destroyed. gettysburg is a major confederate victory on northern soil, jackson goes to lee and recommends spliting the army (sending 1/3 of the ANV under longstreet back south with captured munitions and the shattered and surrendered units back south, 1/3 under jackson goes north as a recon in force to liberate confederate pows at elmyra aka hellmyra and raiding northern supply depots before turning south to move through kentucky and using stuart's cavalry to great effect to disrupt federal supply trains throughout kentucky and tennessee (gaining new recruits along the way through kentucky and into tennessee), the last 1/3 of the ANV under lee heads from gettysburg into kentucky, hooking up with confederate partisan units in the area lee moves south through kentucky and into tennessee skirting around nashville to the east where he links up with jackson (telegrams have been sent to president davis of the confederate victory at gettysburg and further plans of helping in the west, and a telegram is sent to longstreet ordering his part of the army to march south into the carolinas to aid confederate units there in pushing back federal troops after sending the shattered remnants of the army of the potomac to prison camps. lee and jackson's forces link up with the confederate army of tennessee where lee takes command of the combined armies and marches towards vicksburg to liberate the starving city (which having heard the news of confederate victory at gettysburg stick it out until help arrives), lee uses forrest's and stuart's combined cavalry to mask the combined army's movements and to raid federal supplies to capture as much ordinance, food, munitions and weapons as possible to replenish confederate supplies. the combined confederate army attacks and destroys grant's forces (grant was dug in on one side with his rear exposed and high ground surrounded him) from behind and allows fresh supplies to flow into vicksburg relieving the beliegured city as grant and the remnants of his army are marched away into pow camps. then a combined task force under jackson and clebourne taking half of the combined confederate armies of tennessee and northern virginia north to cross the mississippi and link up with a part of the confederate army of trans-mississippi moving south to encounter sherman's army and uses part of the combined cavalry units of forrest and stuart to screen his advance and pins sherman's siege troops against the river surrounding them while lee's artillery units fresh with artillery liberated from grant's shattered troops opens up on sherman's troops with deadly effect across the river using the combined pressure of jackson and lee's forces from both sides causes sherman and his men to surrender, sending more union troops to prison camps with new supplies freshly liberated from sherman's troops jackson marches his part of the army with clebourne and part of the army of tennessee south to liberate louisiana and new orleans. during this interviening time confederate delagates in britain and france show the confederacy has staying power having shattered one army at gettysburg and a large part of another at vicksburg, both britain and france move to recognize the confederate states as its own independant nation and order a combined british/french naval task force to break the blockade (they had condemned the blockade since the begining).

jackson's forces move north from new orleans having beaten the occupying forces of new orleans, to intercept federal units in the trans-mississippi's theater of operations destroying said units in detail before taking his combined task force of the ANV, confederate army of tennessee and part of trans-mississippi back across and into vicksburg meeting up with lee. where jackson discusses with lee the possibility of jackson and his task force liberating the rest of tennessee while lee marches east to deal with federal troops in florida and the carolinas. the union in disarry calls for peace. lincoln looses reelection and is known to history as the man who lost the war of northern agression
 
People love to blame Stuart for the loss at Gettysburg. Yes, having Stuart's force on hand would have helped - every rebel soldier was precious - but Lee had plenty of cavalry on hand to use for gathering intelligence. He simply didn't use them properly.
 
We had a thread on Gettysburg recently. The short answer is that the Confederates destroying the Army of the Potomac would have been implausible to say the least, and their ability to follow up on it nil. Washington was stil heavily defended, and the Confederates lacked the ability to sustain a campaign in Union Territory.
The most likely result would have been the same as OTL, the Confederates withdrawing to recuperate after the mauling they certainly would have received whether they lost or won. The political debate would have intensified, but I'm not sure anything would have ultimately turned out differently.
A Confederate victory with a POD after 1861 is nearly as implausible as a successful Operation Sea Lion. The only hope they had was to drag the war out long enough to force a political solution.
That is victory I suppose.
 
heres my theory on how the confederacy wins at gettysburg....first we've got to go back a few months before gettysburg and jackson miraculously doesnt get hit during his fated night patrol or only gets superficial wounds and ends up missing the rest of the battle but recovers in time to lead his men during the invasion of the north. jackson in charge of his units captures the heights beyond gettysburg and gets his best artillery units entrenched on the heights (during the battle the federals would need buckets to catch the lead). the army of northern virginia entrenched on high ground in northern territory scares the hell out of union officials (confederates on northern soil scarred the north during the war) and lincoln orders meade to attack and he carries out his orders and just like at fredricksburg northern units are cut to shreads during the first two days of battle destroying more than 2/3rds of the army of the potomac, despite this fact lincoln orders meade to attack again and in so dutifully carrying out said orders the last remnants of the army of the potomac is captured or destroyed. gettysburg is a major confederate victory on northern soil, jackson goes to lee and recommends spliting the army (sending 1/3 of the ANV under longstreet back south with captured munitions and the shattered and surrendered units back south, 1/3 under jackson goes north as a recon in force to liberate confederate pows at elmyra aka hellmyra and raiding northern supply depots before turning south to move through kentucky and using stuart's cavalry to great effect to disrupt federal supply trains throughout kentucky and tennessee (gaining new recruits along the way through kentucky and into tennessee), the last 1/3 of the ANV under lee heads from gettysburg into kentucky, hooking up with confederate partisan units in the area lee moves south through kentucky and into tennessee skirting around nashville to the east where he links up with jackson (telegrams have been sent to president davis of the confederate victory at gettysburg and further plans of helping in the west, and a telegram is sent to longstreet ordering his part of the army to march south into the carolinas to aid confederate units there in pushing back federal troops after sending the shattered remnants of the army of the potomac to prison camps. lee and jackson's forces link up with the confederate army of tennessee where lee takes command of the combined armies and marches towards vicksburg to liberate the starving city (which having heard the news of confederate victory at gettysburg stick it out until help arrives), lee uses forrest's and stuart's combined cavalry to mask the combined army's movements and to raid federal supplies to capture as much ordinance, food, munitions and weapons as possible to replenish confederate supplies. the combined confederate army attacks and destroys grant's forces (grant was dug in on one side with his rear exposed and high ground surrounded him) from behind and allows fresh supplies to flow into vicksburg relieving the beliegured city as grant and the remnants of his army are marched away into pow camps. then a combined task force under jackson and clebourne taking half of the combined confederate armies of tennessee and northern virginia north to cross the mississippi and link up with a part of the confederate army of trans-mississippi moving south to encounter sherman's army and uses part of the combined cavalry units of forrest and stuart to screen his advance and pins sherman's siege troops against the river surrounding them while lee's artillery units fresh with artillery liberated from grant's shattered troops opens up on sherman's troops with deadly effect across the river using the combined pressure of jackson and lee's forces from both sides causes sherman and his men to surrender, sending more union troops to prison camps with new supplies freshly liberated from sherman's troops jackson marches his part of the army with clebourne and part of the army of tennessee south to liberate louisiana and new orleans. during this interviening time confederate delagates in britain and france show the confederacy has staying power having shattered one army at gettysburg and a large part of another at vicksburg, both britain and france move to recognize the confederate states as its own independant nation and order a combined british/french naval task force to break the blockade (they had condemned the blockade since the begining).

jackson's forces move north from new orleans having beaten the occupying forces of new orleans, to intercept federal units in the trans-mississippi's theater of operations destroying said units in detail before taking his combined task force of the ANV, confederate army of tennessee and part of trans-mississippi back across and into vicksburg meeting up with lee. where jackson discusses with lee the possibility of jackson and his task force liberating the rest of tennessee while lee marches east to deal with federal troops in florida and the carolinas. the union in disarry calls for peace. lincoln looses reelection and is known to history as the man who lost the war of northern agression
People love to blame Stuart for the loss at Gettysburg. Yes, having Stuart's force on hand would have helped - every rebel soldier was precious - but Lee had plenty of cavalry on hand to use for gathering intelligence. He simply didn't use them properly.
That is victory I suppose.


SWEET MERCIFUL LORD PEOPLE. This is a 10 YEAR NECRO on and ELEVEN YEAR OLD THREAD!!!!!!

Pertinent information or not....this has to be some sort of record....
 
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