Oh no navigation was a problem for all sides. I think the USAAF bombed Dublin once and then there was that brand new Fw 190 that landed at RAF saint AthensDon't think that such wonders of navigation were restricted to the RAF. On August 28th 1940 the pilot of a two seat Gotha 145 communications biplanne of Stab 27 was carrying the post to the garrison on Jersey, got lost and ended up landing on the Sussex South Downs in South East England having flown North East across the widest part of the English Channel. Oops.
Area bombing was the only alternative given the state of technology at the time. At BEST one in three bombers got to within 5 miles of its target, dropping to as low as one in ten in bad weather or smog
This of course led to navigational aids such as gee and oboe which if used correctly and if all went well enabled at best 60% of the bomber stream to bomb within a 3 by 3 mile box [These are figures I remember and I am ready to be corrected]
This means that if your target was a particular factory then everyone around it suffered as well
This was not malice, for if the ability to hit a particular target was available then it would be used. It would have been wastful to do otherwise.
The awareness that civilians would be killed was at the forefront of those who gave the orders and set the policy but Bomber command and the USAAF were never sniper rifles they were shot guns