The Central Powers Victorious: as told in newspaper articles

Concerning the value of Italian contribution: Well, the Italians were the only ones who really managed to get defeated by their colonial subjects (would be) in Ethopia. In WW1 they were the only ones who managed to be defeated by the Austrians, although the Austrians were bashed by everybody else.
There's no real reason to assume they did any better ITTL. So, ok, they lingered around in the Alps. Those that were sent to the Westfront most probably caused more grey hairs with their German allies than they killed enemies. (The Austrian show on the Westfront was already poor.) - Admitted, they might have done something useful on the Balkans (to their own benefit, as they annexed what they entered). And their fleet might have been of some value, although I'd rather see them hiding in the Adriatic...

But I don't want to be difficult. I was just trying to build a plausible case. The Ottomans have done Germany a favour by occupying Egypt and Cyprus, I simply don't see them abandon the OE for Greek interests, even if these are mediated by Italy.
I think a "neutral" zone in Eastern Thrace would be acceptable. For Cyprus and Anatolia we can come up with a EL mission to supervise that the poor, poor Greeks are not mistreated, but more infringements to OE sovereinty are hardly negotatiable. Egypt should go back to the Khedive, but he can have an EL advisory team.
Again: In German eyes, the OE have done nothing wrong. These concessions are just made to please the EL partners.
 

General Zod

Banned
Most posters tend to see the OE as aggressive power. In my view (which is the German view for most of the posts) that isn't so. They retrieved some land that had been their's of old, just as the Germans had retrieved Elsaß-Lothringen in 1971. The Germans also recognised OE sovereinty of the whole Arabian peninsula, but tried to stall the bid for Aden. But some posters are so busy to create another big bloodspilling conflict that they simply do not take all the hints.
The Dodecanes Islands affair was an unbearable provocation. Even if the OE had been busy to the hilt in Persia, they would have reacted to this one.
The OE are only reasonable strong in some areas, that is European Turkey, always protected by sizeable forces, and there where they can travel easily. That's the spell behind Egypt and Cyprus, the main work is done via sea, because the land LOCs are substandard. - This applies also for Aden and Persia, the land LOCs are so bad that hardly anything more than a skirmish with irregulars is conceivable.
The OE have also repeatedly declared that they honour and respect the Italian possession of Lybia and the Dodecanes, as they do Greece and Bulgaria in their present borders. - And they do not attack Italy on the Dodecanes but only strike after Greece has taken possession. This clearly exceeds the warranty they have given and is a direct threat to the OE. Just have a look where the islands are situated.

Forgot to comment on this stuff. Well, put it this way, the Ottoman claims look more reasonable (to a degree; Egypt is not really necessary to support their possessions in the Middle East, Syria and Palestine have some good seaports). The problem was, they use all the wrong arguments to sustain them. Italy might be willing to listen about anarguments about sealanes, but the "historical argument" is a can of worms. Germany itself claimed Elsass on the basis of ethnic and strategic arguments, not really because it belonged to them three centuries ago. What it means that the Sultan claims what was "historically" hims ? The old OE stretched from Morocco to Persia and hold the Balkans. You can see how this argument may look very dangerous. Also they see to be wholly oblivious to the reasons why Italy is giving Dodecaneso and Northern Epirus to Greece, an effort to appease the Greek nationalists so they can be contained better. Had they talked about safety of the sea-lanes and Anatolia, Italy would have payed better attention, and worked some compromise. This way, with he "historical" argument, their behavior looks in Rome like they want Greek nationalism to overstep, so they can crush Greece.

Ok, so there is a wab of misconceptions between Germany, the OE, and Italy. When they sit down to write a peace treaty post-German landing in Suez, all such points of view can be aired, and a reasonable line of demarcation can be established. The whole Anatolia and Middle East is a reasonable sphere of influence. Dodecaneso and Cyprus in El hands keeps the Ottoman coast and sealanes reasonably safe, in the time it lasts, thay have time to improve landbound LOC. Egypt is neutralized so neither the OE can menace Libya from there, nor Italy Palestine.
 

General Zod

Banned
Concerning the value of Italian contribution: Well, the Italians were the only ones who really managed to get defeated by their colonial subjects (would be) in Ethopia.

So did the British by the Zulu and the Sudanese. Nobody thinks them as lightweights for it. Such things did happen in colonial wars. Italy's fault at that was to have a bad confidence crisis and let the defeat stick, but it was a political problem.

In WW1 they were the only ones who managed to be defeated by the Austrians, although the Austrians were bashed by everybody else.

One defeat, reversed by Vittorio Veneto. The rest of the time, the Italians were pounding the Austrians, but getting nowhere because of that bloody trench warfare, just as in France. If the British can have Gallipoli and still be taken seriosuly in WWI, the Italians can afford Caporetto.

So, ok, they lingered around in the Alps. Those that were sent to the Westfront most probably caused more grey hairs with their German allies than they killed enemies. (The Austrian show on the Westfront was already poor.)

This is just unabashed prejudice unbacked by facts. Surely they were of significantly lesser quality than Germans, who were a ladder above anyone else anyway, but to put them as such lesser quality as to nullify their contribution or worse is outlandish. And the Italians defeated the Austrians. I would remind you that the German government and High Staff did agree to those Triple Alliance protocols for transferring a substantial amount of Italian troops to the French theater, and there had been regular contacts between the verious officer corps since the 1880s, so they knew what they were doing and they obviously disagreed with you about the value of Italian help. Anyway, ALL WWI armies performed substandard to expectations, even if Germans had the best Army in the world.

- Admitted, they might have done something useful on the Balkans (to their own benefit, as they annexed what they entered).

What the establishment of protectorate has to do with military performance ? And Albania was defacto Italian puppet since the Balkan Wars. That's why thy strike Serbia from there. And they haven't annexed Serbia. Admittedly Serbia has been kept fuzzy ITTL, probably because we are dumbstruck as what to do with it as the IC Alliance governments are.

Again, you are projecting hindsight prejudice here, ITTL Italy was true to their Alliance. They just did ask compensation according to the terms of the Triple Alliance treaty, for a war that admittedly Austrian shortsightedness and Willy's blundering help precipitate. Had Germany gone for a "East First" strategy and let Russia and France declare war first, Italy would have entered from the start. The Triple Alliance was a defensive treaty. ITTL, they ask for their Triple Alliance compensations, Germany is able to provide them, and they enter the war at the next decent slot, there is no point in starting a mountain war in late Autumn or Winter. And certainly Germany did not aggrandize less than Italy, so there is not reason to regard the latter as "greedy".

And their fleet might have been of some value, although I'd rather see them hiding in the Adriatic...

Again, prejudice.

Really, if we want this TL to restart without another nasty halt in the near-future, I agree to tone down pro-European enthusiam, but you have to agree and tone down your anti-Italian, pro-Ottoman bias, and spare it for other TLs of your own, please.

The Ottomans have done Germany a favour by occupying Egypt and Cyprus, I simply don't see them abandon the OE for Greek interests, even if these are mediated by Italy.

They are hardly "abandoning" them if they act as to ensure them a rather large exclusive sphere of influence in the Middle East mainland.

Also, frankly, IMO you are excessively downplaying the reasons why Germany should be have *some* sympathy for Greek *reasonable* goals. Yep, their nationalists are as bad as Serbian ones, but Greece is not yet another uppity obscure Slav backwater. They are still the cradle of Classical civilization, a Christian country fighting a Muslim one. Have they stopped studying classical Greek literature in German Gymnasiums ?

I keep regarding all this sympathy for the Islamic Ottoman state as unreasonable. IMO, Germany ought to regard the Sultan as a necessary evil to keep all those oilfields out of the Russian and British hands, nothing more. Certainly nothing in German politics and culture before the war gave any inkling of all this pro-Turk, pro-Islamic fascination. The Bagdad railroad was a useful economic and strategic venture, nothing more. They become allies on late 1914 (and Italians were since 1882), before German influences roughly blanced British ones at the Sublime Porte. And the Ottomans *never* saved Germany's butts in the war. Germany had planned to fight this war with A-H and Italy for decades, the OE was just a surprise welcome addition, just like Bulgaria and Sweden. With this balance of forces arrayed against them (Triple Alliance + Sweden + Bulgaria + Romania + Japan), Russia would have collapsed even if the Sublime Porte had stayed neutral and Entente ammunition shipments had flowed through the Straits. It would have just prolonged their lifespan by 0.5-1 year at most. Now, had Turkey gone Entente (which makes Greece go Alliance, however), the balance of forces is more favourable to Entente, but still leans in the favor of the Alliance, although with a late, 1918 victory.

I think a "neutral" zone in Eastern Thrace would be acceptable. For Cyprus and Anatolia we can come up with a EL mission to supervise that the poor, poor Greeks are not mistreated, but more infringements to OE sovereinty are hardly negotatiable.

What do mean by "neutral" ? Demilitarization ? Or EL administration ?

EL mission for Cyprus and Anatolia ? One-time ? Or long-standing ? Should not the same mission cover Greek and Bulgarian Turks, too ?

Hmm, would not the EL powers conclude that the minorities have become a big problem anyway, and agree on some kind of population exchange ?
However, if we let the OE expel Greeks from Cyprus also, it becomes badly unabalanced (OTL it was one million Turks to 1.5 Greeks, with Cyprus it gets two million Greeks. Unless Turks are expelled from Eastern Thrace, too).

Egypt should go back to the Khedive, but he can have an EL advisory team.

This is reasonable.

Again: In German eyes, the OE have done nothing wrong. These concessions are just made to please the EL partners.

Another question: if there had been no Italian bases on Dodecaneso, so they do not intervene when OE invades them, and do not conquer Egypt, would Germany have acquiesced with the results of the war if Greece and Bulgaria win it on their own merits, and claim Eastern Thrace, Dodecanese, and Cyprus ? Or would they still regard it as unacceptable ? Since Italy has the power to press from Egypt into the Middle East, and inflict the OE really serious harm ? Greece/Bulgaria do not, at the very most they can siege Constantinople, any Greek landing in Anatolia would be a bloody failure.
 
Last edited:
Hmm, would not the EL powers conclude that the minorities have become a big problem anyway, and agree on some kind of population exchange ? However, if we let the OE expel Greeks from Cyprus also, it becomes badly unabalanced (OTL it was one million Turks to 1.5 Greeks, with Cyprus it gets two million Greeks. Unless Turks are expelled from Eastern Thrace, too).

I addressed this in a proposal I made earlier to help settle the Eastern Mediterranean mess. I think there is more fighting on the board than there is there though! :D I outlined a plan by which the OE would have a sphere of influence in which to operate. At least 1/3 of Eastern Thrace would go to Greece, probably a bit more, since the swath i suggest remain Turkish is a buffer-zone for Constantinope. Not a huge land concession but it does address the concern over the vast numbers of Greeks in Cyprus, no matter how imperfect. The OE gets to keep their precious straights. If the OE oversteps its sphere of influence as set up, they get whapped again-perhaps more harshly than this time. Contrary to concerns raised otherwise, the OE is not getting "carved up." Its loss of land is minimal. It gets its precious Cyprus as well, which is apparently the most important holding the Sultan has outside of Constantinople which the OE gets too keep too. As for all this "historical claim" the Greek people could claim its position in the East before the OE. The Romans (Italy) before that). Before that even, the Greeks again can claim greater priority in historic claims. But it seems the power who should get the whole of the Ottoman Empire and then some is Persia...oh wait...Egypt has historic claims well up into Palestine. Sarcasm here? Yes...but I beg to ask...how far back are historical claims valid? What is the statute of limitation?

I am still wondering a bit, so we can get on with a little progress, just exactly what we will toss, what we will keep, and what, if anything, needs to be added to get to a new starting point? I think the biggest problem right now on the map is NOT in the eastern Mediterranean, but in Germany. I still do not see any solution for what has become, in this thread, one of the most unstable entities on the map. The people seem to be torn between some sort of pseudo-fascism and a liberal (not left leaning) federal state. It seems to contradict itself incesently. If the country is acting with such cupidity, I have no idea how it has become the great golden economic beacon of the world. Political clamouring is one thing, but coups, and counter coups, and counter-counter coups, votes in favor of joining Europe-wide unions by the people, then in nearly the same stroke these same people take to the streets and cheer the series of coups based on distaste for such "utopian" concepts as Europe uniting! Is Germany going to collapse? Is the Prussian core strong enough to hold together its much larger than ever empire (and I don't mean other countries; I mean European Germany and the European lands added to it at and after the end of the war.

This question of the Italian-Ottoman balance is puzzling too. Solutions have been offered to create a balance, or more balance. But some think the OE is some sort of super powerhouse, while others think Italy is. Think about this in closing. Which country has taken the steps which, in the 19th and early 20th centuries, lead to industrial/economic growth. The OE seems to be living in some sort of time past, reliving some glory day of yore, with its Great War win. I have not seen many steps by the OE to address any real industrial growth, other than the oil it mocks the rest of europe with. In its retreat into days gone by, how industrialized could it really be? Italy, however, has taken more steps towards a modern economic and industrial kind of state. This, while the OE is out grabbing up Egypt and Cyprus because it once was theirs. Could someone clarify the economic/industrial powerhouse that is the OE without simply saying, "they have the oil?" Do they have an economy and a government conducive to growth as has been seen in Italy? Even Greece, it has been said, has a leader who seeks more than land a country with at least a little industrial modernization and economic growth, the creation of new jobs and industries in the country. The OE certainly has a military; it has been moving them all over the map, and they should be damned lucky the Armenians and other minorities have not risen up while all the troops are going to other fronts. After all, isn't at least an inkling of this war, whether a rhetorical nicety or real, about disgust over Turkish genocide as well as fears about new genocides?

In other news to the board, while we are quibbling, White Russia and Japan have all but wiped Red Russia off the map. If we do not hurry up and do somethng, the Whites are going to try to do something in this mess! :p
 

General Zod

Banned
I outlined a plan by which the OE would have a sphere of influence in which to operate. At least 1/3 of Eastern Thrace would go to Greece, probably a bit more, since the swath i suggest remain Turkish is a buffer-zone for Constantinope.

A really fine idea. It only has the little difficulty that IIRC, we took for assumed that Bulgaria somehow got back Western Thrace (don't know how it happened, somehow it was never explcitly defined but got taken for granted sometime along the way), so if Greece got Eastern Thrace it would lack a land connection to the rest of Greece. So we need to recon explictly who holds Western Thrace (if Bulgaria, ITTL must have builled it out of neutral Greece at the peace treaty), and decide how the Greek-Bulgarian border would get settled in Thrace. Anyway, there's got to be a lot of bickering between Greece and Bulgaria. Ah, Balkans ;)

Not a huge land concession but it does address the concern over the vast numbers of Greeks in Cyprus, no matter how imperfect.

That's why I saw Cyprus as a better concession, IMO it's less strategically valuable to the OE than Eastern Thrace, but if the Sultan and Enver have such an obsessive love for Cyprus, I reluctantly bow to it and let's got Eastern Thrace instead.

The OE gets to keep their precious straights.

If the OE oversteps its sphere of influence as set up, they get whapped again-perhaps more harshly than this time.

Yup, although hoping that if the need truly arises, the Prussian officer class have broken from their pro-Ottoman fascination in the meantime and can see the need for it.

Contrary to concerns raised otherwise, the OE is not getting "carved up." Its loss of land is minimal. It gets its precious Cyprus as well, which is apparently the most important holding the Sultan has outside of Constantinople which the OE gets too keep too.

Yup.

As for all this "historical claim" the Greek people could claim its position in the East before the OE. The Romans (Italy) before that). Before that even, the Greeks again can claim greater priority in historic claims. But it seems the power who should get the whole of the Ottoman Empire and then some is Persia...oh wait...Egypt has historic claims well up into Palestine. Sarcasm here? Yes...but I beg to ask...how far back are historical claims valid? What is the statute of limitation?

My points on the issue exactly. At least ethnic and strategic claims have some hard factual basis diplomats can work upon. But historical is an endless can of worms.

I am still wondering a bit, so we can get on with a little progress, just exactly what we will toss, what we will keep, and what, if anything, needs to be added to get to a new starting point?

My own offer on the issue: I recon the posts about the successful implementation of the federal EL reform plan, rast recons the German nationalist reaction against it, and we define some kind of intermediate hybrid supernational/intergovernative evolution of the EL that looks reasonable enough to the German public. Keeping into mind that the OTL equivalent saw the League of Nations got implemented, so anything up to that level ought to be safe (sorry Rast, but I really can't see the German public being more bullheaded nationalist than the Americans as to refuse even this; they are in the middle of Europe with no isolationist tradition, after all; democratic Germany was reasonably confortable in the LoN until Hitler came along).

I also offer to erase either:

Italy does not keep bases on the Dodecanese so it does not enter the 3rd Balkan War. It just gives support to the Greek. Therefore, no invasion of Egypt. Greece, Bulgaria, and OE butt their horns in Thrace, and that's the extent of the war.

OR

After it occupies Egypt, and the Germans land at Suez, it makes not a claim for annexing it. Also it limits their peace claims to an EL supervision on the Egyptian government, and whatever claim for Greece we define as reasonable and Germany can accept. Germany, Italy, OE, and Egypt sign a treaty and this ends the Italian intervention. They leave the OE, Greece, and Bulgaria to fight to mutual exaustion in Thrace, as above.

What IMO must be reconned the other side:

The coup and all the internal mess in Germany. It continues on its normal political order. Whatever influence the neo-Prussian cliques feel the need to apply and safeguard Ottoman interests somehow, it gets applied the normal way, through backstage political pressure, not a coup. Also, some serious brake on the influence of such pseudo-fascist cliques. Barring the coming of the Great Depression or losing a major war, simply there is not enough reason or influence for them to make a serious attempt at overthrowing the democratic order. They have their Kaiser. And the OE losing some minor land certainly is not a good reason for a revolution. Bismarck did far worse.

Germany does not suddenly get anti-Italian, nor so pro-Ottoman, anti-Greek, and anti-Bulgarian as to stage an invasion of an ally for stopping a limited war. They let it fight to mutual exaustion for a while, then enforce a cease-fire in combined action with Italy and the rest of the League the usual old way, by political and economy pressure. At the very most, they make the veiled *threat* of military intervention. In all likelihood, the combined influence of Germany, Hungary, and Italy can accomplish that.

Also, some serious brake on the future projection of anti-Italian bias and pro-Ottoman love on the TL (I plead to be no nationalist, but the amount of anti-Italian scorn thrown around of late has seriously annoyed me). ITTL Italy has not been any more disloyal or imperialist-greedy than Germany, Turkey, or any other power of the Alliance. Germany steps in to prevent any major land loss for the Ottomans, OK. The next time, if ever, that Enver misbehaves, Berlin must agree that he needs to be slapped. The same way, I agree that if Greek nationalists misbehave again, Italy must see the need to punish them.

I also offer as an option to add some recon to add some kind of veteran settlement program and economy development in Libya, so oil gets discovered there in early-mis 20s, so European economy is not *entirely* dependent on Ottoman oil. Anyway, America is neutral, and has no reason as to refuse selling its oil to Europe.

I think the biggest problem right now on the map is NOT in the eastern Mediterranean, but in Germany. I still do not see any solution for what has become, in this thread, one of the most unstable entities on the map. The people seem to be torn between some sort of pseudo-fascism and a liberal (not left leaning) federal state. It seems to contradict itself incesently. If the country is acting with such cupidity, I have no idea how it has become the great golden economic beacon of the world. Political clamouring is one thing, but coups, and counter coups, and counter-counter coups, votes in favor of joining Europe-wide unions by the people, then in nearly the same stroke these same people take to the streets and cheer the series of coups based on distaste for such "utopian" concepts as Europe uniting! Is Germany going to collapse? Is the Prussian core strong enough to hold together its much larger than ever empire (and I don't mean other countries; I mean European Germany and the European lands added to it at and after the end of the war.

Well, to a degree it is reasonable to assume that some neo-Prussian cliques still long for the days of authoritarianism, and distaste the parliamentary government, but their distaste should be seriously toned down by the fact that Germany still has a Kaiser. And democratic Germany has such an impressive lists of successes (economic prosperity, peaceful enlargement to HRE boundaries, most of Europe following its leadership in good will) that all but the most fanatical of such cliques should recognize that the Chancellors and the Reichstag are doing a rather good job.

Anyway, I offer to remove evolution towards federal union of Europe, and let it happen rather more gradually over 1-2 decades, if all the coups sequence is done away entirely, even if the Chancellor sends troops to occupy Suez.

Yes, I think that the Prussian/Great German elite, working in unison, is strong enough to keep this HRE-Gemrany unite, if all the saber-rattling of the officer coprs over a minor point of foreign policy is done away entirely.
This question of the Italian-Ottoman balance is puzzling too. Solutions have been offered to create a balance, or more balance. But some think the OE is some sort of super powerhouse, while others think Italy is.

As far as the TL has advanced so far, IMO a fair description of how the various major powers of European League stand is:

Economically

Germany
Britain
Italy (only until France has not recovered)
France (up a place when it recovers)
Hungary/Sweden (hard to say which is better, so I lump them together)
Spain
Ottoman Empire/Poland (as above, Poland has more industry, but OE has oil)
Greece/Bulgaria (without oil, the OE would be here or lower)

Militarly

Germany
Britain
Italy
Hungary/Sweden
Ottoman Empire
Greece/Bulgaria/France (demilitarized, if not would get before Italy)

As such, I certainly do not regard Italy as a global powerhouse, but economically and militarly it has developed to be the rung just below a France at the full expression of its potential. On the continental scale, it's no lightweight. ITTL it has anticipated the economic development to the levels that OTL it reached in the 60s, which makes the fourth economy of Europe. Since it has won the war, it is no pacifist and has developed its military to scale. Even admitting the OE did some development of its own (which noobody wrote anything about, IIRC) it would be much more backward than Italy, Hungary, and Sweden if we use the same meter. With such an economy differential, it may have developed its military somewhat more than it economy level but that overwhelimgly so. Having such an expansionist leadership, probably most of the oil profits have gone on the military budget, but as it has been pointed out, oil is not yet that fundamental for developed economies.

Think about this in closing. Which country has taken the steps which, in the 19th and early 20th centuries, lead to industrial/economic growth. The OE seems to be living in some sort of time past, reliving some glory day of yore, with its Great War win. I have not seen many steps by the OE to address any real industrial growth, other than the oil it mocks the rest of europe with. In its retreat into days gone by, how industrialized could it really be? Italy, however, has taken more steps towards a modern economic and industrial kind of state. This, while the OE is out grabbing up Egypt and Cyprus because it once was theirs. Could someone clarify the economic/industrial powerhouse that is the OE without simply saying, "they have the oil?" Do they have an economy and a government conducive to growth as has been seen in Italy? Even Greece, it has been said, has a leader who seeks more than land a country with at least a little industrial modernization and economic growth, the creation of new jobs and industries in the country. The OE certainly has a military; it has been moving them all over the map, and they should be damned lucky the Armenians and other minorities have not risen up while all the troops are going to other fronts. After all, isn't at least an inkling of this war, whether a rhetorical nicety or real, about disgust over Turkish genocide as well as fears about new genocides?

I agree entirely.
 
Last edited:
Concerning the OE claims on Egypt and Cyprus: Both areas, in 1914, still belonged nominally to the OE, but had been sneaked away by the British Imperialists under pretenses like "administration" and "safe guearding". This does not apply to the rest of the Maghreb and the Balkans, which were invariably gone - and to repeat again, the OE do expressedly recognize Italian possessions as well as Greece and Bulgaria in their "present" (i.e. 1919 PT) borders.
So any impression of OE aggressiveness must come from them harassing the Brits, which is nothing the EL ought to deplore, given the British reluctance to sign the PT.
In German eyes, it is far better to have the OE in possession of the Near East than Britain. This has little to do with loving the OE.
OE rule over all this areas is far from stable, so any additional hazard must be avoided.
Your scenario of attack against the OE invariably will lead to screeching revolt in Arabia, Syria, Mesopotamia, Kurdistan and an uprise of those Armenians still alive (not to mention your darling Greeks). What you're portraying is effectively the demise of the Ottoman Empire. You will end up with Mustfa Kemal's Turkey and a riot belt south and east of that.

Concerning Italy: The Italo-French arrangements for Italy to change side were well in place pre-1914. And the Germans knew all this, they also knew that the French troops from the Alpine border were moving northwards. - It was only General Pollio who was pro-CP and tried to revive the old arrangements, but he died before the war broke out. - Moltke placed some trust in Pollio's promisses, Bethmann never, he saw the wider implications. When Italy ITTL sways towards the CP it is because she is not only promised the French areas but also substantial gains in Austro-Hungarian territory, Germans would note this down not as "standing to your allies" but "joining the highest bidder".

Concerning inner German affairs: Germany is a stable democracy right now, yet that does not necessarily mean that things happen in the tranquil way observers are used to see in today's FRG. Compare it to modern Turkey where the armed forces are the bullwark of Kemalism, defending it against corrupt politicians and islamistic ideas. Expect the German military to uphold "German" (= Prussian) interest when the politicians try to stage some "internationalist" arrangement that favour a miserable little country (Greece) that did not contribute to the war effort over a staunch and reliable ally. But the coup immediately went for new elections, so whatever happens, democrarcy is not at danger. It may be suspended for a short while, but also the military doesn't question its basic legitimacy any more. (And that truly is a progress over OTL's 1920ies.)

Greece as gradle of civilisation is fine. But that was ancient Greece, long dead and gone. Modern Greece is nothing but another troublesome Balkans country. The Germans have already noted this and their 19th century enthusiasm for Greece is long gone.
As far as Germany is concerned, no concessions to Greece to the detriment of the OE or Bulgaria (both proven allies) will be made.
 
Last edited:
Forgot: OE industrialisation
Not very much advanced, bad infrastructure, bad education. - But a lot of resources to barter for goods.
Presently Germany's best customer: Buys the most modern and most fancy stuff, pays outragious prices. And buys a lot.
Their military is first rate, equipment that the Germany Army dreams of (because too expensive) - the OE have it. Standard of living in the wider area Istambul - Ankara - Izmir is good and rising, the remainder hardly different to 1914.
Compare them to Iran in the 1950/60ies OTL, no real substance, but a lot of high-tech hardware and a huge military.
 
Last edited:
Yeah, the Ottomans have a well-organized military machine trained on the German model and have up to date military equipment, but they don't have the economic base to match it yet. Yet it is true though that much of their economic base outside of the cities remains backwards, and they need secular education. I know I'm being redundant, but oil is becoming more and more important, and as such there will be greater and greater demand for it, so therefore oil is currently one of the Ottomans most reliable commodities, and use the revenues they get from oil to be able to pay for the cost of setting up new government institutions and modernizing its industrial base. That's something that Enver and Kemal will have to address and probably will do something about in the 1920s and 30s.

If I seem like an Ottoman lover, the reason for it is because I want the Ottomans to succeed is because we all already know how what a mess the Middle East is nowadays. If the Ottomans collapse, then you'll likely see the Osamas, Sadaams and the Ahmadinejads that rear their ugly heads in OTL. This is one of the rarer intances where having a large Empire dominate a particular region be more beneficial rather than a bunch of nation states breaking apart. The reason I bring this up is, and I don't mean to sound like a lover of despotism, but how well has democracy worked in the Middle East? It sure has worked in Iraq, Saudi Arabia and Iran hasn't it?

As for Greece, by now King Ioannes is a puppet to the ultra-nationalists, and should absolutely be considered a rogue state. We never named who the leader of the ultra-nationalist clique is, but whoever he is, when one observes the policies he has sponsored 'Protection camps', creation of a 'Greater Hellenistic Empire', I imagined him cast in the same mold as someone like Slobodan Milosevic.
 
Clarifications/suggestions/Positions

The past few posts are full of valid points and good ideas. I think that many of them are not terribly, if at all, at odds with one another. Where odds do exist, perhaps they are not so terribly powerful as to cause too much more trouble. I have dug out the best map I have of the area of greatest concern now, which is entitled "Balkin Peninsula to 1914." It is from an old (1991) Rand McNally atlas called "Historical Atlas of the World." I am not certain how this publication is recieved right now, but it was good enough for several of my professors when I was an undergrad.

Bmao said:
If I seem like an Ottoman lover, the reason for it is because I want the Ottomans to succeed is because we all already know how what a mess the Middle East is nowadays. If the Ottomans collapse, then you'll likely see the Osamas, Sadaams and the Ahmadinejads that rear their ugly heads in OTL. This is one of the rarer intances where having a large Empire dominate a particular region be more beneficial rather than a bunch of nation states breaking apart. The reason I bring this up is, and I don't mean to sound like a lover of despotism, but how well has democracy worked in the Middle East? It sure has worked in Iraq, Saudi Arabia and Iran hasn't it?

I find this to be a fixedly valid reason for keeping the OE together. ITTL I think within their lands the rulers have kept it together well. In the Middle East of today, Western Intervention as well as its related issue of a Jewish state there are two major reasons for the unrest. A single power holding it all together, successfully, after the war would help make this so.

Bmao said
As for Greece, by now King Ioannes is a puppet to the ultra-nationalists, and should absolutely be considered a rogue state. We never named who the leader of the ultra-nationalist clique is, but whoever he is, when one observes the policies he has sponsored 'Protection camps', creation of a 'Greater Hellenistic Empire', I imagined him cast in the same mold as someone like Slobodan Milosevic.Bmao said

Again, this is an issue that must be addressed. Ioannes and the ultra-nationalists will have to be placed on history's great chopping block. Hows this unfolds will be anyone's guess, but Italy and German if needed can take care of the cleanup after the war is over and Greece begins to tear itself apart from the inside. The camps (Bulgaria will have to answer for this too) have really undone a major and valid ethical ground upon which the Greeks could stand. The ultra-nationalist leader should be the guy I suggested earlier in the board (long ago in number of posts) who was head of the Imperialist-Royalist party, the enterpreneur who went off to Italy--I made him up and his name but I have lost track of him. He can be drug back in by rebuilding some posts and adding a post or two about his return to Greece. Of course, I think there are lots of little nationalists in their own right who have been pressuring Ioannes all along. This enterpreneurial national leader can be your Slobodan Milosovic of 1920's Greece.

Rast said:
Concerning the OE claims on Egypt and Cyprus: Both areas, in 1914, still belonged nominally to the OE, but had been sneaked away by the British Imperialists under pretenses like "administration" and "safe guearding". This does not apply to the rest of the Maghreb and the Balkans, which were invariably gone - and to repeat again, the OE do expressedly recognize Italian possessions as well as Greece and Bulgaria in their "present" (i.e. 1919 PT) borders. So any impression of OE aggressiveness must come from them harassing the Brits, which is nothing the EL ought to deplore, given the British reluctance to sign the PT.
In German eyes, it is far better to have the OE in possession of the Near East than Britain. This has little to do with loving the OE.

The key term you used for OE claims, "nominal" is much better than calling them "historical claims." Of course, "nominal" claims are claims "in name only." Egypt when the OE retook it ITTL, was clearly justifiable in the politics of TTL at the time. It helped bring Britain into check. Its taking of Cyprus seems to have been more for OE glory, however. ITTL, I think the powers of Europe are going to say "thank you" for Egypt but insist that permanant annexation is not justifiable. A neutral Egypt and a demilitarized Suez is going to be a positive for Europe, especially if the EL as a whole is the occupying "protector" and then only in a limited way. As for Cyprus, I have suggested that Turkey keep it and it work in the great Pop Swap of Greeks and Turks (ala General Zod)

rast said
As far as Germany is concerned, no concessions to Greece to the detriment of the OE or Bulgaria (both proven allies) will be made.

What Bulgaria works out with Greece is Bulgaria's own business. I am actually trying to diffuse some of the conflicting claims in having the leaders of the two countries sit down in Thessalonika in an earlier quote to work out some of these claims. The "No Concessions" hardline notion is bullheaded. Any exchanges of land will be minimal, and the OE will not loose much, and if anything, be gaining an uncontested right to their "nominal" claim on Cyprus.

Rast said:
Concerning inner German affairs: Germany is a stable democracy right now, yet that does not necessarily mean that things happen in the tranquil way observers are used to see in today's FRG. Compare it to modern Turkey where the armed forces are the bullwark of Kemalism, defending it against corrupt politicians and islamistic ideas. Expect the German military to uphold "German" (= Prussian) interest when the politicians try to stage some "internationalist" arrangement that favour a miserable little country (Greece) that did not contribute to the war effort over a staunch and reliable ally. But the coup immediately went for new elections, so whatever happens, democrarcy is not at danger. It may be suspended for a short while, but also the military doesn't question its basic legitimacy any more. (And that truly is a progress over OTL's 1920ies.)

Germany, in posts heretofore, has proven itself to be neither stable or a (pure) democracy. That it could possibly endure a handful of coups with relatively little internal action would prove that. There have been a number of other "internationalist" arrangements (previously) that did not end up in assertive neo-Prussian takeover. Nor did the work of Luxembourg et al, unless we are going to call the government as it has been "window dressing." Greece is not exactly "a miserable little country" ITTL; it made strides to modernization before the s**t hit the fan as the 3rd Balkin War broke out. Ioannes, remember, before the war, had the aim of and made possible as in his power, to bring more industrial and modernizing reforms to Greece.

General Zod said:
A really fine idea. It only has the little difficulty that IIRC, we took for assumed that Bulgaria somehow got back Western Thrace (don't know how it happened, somehow it was never explcitly defined but got taken for granted sometime along the way), so if Greece got Eastern Thrace it would lack a land connection to the rest of Greece. So we need to recon explictly who holds Western Thrace (if Bulgaria, ITTL must have builled it out of neutral Greece at the peace treaty), and decide how the Greek-Bulgarian border would get settled in Thrace. Anyway, there's got to be a lot of bickering between Greece and Bulgaria.

My map shows, and my memory retains it, tha Western Thrace went to Bulgaria in 1913, giving them an Aegean coast. Greece never has ITTL claimed this land, nor has it gotten it as in OTL. Greece will have to put up with East Thracian land seprated from it by Bulgarian land. Bulgaria should retain its Aegean frontage. However, again, the Bulgarian-Greek land arragement suggested in an earlier post mentioning strategy planning by Bulgaria and Greece can be concretized in a headline outlining who gets what if any land changes hands between Bulgaria and Greece at all. That there would be tensions over Greece not getting 100% of their demands will simply be neutralized by governmental change in Greece.

NOW...getting back to my map and my "sphere for OE" model. Let me make this more concrete in the Aegean. Some of the eastern Dodecanese Islands, as well as a few held by Greece will need to go to the OE to form their "defensive band" on the coast. Mytilene, Chios and Samos, Greek from 1913, revert back to OE. Rhodes, Kos, and other Eastrn Dodecanes islands to OE. Karpathos and other more distant of the Dodecanese islands to the west and south of a one-band deep OE island zone to Greece. East Thrace: Turkey to retain land including Gallipoli, along a line paralelling the Straits and the Sea of Mamara, to where it intersect with the boundary which the Treaty of San Stefano of 1878 set up, which hits ths coast a bit to the east of the city of Midia As for the rest of Eastern Thrace, Adrianople and Black Sea coastal areas (Midia included) should go to Bulgaria. The rest, the bulk of the land, would be Greek. In all these areas changing hands ethnic populations should be moved around to accomodate the new geo-political reality.

*Along all steps of the way, EL involvement should be minimal, and of an internationally equal enforsive nature rather than an occupational one.

*Turkey gets to go back, with minimal loses of lands and actualy a few gains in territory (Mytilene, Chis and Samos for instance), to being its old self. It now has a nice buffer of islands for defence, and has a stronger sense of what is and is not the OE in geographical terms. It has a nice safe zone in which nobody dare enter, and a clearer line of demarcation as to where the OE itself is not to go. Returns immediately upon acceptance to terms to the EL, no questions asked. OE, contained within its sphere, will still have all that tasty oil with which to leverage its position economically in Europe without that oil becoming a commondity that allows Germany to worship it, or to act carte blanche over it.

*Greece goes into civil war, the Nationalists are creamed along with their puppet, Ioannes. His son Alexander is plenty old enough to be king, and is still young enough to embrace his father's ideals of his pre-throne and early regnal years. Italy and Germany, as well as other EL countries, should be militaristically present to stabilize the country without occupying it like a colony as a "protectorate." After it has been stabilized, it will go on to become a full EL member without any OE gripes, but in the meantime will lose any standing in the EL, as part of its punishment for the camps.

*Bulgaria will also be suspended from the EL, for some period of time, for its use of the camps. It will also pay dearly in money, apology for the camps, which seems to be its greatest sin in this conflict. Further, perhaps Bulgaria should foot a lion's share of the bill for orchestrating the population transfers between Bulgaria Greece and OE.

*Italy: it will end up as a great aribitor of the peace deal, kindly revoking all land claims. Will keep permanant bases in Greece.

*Germany--Lets dump the coup/countercoup/counter counter coup busieness and from now on knock a little of the "utopian" glow off Germany by portraying its government as not unstable, but not a bulwark of stability either. Germany has thrived since the war, and if it is through a combination of neo-Prusianism, social democracy, and imperial structure remaining intact, then so be it.

*Germany-Italy: we can knock out some of the idealistic love for these two by perhaps having some discomfort between them over post-3rd balkin war.

*Germany-OE: They do not need to hate each other, nor do they need to form a worshipful pair of countires. Relations should be good between them, but not a rabid reciprocal worshiping kind of relationship. As long as they can scratch each others' backs it should be enough to dispell the pandering love of Germany for the OE.

Hope this helps...it is meant to! :D
 
Whoah, stay away a few days and this thread is a whole different ballgame..

Hamburger, thank you for your praise in #572. You are really being too kind.:eek:

I have thought about researching a Finland in CP victory- scenario for some time, and this thread has given a great opportunity for that. I don't know how acquainted you are with Finnish post-WWI history, but I guess to those well versed with it my posts in this thread look like a study in subtle differences. That is a lot due to the fact that ITTL the Finnish Civil War is, for the most part, avoided, and thus the continuity from the Russian period is even more pronounced than in OTL. An organic Finnish history, if you will, without the shift to the right that were the OTL 20s and the 30s.

This means a strong part for the SDP in parliament and the absense of a rabid anti-Communist right. Instead, we get the utopian Karelianists, who are admittedly a more palatable choice even with their flaws. They might become a parliamentary party on their own in the 30s, but that is still in the works. Karelia will absorb a lot of effort and some possible aggression ITTL, but the work done in there will also take up a lot of resources and retard Finnish economic development, at least for some decades.

Sweden really makes most of their involvement in the war. It was, necessarily, quite limited but politically skilled (to the point of being Swedowankish, I guess) and so provides a great bang for the buck. Some guns, some volunteers and political support, together with a limited intervention buy a new province, economic rights, military bases and a lot of political clout. Add to this the fact that Swedish industry will dominate the Finnish economy, come the 30s-40s and they are all set.

Some minutes ago, I wrote a long, detailed text about the Finnish political situation, and it disappeared into thin air... I'll get back to it later, as soon as I have recovered.

About the state of the TL in general: everyone involved has done great work. Especially we have to thank rast, who for a long time provided both the bones and the flesh for the thread.

I agree with those, who say that the European integration is progressing too fast. We have a Europe recovering from the Great War, with exhausted old nations together with new entities just learning the ropes. Add to this the wars in Russia, Ireland and France, the American flue and the delayed deal with Britain (with the disrupted trade routes and famine to go with it), and I'd say for human reasons unification will come about in the late 30s at the earliest. I understand that Germany wants to solidify their European alliances as soon and comprehensively as they can, but the gears of diplomacy grind slowly, at least in these circumstances.
 
Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung, December 13th, 1924

Prince Regent Eitel Friedrich visits Istambul.


Accompanied by Chancellor Ebert, Foreign Minister Ballin, War Minister Noske, Economy Minister Rathenau and Chief of Joint Staff General Ludendorff, our regent started a visit of the Ottoman Empire yesterday.
In a reception at the Topkapi Palace, the Sultan addressed our delegation and thanked them for their recent help.
In his answer, the Prince Regent plainly said: "My Brother, thank you for the kind words. - But let me put simple: You saved our hide at Gelibolu, we've saved your's now. - That means: We're at pair and stand on equal footing. - Let's all have a cup of Rakee on that!"
At this, Mustafa Kemal Pasha, the hero of Gelibolu, Alexandria and Istambul, stepped forward, embraced the Regent and said:
"You're a man after my heart. Let's have two cups of Rakee!"
 
DrakonFin: Perhaps you could help us solidify some differences w/ more detail

We have here on one hand a view that takes the elites of the German and the Ottoman Empires and melds them together into an irrevocable bond. This is so much so that, despite major past crises since the Great War ended, that the Crypto/Neo/Prussian military of Germany will overtake the government by coup over a vote by its mission to the EL to suspend the OE for some of its actions.

We have on the other hand a view that is described by some as "utopian," by those who take a less rabid stance. Thus, these bloodless velvet coups and countercoups are the result of the failure of various powers of Europe in not operating as some sort of 19th century despotism.

We have another side again that sees Europe as working together, building democracy, thriving economically therefrom. We see truly progressive (by pre-1914 standards) legislation coming in. Emperors are overthrown and replaced by more moderate ones. Rights are gaurenteed to minorities. We have a strong EL that seems to have a lot of power in determining the course of political events across Europe, a Europe growing stronger, more democratic and quickly at that.

We have arguments here that "everything is happening too fast." What is too fast? 10 years? A lot can happen in 10 years. In the course of 10 years or so, Germany, a pretty powerful country fought a war, lost, had its nobility and royalty overthrown, a democracy of some sort come to power, and a currency so valueless that wheelbarrows of huge demoninations of bills were necessary to buy bread. Hell, the fact is, Germans were so faithless in their economy that they made their own damned money! (notgeld). Those are fast chages. In another 10 years, Germany had come from this to a far stronger, quickly evolving dictatorship begining to milatrize and have a right wing take over of the government so that it was of cruel proportions. 10 years after this, Germany had managed to occupy most of Europe, to start losing it again, and to be halfway through another "great war." Another ten years...you have Germany split into two nations, one a satelite of Russia, the other a western puppet, and neither one so powerful at all. The OTL suggests that change happened rapidly. Why would change bog down now?

We have arguments that history is not rational. Indeed it has bordered on ludicris at points. We have countries so disrupted by internal conflict that coup after coup can happen, while the country continues to boom. Policy is issued one day, the revoked the next, followed by a reinstatement the following day. How can a country so conflicted possibly have enough internal political strength to thrive like Superman? All the while we have a sultan sitting in Constantinople, waving oilrigs at Europe and snarling with laughter as if in some newspaper charicature.

Perhaps you could describe in more detail what your position is. I am seeing that it is somehwere along the second view, although I did not get enough data from your post to really tell where you come down on this scale. What posts do we take out? What do we leave? Who comes back from the dead? Who gets butterlied away? Should we just throw up our hands, say Germany and the Ottoman Empire, the inseperable brothers of Galipoli, "won" and will eventually just pretty much own Europe? Will the nations screech on slowly to democracy, as if in quicksand, bogged down by a few elites everywhere who are charismatic and control the population like puppets? Do we have a utopian liberal model where Europe joins hands and sings "kumbaya?" Is it OK to just sideswipe the board with sudden coups when the timeline is not working out the way a poster wants it? I have said it before, and I will say it again. I am not an expert at this. I enjoy it. I like the question of "what if?" I love it when the butterflies come in one thing changes and history unfolds completely differently than it did in reality. I have been trying to play someplace between positions numbers 2 and 3, I have tried to play in bounds. But we have here multiple timelines developing and diverging all at once, and overlapping in the same dimensions as one another. When does the fabric of the universe begin to unravel due to irreconcilably different events occuring at the same time? I would simply like you to tell us all what you think. Maybe we can get someplace. But PLEAAASSSSEE we need someone to come in with specifics and help us get this timeline going, or just throw it to the dogs.

I don't know...you used the past tense in your writings, suggestiing you see the project as being over. After you posted, praising Rast's posting being the bones of this whole thing, Rast posted a nice little end to our story, in which the German and Ottoman leaders toast their lovely victory, arm in arm, laughing like one might find in the last paragraph of a novel. Not quite sure what they were celebrating, unless it was Rast's proposed Prusso-Ottoman lovefest come to fruition. The offspring of this unconditional Gallipoligenic love the two share for one another, I am not sure I could stomach to look at, for no doubt the resulting love-child would make the OTL indeed look like a slice of heaven by comparison.
 

General Zod

Banned
Yeah, the Ottomans have a well-organized military machine trained on the German model and have up to date military equipment, but they don't have the economic base to match it yet. Yet it is true though that much of their economic base outside of the cities remains backwards, and they need secular education. I know I'm being redundant, but oil is becoming more and more important, and as such there will be greater and greater demand for it, so therefore oil is currently one of the Ottomans most reliable commodities, and use the revenues they get from oil to be able to pay for the cost of setting up new government institutions and modernizing its industrial base. That's something that Enver and Kemal will have to address and probably will do something about in the 1920s and 30s.

If I seem like an Ottoman lover, the reason for it is because I want the Ottomans to succeed is because we all already know how what a mess the Middle East is nowadays. If the Ottomans collapse, then you'll likely see the Osamas, Sadaams and the Ahmadinejads that rear their ugly heads in OTL. This is one of the rarer intances where having a large Empire dominate a particular region be more beneficial rather than a bunch of nation states breaking apart. The reason I bring this up is, and I don't mean to sound like a lover of despotism, but how well has democracy worked in the Middle East? It sure has worked in Iraq, Saudi Arabia and Iran hasn't it?

Oh, I absolutely agree with you here. I would just add that ownership of Eastern Thrace (the Straits are another matter), Egypt, Dodecaneso, or Cyprus not really necessary to the continued good health of the Ottoman Empire. Strategic security concerns about the sealane LOC crossing some of these places were indeed worthwhile, but to the point of making their ownership a matter of life or death for the Empire. Demilitarization would have been just as effective.

As for Greece, by now King Ioannes is a puppet to the ultra-nationalists, and should absolutely be considered a rogue state. We never named who the leader of the ultra-nationalist clique is, but whoever he is, when one observes the policies he has sponsored 'Protection camps', creation of a 'Greater Hellenistic Empire', I imagined him cast in the same mold as someone like Slobodan Milosevic.

Yes, I agree that the ultra-nationalists shall have to be brought down, either by popular reaction over the outcome of the war, political/economic pressure by the EL, or actual armed intervention sometime after the war.
 

General Zod

Banned
The key term you used for OE claims, "nominal" is much better than calling them "historical claims." Of course, "nominal" claims are claims "in name only." Egypt when the OE retook it ITTL, was clearly justifiable in the politics of TTL at the time. It helped bring Britain into check. Its taking of Cyprus seems to have been more for OE glory, however. ITTL, I think the powers of Europe are going to say "thank you" for Egypt but insist that permanant annexation is not justifiable. A neutral Egypt and a demilitarized Suez is going to be a positive for Europe, especially if the EL as a whole is the occupying "protector" and then only in a limited way. As for Cyprus, I have suggested that Turkey keep it and it work in the great Pop Swap of Greeks and Turks (ala General Zod)

This seems reasonable.

My map shows, and my memory retains it, tha Western Thrace went to Bulgaria in 1913, giving them an Aegean coast. Greece never has ITTL claimed this land, nor has it gotten it as in OTL.

OTL, Bulgaria conquered it from Turkey in the 1st Balkan War, then lost it to Greece in the 2nd Balkan War. ITTL, we never explictly defined it, but we can easily assume that at the peace deal, Bulgaria is able to bully it back in their hands, since they were a victorious power, and Greece only a friendly neutral .

Greece will have to put up with East Thracian land seprated from it by Bulgarian land. Bulgaria should retain its Aegean frontage. However, again, the Bulgarian-Greek land arragement suggested in an earlier post mentioning strategy planning by Bulgaria and Greece can be concretized in a headline outlining who gets what if any land changes hands between Bulgaria and Greece at all. That there would be tensions over Greece not getting 100% of their demands will simply be neutralized by governmental change in Greece.

This seems feasible.

NOW...getting back to my map and my "sphere for OE" model. Let me make this more concrete in the Aegean. Some of the eastern Dodecanese Islands, as well as a few held by Greece will need to go to the OE to form their "defensive band" on the coast. Mytilene, Chios and Samos, Greek from 1913, revert back to OE. Rhodes, Kos, and other Eastrn Dodecanes islands to OE. Karpathos and other more distant of the Dodecanese islands to the west and south of a one-band deep OE island zone to Greece. East Thrace: Turkey to retain land including Gallipoli, along a line paralelling the Straits and the Sea of Mamara, to where it intersect with the boundary which the Treaty of San Stefano of 1878 set up, which hits ths coast a bit to the east of the city of Midia As for the rest of Eastern Thrace, Adrianople and Black Sea coastal areas (Midia included) should go to Bulgaria. The rest, the bulk of the land, would be Greek. In all these areas changing hands ethnic populations should be moved around to accomodate the new geo-political reality.

This might be a sensible territorial settlement. Question: does the final partition of the contested territories along these get defined after the Greco-Bulgaro-Turk peace, or is it already defined in broad lines in the German-Italo-Turk accord ?

*Along all steps of the way, EL involvement should be minimal, and of an internationally equal enforsive nature rather than an occupational one.

Yup. Mostly, they supervise the population exchanges and create an overseer board to monitor Egyptian neutrality and advice the Khedivè. I would add a treaty provision that no country is allowed to station troops, nor can Egypt join military alliances, without EL agreement.

*Turkey gets to go back, with minimal loses of lands and actualy a few gains in territory (Mytilene, Chis and Samos for instance), to being its old self. It now has a nice buffer of islands for defence, and has a stronger sense of what is and is not the OE in geographical terms. It has a nice safe zone in which nobody dare enter, and a clearer line of demarcation as to where the OE itself is not to go. Returns immediately upon acceptance to terms to the EL, no questions asked. OE, contained within its sphere, will still have all that tasty oil with which to leverage its position economically in Europe without that oil becoming a commondity that allows Germany to worship it, or to act carte blanche over it.

That's fine.

*Greece goes into civil war, the Nationalists are creamed along with their puppet, Ioannes. His son Alexander is plenty old enough to be king, and is still young enough to embrace his father's ideals of his pre-throne and early regnal years. Italy and Germany, as well as other EL countries, should be militaristically present to stabilize the country without occupying it like a colony as a "protectorate." After it has been stabilized, it will go on to become a full EL member without any OE gripes, but in the meantime will lose any standing in the EL, as part of its punishment for the camps.

That seems realistic. Do you assume the ultra-nationalists shall agitate so much, abvout the war's outcome, that the EL countries shall be forced to send forces to put them down ?

*Bulgaria will also be suspended from the EL, for some period of time, for its use of the camps. It will also pay dearly in money, apology for the camps, which seems to be its greatest sin in this conflict. Further, perhaps Bulgaria should foot a lion's share of the bill for orchestrating the population transfers between Bulgaria Greece and OE.

*Italy: it will end up as a great aribitor of the peace deal, kindly revoking all land claims. Will keep permanant bases in Greece.

OK to both.

*Germany--Lets dump the coup/countercoup/counter counter coup busieness and from now on knock a little of the "utopian" glow off Germany by portraying its government as not unstable, but not a bulwark of stability either. Germany has thrived since the war, and if it is through a combination of neo-Prusianism, social democracy, and imperial structure remaining intact, then so be it.

We could just show how neo-Prussian pressure on the government influences it to some degree, through the usual political pressure channels, without the generals rattling the sabers or actually using them. If they have the ear of the Prince Regent to some degree, it is wholly unnecessary.

*Germany-Italy: we can knock out some of the idealistic love for these two by perhaps having some discomfort between them over post-3rd balkin war.

Temporary estrangement, such USA and "Old Europe" after the Iraq War ? It might be a good model. Anyway, they can't sulk for too much, their collaboration is necessary on several levels of European politics (beginning with managing the post-war Greek situation).

*Germany-OE: They do not need to hate each other, nor do they need to form a worshipful pair of countires. Relations should be good between them, but not a rabid reciprocal worshiping kind of relationship. As long as they can scratch each others' backs it should be enough to dispell the pandering love of Germany for the OE.

Absolutely agreed. I still really don't get why ITTL the neo-Prussians ought to have such a fanboy complex about the Gallipoli campaign. With TTL's array of forces against them, Russia would have surely fallen, give or take a season, even the Anglo-French had managed to send them ammo hrough the Straits. With Japan, Sweden, Italy, and Romania in the Triple Alliance, ITTL Russia was doomed anyway. Gallipoli was anything decisive.
 

General Zod

Banned
In German eyes, it is far better to have the OE in possession of the Near East than Britain. This has little to do with loving the OE. OE rule over all this areas is far from stable, so any additional hazard must be avoided. Your scenario of attack against the OE invariably will lead to screeching revolt in Arabia, Syria, Mesopotamia, Kurdistan and an uprise of those Armenians still alive (not to mention your darling Greeks). What you're portraying is effectively the demise of the Ottoman Empire. You will end up with Mustfa Kemal's Turkey and a riot belt south and east of that.

Oh, yes, it seems that by now all regular posters agree on this. We just disgree that a coup, or the blockade/invasion of allies, was necessary to avoid this. The Suez landing and some quick sharp words in Giolitti's ear are sufficient. And Germany can still accomplish the rational strategic objective of keeping the core of the OE safe and united without becoming a fanboy of the Sultan.

Concerning Italy: The Italo-French arrangements for Italy to change side were well in place pre-1914. And the Germans knew all this, they also knew that the French troops from the Alpine border were moving northwards. - It was only General Pollio who was pro-CP and tried to revive the old arrangements, but he died before the war broke out. - Moltke placed some trust in Pollio's promisses, Bethmann never, he saw the wider implications. When Italy ITTL sways towards the CP it is because she is not only promised the French areas but also substantial gains in Austro-Hungarian territory, Germans would note this down not as "standing to your allies" but "joining the highest bidder".

This is just grasping at straws in order to justify a prejudice. ITTL, temporary pre-war detente between Italy and France never really amounted to nothing and I would be amazed if even 1 German out of 20 remembers it after 10 years, a World War fought together, and an ongoing strategic partnership. How many OTL French would remember in 1924 that Britain would have gone neutral if Germany had not invaded Belgium ? Italy did ask for the compensation taht was due to them according to the Triple Alliance treaty. IOTL, negotiations amounted to nothing because of A-H's intransigence, so eventually the Italian government threw arms up and listened to seductive alternative British offers. But they envisaged figthing with the Alliance first and negotiated with them first, at length. ITTL, these negotations were instead completely fruitful, so there was never an "alternative bid", so there was not a bid in the first place. There were only old allies negotiating theri residual differences away to adjust for the circumstances (something that was vanilla for Edwardian diplomacy). And again, after a World War fought together, almost nobody would remember these fine details.

Concerning inner German affairs: Germany is a stable democracy right now, yet that does not necessarily mean that things happen in the tranquil way observers are used to see in today's FRG. Compare it to modern Turkey where the armed forces are the bullwark of Kemalism, defending it against corrupt politicians and islamistic ideas. Expect the German military to uphold "German" (= Prussian) interest when the politicians try to stage some "internationalist" arrangement that favour a miserable little country (Greece) that did not contribute to the war effort over a staunch and reliable ally. But the coup immediately went for new elections, so whatever happens, democrarcy is not at danger. It may be suspended for a short while, but also the military doesn't question its basic legitimacy any more. (And that truly is a progress over OTL's 1920ies.)

A "Kemalist" kind of coup is not outlandish, for this Germany, but I would expect it to happen over something that really upsets the stability of the country (say a far left government tries to abolish the monarchy or halve the military budget), not a minor quibble of foreign policy like a minor ally suffering some non-vital territorial loss. Bismarck did far worse, and the officers never dreamed of couping him.
 
Should we revive this thread?

Sad to see that this timeline has died. I really enjoyed it a lot, and I really want to revive it, and I would have posted during the winter holidays had I not been on vacation, where I did not have access to the internet.

Even with all its problems, this has been one of the most balanced, plausible timelines I have seen of a Central Powers Victory, and I would like to get it going again, even if I have to do it myself.

Here it goes.


NY Times

October 5, 1924

OTTOMANS STAGE COUNTER-ATTACK!!

Yesterday, our war correspondent has confirmed that Ottoman forces under the overall command of General Mustafa Kemal Pasha have staged water-borne landings on the northern and southern Thracian coasts west of the Ottoman Capital city of Constantinople. Reports from the front have described the Greco-Bulgarian resistance as light, with the Ottoman forces reportedly capturing most if not their objectives on the first day.

For the past two months, the city of Constantinople has been subject to street to street fighting. European League officials have estimated that about 35,000 Greek and Bulgarian soldiers have died attempting to take the city thus far, and they estimate that a similar number of Ottoman soldiers have died in its defense, as figures given by the Ottoman authorities have been deemed unreliable. Furthermore, it is estimated that nearly 100,000 citizens of Constantinople have been either killed or wounded during the fighting.

With the bulk of the Greco-Bulgarian forces concentrated in and around Constantinople, it remains to be seen what action their generals will take to this new development on their flank.
 
NY TIMES

October 21, 1924

OTTOMANS CLOSE RING AROUND CONSTANTINOPLE!! GREEKS AND BULGARIANS TRAPPED!!

Yesterday, Ottoman military authorities have announced, and European League officials have confirmed, that Ottoman forces under Mustafa Kemal Pasha have captured the town of Boyalik, thus linking the two counter-attacking forces west of Constantinople, and effectively trapping the 100,000 strong Greek and Bulgarian force in and around the city.

So far, the Greco-Bulgarian Combined Army, commanded by Leonidas Paraskevpoulos, has not staged any concerted effort to break out of the encirclement. Reports have surfaced that speculate that the reason behind this is the symbolic significance of holding Constantinople, which Greece's nationalist leaders have cited was essential for its desire to create a Pan-Hellenistic state.

The head of the Nationalist coalition, War Minister Dmitri Pandazidis, said in a defiant speech that 'We shall hold onto Constantinople no matter the cost, for abandoning her would mean to abandon our Hellenic brothers to Ottoman servitude.' During the speech, Pandazidis also urged the Greek troops to remain vigilant and faithful, and that help will soon be on the way for them.

This was followed by a brief speech by King Ioannes, which basically repeated the points made by Pandazidis. It was the first political speech given by Ioannes since the Battle of Constantinople began a full two months ago, as aside from making visits to field hospitals, conducting ceremonies, fund-raisers and other related activities, he has grown increasingly irrelevant in Greek public life and politics, with Pandazidis and Prime Minister Eleftherios Venizelos heading an oligarchy of nationalists who engage in the decision making.

Though the Greek tone has remained defiant despite their reversal of fortune, there has been little word from Bulgaria about these developments. The Bulgarian public has been left mostly in the dark about specific developments about the war, while its leaders have been out of the public eye. Throughout the Battle of Constantinople, there have been increasing instances of discord between the co-belligerents, specifically over control of Eastern Thrace and Constantinople itself should they succeed in capturing it. Dissent among the high command and lack of coordination between the two forces largely accounts as to how the Ottomans were able to envelop the Greco-Bulgarian forces with the relative ease. Ottoman authorities have stated that Bulgarian forces are nowadays 'frequently deserting their posts and surrendering in droves'.

Meanwhile, house to house fighting continues in the city of Constantinople, which for all intensive purposes is now a pile of rubble. The constant fighting and deplorable conditions have made it extremely difficult for the European League or any other international organization to deliver badly needed aid to its citizens.

"It is a disaster," said one anonymous official, "Like hell on Earth."
 
Washington Post

October 29, 1924

KDEVITE OF EGYPT RETURNED TO POWER

In accordance with European League mandate, the Khedive of Egypt has been restored to his throne, yet under the advisory of the European League. Included in the representation are delegates from Germany, Italy, Finland and notably, the Ottoman Empire.

With the signing of this agreement, Italy has begun to pull its troops out of Egypt, with the last being removed by February 28, 1925, and European League monitors put in its place. The Khedive has also agreed to promote secular education, free and fair elections, and foreign investment. Most important of all this is the internationalization of the Suez Canal, which is open to all foreign trade and Egypt is forbidden to militarize it.

There have been numerous protests against the newly restored Kheives policies, yet none were particularly large in scale and were quickly placed under control.
 
(I'm not very good at writing out treaties, so forgive me.)

Boston Herald

November 13, 1924

OTTOMAN EMPIRE AND BULGARIA COME TO TERMS IN GENEVA

European League officials have confirmed that yesterday, a conference in Geneva was held detailing Bulgaria's desire to finalize a truce with the Ottoman Empire. For the past few weeks, secret meetings had been held between representatives of the Ottoman Empire and the Bulgarians, in effort to come up with an effective peace deal, and were further clarified in yesterday's official meeting.

Though the European League would not reveal all the details of the peace treaty as of yet, a few of the major points include the following.

All Bulgarian troops in the Constantinople pocket will surrender to Ottoman forces.
Bulgaria shall pay reparations to the Ottoman Empire over their role in transporting Muslims to the 'protection camps'.
The Ottoman Empire and Bulgaria agree to a population exchange of Muslims and Bulgarians, monitored by the European League.
Ottoman Empire shall allow Bulgarian merchant vessels free access to through the Dardenelles strait.
Bulgaria shall no longer grant Greece free access across Eastern Thrace, nor will she grant access to Ottoman forces.
 
Top