The Byzantine Republic (Not AH, as Such)

Once in a while, I like posting about a book that I've read recently, because it tends to open up some AH opportunities. The latest one is the Byzantine Republic, by Anthony Kaldellis, which attacks the idea that the Byzantine Empire was an oriental despotism. A few general points:

He makes an interesting point that I ignore. I tend to see it as a decadent and weak state, but the Byzantine Empire survived over a thousand years (longer if you see it as a continuation of the Roman state); that gives it a pretty good run as a society.

Second, the discourse doesn't reflect an oriental despotism, where the subjects are those for the Emperor to do with as he wills. On the contrary, the rhetoric and ideology sees the emperor as holding the state in trust for the people. And the rhetoric makes a distinction between the king and country, as it were; the historian Leon wrote that "soldiers fight on behalf of our basileia and the Christ-loving politeia of the Romans." In this light, the language of the last emperor is pretty revealing: "I do not have the right to give you the City, nor does anyone else of those who live in it. By a collective decision, we will all willingly die and not try to save our lives."

Or, to take a late 11th century example: a tyrant takes power by force; the basileus "receives power "by the good will of the multitude and the consent of the people." This is around the same time that Alexius Commenus tried to put Constantine Doukas on the throne, but, according to a chronicler, "the demos, with one voice, loudly shouted that they did not want to be ruled by him" and the coup fizzled.

There are surprising signs of secularism that we ignore. Chroniclers had no problem noting that an emperor was a deviant Arian heretic but just towards his subjects and restrained in his lifestyle; and many Byzantine chroniclers had no problem blaming the rise of the Turks or foreign policy losses on poor management.

It's an interesting book, and I recommend it.
 
Nevermind!

Not at all!

It's good to see more people interested on this analysis (even if I've some reservations about some litteralism when it come to the mid-part of Byzantine history) and to bring discussion on the reappraisal of the continuity of Late Antiquity and Middle Ages.
 
Once in a while, I like posting about a book that I've read recently, because it tends to open up some AH opportunities. The latest one is the Byzantine Republic, by Anthony Kaldellis, which attacks the idea that the Byzantine Empire was an oriental despotism. A few general points:

He makes an interesting point that I ignore. I tend to see it as a decadent and weak state, but the Byzantine Empire survived over a thousand years (longer if you see it as a continuation of the Roman state); that gives it a pretty good run as a society.

Second, the discourse doesn't reflect an oriental despotism, where the subjects are those for the Emperor to do with as he wills. On the contrary, the rhetoric and ideology sees the emperor as holding the state in trust for the people. And the rhetoric makes a distinction between the king and country, as it were; the historian Leon wrote that "soldiers fight on behalf of our basileia and the Christ-loving politeia of the Romans." In this light, the language of the last emperor is pretty revealing: "I do not have the right to give you the City, nor does anyone else of those who live in it. By a collective decision, we will all willingly die and not try to save our lives."

Or, to take a late 11th century example: a tyrant takes power by force; the basileus "receives power "by the good will of the multitude and the consent of the people." This is around the same time that Alexius Commenus tried to put Constantine Doukas on the throne, but, according to a chronicler, "the demos, with one voice, loudly shouted that they did not want to be ruled by him" and the coup fizzled.

There are surprising signs of secularism that we ignore. Chroniclers had no problem noting that an emperor was a deviant Arian heretic but just towards his subjects and restrained in his lifestyle; and many Byzantine chroniclers had no problem blaming the rise of the Turks or foreign policy losses on poor management.

It's an interesting book, and I recommend it.
I don't know if the book you mention uses the term "Oriental despotism" (and I haven't researched that concept very well) but many of the concepts you mentioned describe China too: the Emperor as a servant of the country (indeed, as the person responsible for the well-being of the universe), the division between the state and the throne, and the presence of criticism (every official having a theoretical right to criticize the Emperor, and special government posts being set up for that purpose). And many monarchs who went too far deep into tyranny ended up being deposed by their officials or saw their dynasties collapse under invasions or peasant rebellions.

Perhaps "Oriental despotism" refers to the pattern of government in the Middle East and South Asia, which I know less about, but I'm getting the feeling that the concept is actually a misconception. Because otherwise, I could take some of these arguments and say that imperial China was a republic too.
 
There's a huge difference between the concept of political power as morally AND politically responsable for the well-being of its people (you can find virtually anywhere, even in the worst dictatorship) and the actual institutionalisation and cultural appropriation of this concept.

Particularily, you're ignoring the popular role (and not just officials, dynastical claimants or else) into Byzantine politics (trough religion is probably the most known exemple, but as much when it comes to urban life) : how many Chinese emperors lost their throne due to a popular reaction?
More importantly : how much the fact that emperors were chased off their throne due to this was an accepted if not celebrated notion?

These caused the byzantine imperium to have a form of democracy (in the sense used by Roman historians about classical Roman emperors, as in actively searching the popular favour bypassing the more formal institutions) that doesn't always exist elsewhere (for exemple, in IXth/Xth Europe) and critically in a generally secular way (not always tough, see the Iconoclast crisis)
 
I would agree to this, in very specific periods. By say, 1100, you just can't describe Byzantium as a Republic anymore; it has far more in common with the contemporary (of the time, ofc) West than it does with even the Rome of Late Antiquity. It had become ruled by the Aristocracy and a pretty clear rule of hereditary succession, excepting usurpation which happened about as often as it did in the West. If you're going to say that's a republic, then you might as well call any Western Kingdom a Republic, because when they were sick of rulers they often dethroned them.

But then there's Late Antiquity, which is where this argument makes the most sense. The Army, the Senate (prodded along by forces like the Excubitors), and the Constantinopolitan mob all played a part in choosing the next Emperor. In some ways it's more inclusive than the early Empire was.

If we're looking at the "Byzantine" period (so after the fall of Western Rome), there are only two examples of succession actually looking like a Monarchic Republic, and not being usurpations or designated successors of the previous Emperor. Those are Anastasius and Justin. In both cases, we're looking at something that seemed to follow a quasi-Republican process: they're voted upon by members of the Senate and have the mob behind them.

Technically, this was true of plenty of other Emperors, but in reality this was because they either had the approval of the last Emperor or they had the power to place themselves on the throne. Though they might have been good choices, I don't think Justin---> Tiberius---> Maurice qualifies as a Republican transition of power. Feel free to disagree.

And even if they did, Phocas and Heraclius completely shredded this legitimacy and turned the system back into who has power keeps it/hereditary.

So essentially, I agree that Byzantium could qualify as a monarchic republic up until the upheaval of the 7th century, and not for much longer after that. While the Basileus often needed the support of the people/Senate/military, and some were overthrown for not having it, there was never really a time where the succession wasn't either forced at the point of the sword or hereditary after that.

EDIT: So basically, I conquer with EC besides a few quibbles.
While I think the gist of what I said some months ago is right, I have to disagree with myself on quite a bit; I've read a bit more about the subject since then (including the book itself).

The threat of usurpation, and the need to constantly appease the masses, really set Rome apart from the rest of Europe and even the Arab World at the time. This is where the idea of it being a Republic comes from; not necessarily the legitimacy of its institutions as I was saying in the past.

It certainly wasn't a Republic as we would imagine it, but the people, particularly those living in Constantinople, had a huge say over how government was run, as examples showed time and time again.
 
There's a huge difference between the concept of political power as morally AND politically responsable for the well-being of its people (you can find virtually anywhere, even in the worst dictatorship) and the actual institutionalisation and cultural appropriation of this concept.

Particularily, you're ignoring the popular role (and not just officials, dynastical claimants or else) into Byzantine politics (trough religion is probably the most known exemple, but as much when it comes to urban life) : how many Chinese emperors lost their throne due to a popular reaction?
More importantly : how much the fact that emperors were chased off their throne due to this was an accepted if not celebrated notion?

These caused the byzantine imperium to have a form of democracy (in the sense used by Roman historians about classical Roman emperors, as in actively searching the popular favour bypassing the more formal institutions) that doesn't always exist elsewhere (for exemple, in IXth/Xth Europe) and critically in a generally secular way (not always tough, see the Iconoclast crisis)

The Mandate of Heaven and various peasant revolts that stemmed off of it throughout dynastic China's long history?
 
The Mandate of Heaven and various peasant revolts that stemmed off of it throughout dynastic China's long history?

Did you even bothered to read the thread?

The point isn't that you had either a concept of political responsability or popular look on it, but its institutionalisation and secularisation.

The second part is obvious enough : as it happened that an emperor lost popular support, it wasn't systematically rationalized as a spiritual or religious outcome, but plainly because it lost popular support and should have see it coming, no matter his objectives qualities.

On the other hand, the Mandate of Heaven plays a rationalisation role there : if the dynasty fall ot raised, it was due to their inner virtues and reject or acclamation from the higher order of things, and not just mundane events (hence why Mandate of Heaven as cause of fall of dynasties was only called on rarily, when imperial valse in Byzantium occured much more easily).

It comes down to the first : again nobody there is ignoring or even less denying the role of peasant revolts, but this is simply irrelevant there.

You would have noticed the emphasis put on urban there : as the classical Roman republican concept (on which was greffed the monarchical idea during the classical then late Empire, and then what we call the Byzantine Empire) is about the idea of the people of the city not only being organized as such, but critically having a real legitimacy intervening into affairs of state would it be by proxy or in this case trough support or revolt against the imperial power.

The confucean/neo-confucean political vision was different : the institutional ethical was more familial, more philosophical than political strictly speaking (it's more a consequence of the others).
Zhōng isn't mandatory at all times, granted : an morally evil ruler may be overthrown "legally".
But the idea that the ruled themselves could have legitimacy into checking their ruler, and that this one should not only work for their good but to search their active support isn't something that was that stressed on similar situations.

As said Dominus, it's hard talking about political ideas and ethos for empires that existed on very long eras without generalizing too much, but I'll take the risk anyway.
The important point was that this popular support was not justified trough virtue or as a religious right, but as a secular (I'd not easily use the term civic, but on the other hand it could fit there) privilege of the Roman "republic" (politeia).
Basically, the acknowledgement of people as a permanent political institution.

Of course, Caesar Biden (and totally not WhatIsAUserName) summarized it best.
It certainly wasn't a Republic as we would imagine it, but the people, particularly those living in Constantinople, had a huge say over how government was run, as examples showed time and time again.
 
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Did you even bothered to read the thread?

The point isn't that you had either a concept of political responsability or popular look on it, but its institutionalisation and secularisation.

The second part is obvious enough : as it happened that an emperor lost popular support, it wasn't systematically rationalized as a spiritual or religious outcome, but plainly because it lost popular support and should have see it coming, no matter his objectives qualities.

On the other hand, the Mandate of Heaven plays a rationalisation role there : if the dynasty fall ot raised, it was due to their inner virtues and reject or acclamation from the higher order of things, and not just mundane events (hence why Mandate of Heaven as cause of fall of dynasties was only called on rarily, when imperial valse in Byzantium occured much more easily).

It comes down to the first : again nobody there is ignoring or even less denying the role of peasant revolts, but this is simply irrelevant there.

You would have noticed the emphasis put on urban there : as the classical Roman republican concept (on which was greffed the monarchical idea during the classical then late Empire, and then what we call the Byzantine Empire) is about the idea of the people of the city not only being organized as such, but critically having a real legitimacy intervening into affairs of state would it be by proxy or in this case trough support or revolt against the imperial power.

The confucean/neo-confucean political vision was different : the institutional ethical was more familial, more philosophical than political strictly speaking (it's more a consequence of the others).
Zhōng isn't mandatory at all times, granted : an morally evil ruler may be overthrown "legally".
But the idea that the ruled themselves could have legitimacy into checking their ruler, and that this one should not only work for their good but to search their active support isn't something that was that stressed on similar situations.

As said Dominus, it's hard talking about political ideas and ethos for empires that existed on very long eras without generalizing too much, but I'll take the risk anyway.
The important point was that this popular support was not justified trough virtue or as a religious right, but as a secular (I'd not easily use the term civic, but on the other hand it could fit there) privilege of the Roman "republic" (politeia).
Basically, the acknowledgement of people as a permanent political institution.

Of course, Caesar Biden (and totally not WhatIsAUserName) summarized it best.

Mencius emphasized the significance of the common citizens in the state. While Confucianism generally regards rulers highly, he argued that it is acceptable for the subjects to overthrow or even kill a ruler who ignores the people's needs and rules harshly. This is because a ruler who does not rule justly is no longer a true ruler.

Mencius's argument that unjust rulers may be overthrown is reminiscent of Socrates' argument in Book I of Plato's Republic.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mencius

How is this any different?
 
-first-quote-

-second quote-

-third quote-

With the caveat that I haven't read Kaldellis' book (but have looked at the thread a few months back about this book as well as the outside article linked in that thread), I want to criticize his argument that the Byzantine Empire was a republic because it was not some "Oriental despotism," because as I see it the term has some hazy, vague connotations that I would argue don't reflect China, at the very least. My post was more along the lines of "By these arguments, imperial China was a republic" and not "Great argument, now I realize imperial China was a republic too."

The argument that Kaldellis seems to be making is that there was not institutionalization of the people as a legal institution. Saying that the Roman people, or more specifically urban denizens of Constantinople "no longer had a legal role in the election of leaders or legislators, but they often played an extralegal role in the making and unmaking of emperors" (from the linked article) sounds exactly applicable to many pre-modern states where the populace as a whole could vote with their pitchforks, so to speak. The next part, "[Emperors'] legitimacy depended on popularity and not on a claim of divine right or constitutional correctness" sounds also potentially applicable at least to China, where rebellion against an unpopular ruler could be justified and widespread. The rebellions that ended the Qin and Sui Dynasties could be examples of this.

However, I would admit that "constitutional correctness" did play some role in keeping Chinese emperors on the throne, and that goes to my second argument: that Chinese emperors also held their thrones in trust. Under a paradigm partly related to the Mandate of Heaven, every Emperor was expected to rule the throne wisely and pass it on to his sons. He held it in trust so that he could guard the fortune and reputation of patrilineal consanguines in the imperial family, and to some extent affines as well. The Emperor could not, therefore, wield absolute power where such exercise threatened the inheritance by posterity.[1] Additionally, the Emperor was expected to protect the nation, particularly to preserve both the ancestral temples of past Emperors (because the fortunes of the dynasty were thought linked to the fortune of China) as well as the altars of soil and grain (who represented China itself. Monarchs who threatened this order could be deposed legally or extralegally. An example of the former would be the Prince of Changyi, whose reported violation of mourning rituals warranted his legal deposition by the Empress Dowager. An example of the latter would be Emperor Yang of Sui, who was deposed in a military coup by his officials while the rest of China was plunged into civil war. Far from being absolutism, this is just more proof that in the real world, absolute authority is rare even in China.

True despotism, in my opinion, should be reserved for those rare instances where despots are able to drive their country basically into collective mass suicide with little or no personal repercussions. Paraguay in the War of the Triple Alliance or Cambodia under the Khmer Rouge could count. "Despotism" would therefore not be synonymous with pre-modern absolute monarchy.

The Emperors, additionally, did need to hold themselves responsible to the people: peasant revolts were not always seen as expressions of the will of Heaven, because I admit that the Mandate of Heaven is not a frequently expressed topic), but also as failures of the Emperor himself. If there were droughts or plagues or floods, then the responsibility then fell on the Emperor.

The example of Mencius does fit in, I think, by showing that the expression of popular discontent did take away from the legitimacy of the monarch, but I'll let supporters of the Byzantine Republic theory address that first.

These are my assessments of "Oriental despotism" as I am trying to decipher from what the "Byzantine Republic" was not. I have no opinion on whether the Byzantine Empire carried over Roman aspects regarding republics. There are probably other ideas I didn't address, so anybody can point out the areas I missed.

[1] In this respect, the system of polygamy in imperial China was justified on the notion that the Emperor should produce many sons for the family line, and not on the notion that as Emperor all the women in the empire were available for his pleasure. I bet that the latter notion would be a part of the "Oriental despotism" concept.
 

Spengler

Banned
Once in a while, I like posting about a book that I've read recently, because it tends to open up some AH opportunities. The latest one is the Byzantine Republic, by Anthony Kaldellis, which attacks the idea that the Byzantine Empire was an oriental despotism. A few general points:

He makes an interesting point that I ignore. I tend to see it as a decadent and weak state, but the Byzantine Empire survived over a thousand years (longer if you see it as a continuation of the Roman state); that gives it a pretty good run as a society.

Second, the discourse doesn't reflect an oriental despotism, where the subjects are those for the Emperor to do with as he wills. On the contrary, the rhetoric and ideology sees the emperor as holding the state in trust for the people. And the rhetoric makes a distinction between the king and country, as it were; the historian Leon wrote that "soldiers fight on behalf of our basileia and the Christ-loving politeia of the Romans." In this light, the language of the last emperor is pretty revealing: "I do not have the right to give you the City, nor does anyone else of those who live in it. By a collective decision, we will all willingly die and not try to save our lives."

Or, to take a late 11th century example: a tyrant takes power by force; the basileus "receives power "by the good will of the multitude and the consent of the people." This is around the same time that Alexius Commenus tried to put Constantine Doukas on the throne, but, according to a chronicler, "the demos, with one voice, loudly shouted that they did not want to be ruled by him" and the coup fizzled.

There are surprising signs of secularism that we ignore. Chroniclers had no problem noting that an emperor was a deviant Arian heretic but just towards his subjects and restrained in his lifestyle; and many Byzantine chroniclers had no problem blaming the rise of the Turks or foreign policy losses on poor management.

It's an interesting book, and I recommend it.
Have you read Lost to the West or Timothy Greggory?


Also lets be honest here, in many ways the idea of "oriental despotism" is a relic of the enlightenment. Not actually founded on any reality that ever existed but on prejudiced English and Frenchmen writing in the 18th century
 
How is this any different?

I can't make it any simpler : confucianism political ethos is about, when the ruler is not virtuous, ruled people can overthrow him.

Byzantine political ethos consider ruled as having an inherent right, all the time, to intervene on political matters.

One is about moral and religious political concept, one is about institutional and secular concept.
One is about people being institutionalised as such, the other is about an exceptional feature.
One is about individual rulers and how they could be overthrow, the other is about whole dynasties.

I want to criticize his argument that the Byzantine Empire was a republic because it was not some "Oriental despotism," because as I see it the term has some hazy, vague connotations that I would argue don't reflect China, at the very least.
The point of the book isn't "Byzantium wasn't one of these oriental despostic countries", but that Byzantium simply doesn't fit this biased model.

Of course it doesn't reflect China as well, at this point I think it's a given. But, focusing on Byzantium, we see a continuity of the idea of republic (more exactly a monarchical republic) that existed in classical and late Roman Empire.

So, I think you're being confused there : the book isn't about calling off despotism on everyone else, but point the political continuity between Rome and Byzantium on the political concept of republic.

Saying that the Roman people, or more specifically urban denizens of Constantinople
Which is again in the aforementioned historical continuity tough, as Roman people was effectively the people of Rome rather than the people of Romania.

"no longer had a legal role in the election of leaders or legislators, but they often played an extralegal role in the making and unmaking of emperors" (from the linked article) sounds exactly applicable to many pre-modern states where the populace as a whole could vote with their pitchforks, so to speak.
It was more than that : it was a role that was expected to happen at all times, a "right to revolt" rather than a "right to overthrow". The emperor was expected to take care of this, not because of his virtues or absence of virtues, but because it was considered a legitimate political necessity.

What's really important there, is not so much the popular involvement in politics (which wasn't that widespread : relatively few peasant or urban revolts in ancient and medieval history actually had as a goal a political change at the head of the state) that this involvement was seen as para-legal and institutionalised rather than extra-legal and exceptionnal.

The rebellions that ended the Qin and Sui Dynasties could be examples of this.
There's some important differences, tough : not only the "right to overthrow" was tied up to the ruler's virtues and capacities (when Roman people was expected to be interested and to meddle with political matters as a basic function, no matter the emperor), but the concept itself of Mandate of Heaven wasn't carried only by the people on its strict sense.

Zhou Dynasty use of the concept (that they may have forged or importantly modified, admittedly) is really about a dynasty chasing another, not peasant revolts getting to choose their ruler, would have they allowed to overthrow the precedent.

Which is eventually one main difference : Byzantine changes were not about changes of dynasties, but of emperor. It happened that, due to a lack of support, one emperor had to give away the place to a brother or a nepos (to not talk about the non-dynastic succession that happened at times).

There was a less important focus on dynasty that you had in China, or in western Europe, and significantly closer to what you had in Rome.

True despotism, in my opinion, should be reserved for those rare instances where despots are able to drive their country basically into collective mass suicide with little or no personal repercussions.
Seriously, how come that when one talks about byzantine political concepts, one pull "but China wasn't a despotism!".
Nobody said that : it's just...come from nowhere and even if it's not your intent, looks like the mother of all strawmen.

So, let's me clarify one and for all, so that we can get rid of it in the discussion : nobody claims ancient China was an "oriental despotism", it's just about Byzantium having political concepts that were in the line of Roman republicanism (contrary to the really idiotic view of Gibbons on it*) that were quite distinct but also defining of its political life.
That China held different political values, institutions and ethos have really as much to do than if I mentioned the organisation of North American tribes and confederations saying "ah, this is not oriental despotism as well, so Byzantium didn't have a distinct concept of republicanism".

*As well virtually anything else

Also lets be honest here, in many ways the idea of "oriental despotism" is a relic of the enlightenment. Not actually founded on any reality that ever existed but on prejudiced English and Frenchmen writing in the 18th century

You'd be surprised how much the concept was widespread, and not dealt off before the early XXth at very best. Heck, it still plagues many para-academical historiography, to say nothing on popular or ideological conceptions.

(The marxist "Asian mode of production" is a really shining exemple of this)
 
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