I had deleted the response, Leo. As you like it, I have reposted. I wasn't angry, I just a bit confused as we seemed to be in agreement.
The Whirlwind was the best aircraft to fill the specification with materials and technology available at the time. Had the Merlins been on the table at the time, the results would have been different. The Welkin's flaws were based on the high-aspect ratio wing. OOPS. The Canberra showed that he did learn his lesson. The Whirlwind could not be modified to meet the specification of power-projection fighter directly, but it was closest to the mark at the time and could have been built to parameters suitable to the task, had it been known what to build before they built it. Foresight is sometimes an AH scam, but DeHavilland built the Mossie with it, and it worked then. A couple of my original drawings at the beginning of the thread show a Whirlwind and a Welkin with Hornet wings. The Hornet's wings used an airfoil from the future and the engines used carburetors of the Bendix-Stromberg variety which British engine manufacturers resisted for the longest time. But the thickness/chord ratio of the Hornet wing, and RAF34 airfoil of the Mossie would, with current Merlin engines, have afforded the revised Whirlwind, a lower landing speed, lower wing loading, better turning performance, and greater internal fuel volume. The Whirlwind still used the HS Mk1 cannon with 60 round drums, but that's an armament challenge which was addressed eventually.
The development and production rates applied to the Whirlwind show that the Air Ministry really didn't want it. What if they did? The British airplane industry possessed a great number of brilliant designers, engineers, and aerodynamicists, spread throughout a number of companies. Sometimes, their brilliance was addressed, and sometimes, it wasn't. This is an aspect which you can't look up in Wiki. Some companies used their design staffs to the utmost, and ended up with the Mossie. Some had a chief engineer who considered himself brilliant, and resisted innovation and input from others which may have resulted in better machines sooner. Some just had nothing. And it showed.
While the Lockheed company had a brilliant team, the P-38 was designed to a specification for a high-speed fast-climbing intercepter with effective armament. Production was not expected to exceed 50 units. Mass production was not an issue, and they would be made as a batch. The turbo's intercooler system was never expected to deal with engines of higher performance, and by P-38G, it was strangling performance. The P-38J with the same engine, but with a chin-mounted intercooler, had virtually the same top speed, due to the adverse aerodynamics of the new intercooler, but the climb rate improved beyond belief, due to the increased power available from the same engine. The use of space from the old intercooler also allowed a great increase in internal fuel volume, expanding the mission capability of the machine greatly. The history of the Lockheed machine showed that foresight would have aided development of the P-38, the machine that was always too needed to be fixed.
I think any point of disagreement is due to lack of clarity on my part.
I agree that given foresight back in the 1930s, Westland probably would have designed a Whirlwind better suited to the needs of the WW II. Likewise, Lockheed would have designed the P-38 with mass production in mind and a better set up for the intercoolers. I was not addressing that point.
The point I was making, was if Westland was seeking to make a better Whirlwind after 1940, there seems to be little chance of success. The Whirlwind was too tight a design to improve and Westland's record at project management was not good based on the Welkin.
Certainly, there can be no doubt that the Whirlwind was too small and complicated to easily upgrade. You, have said as much. Part of the problem was Teddy Petter's design philosophy. I recall reading a story of Petter, Westland's top designer, examining the Beaufighter and feeling there was too much unnecessary space, to which the Beaufignter's designer noted it allowed for contingencies. Petter apparently shrugged this off. Petter tended to design very tight airplanes. This led to the Whirlwind being a very difficult plane to repair, as well as to modify.
This tendency of Petter appeared again in the EE Lightning, another Petter twin engined fighter whose tight design limited its versatility. (This is not to say that Petter was not gifted. The Lightning was an amazing aircraft, as was the Canberra. The Canberra was just more practical.)
That said, for the brief window of time, the Whirlwind was performance wise a very good plane when compared to its contemporaries. However, it offered no huge advantages as time wore on, and it was not able to be easily developed into something else that was bigger and better as was done with such as aircraft as the Spitfire, P-51 or P-38.
I should have been more clear of the relationship of the Welkin to Whirlwind. It definitely was not a direct follow-on. Rather, it was new aircraft based on knowledge Westland obtained from building the Whirlwind.
I am well aware of the failings of the Welkin's wing, as we have discussed this at length. (No pun intended.) It's also in the Wikipedia

and numerous other sources. I was also aware that the lesson the wing being learned was applied to the Canberra. Of course, the other failing of the Welkin are listed there and elsewhere.
One of my points was not to restate the obvious--that the Welkin was flawed as an aircraft. Rather, I was trying to raise the point that the Welkin showed Westland had flaws in its handling of the design process and procurement process, and these suggest that Westland probably would not have fared better in producing a super Whirlwind. Consequently, these management failures that appeared in the Welkin development suggest that Westland would not have been able to create an enlarged/improved Whirlwind in any timely fashion.
That the Air Ministry really did not want the Whirlwind or at least did not know what to do with it is most likely true. Even with that aside, the evidence is dubious Westland was capable of designing a more powerful successor to the Whirlwind in time given the performance of Westland in the Welkin debacle. Similarly, Westland's handling of the Welkin (and even the Whirlwind) suggested that the management at Westland lacked some of the skills needed to work optimally with the Air Ministry.
Being able to work with the Air Ministry or other government ministry/agency is an extremely vital skill that is often discounted in the counter-factuals. I believe you have made this point repeatedly, such as when you discuss the role of the Fifth Sealord.