The British Civil War(s) 1984–1986

Hi I am enjoying your TL. I thought it a bit fantastical at first but I like the way you are building it and I particularly liked your description of the left with the small idealistic (purist) groups and the larger manipulative ones. I never came across the WRP buy had similar feelings about the SWP who just looked for a bandwagon to jump on.
 
Excellent timeline, I'm very much e joying the build-up. Reading the title I was expecting it to be a little ASB at least, but you've certainly pulled off the scenario very well. Keep it up!
 

James G

Gone Fishin'
One thing to remember is that the RAF Regiment is not as well versed in this period in dealing with tense confrontations with unruly civilians. The Army (well, bits of it) and the Royal Marines were all too familiar with such incidents, and knew how to contain a confrontation. I'm not entirely convinced that the RAF Regiment would have this experience. As a result, it would be very easy for them to overreact to a situation. How that could pan out is a bit of an open question. My first guess would be that it wouldn't end well for protesters, and the publicity fall-out would be horrible for all concerned.



Ulster is an area I know a bit about.

Question on the military and Ulster. As you mentioned the RAF Regiment not having contact with unruly civilians but the Army and the Royal Marines having so, what was the scale of the military deployments to Ulster in terms of units? What I mean is that I know that infantry units did tours of Ulster under the BANNER mission and also that Royal Armoured Corps and Royal Artillery formations - heavy gear (tanks, howitzers) left behind - did too but who else did. Royal Engineers? Signalsmen? Service units too?

Hi I am enjoying your TL. I thought it a bit fantastical at first but I like the way you are building it and I particularly liked your description of the left with the small idealistic (purist) groups and the larger manipulative ones. I never came across the WRP buy had similar feelings about the SWP who just looked for a bandwagon to jump on.

Thank you for the kind words and the candour too; I hope not to disappoint. The political side is something I have recently become versed in - mistakes are probably there aplenty - but I have read about the WRP in the past and had a recent interest in the SWP too. Hi-jacking a popular cause and using it for their own ends is typical, especially with the latter. As the WRP, it was a crazy organisation led by a rapist.

Excellent timeline, I'm very much e joying the build-up. Reading the title I was expecting it to be a little ASB at least, but you've certainly pulled off the scenario very well. Keep it up!

Thank you, I hope to keep your interest. Skippy isn't allowed to play here!
I have had thoughts since about maybe that title was the wrong choice: it might have given the 'WTF' reaction. 'Tears of the Lion' or something like that might have been an idea but the story is a civil war overall.
 
Question on the military and Ulster. As you mentioned the RAF Regiment not having contact with unruly civilians but the Army and the Royal Marines having so, what was the scale of the military deployments to Ulster in terms of units? What I mean is that I know that infantry units did tours of Ulster under the BANNER mission and also that Royal Armoured Corps and Royal Artillery formations - heavy gear (tanks, howitzers) left behind - did too but who else did. Royal Engineers? Signalsmen? Service units too?

What follows is the viewpoint of a Royal Marine at the time. You are warned that I do not necessarily have an objective viewpoint.

Rough rule of thumb. Infantry units did proper tours. Dealing with the situations that arose needed specialist infantry training, which artillery and armoured units - for obvious reasons - didn't have a great deal of. Signallers, engineers, medics, and the like would go out as individuals attached to infantry patrols (and were basically shepherded around, as they were generally there so the boots could make use of their specialist expertise).

Guards units did go out occasionally. They weren't very good. They didn't seem to think they had much to learn from the people who'd done it before. I even came across one Guard Lt who insisted that I needed to salute him when out on patrol, which rather surprised me, so I felt I should explain to him that this was perhaps not the greatest idea in the world. Basically, Guards units were more trouble than they were worth. They didn't much care for being away from their natural habitat of the important task of patrolling The Mall.

The SAS didn't do standard patrols. They basically played Cowboys and Indians, with debatable success.

The Paras did patrols, but it has to be said that the local people did not much care for them. Paratrooper training is not ideal for situations where restraint is called for, hence events such as Bloody Sunday.

The feature about dealing with unruly civilian crowds is that the response has to be appropriate. A situation can be moving very quickly, you're invariably massively outnumbered by the crowd, and while you've got far more firepower at your disposal than they have, you're not allowed to use it. They'll try and provoke you into an over-reaction. They'll throw bricks and bottles, and you've just got to take it. You've got CS gas and baton rounds at your disposal, but the first isn't hugely effective, and the second is only a ranged weapon with a very generous definition of ranged. What you have to do is separate out groups of the crowd, and persuade it to disperse, and break a crowd up into little bits. That requires being able to trust the guy at your back, because if you get isolated in such a crowd, you're dead meat. There are certain dispersal persuaders one has available, but they take some training to use effectively.

HTH.
 

James G

Gone Fishin'
What follows is the viewpoint of a Royal Marine at the time. You are warned that I do not necessarily have an objective viewpoint.

Rough rule of thumb. Infantry units did proper tours. Dealing with the situations that arose needed specialist infantry training, which artillery and armoured units - for obvious reasons - didn't have a great deal of. Signallers, engineers, medics, and the like would go out as individuals attached to infantry patrols (and were basically shepherded around, as they were generally there so the boots could make use of their specialist expertise).

Guards units did go out occasionally. They weren't very good. They didn't seem to think they had much to learn from the people who'd done it before. I even came across one Guard Lt who insisted that I needed to salute him when out on patrol, which rather surprised me, so I felt I should explain to him that this was perhaps not the greatest idea in the world. Basically, Guards units were more trouble than they were worth. They didn't much care for being away from their natural habitat of the important task of patrolling The Mall.

The SAS didn't do standard patrols. They basically played Cowboys and Indians, with debatable success.

The Paras did patrols, but it has to be said that the local people did not much care for them. Paratrooper training is not ideal for situations where restraint is called for, hence events such as Bloody Sunday.

The feature about dealing with unruly civilian crowds is that the response has to be appropriate. A situation can be moving very quickly, you're invariably massively outnumbered by the crowd, and while you've got far more firepower at your disposal than they have, you're not allowed to use it. They'll try and provoke you into an over-reaction. They'll throw bricks and bottles, and you've just got to take it. You've got CS gas and baton rounds at your disposal, but the first isn't hugely effective, and the second is only a ranged weapon with a very generous definition of ranged. What you have to do is separate out groups of the crowd, and persuade it to disperse, and break a crowd up into little bits. That requires being able to trust the guy at your back, because if you get isolated in such a crowd, you're dead meat. There are certain dispersal persuaders one has available, but they take some training to use effectively.

HTH.

Nothing wrong with bias in my book.
The info on dealing with protesters is very helpful, thank you.
Those I things I need to remember for the future of the story.
 
Anarchy

James G

Gone Fishin'
Anarchy

A bazooka was too much. It was an over-the-top choice of weapon for the engaged target. The shiny new toy was one of several and none had been used yet. An opportunity presented itself, one limited by time, where a bazooka was a guarantee of the desired result. A machine gun, even automatic rifles, would have probably assured the outcome wanted… but a bazooka really would do the job. It was also a test too, to see if such a weapon was as useful as promised and actually did work.

One of five that they had been sent by fellow supporters of ‘the cause’ from across on the other side of the North Atlantic, a US Army issue M72 LAW bazooka was put to use by the Irish National Liberation Army (INLA) on June 12th to kill Ian Paisley. His car was violently disassembled with him and three others inside when travelling outside Belfast. The INLA volunteers who undertook the action were left stunned by the blast as it caused more destruction than they anticipated and also the physical effects they themselves felt at being far too close to the explosion and shockwave. The launch tube for the rocket was dropped by the man who had fired it and he ran away alongside those with him – carrying pistols and a walkie-talkie – leaving that behind instead of taking it with them as they were meant to; there would be something for the security forces to look into. A trace would later reveal the history of the weapon and how it was meant to have been destroyed after removal from its guarded military arsenal because it was broken beyond repair yet somehow ended up in Ulster in the hands of terrorists.

Meanwhile, Paisley was dead along with those travelling with him. The leader of the Democratic Unionist Party and a controversial man – to say the least – had been murdered in such a dramatic fashion by Irish Republicans.


Ulster had been alight in conflict since the end of the 60s. It was a long and complicated situation with radicalisation happening long before and being entrenched; to many outsiders, the conflict there was a civil war in all but name. The conflict in Northern Ireland had spread far and wide and away from Ulster too.

Tebbit had paid attention to the violence there during his premiership yet not as much as he intended to. There had been other matters which had demanded his attention and there was also the feeling that nothing could be realistically done to solve the problems in Ulster therefore the best approach was to keep a lid on things. He wouldn’t stand for anarchy though and had made sure that the security services in the form of the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC), MI-5 and the British Armed Forces on deployment there did their best. Yet, the killings had continued and so had other violence. Armed groups in Ulster attacked each other and innocent civilians. Weapons were smuggled in and only some of them stopped with few arrests made. No endgame could be seen. Too many groups were full of hardened murderers who were invested in the violence and their political leaders kept up the rhetoric.

Foot’s new government had different ideas. They wanted dialogue on Northern Ireland towards a political solution rather than more of the same. There was the possibility of demilitarising Ulster, but only in the long-run. That was seen as possible when the chance was truly given to get politicians talking. The ordinary people in Northern Ireland weren’t interested in violence, they wanted peace. Northern Ireland Secretary Rees was a little more realistic than those who had formed the party policy on Ulster and got their ideas into the manifesto. He personally rated the chances of peace as zero and would see that the security forces wouldn’t be withdrawn unless the violence stopped… which it wasn’t going to. He did try to open dialogue though with the best of intentions; everyone knows what happens to best intentions.

Many of those on the Unionist side politically, and who were often referred to as Loyalists when to some they were anything but, saw the Labour victory at the polls in 1984 as the coming apocalypse. Labour was going to sell them out to ‘Dublin and Popery’. The Falklands – populated by fellow Britons like them – had been surrendered by the last government and the new one would give Ulster to the Republic of Ireland. Paisley, a reverend and thus man of the cloth, was one of the most outspoken and prominent proponents of opposing such a thing. He was intransigent in his beliefs and people paid attention to him when he spoke whether they agreed with him or not. Politically, other politicians on the Unionist side had greater influence yet Paisley was the one who gained all of the attention in the public eye. He had denounced the new government in London as ‘communists’ – his focus was less so on ministers but rather the outspoken comments from other Labour MPs – and promised to stop such a surrender from them. As was his way, Paisley always stopped short of calling for violence directly but the interpretation of his words since the general election by those who were influenced by his ideas was always that of violence. At the same time, others on the Unionist side were warning of the same thing occurring: Labour was going to abandon Ulster to the Republican terrorists and Dublin. A surrender to Popery must be stopped, Paisley had said, and he declared that it would be.


In the lead-up to the assassination of Paisley, those in the INLA – less well known than the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA) but just as violent – had been listening to what he had been saying and the words of others too. The rhetoric was that of fighting against the Catholic people in Northern Ireland, not combatting the political will from London: that was how they saw it. Paisley was the face of this and the figure of hatred. It was he that was going to lead that effort and the new government there in London – no friends of the INLA – would be incapable of stopping the anarchy and genocide against the Catholics in Northern Ireland that they feared was coming. Their fear was just as passionate as Paisley’s.

Weapons reached the INLA just like they did the PIRA from various sources. Money was raised to buy them from those who supported the cause either directly understanding what was going on or having a lack of real grasp of the situation. The buckets passed around the bars of Boston and elsewhere in New England across the North Atlantic were one manner of raising money; others were from armed robberies and extortion. Guns and other weapons – explosives and heavy weapons – were brought from whoever would sell them and not be caught doing so. Whatever could be got from whomever they were available from was gained: there was talk of ideology with weapons but that ignored the practically of getting their hands on such things. More were always wanted too, especially those that could give a better ‘bang for the buck’.

The bazookas which were officially listed as destroyed by the US Army were part of the latest cache gained by the INLA, a man from the United States promised them that bang for the buck. They believed that their rivals in the PIRA had the same sort of weapons but more than that they wanted something to take on the security services with. Even heavier weapons were sought too yet the stolen M72s would certainly do. Further deliveries had been promised later. The INLA sat on their bazooka shipment for a while and sought an opportunity to use them. They considered attacking several British Army bases yet kept looking for the perfect target. Some of the shot-callers in the terrorist group had a concern too that the bazookas might be faulty as they were officially supposed to be as well. They had a new source who supplied these weapons and wanted a test. A test would mean using one of the five weapons and they were one-shot pieces of equipment. That made them hesitant yet eager too.

A week before they killed Paisley, he had made a dramatic speech and fired up his audience. The coded terms he used were, the INLA decided, certainly a call to begin a slaughter of their people by the Loyalist groups that shared his ideology. There was an understanding that killing him would inflame matters greatly but the risk was judged worth it. Those whose task it was to gather intelligence made a lucky breakthrough on his movements to where he would be at a certain time on a certain day. The decision was made to kill him and use one of the bazookas. It would also send a message using such a weapon, one to show that the INLA was just as lethal as the bigger PIRA and also capable of doing what their rivals couldn’t and eliminating the face of genocide-baiting Loyalism.


Immediately after the death of Paisley, there was the calm before the storm. The shocking news of the death of such a man as he, and in such a fashion too, took some time to sink in. That was just half a day though. Rees was in London at the time after the vote in the Commons the night before had brought about a Cabinet meeting and he flew back at once to Ulster. He had been forced by the party whips to attend the vote that had been lost when he was in the middle of battles with civil servants opposing the changes he wished to bring about. On his way to Ulster from Whitehall, he knew that he was jumping out of the frying pan and into the fire.

The Province erupted into violence. There were riots and shootings. That night and into the next day it continued. It couldn’t be stopped no matter what was tried. Attacks were made against Catholic communities and against those of Protestants too. Terrorist groups on both sides quickly had their armed men out and the security forces in the middle did as well but anarchy came across Ulster. An attempt was made to kill Martin McGuinness, a high-profile Nationalist political figure, but it was a failure on the part of his attempted Loyalists assassins: more ‘success’ was had against those with less profile. The president of Sein Fein, Gerry Adams (who had failed to get elected in May), was wounded by a bomb and did what McGuiness did in quietly leaving Ulster for the time being. They ran away to save their own lives though without publicity. This was done because the Loyalists had rapidly upped the level of violence and the security services, as well as Republican gunmen, couldn’t stop it.

Loyalist terror groups like the proscribed Loyalist Volunteer Force (LVF), Red Hand Commando (RHC) and the Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF) along with the legal but just as guilty Ulster Defence Association (UDA) were out in force seeking vengeance. They were joined by elements of the Protestant population who previously only supported the Loyalist groups in part while at other times upset at the violence: recruits flooded to these groups ready to take up arms and fight due to the outrage of the Paisley assassination. It was the same with the INLA and the PIRA: they fought on the streets and gained more active recruits in response to what the Loyalists were doing. Supposedly standing between them though with selective parts giving sympathy to the Loyalists, were the security forces who were overwhelmed by the widespread and ceaseless violence. They had informers from the Loyalists and Republican groups giving them intelligence yet everything happened so fast. The RUC cancelled all police leave and called out Reserve Constables en mass. The British Armed Forces on Operation Banner duties put all available troops out to try to break-up the violence while also soon requesting more to be urgently sent to Ulster. In addition, both the RUC and the military came under attack from the INLA and the PIRA while they were trying to stop all of this.

What wasn’t noticeable in immediate reaction was the sudden inactivity from others on the Loyalist side politically: Peter Robinson being a prime example. The Ulster Defence Regiment (UDR) wasn’t a factor either, that part-time volunteer reserve force who were stationed in Ulster and a hotbed of questionable loyalties.

Rees and those in power could do nothing to stop the now open killings taking place as the bloodbath started and showed no sign of stopping. Tit-for-tat shootings had very quickly become the start of the full on civil war in Ulster that had always been feared was waiting to occur if the situation was right for that.

At a time like this, everyone should have been paying full attention to Ulster. Other things were going on though.
 

Jack Brisco

Banned
James G,

You may have already made preparations for this, but once things really hit the fan it would be interesting to see the life of an average British family during this time.

On another subject, do you see the US military flying their dependents out of the UK when/before things start going totally crazy?
 
Methinks there will be blowback once the bazooka is traced to the US military; all hell is fixing to break loose...
 

James G

Gone Fishin'
James G,

You may have already made preparations for this, but once things really hit the fan it would be interesting to see the life of an average British family during this time.

On another subject, do you see the US military flying their dependents out of the UK when/before things start going totally crazy?

The initial nugget of an idea for the whole thing was similar to that; a post war reflection from someone who was young talking years later. As with all good ideas, they grow and evolve. That isn't in my plans at the minute. I'll sleep on it and see how that could work.
American military dependents will go home. The US military will leave too... temporarily.

How will the Soviets react to this?

Will the KGB be creating some red militias?
The superpowers will play a role.
No on red militias. I don't see that working. There is a KGB element planned though small in reality, immense in the minds/fears of others.
 
Methinks there will be blowback once the bazooka is traced to the US military; all hell is fixing to break loose...

I doubt it. Historically, during the 1970s, several tons of kit went walkabout from US military stocks into Northern Ireland. RN gun running patrols intercepted fair amounts, and it was returned to the USA, complete with listing of stock numbers so it could be identified where it had originated from and which bases were lax in stock control. This was met with, effectively, a shrug of the shoulders.

Some of it was serious kit. Red-Eye surface-to-air missiles, flamethrowers, claymore mines, you name it, we intercepted it. I've no way of knowing how the information was received by the US authorities, but there was no noticeable effect on the flow. Obviously, I've no way of knowing what proportion of stuff got through undetected, but literally tons of US military stocks was intercepted, identified, and returned. All hell breaking loose? I rather doubt it. It didn't during the 1970s, so I see no reason why it should now. There were those of us who kept intercepting the bloody stuff who theorised that the US military was happy to see their kit getting field tested.

Incidentally, the author describes the INLA using a obsolete bazooka. They would have had access to much more up-to-date kit if they choose to use it.

The author uses a phrase describing the INLA as "just as violent" as the PIRA. Well, rather more. The PIRA generally took a little bit of care around civilians (opinions differ as to how generally, how much care, and who was defined as a civilian and who was a "legitimate military target"); they'd phone in bomb warnings, for example (usually, and not always successfully). That was because they wanted disruption rather than high casualties. They didn't mind if they got high civilian casualties, but it wasn't the objective. The INLA, however, were murderous bastards. For example, in one incident, they entered a Pentecostal church during a Sunday Service and opened fire on the congregation, which obviously included women and children. The INLA were not as effective as they might have been because, in pure Life of Brian fashion, they kept splitting into splinter groups and spent more time attacking each other as they did attacking what they would have perceived as the common enemy.

By 1983, the INLA was rendered pretty much insignificant, because they had been so thoroughly infiltrated by MI5 that Five knew operational plans generally before the strike teams did. The only strikes that were carried out after this period were those that were undertaken on local initiative. If the plan went through the leadership, Five knew about it.
 
With all hell breaking loose, I was referring to the civil war soon to be breaking out, David, not the bazooka being traced (I wish I had made that clearer).

BTW, David, hope your TL gets at least a Turtledove nomination...
 
As someone who lives in Boston I can definitely understand why U.S officials would react with a shrug.

I wonder how much of a 'war' this civil war will be? Lasting 2 years I imagine somewhat intense, I'm expecting something closer to the Austrian Civil War rather than the Spanish Civil War to use two interwar examples.
 
I doubt it. Historically, during the 1970s, several tons of kit went walkabout from US military stocks into Northern Ireland. RN gun running patrols intercepted fair amounts, and it was returned to the USA, complete with listing of stock numbers so it could be identified where it had originated from and which bases were lax in stock control. This was met with, effectively, a shrug of the shoulders.

Some of it was serious kit. Red-Eye surface-to-air missiles, flamethrowers, claymore mines, you name it, we intercepted it. I've no way of knowing how the information was received by the US authorities, but there was no noticeable effect on the flow. Obviously, I've no way of knowing what proportion of stuff got through undetected, but literally tons of US military stocks was intercepted, identified, and returned. All hell breaking loose? I rather doubt it. It didn't during the 1970s, so I see no reason why it should now. There were those of us who kept intercepting the bloody stuff who theorised that the US military was happy to see their kit getting field tested.

Incidentally, the author describes the INLA using a obsolete bazooka. They would have had access to much more up-to-date kit if they choose to use it.

The author uses a phrase describing the INLA as "just as violent" as the PIRA. Well, rather more. The PIRA generally took a little bit of care around civilians (opinions differ as to how generally, how much care, and who was defined as a civilian and who was a "legitimate military target"); they'd phone in bomb warnings, for example (usually, and not always successfully). That was because they wanted disruption rather than high casualties. They didn't mind if they got high civilian casualties, but it wasn't the objective. The INLA, however, were murderous bastards. For example, in one incident, they entered a Pentecostal church during a Sunday Service and opened fire on the congregation, which obviously included women and children. The INLA were not as effective as they might have been because, in pure Life of Brian fashion, they kept splitting into splinter groups and spent more time attacking each other as they did attacking what they would have perceived as the common enemy.

By 1983, the INLA was rendered pretty much insignificant, because they had been so thoroughly infiltrated by MI5 that Five knew operational plans generally before the strike teams did. The only strikes that were carried out after this period were those that were undertaken on local initiative. If the plan went through the leadership, Five knew about it.
In the USA the Harrison network acquired several hundred pieces of small arms including M-16 rifles (>600), M-10 sub-machine guns (~350), MP-5 sub-machine guns (~100), M-14 rifles (>300 stolen plus more acquired as surplus through NMP) and over thirty M-60 GPMGs. Plus LAW/M-72 rockets, M-2 mortars, M-67 recoilless rifles, hand grenades. Redeye surface-to-air missiles and a horde of obsolete stuff (Garands, M-2 carbines, M-3 sub-machine guns, BARs, Browning machine gun et cetera, much from NG armouries).

There was a US government report (OIG IIRR) which I'll try a dig out, that stated that US military arms thefts from 1970 to 1977 were sufficient to arm a force of 8,000. Not all of that went to the IRA, but a sizable amount did.
Then there were thefts in the UK (averaging around 100 weapons per year), Norway and Switzerland (a prime source for the European market in those days, supplying the RAF, Basques, various French groups as well as the IRA).
 
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