Dave Shoup, remember that this is only a list of the British divisions. It does not include the African, Australian, Canadian, Indian, New Zealand and Polish divisions serving with the British, in NW Europe, the Middle East & Mediterranean and India.
- Home (L.E.) are infantry divisions on the Lower Establishment.
- N. Africa are divisions that were actually fighting in North Africa to May 1943. Some of the divisions listed as being in Egypt from 31s May 1943 onwards may not have been in Egypt, but were in Libya or French North Africa.
- Italy includes divisions that took part in the invasion of Scilly.
- India includes divisions in Burma.
And none of 1, 2, or 4 have any bearing on why sending ~20,000 or so physically fit British 18- and 19-year-olds into the coal mines, rather then the British Army infantry replacement pipeline for 21st Army Group or 15th Army Group, was a good decision or not, do they?
As far as 3 goes, obviously the transfer of the British 1st Airborne, 5th Infantry, 7th Armoured, and 50th and 51st infantry divisions, plus various separate brigades, corps and army troops, and the XXX Corps headquarters, makes it clear that the combat formations the British deployed into Italy in 1943-45 and northwestern Europe in 1944-45 were equivalents. Still has no bearing on whether it was wise policy to send ~20,000 or so physically fit British 18- and 19-year-olds into the coal mines, rather then the British Army infantry replacement pipeline for 21st Army Group
or 15th Army Group.
It would be an increase.
As you can see from the table the number of British divisions in 21st Army Group increased from 11 at the end of June 1944 to 14 at the end of March 1945.
- 6th Airborne Division was replaced by 7th Armoured Division and 56th Infantry Division in July 1944, increasing the total from 11 to 12
- 79th Armoured Division arrived in August 1944, increasing the total to 13.
- 59th Infantry Division was replaced by 52nd Infantry Division in October 1944, maintaining the total at 13
- 50th Infantry Division was replaced by 6th Airborne Division in December 1944, maintaining the total at 13
- 6th Airborne Division returned to the UK on 24th February 1945, presumably to prepare for the Rhine crossing, reducing the total to 12
- 6th Airborne Division was back in 21st Army Group on 24th March 1945 and 5th Infantry Division had joined 21st Army group in March too, increasing the total to 14 divisions which was maintained until the end of the war in Europe.
1st Airborne Division was only in NW Europe from 17th to 29th September 1944 and didn't go to Norway until 10th May 1945. 1st Armoured Division was serving in Italy. I don't know why it was disbanded. It could have been to provide reinforcements for other units. It could also have been that the British Army didn't need 2 armoured divisions to fight in northern Italy.
That's all interesting, but after all, it would be difficult
not to increase the number of combat formations (divisions and brigades) in 21st Army Group between June, 1944 and VE Day. The question is whether the larger number - two more infantry divisions and three additional full strength armoured brigades - could have been sustained in action with the manpower ordered into the coal mines and/or the seven light infantry brigades raised by converting AA, CA, and SL battalions, rather than keeping these units as Royal Artillery.
Also, 79th Armoured Division was not a combat division; it was an administrative headquarters for a brigade of armoured engineers and two tank brigade headquarters that functioned as administrative headquarters for battalions equipped with the various specialized combat engineering vehicles the British developed in 1942-44.
And the 1st Armoured Division was broken up so the 18th Infantry Brigade could be disbanded in 1945 to provide infantry replacements for the rest of 8th Army; the 2nd Armoured Brigade remained in the 8th Army's order of battle until the end.
All of the above is from
Joslen.
I admit that the destruction of Normandie was nearly 2 years before the OP. I put it in to give an idea of how significant its loss was. However, the UK's manpower shortage had been an issue for some time, so I think it's legitimate to have some sort of alternative action taken sooner than the POD. I still think that you are overestimating the amount of spare shipping that was available and that it would be harder to find transport than you think even for these small numbers.
Not really, actually; moving 1,000 laborers across the Atlantic would have required the equivalent of one voyage each of two Liberty ships converted as
ad hoc troopers; more than 200 were converted for such duties from 1943 onward, historically.
As the table of divisions shows there wasn't a decrease in the number of British divisions NW Europe didn't decline between June 1944 and May 1945, it increased. Therefore, 21st Army Group would have needed more supplies would have been required for the 50th and 59th Divisions had they not been disbanded. Also note that from September 1943 to May 1944 an average of 6½ British divisions were fighting, compared to an average of 19 from June 1944 until the end of the war.
Actually, the loss of the three infantry divisions (including the 1st Airborne) and the 27th Armoured Brigade in northwest Europe, the loss of the 1st Armoured Division in Italy, and the diversion of the British 4th and 46th divisions (and the 23rd Armoured Brigade and the 4th Indian Division) from Italy to Greece in 1944-45 under Scobie's III Corps most
certainly decreased the number of British Army divisions deployed to active fronts in Europe, from 22 (Guards, 1st, 6th, 7th, and 11th Armoured divisions; 1st and 6th Airborne divisions; and 1st, 3rd, 4th, 5th, 15th, 43rd, 46th, 49th, 50th, 51st, 52nd, 53rd, 56th, 59th, and 78th Infantry divisions) to 16 (Guards, 6th, 7th, and 11th Armoured; 6th Airborne; and 1st, 3rd, 5th, 15th, 43rd, 49th, 51st, 52nd, 53rd, 56th, and 78th Infantry divisions). One can argue that a decease from 22 combat-capable divisions to 16 was insignificant, but it seems rather doubtful any general officer responsible for holding a given front - much less preparing for an offensive - would agree
Obviously, it was a good thing for the Allied cause that the US Army, the French, the Italians, the Poles, etc,. could fill in the gaps, in Italy and northwest Europe.
Likewise, given the realities of Allied production in 1944-45, there would be no need to disband combat forces to buildup equipment or supply pools. If nothing else, divisions could be "grounded" on the defensive or in theater reserve pending any supply build-up, and then go back into action - obviously, in 1945.