The Best Post-Pearl Harbor Allied Strategies

No, actually what you're doing here is applying your hindsight knowledge to make decisions actually made even more palatable than they were in OTL, in effect stovepiping historical decision making process into a fixed path instead of a road of possibilities. It's a well known phenomenom even when professional historians are discussing their pet projects.


Jukra,

I'm looking at what was known or guessed at then in an attempt to understand why the decisions made then were made the way they were made.

You, on the other hand, safely in front of your computer and risking no actual lives, are second guessing those decisions in the light of 70 years hindsight.

Not really. Combination of coastal tankers and barrel logistics (for the initial part) would have done fine too.

You truly have no comprehension of the subject. Petroleum is my business. Tankers and barrel logistics will not work, especially given a more active Luftwaffe and KM.

But PLUTO was part of the Allied (or to be more exact, British) engineering hero story to be used after the war.

PLUTO was more than post-war propaganda. As the people at the time saw things, PLUTO was a prerequisite.

No it would not. The Allies would simply attrit the German forces in contact with the Allied bridgehead by combination of naval gunfire (for first stage), tactical airpower isolating the immediate battlefield and above all by the excellent field artilllery both major Allied armies had. These were the main killers in 1944 and were ready for 1943.

Good god, you are clueless aren't you?

Naval gunfire? What if the bridgehead's front lines are beyond range of naval guns? And the Germans would be idiots not to pick up on that point. TacAir in 1943 isn't going to be as easy as it was in '44 against a less damaged Luftwaffe. As for artillery, much of that doctrine still needs to be worked out in places like Sicily and Italy.

Take a realistic look to mobile forces Germany had available for 1943.

Kursk?

Remember logistics and the German ability to concentrate their forces in France, and above all, to supply them from railheads onwards.

Which will be easier in 1943 than it was in 1944.

Logistics is the key.

Which makes me wonder why you're continually ignoring it. Many of the ships the Allied forces require for both landing and supply won't be available until 1944.

No one is going to challenge this heroic assumption. But why remain fixed to a series of questionable decisions even 70 years afterwards?

The only thing I'm challenging is this unthinking dismissal of the assumptions the people at the time were operating under.

The Allies could have built up their amphibious capacities faster, could have destroyed the Luftwaffe faster, and perhaps could have landed in France sooner as a result but they won't even consider landing in France in 1943 without major changes to the OTL's situation. They will not and indeed cannot successfully land in France with what was available to them in 1943 and what was available to Germany in 1943.


Bill
 

Cook

Banned
Naval gunfire? What if the bridgehead's front lines are beyond range of naval guns? And the Germans would be idiots not to pick up on that point. TacAir in 1943 isn't going to be as easy as it was in '44 against a less damaged Luftwaffe. As for artillery, much of that doctrine still needs to be worked out in places like Sicily and Italy.

The Sicilian Campaign is a very good example of how limited Allied Tactical Air Support was in 1943.

In Sicily the Allies faced a much smaller German force, were able to quarantine the island from large German reinforcements and had a terrain that isn’t good for defence. And they still had a hard time of it.

In Northern France in ’44 the German force was much larger (and even larger again in ’43), was dug in to a degree not seen in Sicily and the Terrain favours defence.

Operation Overlord was the largest single operation of the war and even then was a struggle!

Something like Operation Roundup or similar would have probably resulted in a large scale version of the Dieppe disaster.
 
In response to an Overlord 1943 equivalent.

It is true that the Allies didn't have the resources ranging from Mulberry harbours to PLUTO to the landing craft needed.

It is also true that the Germans hadn't had time to build the Atlantic Wall up very much at all. IIRC, Rommel, when he took over was horrified at the discrepancy between what was supposed to exist and what was actually there.

On balance, I suspect that a 1943 invasion might have given the Allies a major headstart. (5-10% chance of that). A reasonable chance they get a minor foothold and hold it, very expensively. And a reasonable to good chance that they get thrown back into the sea and the whole idea of a Normandy invasion becomes political suicide.

I think Churchill was right to refuse the American pressure for an earlier campaign, on balance. I even think his refusal was MOSTLY for the right reasons.
 
Trying to stick to what could plausibly be achieved without 20/20 hindsight, I think that there are a couple of big things:

1: Fixing the Mark XIV!!!!
1a: Properly using US subs (incl. enhanced forward basing)
--> Submarine warfare was very effective against Japan, and focusing more on waging economic war and fixing the Mark XIV torpedoes straight away would have helped A LOT in killing Japan even earlier than OTL.

2: King adopting British anti-submarine practices immediately in '42. Convoying, black-outs, etc.
--> Do I even need to explain this one?

3: Possibly some reallocations of resources (eg., the Alaskas were totally unnecessary given the presence of the superior Iowas, and the poor design of the CBs anyway)
--> Again, do I really need to explain this?

4: Focusing on actual targets, not terror bombing for European strategic bombing
--> This has got to be one of the stupidist yet most resilient military ideas ever thought of. It didn't work in WWI, it didn't work in WWII, and it didn't work in Vietnam. It's just a huge waste of resources to try to "erode enemy morale" instead of focusing on, you know, actually reducing their ability to fight.

5: A bit less Lend-Lease aid to Russia.
--> This is more oriented towards the Cold War, but it will help the WAllies a bit, too.

6: A lot less focus on CBI for the "Pacific" war.
--> Due to the tremendous difficulty of getting supplies to China, the very poor terrain, the sheer corruption and ineptitude of the KMT, and the great "defender's advantage" there, the only concern should be to hold India proper. Anything else is a fool's game.

7: Somehow getting MacArthur the hell out of the Pacific, and preferably out of any direct combat role. Let Nimitz and King run that theater, and Marshall and Eisenhower Europe/Africa. It fits with the "character" of each area, anyways.
--> Yet again, does this really need explanation? This also means the Australians will be a lot happier, the Filipinos less so, and the Japanese will probably lose faster.

8: More landings in Italy in '43.
--> If the Allies plan well, they could be threatning Germany directly (at least in theory). Hitler will go apeshit at Americans and Brits being on the Alps for sure, and it will help Stalin some as well as tie up Germans for Overlord in '44 (especially as the Germans will probably be more on the attacking side given the situation). Once North Italy is occupied, the main focus should be on holding this theater.
8a: Combined with that, perhaps a more agressive South French landing in '44.
8b: Perhaps a few pin-prick thrusts into the Balkans as well to force additional German effort into securing those areas. Nothing huge, but perhaps landings on a few Greek or Damaltian islands.
 
2: King adopting British anti-submarine practices immediately in '42. Convoying, black-outs, etc. --> Do I even need to explain this one?


TiL,

No, but it needs to be explained to you.

Here's part of a post of mine from less than a month ago explaining what was really going on during those depressing months in 1942:

Bullshit. I've repeatedly explained King's role in the Happy Time of '42 in threads of this type over many years at this forum. The legend of King "ignoring" British advice is just that, a legend that has little if any basis in fact. The real truth of the matter was that the US lacked a unified "Coastal Command", although King laid the groundwork for that by creating the 10th Fleet.

The fact of the matter is that, among many other things, King didn't have the kinds of escorts he said would be necessary, didn't have the numbers of escorts he said would be necessary, didn't have control over the numerous Army squadrons flying ASW patrols, didn't have control over coastal cities and their blackout orders, couldn't mandate the use of convoys except for those that were purely military or were crossing the Atlantic, and saw the best escorts he did have directed away from the US east coast on missions mandated by his political superiors.

He didn't have the tools he needed, didn't have control of the tools that were available, was told to use what tools he did have in certain ways, and yet it was all somehow his fault. It's to King's credit that he chose not to argue the false charges laid at him and took the blame for a catastrophe created by his civilian superiors like a good soldier.

King was a son of a bitch and a reflexive Anglophobe, he was neither willfully ignorant or actually stupid however. It's his Anglophobia that has colored his post-war reputation because most of the books covering the Atlantic War necessarily rely on British sources or are written by British authors.

Because he was human, King wasn't perfect and didn't make the right decisions all the time, however as I wrote he wasn't either willfully ignorant or actually stupid and the blame for the Happy Time cannot be laid at his feet.


Bill
 
TiL,

No, but it needs to be explained to you.

Here's part of a post of mine from less than a month ago explaining what was really going on during those depressing months in 1942:



Because he was human, King wasn't perfect and didn't make the right decisions all the time, however as I wrote he wasn't either willfully ignorant or actually stupid and the blame for the Happy Time cannot be laid at his feet.


Bill

Ah, fine. Another instance where the received wisdom is wrong.

However, that still means there's a useful change that could be made! Namely, the political restrictions lifted and (even more usefully) the production of many more escorts pre-war.

So...I'll change that to:
2: In 1940, note German submarine war efforts. Step up production of convoy escorts to defend Allied convoys (can be justified as protecting neutral American commerce). Create a unified anti-submarine command for the Atlantic coast including escorts, patrol ships, and air patrols. Possibly extend certain authorities to anti-submarine commander wrt convoying and blackouts (certainly after Germany's DOW in '41).

That suit you better?
 

Bearcat

Banned
I'll say this, the whole blackout fiasco in early 1942 was criminal in its level of stupidity.

On the whole, I think a blackout will hurt your tourism rather less than dead bodies and oil washing ashore from another stricken tanker, burning within sight of the beach. Call me crazy.
 
2: In 1940, note German submarine war efforts. (snip)


TiL,

Actually it doesn't suit me better because it ignores the OP's question about best post-Pearl Harbor Strategies. You cannot begin making changes in 1940... ;)

Step up production of convoy escorts to defend Allied convoys (can be justified as protecting neutral American commerce).

This was done somewhat in the OTL, just not as much as could have been. Of course, no matter how much faster you begin building escorts after December 7th 1941, which is the actual question under discussion here, you're still going to be facing a deficit of that type through much of '42.

Create a unified anti-submarine command for the Atlantic coast including escorts, patrol ships, and air patrols. Possibly extend certain authorities to anti-submarine commander wrt convoying and blackouts (certainly after Germany's DOW in '41).

That's something that can be done immediately after Pearl Harbor and done much faster in the OTL. There will still be teething and other organizational problems, but results will be immediate. Basically, the US needs to recreate the UK's Coastal Command with all it's assets, functions, and command responsibilities. King started this with the creation of 10th Fleet, but he wasn't able to endow 10th Fleet with the assets, functions, or responsibilities it required. (To be fair, Coastal Command in late '41/early '42 wasn't the powerhouse it became either.)

The US' primary ASW problem during early '42 lay in the civilian imposed "strategic triad" of the period. Just as our later nuclear deterrence was split among land, sea, and air assets to avoid first strike decapitation and inter-service squabbling, the defense of the continental US in the decades before WW2 was split into land, sea, and air assets too and for much the same reasons.

The Army would man coastal fortifications as well as flying recon aircraft and bombers (with one of the later types of the latter known as the Flying Fortress for that very reason) while the Navy maintained minefields, flew it's aircraft, and operated warships. It was this parceling out of jobs, assets, and responsibilities that found USAAF air assets under purely Army control making maritime patrols against submarines as odd as that sounds to our modern ears.


Bill
 
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TiL,

No, but it needs to be explained to you.

Here's part of a post of mine from less than a month ago explaining what was really going on during those depressing months in 1942:



Because he was human, King wasn't perfect and didn't make the right decisions all the time, however as I wrote he wasn't either willfully ignorant or actually stupid and the blame for the Happy Time cannot be laid at his feet.


Bill

Ah, fine. Another instance where the received wisdom is wrong.

However, that still means there's a useful change that could be made! Namely, the political restrictions lifted and (even more usefully) the production of many more escorts pre-war.

I'll say this, the whole blackout fiasco in early 1942 was criminal in its level of stupidity.

On the whole, I think a blackout will hurt your tourism rather less than dead bodies and oil washing ashore from another stricken tanker, burning within sight of the beach. Call me crazy.

Actually, if you take TruthIsLife's original post and replace "King" by "the powers that be" (essentially), I think his point stands. So what if KING didn't have the authority to order convoys, black out cities, etc. SOMEBODY did, and that work should have been done. Perhaps King was negligent in not pushing the needed actions (because of his anti-English bias or no), but there was a WHOLE BUNCH of low hanging fruit (easy things to do) that didn't get done. And, to follow Bearcat, I'd agree that this constitutes criminal negligence (or borders it really closely, at least).
 
Actually, if you take TruthIsLife's original post and replace "King" by "the powers that be" (essentially), I think his point stands.


Dathi,

His point was correct, even if it was aimed at the wrong person and included actions which take place before the OP's date of December 7th, 1941.

So what if KING didn't have the authority to order convoys, black out cities, etc. SOMEBODY did, and that work should have been done.

Basically, that somebody was FDR and even he had his limitations given the federal nature of the US and the necessity that things be done legally.

As I've pointed out, the defense of the continental US had been divvied up into a "strategic triad" of sorts by the government. The divided nature of that defense led to a divided command for that defense and onto a divided command in ASW operations. Those problems were eventually rectified to one extent or another and, as I've also pointed out, they could have been rectified much faster.


Bill
 

Bearcat

Banned
As I've pointed out, the defense of the continental US had been divvied up into a "strategic triad" of sorts by the government. The divided nature of that defense led to a divided command for that defense and onto a divided command in ASW operations. Those problems were eventually rectified to one extent or another and, as I've also pointed out, they could have been rectified much faster.
Bill

Yes. And you also can't dismiss the psychological aspects of trying to avoid wars for a generation, and suddenly being in one. The American public couldn't just jump from "all war is teh evol" to a pre-eminent military power in one bound. It took time to get the weapons and the doctrine, and it took time for Americans to internalize that we were at war, and yeah, those SOBs out there are really trying to kill us.
 
I'm looking at what was known or guessed at then in an attempt to understand why the decisions made then were made the way they were made.

That's fine if one is writing a history essay. However, in a-h you're using this method too much for ensuring that no divergent paths are chosen. What you're writing actually confirms what I initially wrote: The Western Allies chose higher probability of success over risk, thus (perhaps) prolonging the war. In light of First World War experience of heavy casualties and military situation where Germany was (seemingly) a deadly threat until last few months of the war this was perfectly understandable.

If I were to take an admittely 50-year old view, I would cite Leo J. Meyer on "Decision To Invade North Africa" in US Army Center of Military History's "Command Decisions" dating from 1960

http://www.history.army.mil/books/70-7_07.htm


The American military leaders, on the other hand, less bound by tradition and confident that productive capacity and organization would give the Allies overwhelming odds within a short time, believed the war could be brought to an end more quickly if a main thrust was directed toward the heart of the enemy. In their opinion the enemy, softened by heavy and sustained preliminary bombardment from the air, would become a ready subject for such a thrust by the summer of 1943. They also believed that an early cross-Channel attack was the best way to help the Russians whose continued participation in the war was a matter of paramount importance. They did not want SLEDGEHAMMER any more than the British, but fought against scrapping it before Russia's ability to hold out was certain. They opposed entry into North Africa because they did not consider it an area where a vital blow could be struck and because they wanted to save ROUNDUP. Churchill, Brooke, and others may assert, as they do, that no cross-Channel attack would have been feasible in 1942 or in 1943 because the Allies lacked the means and the experience in conducting amphibious warfare, and because the enemy was too strong in western Europe. Marshall and his support can contend with equal vigor that had not TORCH and the preparations for subsequent operations in the Mediterranean drained off men and resources, depleted the

reserves laboriously built up in the United Kingdom under the BOLERO program, wrecked the logistical organization in process of being established there, had given the enemy an added year to prepare his defenses, a cross-Channel operation could have been carried out successfully in 1943 and the costly war brought to an end earlier. Whose strategy was the sounder will never be known. The decision that was made was a momentous one in which political and military considerations were so intermingled that it is difficult to determine which carried the greater weight. For that reason if for no other, it will be the subject of controversy as long as men debate the strategy of World War II.

JYou truly have no comprehension of the subject. Petroleum is my business. Tankers and barrel logistics will not work, especially given a more active Luftwaffe and KM.

PLUTO was more than post-war propaganda. As the people at the time saw things, PLUTO was a prerequisite.

Sure, it was an another example where the Western Allies were really good at: insuring their success. However, in OTL the breakout from Normandy was facilitated before PLUTO even started operating in mid-August, in rather slow speed I might mention. After the breakout the problem was, as I wrote, in supplying fuel to advancing troops. In this process fuel pipelines could not be laid fast enough and barrels and tanker trucks had to be used.

However, land based tactical pipelines date back to WW I so I'd imagine they were already in widescale use.

Naval gunfire? What if the bridgehead's front lines are beyond range of naval guns? And the Germans would be idiots not to pick up on that point. TacAir in 1943 isn't going to be as easy as it was in '44 against a less damaged Luftwaffe. As for artillery, much of that doctrine still needs to be worked out in places like Sicily and Italy.

Naval gunfire was and would have been important for the first few days and would ultimately (in worst case) be of much value preventing any Allied force to be driven back to the sea. As for tactical aviation, this is no Italy or Sicily with very limited Allied aviation facilities. The Airstrip One is right behind the Channel. The Western Allied artillery was already vastly superior to German artillery.

The Allies could have built up their amphibious capacities faster, could have destroyed the Luftwaffe faster, and perhaps could have landed in France sooner as a result but they won't even consider landing in France in 1943 without major changes to the OTL's situation. They will not and indeed cannot successfully land in France with what was available to them in 1943 and what was available to Germany in 1943.

Yes, a decision to invade in 1943 would have most likely slow down the overextended convoy escort program in favour of faster amphibious construction. It would have also most likely meant no Operation Torch.

As for Luftwaffe, I'd be rather pessimistic on Luftwaffe's prospect as it has to in an imaginary Normandy 1944 scenario measure itself up against entire might of the RAF and USAAF might based on Airstrip One. Strategic bombing gave Luftwaffe a lease of life until long range fighter escorts came online.
 
Interesting the debate about 'Torch'!
Yes, at the time Marshal believed a cross-channel landing in northern France was preferable to North Africa. But at that time - '43, the majority of troops in such a landing would be British & Empire.
Moreover the events of Kasserine seem to prove that it was better to use North-west Africa as an 'on-the-job' training ground rather than northern France!
The campaign might have ended sooner had a landing taken place further east.
The Campaign, had other benefits:
- it reformed US Air Support policy. This was first issued in April '42 Field Manual FM 31-35, entitled "Avaition in Support of Ground Forces"; it was replaced by FM100-20 - it was heavily influenced by Air Marshal Sir Arthur Coningham.
- it brought France back into the war, providing extra manpower, and by the occupation of Vichy further stretched German forces.

Better, would have been an earlier decision of what next. That is instead of Torch - finish, what next? Squabble, squabble - Sicilly - finish, what next? Squabble, squabble - Italy!
Before Tunis had been captured the planning for Sicilly, should have been in hand, with it understood that Italy was next (why allow the Germans to escape across the Straits of Messina) - but it didn't have to have the objective of all Italy.
 
However, in a-h you're using this method too much for ensuring that no divergent paths are chosen.


Jukra,

No, not ensuring that no divergent paths are chosen. Instead, ensuring no implausibly divergent paths are chosen. People too often confuse what is possible with what is plausible.

The Western Allies made decisions based on what they knew, when they knew what they knew, how they knew what they knew, and what their fears were when they knew what they knew. Coin flips were not part of the process no matter what we might want to believe.

ANY change to the historical decisions the Western Allies made require changes to the the "whats" and "whens" I listed above. The greater the change desired, the greater change in time or scope that needs to be made to the "whats" and "whens". Simply suggesting that a whim or coin flip is up to the job does not cut it.

What you're writing actually confirms what I initially wrote: The Western Allies chose higher probability of success over risk, thus (perhaps) prolonging the war.

In that we are in agreement.

I am also suggesting that more of a "shock" needs to occur to shift the Western Allies out of that mindset than you believe is necessary.

However, in OTL the breakout from Normandy was facilitated before PLUTO even started operating in mid-August, in rather slow speed I might mention.

PLUTO was made up of the first sub-oceanic petroleum pipe lines laid in human history. Claiming it was designed, constructed, or laid "slowly" is nothing but hindsight.

However, land based tactical pipelines date back to WW I so I'd imagine they were already in widescale use.

Land based pipe lines are another question entirely. However, if a very flexible "Red Ball Express" system had trouble keeping up with the Allied breakout, physical pipe lines and the tankage systems they required would have had even more trouble.

Naval gunfire was and would have been important for the first few days...

The role of naval gunfire, plus it's accuracy and lethality, were not guessed or even planned for until after the Allied landings Sicily, particularly after the events surrounding the defeat of the counter-attack by the Herman Goering Division against the US 1st Infantry Division beachhead at Gela.

Strategy & Tactics Issue No. 146, November 1991, page 9:

At this point, the usefulness of naval gun support had not yet been proven to the Allied armies. The navies played a small role in the Torch landings, but nothing approaching the magnitude of the bombardment at Normandy. In order to maintain the element of surprise, the landings on Sicily were not even proceeded by a naval barrage. It was, in fact, during this battle that the American Navy finally proved the merits of close naval fire support for supporting assault troops.

The same article also describes how the USAAF and RAF operated separately over Sicily and how the air chiefs concentrated on strategic bombing and long range fighter sweeps rather than close air support or fighter coverage over the landing sites. That allowed Luftwaffe fighter-bombers to easily penetrate the fighter cover over the Allied beaches.

The truth of the matter is that the air and naval support you and many others blithely assume would be available for an Allied landing in Europe in 1943, simply because it was available for the Allied landings in 1944, had not been developed yet.


Bill
 
PLUTO was made up of the first sub-oceanic petroleum pipe lines laid in human history. Claiming it was designed, constructed, or laid "slowly" is nothing but hindsight.

I meant slow initial transfer speed per day, compared to tanker logistics. The technical advance in itself was impressive.

The truth of the matter is that the air and naval support you and many others blithely assume would be available for an Allied landing in Europe in 1943, simply because it was available for the Allied landings in 1944, had not been developed yet.

While the Allied effort improved significantly from 1943 to 1944 there's also the other side of the hill. The experience in the Eastern Front and Italian campaign provided Germany a Doctorate on delay and defensive operations. The new German tanks were tactically superior to Allied tanks and the scale of issue for machine guns, mines and mortars was greatly expanded.
 
While the Allied effort improved significantly from 1943 to 1944 there's also the other side of the hill. The experience in the Eastern Front and Italian campaign provided Germany a Doctorate on delay and defensive operations. The new German tanks were tactically superior to Allied tanks and the scale of issue for machine guns, mines and mortars was greatly expanded.


Jukra,

That's besides the point.

If US naval gunfire, which had been totally unplanned for by the Allies, had not been available off the Gela beachhead, the US 1st Infantry Division would have been driven back into the sea by the German counter-attack and that nearly successful counter-attack used the weapons and tactics available to Germany in 1943.

The naval gunfire support you've repeatedly asserted would be the difference between a repeat of Dieppe and a successful landing in northwest Europe in 1943 did not exist and would not have existed unless the "happy accident" of USN cruisers and destroyers shredding the Herman Goering Division at Gela occurred.

Furthermore, Sicily taught both the USAAF and RAF that their ideas for close air support was wrong and other options needed to be explored. Again, without a previous invasion to point out that problem, the air support you've repeatedly asserted would be the difference between a repeat of Dieppe and a successful landing in northwest Europe in 1943 did not exist yet either.

You can't have it both ways, arguing that the Germans are limited to the weapons and tactics they had 1943 while also arguing the Allies will somehow employ weapons and tactics they hadn't yet developed in 1943.


Bill
 
The naval gunfire support you've repeatedly asserted would be the difference between a repeat of Dieppe and a successful landing in northwest Europe in 1943 did not exist and would not have existed unless the "happy accident" of USN cruisers and destroyers shredding the Herman Goering Division at Gela occurred.

RN had employed naval gunfire support since when? In Dieppe the NGFS element was composed of just eight Hunts which in addition had much else to do and even their fire was mightily effective. Of USN, I'm not aware of it's practice of the time but even in OTL Normandy the RN + Commonwealth navies were in primary role.

As for tactical airpower, the CAS was really not that effective in ETO anyway. Where tactical air power (or should it be called operational in this sense) excelled was the interdiction of supply and that capability the RAF had well schooled itself in the Western Desert, and I might guess that USAAF had taken some note as well.
 
RN had employed naval gunfire support since when?


Jukra,

Okay, now you're just being argumentative.

How many more quotes am I going to have to post to explain to you that the thinking and planning behind the Normandy style bombardments you've been blithely asserting would be used for a 1943 landing in Europe did not exist yet?

The RN has been employing gunfire support since there's been a RN, yet Britain threw four divisions ashore on Sicily without anything resembling the gunfire support later seen at Normandy and without even a preliminary bombardment at that.

Of USN, I'm not aware of it's practice of the time but even in OTL Normandy the RN + Commonwealth navies were in primary role.

The RN and Commonwealth navies didn't undertake the practice during the Sicily landing.

Where tactical air power (or should it be called operational in this sense) excelled was the interdiction of supply and that capability the RAF had well schooled itself in the Western Desert...

While the RAF may have excelled in interdiction in the Western Desert campaigns, it didn't even bother trying to perform that mission in Sicily. For whatever reason, they either forgot what they had learned or no longer thought it applied.

I repeat again, although you'll undoubtedly argue to the contrary, that Dieppe and Torch were not enough "practice" for the Western Allies. Sicily and Salerno is where the real lessons were learned regarding landings.


Bill
 
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