The Berlin Blockade leads to World War III. Who wins?

Data released by DOE.

number-of-nuclear-warheads-in-the-inventory-of-the-nuclear-powers-1945-2014.png


Some history.

I was off by 3 assembled weapons but not the total components (50 bombs).
 
So if the Balloon goes up in '47-48, thse pits will be assembled into cases and used, rather than sitting at the Pantex plant in Texas waiting for reprocessing and recast to more efficient cores

“We were plain bluffing. We couldn't have put the bomb together and used it.”-Colonel Gilbert M. Dorland, Commander of the US Sandia Atomic Stockpile

I was off by 3 assembled weapons

It should be further noted that prior to the Mk-IV design in 1949 reaching service, the Mk-III could not remain assembled indefinitely. Such weapons had to be disassembled every 48 hours to recharge the batteries and prevent neutron-emission from the plutonium core from rendering the firing plugs inoperable. Moving a fully assembled weapon, particularly by air, was also regarded as too dangerous because of the primitive safety mechanisms for the MK-III, so no weapons were ever to be transported fully-assembled. So for all practical intents and purposes, the number of bombs in the "ready-to-use" category in 1946-1948 was 0.
 
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“We were plain bluffing. We couldn't have put the bomb together and used it.”-Colonel Gilbert M. Dorland, Commander of the US Sandia Atomic Stockpile

It should be further noted that prior to the Mk-IV design in 1949 reaching service, the Mk-III could not remain assembled indefinitely. Such weapons had to be disassembled every 48 hours to recharge the batteries and prevent neutron-emission from the plutonium core from rendering the firing plugs inoperable. Moving a fully assembled weapon, particularly by air, was also regarded as too dangerous because of the primitive safety mechanisms for the MK-III, so no weapons were ever to be transported fully-assembled. So for all practical intents and purposes, the number of bombs in the "ready-to-use" category in 1946-1948 was 0.

There was a crisis at Hanford with the first fast breeders that produced heavily contaminated and useless plutonium (Wigner effect) which kind of made the Mark III problematic at the time. To ensure that something would be there and work, at least 26 Little Boy component sets were built by both the Army (6) and Navy (~20) as ready use munitions. 10 of these were eventually USN deployed on the Midways around *48 with the then current US fissile uranium stockpile. By 1950, the Hanford problem was solved and the levitated pit was invented which solved twice over the plutonium contamination problem.

Hansen, Chuck (1995). Volume V: US Nuclear Weapons Histories. Swords of Armageddon: US Nuclear Weapons Development since 1945. Sunnyvale, California: Chuckelea Publications. PP 104-106
 
There was a crisis at Hanford with the first fast breeders that produced heavily contaminated and useless plutonium (Wigner effect) which kind of made the Mark III problematic at the time. To ensure that something would be there and work, at least 26 Little Boy component sets were built by both the Army (6) and Navy (~20) as ready use munitions. 10 of these were eventually USN deployed on the Midways around *48 with the then current US fissile uranium stockpile. By 1950, the Hanford problem was solved and the levitated pit was invented which solved twice over the plutonium contamination problem.

Oh god, if you thought the Mk-III was unsafe and unreliable design by nuclear weapon standards, the Mk-1561 was a total nightmare. The Los Alamos staff hated the thing and it was regarded as obsolete when it was being dropped on Hiroshima! In 1963, the director of Los Alamos rejected the idea of creating a Mk-1561 for testing purposes because, among other reasons, it was "hideously unsafe". That the US was desparate enough to make some assembly-ready in the late-40s says a lot about the poor shape of the US nuclear arsenal at the time.

What did the Navy intended to drop Little Boy from, anyways? Is there any existant late-40s carrier aircraft that was capable of lugging it around or was it being done in anticipation of a future design?
 
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SwampTiger

Banned
I'm not sure why the fixation on atomic bombs in this thread. Would the US deploy the bombs over German territory to stop the armored spearheads? If not, you will not make any immediate impact on the Russian invaders. Bridges can be destroyed with the Tall Boy/Grand Slam/ Tarzon/Azon supply. How long, in days before the US/UK/France are able to deploy troops near the Rhine/Elbe region? If more than two weeks, they are going to be up a proverbial creek. How many tactical bombers/fighter bombers can they call upon. The only jets I would expect are Meteors and Vampires, with P-80's appearing later. Russia would keep their jets out unless they start getting totally embarrassed. They were more willing to take heavy losses to front-line squadrons.
 
What did the Navy intended to drop Little Boy from, anyways? Is there any existant late-40s carrier aircraft that was capable of lugging it around or was it being done in anticipation of a future design?

Neptunes could take off from Midways, but not land.

The Atomic Neptunes: The Navy's Interim Nuclear Bombers





P2V-3C JATO takeoff from the USS Midway

Not often realized in aviation history is the key role naval personnel played in the development and the deployment of the first atomic bombs that closed out the Second World War. In March 1943, Navy captain William Parsons was assigned to the Manhattan Project's Ordnance Division as he had had prior experience in the development of the proximity fuse for anti-aircraft shells. While he also contributed to the design of the atomic bomb's proximity fuse, he ultimately became responsible for the planning and execution of the US Army Air Force's use of the bombs against Japan. At Titian Island in the Marianas, it was Captain Parsons who was in charge of the bomb assembly and check out. The early bombs of those days had a core that was separate from the main core, this way the two parts were each of subcritical mass and unlikely to detonate as a safety measure. Once airborne, the "weaponeer" was responsible for inserting the core into the atomic bomb to arm it. The weaponeer also acted as the mission's tactical commander as they had the final authority on the bomb's use. On the Enola Gay's mission against Hiroshima, Captain Parsons was aboard as the weaponeer and armed "Little Boy" prior to its use. Parson's director of operations in the Manhattan Project was another naval officer, Commander Frederick Ashworth, a former Grumman TBF pilot. On the second mission against Nagasaki, Commander Ashworth was the weaponeer aboard Bock's Car. Though delivered to their targets by USAAF Boeing B-29 Superfortresses, both atomic bombs were armed by naval officers in flight and in essence, naval officers acted as the mission commanders. Despite the primacy of the Navy's carrier battle groups in the Pacific War, the Navy was well aware of the potential power of nuclear weapons in the postwar period. In September 1945 right after the Japanese surrender, the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) established the Navy's "Special Weapons Division" which was headed by a vice-admiral. Planning immediately began for a new, much larger aircraft carrier that would carry the Navy's planned nuclear strike force. Until this supercarrier was launched, the three biggest aircraft carriers of the US Navy would be responsible for deploying nuclear weapons- these three ships were the Midway-class carriers- the USS Midway, USS Franklin D. Roosevelt, and the USS Coral Sea. In December 1945, the Navy laid out a three-phase carrier-based strategic bomber plan- Phase 1 called for modest capability bomber to speed its introduction and deployment to the fleet. That aircraft became the North American AJ Savage. Phase 2 was eventually dropped as it was decided to adopt the Allison T40 turboprop engine for an improved version of the AJ Savage- that aircraft was the failed XA2J Super Savage. Phase 3 was for the definitive jet-powered nuclear strike bomber that the Navy really wanted, and that aircraft would eventually become the Douglas A3D Skywarrior.



North American Aviation received the contract to start work on the AJ Savage in June 1946.





North American AJ-1 Savage, the Neptune's replacement.

With the prototype North American XAJ Savage making its first flight in May 1949, it was imperative during the development of the Savage that the Navy establish some sort of nuclear delivery capability from its aircraft carriers as soon as possible. The most ideal candidate aircraft to get some sort of interim capability fielded was the Lockheed P2V Neptune. In 1946, a modified Neptune named "Truculent Turtle" made a record-breaking long distance flight from Australia to Ohio, over 11,000 nautical miles without refueling. With the plans for the Midway-class carriers to operate in the Mediterranean with the nuclear-armed Neptunes, a flight from the eastern Med to Moscow was significantly less than that of the Truculent Turtle's flight and if the targets were coastal naval bases, the range required was even less. With a gross weight well in excess of the catapults of the Midway-class ships, the modified Neptunes would use eight 1,000 lb-thrust JATO rockets with a near-full length deck run of 900 feet and the starboard wingtip clearing the island by only 10 feet. The modified Neptunes were designated P2V-3C and only twelve such aircraft were ordered- since there were only three Midway-class ships and a small number of the Mk 1 bomb (based on the Little Boy design) available, the interim strike force would be very small until the AJ Savage became operational. The more advanced Mk 4 bomb which was based on the Fat Man design used on Nagasaki was too large for the Neptune's bomb bay- but the AJ Savage was designed from the outset to be able to carry the larger Mk 4 bomb.



At first it was planned to give the P2V-3Cs the ability to return to the carrier after their missions. One of the twelve aircraft modified got a tail hook and around 128 field arrested landings were practiced both at Lockheed's facility at Burbank Airport and at the Navy's flight test center at NAS Patuxent River in Maryland. These flights were flown by another naval aviator who was a veteran of the Manhattan Project, Commander John Hayward. During the war he was assigned to China Lake where he worked on the implosion device used on Fat Man to start the nuclear chain reaction that resulted in detonation. Commander Hayward even flew the P2V-3C on touch and goes off the USS Franklin D. Roosevelt, but no arrested landings at sea were made. It was found that the Neptune's structure wasn't strong enough for carrier landings and the aircraft that Hayward flew on land-based arrested landings had numerous structural deformities as a result. Since there wasn't time to beef up the structure of the Neptune, the P2V-3Cs would have be craned aboard the Midway-class ships dockside and then, after completion of the mission, either ditch alongside the carrier or land at a friendly airfield. This made the P2V-3C aircraft pretty much a single-use weapon.





Internal layout of the P2V-3C. Note the fuel tanks in the nose and aft fuselage.

Additional fuel tanks were added in the wings and fuselage of the Neptune to create the P2V-3C. Total internal fuel over a standard P2V patrol bomber was increased by an astounding 75%! The P2V-3C carried 4,120 gallons of fuel over the standard P2V's 2,350 gallons. Anything unnecessary to the nuclear delivery mission was deleted, especially if it caused drag- so the dorsal gun turret, nose turret, rocket launcher provisions on the wings and multiple antennas were removed. An AN/APS-31 search and navigation radar replaced the nose turret and it worked with a radar bomb sight. Even the astrodome was removed to reduce drag, sextant shots for navigation would be done via a periscope. Since the mission endurance of the P2V-3C would outlast the oil capacity of the Wright R-3350 radial engines, a 38-gallon oil tank was installed (in fact, the navigator sat on it) with plumbing to keep the engines replenished with oil during the mission. To further save on weight, even the emergency hydraulic system was removed from the P2V-3C. A pair of 20mm tail guns were kept for self defense along with radar detection equipment (but no countermeasures or jamming capability was installed) and the crew was reduced to just four: pilot, copilot/weaponeer, bombardier/navigator, and radioman/tail gunner.



The first P2V-3C takeoff from a carrier took place in April 1948 fro the USS Coral Sea and a rapid series of demonstrations were made at increasing weights to show that a fully-fueled and loaded Neptune could make it off the carrier with a JATO-assist deck run. On one demonstration flight, Captain Hayward had the second Secretary of Defense, Louis Johnson, in the right seat. It was Johnson who succeeded Forrestal as SecDef and interestingly, just months before his flight on a P2V-3C demonstration takeoff, he had canceled the Navy's first supercarrier, the USS United States. Through 1948, the Navy conducted a series of long range missions from a Midway-class carrier to demonstrate the concept, a simulated weapon delivery and recovery to a friendly air base. Should the Neptune crew elect to ditch along side the carrier, a special flap was added to the underside of the P2V-3C called a "hydroflap" that helped keep the nose of the aircraft from boring into the water during ditching.



With the deployment of the P2V-3C nearing, the Navy formed three Special Weapons Units- one each for each of the Midway-class aircraft carriers. Based and trained at Kirkland AFB in Albuquerque, New Mexico, where the Department of Energy in cooperation with the USAF had a nuclear technical facility, each unit would be responsible for the assembly, maintenance, and check out of each weapon. The technology of the day meant it took about 50 men and 80 hours to carry out a bomb aseembly and disassembly for maintenance checks. Modifications to each Midway-class carrier provided for facilities for bomb handling, storage, and maintenance with a special Marine Corps detachment for security. The first Navy heavy attack squadron was Composite Squadron 5 (VC-5), established at Moffett Field, California on 9 September 1948. VC-5's commanding officer was Commander Frederick Ashworth, the weaponeer on Bock's Car. In the following January, Captain John Hayward assumed command with Ashworth as his XO. The first P2V-3Cs were delivered to the squadron in November 1948. JATO training at NAS Patuxent River began in February 1949 and by March, three aircraft were craned aboard the USS Coral Sea for its first exercises. By April 1949, all three Midway-class carriers were ready for deployment- all three would be homeported at Norfolk, Virginia, on the East Coast since their deterrent patrols would be in either the Mediterranean or North Seas
. http://www.tailsthroughtime.com/2015/08/the-atomic-neptunes-navys-interim.html
 
What did the Navy intended to drop Little Boy from, anyways? Is there any existant late-40s carrier aircraft that was capable of lugging it around or was it being done in anticipation of a future design?

The P2V Neptune. It was just barely capable for one bomb. The Little Boy was small enough to fit.
 
Although a series of improvements for the implosion bomb were envisioned and under development at Los Alamos even before Trinity, the first nuclear test, the end of the war had derailed these efforts. With the Cold War rapidly developing, an urgent need was felt to bring these improvements to the U.S. weapon stockpile.

On 27 June 1947 President Harry Truman authorized a new test series for weapons development for the following year. Operation Sandstone was conducted at Enewetak Atoll in the Marshall Islands in 1948 to test the first new weapon designs since World War II. The massive operation involved 10,200 personnel.

Up until this time, all four implosion bombs that had been exploded (the Trinity Gadget, the Fat Man bomb used on Nagasaki, and the two bombs used during Operation Crossroads ) had all been identical, based on a conservative wartime design. The Sandstone test series intoduced a second generation of weapon design by evaluating several new design principles. In addition a number of design parameters were varied to evaluate their effects on performance.

The original Fat Man pit design used a Christy solid plutonium core, surrounded by a close fitting natural uranium tamper. The Sandstone devices all replaced the contiguous tamper-core approach with a "levitated core" in which the core was suspended within a larger hollow space within the tamper so that a gap existed between them. The collision between the tamper and core would create more efficient compression of the core than the explosive-driven shock in the watime design. They apparently retained a solid core however.

These devices also abandoned the use of a pure plutonium core since oralloy (uranium hihgly enriched in U-235) production exceeded plutonium production by a factor of over 3-to-1. The first test, X-Ray, used a composite oralloy-plutonium core. Both Yoke and Zebra used an all oralloy core. The pits (tamper plus core) for all three devices weighed about the same.

Other tested features included:

  • varying the tamper thickness (which had been fixed at 7 cm in earlier devices)
  • varying the amount of fissile material in the core
  • the effect of using a "minimum strength" polonium-beryllium Urchin neutron initiator.
Previously, Urchins containing the full load of 50 curies of Po-210 had been used in tested bombs. Guidelines permitted the use of initiators with as little as 12 curies, but the adequacy of these had never been put to an actual test. Given the very short 138.4 day half life of Po-210, this was an important question for maintaining a ready stockpile.

Although the Sandstone tests continued to use the Mk 3 implosion system, they proof tested components that led to the fielding of the Mk 4 bomb. The Mk 3 bomb used for the Sandstone devices was 60 inches in diameter and weighed 10,500 lb total; the explosive, core and firing system weighed 7,600 lb.

Both the principle of levitation and the use of oralloy-plutonium composite cores had been under development at Los Alamos during the war. If it had continued into the fall of 1945, both of these innovations would have been introduced to increase the size and efficiency of the stockpile. Now, the confrontation with the Soviet Union impelled the inclusion of these innovations in deployed weapons. The results of Sandstone led to the immediate stockpiling of both X-Ray and Zebra core designs, replacing all other designs. Taken together, this lead to an immediate increase in total stockpile yield of 75%
.https://www.radiochemistry.org/history/nuke_tests/sandstone/index.html
 
The problem is that the Sandstone test pushed American bomb assembly teams to the limit and left nothing available for assembling bombs for wartime. The problem is that cancelling Sandstone leaves the Mk-IV as an unproven concept and it can’t enter operational service in ‘49. The US in 1948 can either assemble bombs for wartime or conduct the Sandstone Test. It cannot do both at the same time.

I'm not sure why the fixation on atomic bombs in this thread. Would the US deploy the bombs over German territory to stop the armored spearheads? If not, you will not make any immediate impact on the Russian invaders. Bridges can be destroyed with the Tall Boy/Grand Slam/ Tarzon/Azon supply. How long, in days before the US/UK/France are able to deploy troops near the Rhine/Elbe region? If more than two weeks, they are going to be up a proverbial creek. How many tactical bombers/fighter bombers can they call upon. The only jets I would expect are Meteors and Vampires, with P-80's appearing later. Russia would keep their jets out unless they start getting totally embarrassed. They were more willing to take heavy losses to front-line squadrons.

Global Anglo-American air forces had approximately 5,000 aircraft.

The Soviets mustered 15,000.

Suffice to say, the Soviets have more fighters then the West will have aircraft in the opening phase of the war. Their air defense system had also radically improved by 1948.

As for Anglo-American reinforcements: that timeframe is months, not days or weeks.
 
(^^^) I somewhat left handed agree. If anything stops the Russians 1945-1955, it is their fear of another bloodbath like the one they just experienced and their logistical ineptitude. They were in no shape emotionally or practically to go a conquering. Their arrangements and massive military appears (aside from Stalin, who I am convinced was at this time a psychotic as well as a sociopath) to be defensive in the west, while their Korea adventure seems more a spoiler war to distract the Americans.
 
The P2V Neptune. It was just barely capable for one bomb. The Little Boy was small enough to fit.

So, wait. The Navy was expecting a plane with a 3,629 kilogram bomb load to be able to lift a bomb which weighs 4,400 kilograms? I know AEC relations with the military were terrible and a lot of stuff weren’t being communicated between the two, so were they unaware of how much a Mk-1561 actually weighed? Or was this some kind of special variant of the Neptune?

(^^^) I somewhat left handed agree. If anything stops the Russians 1945-1955, it is their fear of another bloodbath like the one they just experienced and their logistical ineptitude.

More the former then the latter, given that the Soviets don’t have any supposed logistical ineptitude. WW2 demonstrated that.

They were in no shape emotionally or practically to go a conquering. Their arrangements and massive military appears (aside from Stalin, who I am convinced was at this time a psychotic as well as a sociopath) to be defensive in the west, while their Korea adventure seems more a spoiler war to distract the Americans.

Stalin’s words and actions are in line with this, and indeed the posture of the Soviet forces were a result of this, so I don’t see why there would be any “aside from him” there.
 
Rocket boosted takeoff, ON. They could get off the deck with about 5,000 kg dead weight but they had to JATO to do it.

Considering that the man, Stalin, was plotting and planning on killing imaginary enemies (doctors plot 1953) before he died; that kind of convinces me that he was insane and we cannot take his words or interpret his actions as anything but those of a madman at that time. So I respectfully disagree as to the claim that Stalin's words or actions were proof that he was a rational actor. We cannot know his motives except by the results. The results were chaotic at best 1950-1953. The Russians admit this much themselves with what they say. I strongly suspect that 1945-1950 we cannot know who was doing the hand-holding, until we get into their state papers but someone besides Stalin was at work. It smacks too much of a kind of "Edith Wilson" symptomology in their foreign policy.
 

Marc

Donor
Just to throw something more into the mix:
Russian espionage was arguably superior to Western in the immediate postwar decades. Infiltration and penetration had been going on since the 1920's.
Add the literally tens of millions of communist supporters in Western Europe... well, it suggests that the allies may have more logistical trouble than some might think
 
Just to throw something more into the mix:
Russian espionage was arguably superior to Western in the immediate postwar decades. Infiltration and penetration had been going on since the 1920's.
Add the literally tens of millions of communist supporters in Western Europe... well, it suggests that the allies may have more logistical trouble than some might think

OTL, France had around 800,000 PCF members in 1946. How many would be out attacking the US, UK, and French Troops after the 2nd Soviet doublecross?

Memories were not too short to recall that the Nazis had been all but Allied with the USSR from 1939 till Summer of 1941.

During that time, the local Communists were doing their part to sabotage the French war effort against the Nazis, that resulted in the bitter fruit of Vichy then full occupation.

The US and UK freed France, not the USSR. I have my doubts on the local Communists dancing to Stalin's tune a 2nd time
 

Marc

Donor
OTL, France had around 800,000 PCF members in 1946. How many would be out attacking the US, UK, and French Troops after the 2nd Soviet doublecross?

Memories were not too short to recall that the Nazis had been all but Allied with the USSR from 1939 till Summer of 1941.

During that time, the local Communists were doing their part to sabotage the French war effort against the Nazis, that resulted in the bitter fruit of Vichy then full occupation.

The US and UK freed France, not the USSR. I have my doubts on the local Communists dancing to Stalin's tune a 2nd time

Are you aware of the Francs-Tireurs et Partisans Français and the Front national de l'indépendance de la France?
In Italy, while there were significant non-communist units, the best and most numerous were the women and men who were communists - read up on the Garibaldi Brigades.
You might want to consider that it was generally agreed that communists were the most determined and effective partisans against the Nazis.
Like every thing about this scenario, the response of Western European communists would be predicated on the how, where, what, and whys of what would be the 4th act of WW2.
 
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I think you either have to remove Stalin or this becomes ASB. WWIII over the Berlin Blockade goes fundamentally against Stalin's character. He would never go to war if he isnt sure he can win.

Even if its a series of accidents that turn into a shoot out, negotiations and communications exist. Stalin can tell it wasnt an authorized attack. What will the US and the UK do? Demand his unconditional surrender? That would be insane.

Stalin would be willing to give up Germany if need be, up until he has nukes ready, he is going to give anything needed to appease the allies.
 
There was a crisis at Hanford with the first fast breeders that produced heavily contaminated and useless plutonium (Wigner effect) which kind of made the Mark III problematic at the time. To ensure that something would be there and work, at least 26 Little Boy component sets were built by both the Army (6) and Navy (~20) as ready use munitions. 10 of these were eventually USN deployed on the Midways around *48 with the then current US fissile uranium stockpile. By 1950, the Hanford problem was solved and the levitated pit was invented which solved twice over the plutonium contamination problem.

Hansen, Chuck (1995). Volume V: US Nuclear Weapons Histories. Swords of Armageddon: US Nuclear Weapons Development since 1945. Sunnyvale, California: Chuckelea Publications. PP 104-106
Presumably at least some of these bombs could also have been used by USAF B29's if needed. (To recap some comments I made in another thread I am assuming that US forces under world war three conditions in this notional time line display a modest amount of out of the box thinking and initiative, which in my view is an entirely reasonable assumption to make.)
 
Rocket boosted takeoff, ON. They could get off the deck with about 5,000 kg dead weight but they had to JATO to do it.

That makes sense.

Considering that the man, Stalin, was plotting and planning on killing imaginary enemies (doctors plot 1953) before he died; that kind of convinces me that he was insane and we cannot take his words or interpret his actions as anything but those of a madman at that time. So I respectfully disagree as to the claim that Stalin's words or actions were proof that he was a rational actor. We cannot know his motives except by the results. The results were chaotic at best 1950-1953. The Russians admit this much themselves with what they say. I strongly suspect that 1945-1950 we cannot know who was doing the hand-holding, until we get into their state papers but someone besides Stalin was at work. It smacks too much of a kind of "Edith Wilson" symptomology in their foreign policy.

That... is total conspiracy nonsense. It's pretty clear that Stalin was in charge right up until the moment he had that final stroke. Even while he was lying on the floor dying, his inner circle was too terrified to suggest someone else take power. The Doctors Plot was a result of the same paranoia which oversaw the Great Purges, but it wasn't the actions of a madman. Otherwise, Stalin's foreign policy was consistent and rational, as expressed in both words and actions: preserve the existence of the "Workers State", consolidate existing gains from the last war, probe the West for further gains at a minimal cost, and prepare for the future war when the Capitalists will attack, which is supposed to be inevitable, while simultaneously delaying that war as much as possible.

I think you either have to remove Stalin or this becomes ASB. WWIII over the Berlin Blockade goes fundamentally against Stalin's character. He would never go to war if he isnt sure he can win.

Even if its a series of accidents that turn into a shoot out, negotiations and communications exist. Stalin can tell it wasnt an authorized attack. What will the US and the UK do? Demand his unconditional surrender? That would be insane.

I largely agree that a 1948 war is exceedingly unlikely as long as Stalin is in charge. I wouldn't go so far as to declare it ASB, but it's not in his character to prosecute it. It would be interesting to speculate how the late-40s US would react if a accidental war breaks out in Central Europe at the time, the Soviets surge over Western Germany and Austria eviscerating the few Western forces there in the process, the US starts to buckle down for the loss of Western Europe and prepares to execute warplan Broiler... only for the Red Army to pause on the border with France and Italy and they get a public offer from Stalin in which the peace terms are astonishingly modest (minor border adjustments and the concession of West Berlin).

Stalin would be willing to give up Germany if need be, up until he has nukes ready, he is going to give anything needed to appease the allies.

This on the other hand, I don't see at all. The most that Stalin will be willing to concede is to backdown and let the land routes reopen. Giving up East Germany? Hell no. Not with the memory of Barbarossa so fresh.
 
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That... is total conspiracy nonsense. It's pretty clear that Stalin was in charge right up until the moment he had that final stroke. Even while he was lying on the floor dying, his inner circle was too terrified to suggest someone else take power. The Doctors Plot was a result of the same paranoia which oversaw the Great Purges, but it wasn't the actions of a madman. Otherwise, Stalin's foreign policy was consistent and rational, as expressed in both words and actions: preserve the existence of the "Workers State", consolidate existing gains from the last war, probe the West for further gains at a minimal cost, and prepare for the future war when the Capitalists will attack, which is supposed to be inevitable, while simultaneously delaying that war as much as possible.

The same way Woodrow Wilson was. YMMV and it probably should.
 
This on the other hand, I don't see at all. The most that Stalin will be willing to concede is backdown and let the land routes reopen. Giving up East Germany? Hell no. Not with the memory of Barbarossa so fresh.

I mean, it would be a heavy blow, but OTL Stalin's greatest fear was an alliance of capitalist powers to take the USSR out and in 1948 he knows such an alliance will defeat it. He knows his nukes are coming through, he knows he will be able to fight the West on equal terms then. I dont see him giving up that over Germany.

It will be the last resource, and 99% chances are another peace offer, like the one you propose, will take place. But if the allies go insane and tell him its either Germany or a fight for unconditional surrender, Stalin would very angrily take it.
 
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