The Berlin Blockade leads to World War III. Who wins?

Britain had fully pulled it's military out of Iran by the end of '46 and out of the rest of the Middle East by mid-'48. Only observers remained by that point.

Up to a point...

Apart from the forces in Libya, Suez Canal Zone, Aden, Cyprus...

And the RAF base in Iraq which was only handed over in 1955



The GSVG in 1948 have 5 armies.

What sources are shown for this - Soviet plans, or US intelligence?
 
Last edited:
Up to a point...

Apart from the forces in Libya, Suez Canal Zone, Aden, Cyprus...

True. Both the US and Britain did look into these and found that of these Libya is too far, Aden is too small to act as more then a stopover site, and and too vulnerable once/if the Soviets overrun Turkey and/or Syria. It was Suez that the US focused on for being in the sweet-spot: close enough for the bombers to stage from with room for error and far away enough for the Soviet ground forces to have difficulty in reaching while there's enough room for mass expansion to hold all the needed bombers. The only problem was the complete unpreparedness of the bases and their logistical support: the runways weren't even long enough to support the bombers, there was no fuel stored for extended operation, no maintenance, etc. In the long-run, undoubtedly it would become the US's second premier air stationing region after Britain (Airstrip Two to go with Britain's Airstrip One, I suppose?), but that as planners at the time acknowledged, it would take years.

What sources are shown for this - Soviet plans, or US intelligence?

Soviet plans. The overall defensive scheme was that, in the event of an enemy attack, the first GSVG operational echelon stops the enemy advance. The second echelon then reinforces the first and drives the enemy back over the border. The third echelon then joins the first and second and takes the war into enemy territory. By the time the GSVG forces become exhausted, the strategic reserves would arrive and takeover the rest of the advance on to the Atlantic. There are known to be offensive plans and while they remained unpublished and hence the details are not available, their generalities are known: Tactical Air would open by striking enemy airfields, fuel and weapon storage depots, and radar installations to win air superiority and inhibit defense. Artillery and ground attack aircraft would conduct an hour preparation on known enemy positions before the mechanized assault, which would advance on a broad front akin to the tank armies during Operation Bagration and the Vistula-Oder Offensive to seek and destroy enemy formations.
 
Up to a point...

Apart from the forces in Libya, Suez Canal Zone, Aden, Cyprus...

True. The US did look into these and found that of these Libya is too far, Aden is too small to act as more then a stopover site, and too vulnerable once/if the Soviets overrun Turkey and/or Syria. It was Suez that the US focused on for being in the sweet-spot: close enough for the bombers to stage from with room for error and far away enough for the Soviet ground forces to have difficulty in reaching while there's enough room for mass expansion to hold all the needed bombers. I'd imagine the RAF came to similar conclusions, especially since their planning from '46 on was coordinated with the US's. The only problem was the complete unpreparedness of the bases and their logistical support: the runways weren't even long enough to support the bombers, there was no fuel stored for extended operation, no maintenance, etc. In the long-run, undoubtedly it would become the US's second premier air stationing region after Britain (Airstrip Two to go with Britain's Airstrip One, I suppose?), but that will take years.

What sources are shown for this - Soviet plans, or US intelligence?

Soviet plans. The overall defensive scheme was that, in the event of an enemy attack, the first GSVG operational echelon stops the enemy advance. The second echelon then reinforces the first and drives the enemy back over the border. The third echelon then joins the first and second and takes the war into enemy territory. By the time the GSVG forces become exhausted, the strategic reserves would arrive and takeover the rest of the advance on to the Atlantic. There are known to be offensive plans and while they remained unpublished and hence the details are not available, their generalities are known due to interviews with the planners: Tactical air would open by striking enemy airfields, fuel and weapon storage depots, and radar installations to win air superiority. Artillery and ground attack aircraft would conduct an hour preparation bombardment on known enemy position before a broad front mechanized advance in the manner of Bagration or the Vistula-Oder Offensives.
 
Last edited:
True. Both the US and Britain did look into these and found that of these Libya is too far, Aden is too small to act as more then a stopover site, and and too vulnerable once/if the Soviets overrun Turkey and/or Syria.

And you completely ignore the operational RAF base in Iraq closest to Baku.

I'd imagine the RAF came to similar conclusions

Oh

Soviet plans.

There are known to be offensive plans and while they remained unpublished and hence the details are not available, their generalities are known due to interviews with the planners

Interviews held some 50 years after the plans were made.

The only Soviet operational plan that I'm aware has been publicly released is Plan 52 referred to earlier.
 
And you completely ignore the operational RAF base in Iraq closest to Baku.

"Operational" in the sense it was there. Like the Suez bases, it wasn't really suited for carrying out extended operations. Also, your own sentence shows why it wasn't considered. It was close... too close. Within easy striking range of Soviet armies while also too far for the western countries to easily reinforce with land forces.


Reasonable conclusion to make. After all, I know they made plans to try to sabotage Iraq and Iran's oil infrastructure in the event of war with the Soviets (Operation Sandown) so clearly they expected the loss of those countries, which would rule out the use of it as a base.

Interviews held some 50 years after the plans were made.

The only Soviet operational plan that I'm aware has been publicly released is Plan 52 referred to earlier.

Well, and people with the clearance to see them who've bothered to look. Just because they haven't been made public doesn't mean they aren't there or no one can look at them. It just means the people who can look at them are limited in number and are also limited in what they can say about them. That the Red Army intended to use air and artillery bombardments followed by mechanized assaults to destroy the enemies forces isn't exactly some big secret to anyone with passing familiarity with how the Soviets operated offensively so it's unsurprising their allowed to talk about such generalities. The descriptions also appeared in some sort of Soviet military journal during the 70's and 80's: Voenno-istoricheskii zhurnal (at least these citations are already transliterated instead of in Cyrillic). What's really surprising is there isn't much mention in there of them using their airborne forces, despite the Soviets putting a lot of effort into improving that capability in the post-war period.
 
Last edited:
"Operational" in the sense it was there. Like the Suez bases, it wasn't really suited for carrying out extended operations. Also, your own sentence shows why it wasn't considered. It was close... too close. Within easy striking range of Soviet armies while also too far for the western countries to easily reinforce with land forces.

Operational in the sense that RAF squadrons were based there up to 1955.

You seem to be ignoring the operational mobility of air forces. Attacking Baku (a very vulnerable target given the amount of hydrocarbons you can simply smell in the air) simply requires a refuelling base for bombers within range. Fighters are even more mobile given that the RAF operated fighters from behind the German frontlines in North Africa.

Well, and people with the clearance to see them who've bothered to look. Just because they haven't been made public doesn't mean they aren't there or no one can look at them. It just means the people who can look at them are limited in number and are also limited in what they can say about them.

This is clutching at straws. There is no reason for the 1940s plans not to be declassified if they are held by the West (or even Eastern Europe as some interesting documents have been found there). If they are in Russia then, unless they were reviewed in the 90s before Putin, it is unlikely that many people have seen them, and less likely that Russians would be discussing details. If people are going from memory there is also the challenge of disentangling plans made at different dates - geography doesn't change but force numbers, unit strengths and policy do.

The descriptions also appeared in some sort of Soviet military journal during the 70's and 80's: Voenno-istoricheskii zhurnal (at least these citations are already transliterated instead of in Cyrillic).

Yes, that is where they would be published. However these are descriptions of plans, not the plans themselves, apart from the post-glasnost 1989 publication that I have referenced. Before glasnost these are less likely to be accurate or detailed - like Soviet maps.
 

oberdada

Gone Fishin'
The blockage was non violent power play.
The airlift was a non violent counter move.

Half a war torn city was not worth a war, but strong enough as a symbol to simply abandon.

I consider this POD highly implausible. And that is being polite.
 
@oberdada : I don't disagree with you in some ways about the "value" of Berlin. In other ways it was a test of wills, who would flinch first and would "the west" resist further Soviet advances, the Czech coup was just months before. Many wars, and some people would say all wars are "not worth it". Certainly WWI, only thirty years in the past here was "not worth it" - the world was not a better place in 1919 that it was in 1913. The problem is that many wars throughout history are not truly planned, one incident sparks a response which sparks another and away we go. In 1948, while both sides were facing reconstruction form the human and material destruction of WWII, both the USA and the USSR had "won" that war. The reality of MAD, with emphasis on "destruction" with thermonuclear weapons, was not there staring both sides in the face and acting as a brakeon the cycle of escalation.

Given Stalin's caution, I doubt that he would be planning for war, although a shoot-down might be official and not some "error". However error or official, even if Stalin was not planning on going west and this was the opening move, this could have escalated given the right circumstances. Einstein once said the only thing unlimited in the universe was human stupidity, and in that as much else he was correct.

Unlikely but not implausible, and certainly not ASB.
 

Marc

Donor
@oberdada : I don't disagree with you in some ways about the "value" of Berlin. In other ways it was a test of wills, who would flinch first and would "the west" resist further Soviet advances, the Czech coup was just months before. Many wars, and some people would say all wars are "not worth it". Certainly WWI, only thirty years in the past here was "not worth it" - the world was not a better place in 1919 that it was in 1913. The problem is that many wars throughout history are not truly planned, one incident sparks a response which sparks another and away we go. In 1948, while both sides were facing reconstruction form the human and material destruction of WWII, both the USA and the USSR had "won" that war. The reality of MAD, with emphasis on "destruction" with thermonuclear weapons, was not there staring both sides in the face and acting as a brakeon the cycle of escalation.

Given Stalin's caution, I doubt that he would be planning for war, although a shoot-down might be official and not some "error". However error or official, even if Stalin was not planning on going west and this was the opening move, this could have escalated given the right circumstances. Einstein once said the only thing unlimited in the universe was human stupidity, and in that as much else he was correct.

Unlikely but not implausible, and certainly not ASB.

I would put into the improbable category myself.

[My working definition for alternate historical events:

Plausible: Y happens instead of X.
Implausible: Y+Z happens about the same time instead of X.
Improbable: Y+Z+N happens (N being one or several supposing's)]
 

oberdada

Gone Fishin'
@oberdada : I don't disagree with you in some ways about the "value" of Berlin. In other ways it was a test of wills, who would flinch first and would "the west" resist further Soviet advances, the Czech coup was just months before. Many wars, and some people would say all wars are "not worth it". Certainly WWI, only thirty years in the past here was "not worth it" - the world was not a better place in 1919 that it was in 1913. The problem is that many wars throughout history are not truly planned, one incident sparks a response which sparks another and away we go. In 1948, while both sides were facing reconstruction form the human and material destruction of WWII, both the USA and the USSR had "won" that war. The reality of MAD, with emphasis on "destruction" with thermonuclear weapons, was not there staring both sides in the face and acting as a brakeon the cycle of escalation.

Given Stalin's caution, I doubt that he would be planning for war, although a shoot-down might be official and not some "error". However error or official, even if Stalin was not planning on going west and this was the opening move, this could have escalated given the right circumstances. Einstein once said the only thing unlimited in the universe was human stupidity, and in that as much else he was correct.

Unlikely but not implausible, and certainly not ASB.

Find.

But if you really want a war to break out in 1948 or 1949, there likely is a better backstory.

Unless it is some huge evil Masterplan by the Soviet Union to have the West concentrate most of their airpower in Germany.
But given the fact that the airlift was improvised, as well as the blockade; that doesn't really work either.

So if the blockage should be the POD, then a different western western reaction is far more likely.

Like pushing to Berlin with admired convoys.
 
Operational in the sense that RAF squadrons were based there up to 1955.

You seem to be ignoring the operational mobility of air forces. Attacking Baku (a very vulnerable target given the amount of hydrocarbons you can simply smell in the air) simply requires a refuelling base for bombers within range. Fighters are even more mobile given that the RAF operated fighters from behind the German frontlines in North Africa.

You seem to be ignoring, or ignorant of, the logistical realities of supporting strategic air operations. Throughout it's history, the Iraqis RAF bases never had to support combat missions tougher then low-intensity CAS for anti-insurgency ops and that does not mean they have the maintenance spaces, bomb dumps, taxiways, parking aprons, engineering support, bulk fuel storage, and many, many, many other logistical accruements for major strategic bomber operations. The construction of such accruements would require masses of men and material which could only be dispatched via ship from the US and Britain and would take months to arrive in the required quantities.

This is clutching at straws. There is no reason for the 1940s plans not to be declassified if they are held by the West (or even Eastern Europe as some interesting documents have been found there). If they are in Russia then, unless they were reviewed in the 90s before Putin, it is unlikely that many people have seen them, and less likely that Russians would be discussing details. If people are going from memory there is also the challenge of disentangling plans made at different dates - geography doesn't change but force numbers, unit strengths and policy do.

Yes, that is where they would be published. However these are descriptions of plans, not the plans themselves, apart from the post-glasnost 1989 publication that I have referenced. Before glasnost these are less likely to be accurate or detailed - like Soviet maps.

Sound like your projecting. I cite that the existence of these plans are backed up by interviews with the planners, people who saw the plans, and (most significantly) by pointing to publications in Soviet military journals discussing them and the biggest objection you can muster is “why haven’t the Russians published them since the end of the Cold War then?” I don’t know and can only speculate. But the fact that the Russians haven’t declassified and published them in full does not change the fact that the Soviets discussed them in interviews and in the publications of their military journals* in the 70s and 80s, which is more then enough evidence that such plans existed. And for plans to be described, they have to exist. Soviet force numbers and unit strength increased from ‘46 onwards (the Soviet military went from 3 million in 1946 to 4.9 million by 1949 to 5.7 million by 1954) while Soviet military policy remained to a large degree static until Stalin died, although since the OP is positing much more aggressive Soviet action then obviously that’s changed IATL.

*The significance of the journals as evidence in particular can’t be understated: these journals were published for internal Soviet military consumption and their intended audience were not the Soviet civilian populace, much less foreigners. They weren’t outright state secrets, but they were restricted enough that NATO had to jump through some serious hoops to get their hands on copies. If such a Soviet publication refers to a past offensive plan or plans, then the overwhelming likelihood is that they existed.
 
Throughout it's history, the Iraqis RAF bases never had to support combat missions tougher then low-intensity CAS for anti-insurgency ops

Really?

Not many insurgents have medium bombers.



does not mean they have the maintenance spaces, bomb dumps, taxiways, parking aprons, engineering support, bulk fuel storage, and many, many, many other logistical accruements for major strategic bomber operations. The construction of such accruements would require masses of men and material which could only be dispatched via ship from the US and Britain and would take months to arrive in the required quantities.

A - I never claimed that they could support "major strategic bomber operations" - you're creating a strawman
B - Do you have any evidence to support your claims for lack of infrastructure, as you didn't seem to have heard of the place
C - logistical support will arrive sooner than "months"

Sound like your projecting.
:rolleyes:

I cite that the existence of these plans are backed up by interviews with the planners, people who saw the plans, and (most significantly) by pointing to publications in Soviet military journals discussing them and the biggest objection you can muster is “why haven’t the Russians published them since the end of the Cold War then?”

More strawmen. I have never disputed that the plans existed. In fact I have highlighted that exactly ONE has been published, and I have supplied details from that plan.

The crucial question is the details of the plans, especially the number, location, and strength of Soviet divisions. This will vary from plan to plan BUT trying to reconstruct details from memory 50 years later is fraught with problems of confusing say the number of divisions from 1948 plan with those from the 1952 plan. Any reconstruction is a best guess, and is difficult to cross-check with contemporary western records because US intelligence were so far off in their assessments.

*The significance of the journals as evidence in particular can’t be understated: these journals were published for internal Soviet military consumption and their intended audience were not the Soviet civilian populace, much less foreigners. They weren’t outright state secrets, but they were restricted enough that NATO had to jump through some serious hoops to get their hands on copies. If such a Soviet publication refers to a past offensive plan or plans, then the overwhelming likelihood is that they existed.

In the Soviet Union EVERYTHING was a state secret (and Russia is very similar in that regard).:)

Apart from the one plan I have highlighted, I am not aware of any other plan published in detail - discussions will have been in general terms.

Soviet force numbers and unit strength increased from ‘46 onwards (the Soviet military went from 3 million in 1946 to 4.9 million by 1949 to 5.7 million by 1954)

Khrushchev later said the 1948 total was 2.9 million, although Stalin did build numbers up beyond 5 million in 1953.
 
Really?

Not many insurgents have medium bombers.


Shooting down some poorly-supported aircraft sent out in a brief badly-planned, ill-conceived, and hasty operation < Providing low-intensity ground support for counter-insurgency operations that lasts multiple months.

A - I never claimed that they could support "major strategic bomber operations" - you're creating a strawman

Yes, that is precisely what you are claiming. That's the sort of effort that is required to bomb Baku and break through it'sair defenses.

B - Do you have any evidence to support your claims for lack of infrastructure, as you didn't seem to have heard of the place

US logistical assessments of Middle Eastern Bases in the warplans assembled during the 1946-1950 periods.

C - logistical support will arrive sooner than "months"

American logistical planners disagree and are quite explicit in doing so. Given that many of these men constituted some of the finest logisticians in history, being many of the same men who planned the impressive logistical feats the WAllies achieved during the Second World War, their assessment has quite a bit of weight.


If the shoe fits.

More strawmen. I have never disputed that the plans existed. In fact I have highlighted that exactly ONE has been published, and I have supplied details from that plan.

Yes, the wording of your post very much indicates a dispute that the plan existed. You questioned what the sources were for that plan and claimed I was "grasping at straws" when I pointed to those sources. Those very much represent the words of someone who was disputing the existence of such plans. You supplied a defense/counter-offense plan and badly misrepresented the forces at the disposal of that plan (claiming 2 armies instead of the actual 5). My reply to you corrected the number and supplied far more details then you ever did.

The crucial question is the details of the plans, especially the number, location, and strength of Soviet divisions. This will vary from plan to plan BUT trying to reconstruct details from memory 50 years later is fraught with problems of confusing say the number of divisions from 1948 plan with those from the 1952 plan. Any reconstruction is a best guess, and is difficult to cross-check with contemporary western records because US intelligence were so far off in their assessments.

We have Soviet documentation on the number and strength of Soviet divisions in Germany: 30 full-strength divisions total, around half-of them is full-strength which is a constant from 1947 all the way through to the death of Stalin. Obviously, but given the wealth of military resources on hand compared to what their opponents possess, the claim that the 1948 Red Army officer corps, which are made up of crack veterans of the Great Patriotic War, would be incapable of coming up with a plan that could carry them to the Atlantic is a extraordinary claim that requires extraordinary evidence to back up.

In the Soviet Union EVERYTHING was a state secret (and Russia is very similar in that regard).:)

Apart from the one plan I have highlighted, I am not aware of any other plan published in detail - discussions will have been in general terms.

To a degree. One could argue it's a matter of precisely how much a state secret it is. And yes, I already said the discussions about those offensive plans were in general terms. My point in mentioning them was to show those plans existed and then describe what we do know about them. You then started making replies that seemed to cast aspersions on the existence of said plans. So I rebuked that by pointing to the credibility of evidence. Now that I've demolished those aspirations your hastily beating a hasty retreat by trying to appeal to the only plan... even though that plan also indicates overwhelming Soviet superiority over Western forces in Germany.

Khrushchev later said the 1948 total was 2.9 million, although Stalin did build numbers up beyond 5 million in 1953.

Rechecking the figures from The Development of the Soviet and Russian Armies in Context, 1946–2008: A Chronological and Topical Outline of the Journal of Slavic Military Studies, it's 2,874,000 personnel in 1946, 4,730,000 personnel in 1949, and 5,763,000 personnel in 1954.
 
The problem, as I see it, is that ObsessedNuker is appealing to war plans he admittedly can't cite, and assuming they will be sufficient to carry the Soviets to victory. The other side certainly can't prove that wrong, and in fact can't even criticize the plans at all without attacking a strawman.

This is the epitome of an unfalsifiable argument.

Is it LIKELY that the Soviets had war plans that would have succeeded? Sure, given the initial correlation of forces. Is it possible they could have been countered? Logically speaking, certainly. Is it possible the US and Allies could have held off the Soviets, despite their planners doubting it? Again, yes.

The problem I am having is that the confidence doesn't seem to be scaling with the available facts in this case.
 
The problem, as I see it, is that ObsessedNuker is appealing to war plans he admittedly can't cite, and assuming they will be sufficient to carry the Soviets to victory. The other side certainly can't prove that wrong, and in fact can't even criticize the plans at all without attacking a strawman.

This is the epitome of an unfalsifiable argument.

Now this. This is a strawman. I pointed out what we do know about Soviet warplans and cited where we those details came from. I never "appealed" to them as the core of my argument about the likelihood of the Soviets. Because war plans are merely the "ways" which military campaigns are prosecuted. What really matters in this initial phase of the war is going to be the "means"... that is the military resources each side has to execute their warplans. And in that, there is no question that the Soviets have a positively crushing advantage.

The real problem here, for the Soviets, is the "ends". What do they actually achieve by rolling to the Atlantic besides the destruction of British and US military assets that the Americans can easily replace and then some in a few years time? They can score an enormous victory in battle at the start of the war. But that doesn't win them the war. At best, it sets back their eventual defeat.

Is it LIKELY that the Soviets had war plans that would have succeeded? Sure, given the initial correlation of forces. Is it possible they could have been countered? Logically speaking, certainly.

War isn't a game of rock-paper-scissors. There isn't some kind of magical hardcounter that will defeat any given opponent at all times, many a plethora of options to attempt that are limited by resources. Even if the US does have the perfect plan to counter the Soviet assault, it means dick all if they don't have the resources to carry it out. The historical record we have of the sort of quantitative and qualitative disparities faced by American forces against their Soviet counterparts points to basically the obliteration of US military (save, perhaps, those that immediately try to retreat from the continent) and the Soviets rolling all the way to the Atlantic in the opening stage of the war. The military has a word for the idea that a half-ineffective division and four regiments of glorified constabulary short on training, discipline, and weapons are going to be able to outright stop multiple mechanized armies of crack troops outfitted with a plethora of modern armor and artillery in their tracks. It's called delusion.
 
Last edited:
In such a scenario, at that time, it's nukes on Moscow Leningrad Gorky and probably vladivostok too for good measure. I'll assume the West withdraws most of the way to the Channel and lets the rot of internal nuclear destruction bring down the USSR. Nernburg Trials #2 for what high level prisoners the West can get from the remains of the Soviet Union.
I agree, it's not going to be a conventional war. Russian probably cannot make it pass the rhine.
 
Rechecking the figures from The Development of the Soviet and Russian Armies in Context, 1946–2008: A Chronological and Topical Outline of the Journal of Slavic Military Studies, it's 2,874,000 personnel in 1946, 4,730,000 personnel in 1949, and 5,763,000 personnel in 1954.

I think that 1946 date is actually 1948, if based off Krushchev' numbers.
https://www.jstor.org/stable/253875...68750decd83f2cfe&seq=7#page_scan_tab_contents

You supplied a defense/counter-offense plan and badly misrepresented the forces at the disposal of that plan (claiming 2 armies instead of the actual 5). My reply to you corrected the number and supplied far more details then you ever did.

My numbers were from Operational Plan No 52 published in Voenno-istoriicheskii zhournal February 1989 via an academic article. What are the sources given for your numbers?

We have Soviet documentation on the number and strength of Soviet divisions in Germany: 30 full-strength divisions

In 1948? Are you sure that is Germany, not Eastern Europe?

The major problem is the over-estimation of Soviet strengths in this period by US intelligence, which affected US warplans at the time. Also the Soviet Union also exaggerated its technological abilities and ability to produce cutting edge designs eg Tu-4 and May Day. Therefore great care should be taken with information sources when looking at what-ifs to avoid perpetuating the errors of the past.

To a degree. One could argue it's a matter of precisely how much a state secret it is.
I was told that the name of the difficult Customs official at Sheremetyevo was a State Secret. :) EVERYTHING was a state secret in the Soviet Union unless it officially was not.
 
Last edited:
And what sources are given for those numbers?

A Russian military history study from 2004, another from 2006, and the 1982 copy of Voenno-tekhnicheskii progress i vooruzhennye cily SSSR. Slavic Military Studies in general tends to rely heavily on Russian archival material.

My numbers were from Operational Plan No 52 published in Voenno-istoriicheskii zhournal February 1989 via an academic article. What are the sources given for your numbers?

Yes, I know. That's what I said: you supplied a defensive/counter-offensive plan and either misread or misrepresented the two armies in the first operational echelon as the only two armies in Germany. I corrected that using the same source.

In 1948? Are you sure that is Germany, not Eastern Europe?

Possibly. I'll double check when I get home.

The major problem is the over-estimation of Soviet strengths in this period by US intelligence, which affected US warplans at the time. Also the Soviet Union also exaggerated its technological abilities and ability to produce cutting edge designs eg Tu-4 and May Day. Therefore great care should be taken with information sources when looking at what-ifs to avoid perpetuating the errors of the past.

Pretty much the universal consensus among historians today is that while Stalin intended consolidation over further conquest, Soviet armies nonetheless did possess a overwhelming advantage of conventional strength over the West. Western overestimation vary depending on the source, but the stark reality is that Soviet sources also show the Soviets with crushing numerical advantages. It also ignores that western intelligence in this period tended to underestimate Soviet technological-industrial capabilities, nothing of which illustrates this better then the CIA predicting the Soviets were still around a half-decade or decade off from a atomic bomb. Appealing to the Tu-4 May Day example (which I'm not sure what that is supposed to be referencing... are you sure you aren't getting it confused with the later M-4 instance?) ignores that Westerners initially dismissed the aircraft as the earlier interned B-29s because they didn't think the Soviets had the technical-industrial capabilities to build a B-29 clone.

I was told that the name of the difficult Customs official at Sheremetyevo was a State Secret. :) EVERYTHING was a state secret in the Soviet Union unless it officially was not.

Yeah, I'm given to understand it's been getting that way again since roughly 2008.
 
The US had TEN operational weapons and parts for 50 AFAIR in 1948-49.

I have
1946 11
1947 32
1948 110
1949 235
1950 369

And that was with 100 or so Mk III bomb pits built in '46-48 and pulled from the Stockpile for later remaufacturing into Mk 5 and Mk 6 (that would not be deployed til 1951-52), were not accounted for in those totals

So if the Balloon goes up in '47-48, thse pits will be assembled into cases and used, rather than sitting at the Pantex plant in Texas waiting for reprocessing and recast to more efficient cores
 
Top