The Berlin Blockade leads to World War III. Who wins?

As I think even ObsessedNuker concedes, this isn't really a war Stalin can *win* in the long-term, if the Anglo-Americans have the will to see it through (which I think they would).

But given that he *could* reach the Pyrenees in the short-term, I tend to expect that he would be using the opportunity to "take care of" Tito while he's at it, one way or another.
1009px-BagrationMap2.jpg

That was with over 2M men, but even the Steamroller had to stop after 250 miles.
Logistics.

They have to regauge every mile of RR trackage past Poland if they plan to do more than 'Live of the Land', Land that was in pretty poor shape, even in 1948
 
The MiG-15 had superior ceiling and speed over even the Peacemaker.

but worse handling characteristics than the USAF fighters, that had a hard time intercepting the B-36 at those high altitudes

The Jets were operating at the edge of compressibility, 'Coffin Corner' where top speed and Stall speed got very close. The B-36 was actually far more maneuverable at the very high altitudes. USAF fighters had difficulty in obtaining a firing solution without spinning out. One of the reason for equipping interceptors with large numbers of FFARs to work with radar ranged predicting gunsights
 
but worse handling characteristics than the USAF fighters, that had a hard time intercepting the B-36 at those high altitudes

The Jets were operating at the edge of compressibility, 'Coffin Corner' where top speed and Stall speed got very close. The B-36 was actually far more maneuverable at the very high altitudes. USAF fighters had difficulty in obtaining a firing solution without spinning out. One of the reason for equipping interceptors with large numbers of FFARs to work with radar ranged predicting gunsights

Right. One more reason why they wouldn't achieve anything remotely close to 66% against B-36's in a nuclear strike.

Still, there was a reason why SAC wanted to phase them out as soon as possible with the B-52.
 
The USAF in their own air defence tests concluded fighters with night all / weather radars (and better performance than their P61 night fighters) were needed to deal with B29 attacks at night or in bad weather.

But that was a inept, underresources system going up against an inept, defunded system. The PVO vs SAC in ‘48 would be a well-trained, highly resourced be a inept, underresourced system. The results would be completely different.

I suspect the Soviets will come to a similar conclusion when they try to intercept B29's at night on nuclear strike missions using Mig15 day fighters.

They didn’t in Korea, when they were able to effect successful night intercepts. Nocturnal missions into MiG alley suffered almost as badly as the daytime ones. The USAF itself conclusion from these operations were that piston-powered aircraft, including the B-50 and B-36, could simply no longer cut it.

1009px-BagrationMap2.jpg

That was with over 2M men, but even the Steamroller had to stop after 250 miles.
Logistics.

But then they still faced a German army of millions of men after several months of hard combat. What will they face after wiping out the few tens of thousands of Western Allied combat troops in a few weeks of straightforward combat? Are you taking into account the fact that the Red Army in 1948 is far more motorized then that of ‘44?

but worse handling characteristics than the USAF fighters, that had a hard time intercepting the B-36 at those high altitudes

As I pointed out last time you tried to argue this, that doesn’t matter. The MiG-15 doesn’t have to turn with the ‘36 to shoot it down. If it's faster (which it is) it needs to make only a comparatively small aiming adjustment to bring its guns on a target as it flies by, particularly if the target is a B-36 which is HUGE.

That's how American aircraft that the Zero could turn rings around still shot down the far more agile plane in droves.

The core problems with the B-36 remain were that it was rather slow and its remotely controlled gun armament didn't work. That's really really bad when its facing a well armed high speed fighter that can easily reach its altitude.
 
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As highlighted earlier, Allied troops in western Europe total 800k, quite a bit more than "few tens of thousands".

If one ignores that many of those forces are gendarmies with no combat value. In reality, Soviet superiority is probably on the order of 5+:1 once all quantitative and qualitative factors are factored in.

No Soviet armed forces formations was engaged in occupation duty by 1948. That job was left to some 400,000 MGB paramilitary troops. On the other hand, ALL western forces in west Germany are pure garrison forces, with a absence of any of the armor or artillery needed to take on a Soviet assault.

Well, end of 1947/beginning of 1948. Given the expansion of Soviet formations, with a number of armies moved from cadre to full-readiness formations, during the winter-spring of 1948 described by the articles I've posted that figure was probably larger in June. A full mobilization would also rapidly see the number expand to around six million by the end of the first month. The West in 1948 has only 3-4 unready divisions to defend Germany vs up to 31 fully ready Soviet divisions and that imbalance will only worsen as the Soviets mobilize.



Eh... divisional slices aren't actually indicative of anything here given that it relies on ignoring that a portion of rear-area jobs that in western forces were handled by military ones were instead handled by civilian or paramilitary personnel in the Eastern bloc ones, rendering a large portion of a Soviet divisional strength as invisible. Railroads are a good example of this: in the 40's, the US Army's railroad needs were handled. In the Soviet Union, it was the job of first the People's Commissariat, and later the Ministry, of Railways which was a civilian organization.

As the article I posted several pages back the Soviets are starting the war with massive conventional superiority and no amount of accounting games that includes such chicanery as including glorified bean counters and policemen as soldiers can change that.

The number of actual US combat troops in Western Europe was around 10,000 men out of a total force of some 100,000 men who belonged to the US Army. Assuming that ratio holds true for the other powers, total Western Combat Troops are around 80,000.
 
The number of actual US combat troops in Western Europe was around 10,000 men out of a total force of some 100,000 men who belonged to the US Army. Assuming that ratio holds true for the other powers, total Western Combat Troops are around 80,000.

Why? Because it suits your narrative?
 

Knowledge of the overall priorities and conditions of the European states at the time. That the bulk of European combat forces (particularly the French) were off fighting colonial wars and that the economic conditions at home prevented them from establishing much in the way of additional forces is well recorded in the literature. Some hadn't even considered the Soviets a threat until very recently: the Dutch only concluded that the USSR was a threat after the London Conference of 1947, but the countries domestic economy prevented any additional funding in '48. The British, like the Americans, established that the Soviets would overrun Europe within a few months and hence intended to not even try to fight for the continent, so there would have been very little point for them to maintain more then token combat ready forces there. (Beginnings of the Cold War Arms Race, Raymond P. Ojserkis, Pg 8-9).

y cavil here is that there were relatively few MiG-15's in operation in 1948-49. In a World War III scenario in this time frame, those few MiG-15's will be in heavy demand to sustain combat operations in Europe and possibly the Middle East.

How did I miss this? In any case, for 1948-49, the only realistic approach for SAC is the European approach, as the Middle Eastern and Pacific bases aren't ready, which the Soviets already have covered by their EW net and would mean flying through the bulk of not only the PVO forces, but also the VVS. The MiG-15 also isn't the only interceptor the Soviets possess, it's just the most capable one. I also have to question the assertion that it will be in limited numbers in 1949: the USSR manufactured 729 MiGs in 1949 and that was at peacetime production rates. One could easily see that number shoot up if the USSR has mobilized for a wartime economy.

Those people have lane exploits (today) that their radars and fighters cannot cover.

Those lanes don't have anything to defend.

The USAF knew how to map and use those lanes as a result of their WW II combat experience in 1948.

Given the deficiencies displayed by SAC in their actual training and exercises in 1948, with SAC crews unable to locate entire cities in their own country, this claim is extremely dubious.

Maybe half the bombers never survive to unload, but with atomic weapons 50% get through is dead Russia, or at least enough to ensure it loses the war in OTL in 1948 assuming about 100 weapons allocated to the strike profile.

No need to pull numbers out of your ass. We have the figures to deduce what a actual nuclear strike in mid-1948 might look like: 50 bomb components, 32 aircraft capable of delivering nuclear bombs, and 13 aircrews certified for atomic weapons delivery (Steven T Ross, American War Plans 1945-1950, Pg 12). That means the US can only launch a strike profile of 13 bombers at most and only 6-7 bombers will reach their targets and given that SAC's accuracy averaged 10,000 yards, they have a high likelihood of missing even with an atomic bomb.
 
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But that was a inept, underresources system going up against an inept, defunded system. The PVO vs SAC in ‘48 would be a well-trained, highly resourced be a inept, underresourced system. The results would be completely different.



They didn’t in Korea, when they were able to effect successful night intercepts. Nocturnal missions into MiG alley suffered almost as badly as the daytime ones. The USAF itself conclusion from these operations were that piston-powered aircraft, including the B-50 and B-36, could simply no longer cut it.



But then they still faced a German army of millions of men after several months of hard combat. What will they face after wiping out the few tens of thousands of Western Allied combat troops in a few weeks of straightforward combat? Are you taking into account the fact that the Red Army in 1948 is far more motorized then that of ‘44?



As I pointed out last time you tried to argue this, that doesn’t matter. The MiG-15 doesn’t have to turn with the ‘36 to shoot it down. If it's faster (which it is) it needs to make only a comparatively small aiming adjustment to bring its guns on a target as it flies by, particularly if the target is a B-36 which is HUGE.

That's how American aircraft that the Zero could turn rings around still shot down the far more agile plane in droves.

The core problems with the B-36 remain were that it was rather slow and its remotely controlled gun armament didn't work. That's really really bad when its facing a well armed high speed fighter that can easily reach its altitude.
Hmmm....


I seem to recall reading the Canadians were also quite worried about the ability of their first generation jet fighters to cope with B36 class targets at high altitude.

Amongst other things they instituted weight saving modification plans, added wing tip extensions to improve higher altitude performance, started developing guided missiles, deleted guns and focused on rocket armament etc..

They also developed a supersonic interceptor.

I've also read first hand accounts from air crew involved in practice interceptions that leave me with the impression that the B36 at altitude was a tough target for any gun armed subsonic fighter.


I also seem to recall reading of an official Canadian account that credited the gun system on a B36 as likely being able to shoot down a gun armed fighter before it could shoot down the B36. That being said I also seem to recall that the USAF may have removed at least some of the guns from some of their B36's to save weight to increase their high altitude performance. I also seem to recall reading accounts of SAC aircraft having their gun laying radars jammed during skirmishes with soviet interceptors in the mid to late 1950's so who knows what might have happened in the time frame we are discussing.

All that said I'll agree to disagree with you that the Soviets would likely have consistently succeeded at this type of interception task with their early gun armed mig 15's that didn't even have radar. That being said sure they might manage to pull of a few interceptions.

Re the Korea experience. I don't believe a modest number of sucssefull interceptions of B29's on conventional bombing raids in a small geographic area implies that the same weapon systems and tactics will be consistently effective on a national scale for the USSR vs nuclear armed B29's, let alone B36's or B50's.

I'll also agree to disagree with you about the usefulness of non radar equipped interceptors in countering nuclear armed bombers at night when trying to defend an area such as North America or the Soviet Union. The Canadians, the Americans, the UK, the USSR and presumably other nations all worked hard to get jet powered radar equipped fighters into service during to time frame we are discussing. I figure the air forces of those and other nations knew what was needed to deal with likely targets at night.



All the best
Blue cat
 
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As I pointed out last time you tried to argue this, that doesn’t matter. The MiG-15 doesn’t have to turn with the ‘36 to shoot it down. If it's faster (which it is) it needs to make only a comparatively small aiming adjustment to bring its guns on a target as it flies by, particularly if the target is a B-36 which is HUGE.

That's how American aircraft that the Zero could turn rings around still shot down the far more agile plane in droves.

The core problems with the B-36 remain were that it was rather slow and its remotely controlled gun armament didn't work. That's really really bad when its facing a well armed high speed fighter that can easily reach its altitude.

But they had to get to the B-36 at altitude, and yes, would have to turn to get a firing solution on a turning B-36. Any change in yaw, pitch or roll could induce a spin or stall, something that the MiG had real troubles in comparison to the F-84 and F-86 had in the mock intercepts of the B-36

Since the B-36 was never in combat, it's hard to say that the B-36 gun system would have been as effective as the B-29(that also had issues) was in shooting down MiG-15s. Upthread, I gave the losses, and how many fighters the B-29s actually shot down
That was a very large loss in fighters for the overall number of bombers shot down
 
The number of actual US combat troops in Western Europe was around 10,000 men out of a total force of some 100,000 men who belonged to the US Army. Assuming that ratio holds true for the other powers, total Western Combat Troops are around 80,000.

As my point about Bagration that you seemed to miss

The Germans were shattered, but the Soviets couldn't maintain the advance, even in the face of minimal resistance
 
That the bulk of European combat forces (particularly the French) were off fighting colonial wars and that the economic conditions at home prevented them from establishing much in the way of additional forces is well recorded in the literature. Some hadn't even considered the Soviets a threat until very recently

Hell, Attlee and Cripps even sold them the license for the damned engine for the Mig-15 - which left even Stalin incredulous.

Someone should have gone to the Tower for that one. At least make the NKVD *work* to steal it.
 
How did I miss this? In any case, for 1948-49, the only realistic approach for SAC is the European approach, as the Middle Eastern and Pacific bases aren't ready, which the Soviets already have covered by their EW net and would mean flying through the bulk of not only the PVO forces, but also the VVS.

No, they aren't ready in 1948 - well, there *were* usable airfields in Okinawa, Japan, and Guam for heavy bombers, though the units and their logistics would need to be deployed there...

But give Lemay 18 months on a total war footing, and that would change.

The MiG-15 also isn't the only interceptor the Soviets possess, it's just the most capable one.

For this mission, the Mig-15 is the only one worth talking about.
 



No need to pull numbers out of your ass. We have the figures to deduce what a actual nuclear strike in mid-1948 might look like: 50 bomb components, 32 aircraft capable of delivering nuclear bombs, and 13 aircrews certified for atomic weapons delivery (Steven T Ross, American War Plans 1945-1950, Pg 12). That means the US can only launch a strike profile of 13 bombers at most and only 6-7 bombers will reach their targets and given that SAC's accuracy averaged 10,000 yards, they have a high likelihood of missing even with an atomic bomb.
Do you know if the average 10,000 yard miss distance was for all of SAC ? Or was it for the crews who were nuclear certified ?

In any event using your own numbers there are only 13 crews who need to be trained or coached on a "war emergency" basis to do better. One way or another I'm thinking SAC can figure out how to do this prior to launching their nuclear attack with their 13 certified crews. Presumably they would pick targets that would still sustain damage even if missed by the likely miss distance.

All in all I'm thinking getting 6 or 7 bombs within a reasonable distance of their aim points seems like a reasonable outcome for an initial effort from SAC in the time period we are discussing.

I expect subsequent attacks (if needed) would be much more effective.
 
But they had to get to the B-36 at altitude,

Which is easy enough. The MiG-15s service ceiling is around 50,000 feet and a max speed of ~675 miles-per-hour. The B-36B, the version of the B-36 actually available in 1949, has a service ceiling of around 42,500 feet and a max speed of 381 miles-per-hour.

and yes, would have to turn to get a firing solution on a turning B-36.

I've already said why they would not. Until you actually explain otherwise, your blowing smoke.

Since the B-36 was never in combat, it's hard to say that the B-36 gun system would have been as effective as the B-29

Given that it flat-out didn't work until 1950, and even afterwards continued to suffer serious problems, it's very easy to say.

Upthread, I gave the losses, and how many fighters the B-29s actually shot down

No, you gave USAF claims on how many fighters the B-29s shot down. I didn't mention it at the time since it didn't matter to my point, but bomber gunners overclaiming is even worse then fighter pilot overclaiming. This isn't just limited to Korea either: In WWII B-17 Gunners routinely claimed five or more times as many kills as they actually scored. Allied intelligence had some sense that these claims were wildly overblown, but given the losses the bombers were taking didn't have the heart to officially correct the bomber crews.

The same dynamic was in play over Korea. The Soviets were the ones who attacked the B-29s in almost every instance and we now have access to their records from the Korean War. Not a single one of the "confirmed" B-29 kills on MiG-15s checks out according to these records, although several MiGs are known to have been damaged by Superfortress guns.

The main value of bomber gunners was in forcing fighters into less-than-optimal attack runs, not so much in actually killing the enemy fighters.

As my point about Bagration that you seemed to miss

The Germans were shattered, but the Soviets couldn't maintain the advance, even in the face of minimal resistance

No, I didn't miss it, because your point is nonsense. The initial German forces were shattered, but the Germans brought in reinforcements rapidly enough that they were hardly facing "minimal resistance" by the time they hit Warsaw. Aggressive counter-attacks by multiple panzer corps on multiple points of the front is not "minimal resistance".

No, they aren't ready in 1948 - well, there *were* usable airfields in Okinawa, Japan, and Guam for heavy bombers, though the units and their logistics would need to be deployed there...

But give Lemay 18 months on a total war footing, and that would change.

Naturally. Although by then the Soviets would have likely extended their EW nets to cover the other approaches, as they did OTL. Even with that though, by the 18 month mark, SAC's weight of numbers would probably be starting to tell.

For this mission, the Mig-15 is the only one worth talking about.

Well, I'd argue some of the other Soviet fighters would be adequate against the B-29/50s. Against the B-36... yeah, the MiG-15 is pretty much it.

Do you know if the average 10,000 yard miss distance was for all of SAC ? Or was it for the crews who were nuclear certified ?

All of SAC. It was the result of the Dayton practice raid in 1949 which pulled in all available air crews. As LeMay said, not one crew completed successfully completed the mission.
 
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For this mission, the Mig-15 is the only one worth talking about.

Operational Soviet interceptors with actual air interception
radar (as opposed to radar ranging gun sights which I seem to recall early Mig 15's also lacked) and their performance vis a vis B29's, B36's and B50's would be would be worth talking about as well :)

Any tests where the Soviets practiced intercepting B29's on simulated nuclear strike missions (preferably at night) against the USSR would be worth talking about as well :)

I'd also be interested to hear about Soviet assessments of the adequacy of (at least the vast majority) war 2 radars against the likely threat to the Soviet Union. (As opposed to a portion of North Korea.)

Having read accounts of the U.S. and Canadian views of the suitability of most world war 2 left overs to counter nuclear armed B29 clones I am struggling a bit in envisioning the Soviets stopping a SAC nuclear attack against the Soviet Union in the time frame we are discussing.
 
I'd also be interested to hear about Soviet assessments of the adequacy of (at least the vast majority) war 2 radars against the likely threat to the Soviet Union. (As opposed to a portion of North Korea.)

I know the Soviets ran some major air defense exercises in 1947 and early-1948, even though I don't know any of the details. I'll try to dig around and see what I can come up with.
 
No, you gave USAF claims on how many fighters the B-29s shot down. I didn't mention it at the time since it didn't matter to my point, but bomber gunners overclaiming is even worse then fighter pilot overclaiming.

I can give the serial numbers of each B-29, and how was lost during the Korean War. AAA, Fighters or Accident

However, the Russian sources are not as open

USAF records of the Korean War are searchable
Soviet Archives are not.

So you are just deflecting. DPRK&Chinese Jets with Soviets Pilots flying them, just didn't shoot down/damage many B-29s from all the Sorties they flew. I can get that data.

Can you get the numbers for the times those Soviet Pilots had missions, and the results for each airframe
No, I don't think so, and you fall back on a dodge on overclaims.
Yeah, that happened.
Bu unlike earlier bombers, the remote system on the B-29 also included gun cameras. So not as much overclaiming as you wish there was
 
I can give the serial numbers of each B-29, and how was lost during the Korean War. AAA, Fighters or Accident

However, the Russian sources are not as open

USAF records of the Korean War are searchable
Soviet Archives are not.

Soviet sources on the Korean War are among those open to academicians. They’ve been open since the fall of the Soviet Union and scholars have gone over them with a fine-comb and have been unable to find a single MiG loss to B-29s. I personally may not have access to Soviet archives (and since my knowledge of Russian is limited to a couple of words and being able to phonetically pronounce the alphabet, it probably wouldn't be of much use if I did), but academics do and academics publish their findings. Zhang in Red Wings Over the Yalu quotes the work of an American academic, Mark O'Niell's Other Side of the Yalu in observing that American B-29 gunner kill claims are "absurd". He goes on to state:

When recalling their combat actions with B-29s in Korea, Soviet pilots thought it preposterous for Superfort gunners to claim they destroyed MiG-15s with their machine guns. Lobov, former commander of the the 64th IAK, wrote: “our cannons had a much greater capacity to damage than the B-29’s .50-caliber machine guns. Besides, B-29s demonstrated poor survivability. The computing devices and gun mounts themselves did not provide for aiming at, and effectively firing on, fighters attacking at a high closing rate.” Other Soviet Korean War veterans added that they usually broke off their attacks before coming in range of the B-29s machine guns. Although some MiGs were nicked by the bombers’ machine guns, they all returned safely totheir bases and flew again after repairs were made.
-Pg 129

So you are just deflecting.

Careful with your projection there. It is not at all deflection to point out that kill claims are worthless and appealing to them has no standing. Actual academics have accepted this for decades by now. Deflection would be something like saying, for example, that overall bomber losses were low for the entirety of a conflict when someone points out that losses on raids which dared to venture into areas that the communists had local air superiority were cripplingly high despite the fact bombing raids in WW3 would normally resemble such.

Bu unlike earlier bombers, the remote system on the B-29 also included gun cameras. So not as much overclaiming as you wish there was

Which means nothing. Gun cam footage still resulted in over claiming, as can be seen by the fact that the gun cams on MiGs and Sabre’s still resulted in those Russians and Americans overclaiming the others losses. Bomber gunners tended to claim kills on a lot of aircraft that attacked them and then broke off in a hard dive, smoke or not. Since a hard break downward was the standard disengage for fighters against bombers, the problem this made for kill claims is rather obvious. Also unlike fighters, bombers couldn't follow a fighter down to see if it was actually crashing.

As far as mid-20th century air combat is concerned, kill claims are worthless unless verified by the other sides loss records, as can be seen by the fact that Soviet claims for B-29 kills is on the order of 70 aircraft, more then double the actual number. It isn't until the introduction of reliable missiles that reality and kill claims have started to match-up.
 
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