The Berlin Blockade leads to World War III. Who wins?

You did not prove it then and you fail to prove it now.

Yes, yes. Your real butthurt over the fact you can't dredge up the slightest bit of evidence that American logisticians were involved in planning the Soviet logistics into their Manchurian operation or that American material was used to enhance the TS-RR. You haven't even yet been able to muster a reply to my demolition of your claims about Soviet air operation capabilities in the Korean War several pages back using your own sources which you clearly didn't actually read and still can't drag any quotes or page numbers from to actually support your claims.

We've also gone the unsubstantiated claim route. The Russians did not navally challenge, because they knew they could not. RTL is your guide in all things.

What the hell does American naval operations have to do with your or my claims about Soviet ability to supply their forces overland into Manchuria and Korea? For all that you claim to appeal to RTL as a guide, you seem consistently unable to dredge up anything from it that actually disputes my point or proves yours of the actual topic at hand and have to keep tossing out these strange red-herrings and misusing acronyms that you clearly don't understand how to use, given that you haven't demonstrated shit.
 
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Over 90% of all new railroad equipment during WWII in the USSR, including locomotives, rail cars, rails, signaling equipment etc, was supplied by Lend-Lease. This replaced equipment etc lost in combat or captured by the Germans. None of this arrived labelled "not for use on the Trans-Siberian RR", and even if it had every bit used in the western part of the USSR frees up something to be used in the east. By 1945 around 1/3 of all the trucks in the Red Army were US made, none of which were stamped "not for use east of the Urals". Finally LL continued after the surrender of Germany in May, 1945 until September, 1945 when the last shipments in the pipeline arrived. The sole purpose of the LL supplies which arrived after the German surrender was to help support Soviet forces when they attacked Japan, which had been agreed upon to be 90 days after Germany surrendered.

Yes, American logisticians were not involved in the planning of the Soviet invasion of Manchuria and beyond. American logistics experts were involved in planning such aid to the USSR for the Japanese campaign. Sure the USSR would send a list of "wants", but US experts would then vet the list based on what the US could "spare" for the USSR based on needs/commitments for US and other forces, and also on what was a realistic "need".
 
Where are the military aged men going to come from on the Soviet side? Most of the cohorts of the early '20s had been wiped out during WW2, by 1948 the Soviets would be scraping the bottom of the barrel for old men and teenagers. Even if the Soviets had a rapid initial advance through Germany, I don't think they could sustain heavy losses. The initial Soviet advance would need to be as rapid and bloodless as the Battle of France was for Germany.

The most likely outcome seems to be conventional warfare contained to the Germanies, followed by a wave of uprisings in the satellite states that complicates logistics for Soviet troops in Germany.
 
Where are the military aged men going to come from on the Soviet side? Most of the cohorts of the early '20s had been wiped out during WW2, by 1948 the Soviets would be scraping the bottom of the barrel for old men and teenagers.

I’ll take “questions already answered in the thread” for 800, Alex.

In terms of manpower, in addition to the ~9 million men demobilized during 1945-46, another ~9 million men fit for military service came of age in 1945-1947 who had been born in the late-20s. The class of 1930, who would be coming of age in 1948, would be the first class in which the Soviets started to see a serious drop-off in the yearly number of young men becoming available as it was the first class born at the time in which the collectivization program, and it's consequences, had impact on the Soviet population, but the drop off was still only about 20% at this point which leaves the class of 1930 as being about 2.4 million. So, that leaves the Soviets with a unmobilized military manpower reserve of potentially some 20.4 million men. Add on to that the 3 million man standing military the Soviets had in 1948 and that's 23.4 million total military manpower. While this figure is smaller then the number of men the Soviet Union who cycled through during the course of WW2 (34,000,000), it's still more then 6 million men larger then the number of men the Germans cycled through during the war and about 3 million more then the total military manpower fielded by the US during the war.

The manpower above is far more then enough to fulfill all of the Red Army's mobilization plans with room to spare for losses. In addition to bringing their standing divisions within the first 20 days of mobilization, the Soviets would also begin to mobilize the 120 Category-D "ghost" mobilization rifle divisions, which normally only exist on paper in peacetime with their equipment in storage and their manpower in the civilian reserves. The first of these would reach strength by M+30 and the last by M+60, with all being at full-combat readiness by M+120. The ability of the Red Army to do this is very much in line with the historical record: in 1941, the Red Army mobilization system managed to generate more then 300 divisions from 5 million men mobilized in the course of 5 months and this was under a series of deficiencies (most notably, the unexpected surprise attack and collapse of the front caused massive disruption and there was a shortage of trained or experienced officers due to the purges) that the 1948 Red Army does not have. Even 1914 Imperial Russia, operating under logistical and material constraints which make the 1941 Red Army (never mind the 1948 one) look like paradise, managed to mobilize a additional 100 divisions on top of bringing their standing army up to full manpower strength in the opening two months of WW1.

Even if the Soviets had a rapid initial advance through Germany, I don't think they could sustain heavy losses. The initial Soviet advance would need to be as rapid and bloodless as the Battle of France was for Germany.

Given the qualitative and quantitative superiority of the Red Army, that’s eminently doable. Hell, the Germans in 1940 would have killed for the sort of numerical and material advantages over the French that the Red Army had over the Anglo-French-Americans in ‘48. As one post-Cold War study noted, the enactment of the Berlin blockade saw the Red Army deploy 8 full-readiness divisions into assembly areas along the border in the course of a single night. That is only one shy of three times the number of divisions the western alliance have in Western Germany, none of which were more then half-ready. Compare this to 1940, when the Germans were operating at numerical parity, and even inferiority in several categories, and won through a mix of skill and luck (that is, qualitative superiority). The outlook is simply awful good for any unfortunate American, British, or French serviceman on the European continent in '48.
 
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That source of course undercuts most of your previous claims about the strength of the Red Army in 1948. :)

Did you actually read it? Because paging through, it pretty clearly largely verifies it. It declares the overestimate in 1948 to be extremely minor and goes on to say:

"These new sources make clear that American and NATO intelligence did not purposely exaggerate Soviet capabilities. In fact, they seem to have underestimated them as often as they overestimated them. Moreover, the problems they had in estimating Soviet capabilities concerned primarily the interior of the Soviet Union, not the forces in Eastern Europe and the western districts of the Soviet Union that would have participated in any invasion of Western Europe. American and NATO leaders were generally able to construct an accurate estimate of Soviet capabilities oriented towards Western Europe and of the policy options available to them."

The fact that western estimates about Soviet Union's capabilities towards Western Europe are judged as accurate and western estimates on this account, at this time projected the USSR's ability to rapidly overrun the whole of continental Western Europe in a full-scale invasion really rather says it all.

It also marks 1948 as the year western intelligence went from overestimating the Red Army's size (although, notably, not it's quality, which seems to be consistently underestimated throughout this period) to underestimating it, as the Red Army built up it's strength during the course of the year. The fact it was able to make NATO estimates undershoot their mark in the course of what was (by Soviet standards) a slow build-up says rather a lot about how rapidly it could increase it's strength in a all-out mobilization that war would entail.

It also says "virtually overnight" not "in the course of a single night".

Hyperbole. Do you speak it? The definition of the adjective virtually is "in effect though not in fact; practically; nearly" so it might as well have been the course of a single night as far as NATO military reaction times are concerned. Your splitting meaningless hairs there.
 
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raharris1973

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Bigger Bombs for a Brighter Tomorrow by John M. Curatola goes into exquisite detail, without sacrificing readibility, on just how ineffective the US strategic air arm in general and nuclear arsenal in particular was in the 1946-50 period. Curatola also goes into some detail about Soviet air defense forces, although he doesn't spend as much time on them as his focus is mainly on SAC. Here's a choice quote of particular relevance to the discussion:

"The issues regarding the small pool of skilled weapons assembly teams and atomic competence were highlighted during the SANDSTONE atomic test held in April and May 1 948 as the Berlin Blockade crisis emerged. At the end of March, in a meeting at Forrestal’s office with the service chiefs, Secretaries Royall and Symington, and retired General Dwight Eisenhower, the issue of atomic capability came to the fore. Eisenhower inquired about American atomic capability given the growing tensions around the German capital. The response to Eisenhower’s question was an alarming one. Nichols answered that the United States could not prepare or assemble any bombs for delivery at the time because all the qualified personnel were at Eniwetok preparing for the SANDSTONE tests. In subsequent meetings the issue was raised of returning some of the assembly personnel back to Sandia in case the atomic bomb was required during the early part of the crisis, but the idea of returning the teams was eventually nixed by the AEC." - Pg 47

Do you sources go so far as to describe how much all these American nuclear delivery shortfalls had been remedied as we got in to the 1950s, say at particular junctions like June 1950, November 1950, April 1951, July 1953 ?
 
Do you sources go so far as to describe how much all these American nuclear delivery shortfalls had been remedied as we got in to the 1950s, say at particular junctions like June 1950, November 1950, April 1951, July 1953 ?

I suspect ObsessedNuker is more of an expert than I am, but I might start with Strategic Air Command: People, Aircraft and Missiles by Norman Polmar, and Richard Rhodes's Dark Sun: The Making of the Hydrogen Bomb (particularly the chapters "Lessons of Limited War" and "Scorpions in a Bottle").

The short version is that by 1953-54, Lemay had assembled a force - what he called his "Sunday Punch" - which could have effectively destroyed the USSR as a functional great power within 48-72 hours - with no Soviet capability to strike the Continental United States. (West Germany might not have been so lucky.)

But that's a far, far cry from the state of affairs in 1948-49. As Lemay would have been the first to admit.
 
Do you sources go so far as to describe how much all these American nuclear delivery shortfalls had been remedied as we got in to the 1950s, say at particular junctions like June 1950, November 1950, April 1951, July 1953 ?

Yes, actually. Things got better during the course of '49-'50, but by LeMay's own admission not better enough. Thanks to his overhauls of the training program and the infusion of nuclear capable aircraft under the Saddletree program, crew and aircraft bottlenecks were alleviated, although not outright eliminated, but there still remained serious bottlenecks in infrastructure and maintenance. As an example, 56% of aircraft were still inoperable due to maintenance issues when SAC's minimum acceptable standard was 30%. What's more Soviet Air Defenses also continued to improve. With all that taken into account, SACs ability to do the job in a 1950 war probably wouldn't be too much different from a 1948 or '49 war. LeMay remarked in April of 1950 that he had hit the limits of what he could do by himself and that if SAC really was going to achieve it's mission, he needed more resources... and the Korean War build-up wound-up giving him just that. The official US Air Force History, probably with the benefit of hindsight, identifies 1952 as the watershed year when everything came together for SAC in terms of both personnel and material. After that, as Athelstane said, SAC would probably blow the USSR away in a couple of days.

That really leaves 1951 as kinda this question mark period where maybe SAC could do it, maybe they couldn't, but my best bet is they'd partially do it in the first attempt and then finish the job in the second attempt after a bit of further build-up.
 
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raharris1973

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That really leaves 1951 as kinda this question mark period where maybe SAC would do it, maybe they couldn't, but my best bet is they'd partially do it in the first attempt and then finish the job in the second attempt after a bit of further build-up

Kinda puts a different perspective on the idea implementing MacArthur's ideas in 1951 in a different light, huh? The US, and more importantly the larger US alliance interests that got the US involved in Korea in the first place, would not be getting off scot free. IE, a *relative* victory, but ending up in a far worse place than before the war.
 
Kinda puts a different perspective on the idea implementing MacArthur's ideas in 1951 in a different light, huh? The US, and more importantly the larger US alliance interests that got the US involved in Korea in the first place, would not be getting off scot free. IE, a *relative* victory, but ending up in a far worse place than before the war.

That was pretty much what the Joint Chiefs told Congress in the parts of the MacArthur hearings that were only declassified in the 70s and only published a few years ago, yes. Both they and LeMay opposed to trying to expand the war into China because it would be an unacceptable strain on the American strategic forces that it needed to preserve for a credible deterrent against the USSR.
 
The official US Air Force History, probably with the benefit of hindsight, identifies 1952 as the watershed year when everything came together for SAC in terms of both personnel and material.

That seems about right.

Until then, SAC just wasn't there yet.

Frustrating as it must have been to Lemay, the real wonder, looking back, is that it developed so fast. SAC went from a force structure that in 1948 could hardly find Dayton on a map - with no actual bombs in its custody it could use even if it could ! - to something capable of destroying the Soviet Union (and thus, any other country on the planet) as a functional state in a couple of days in the space of just 4-5 years.

By contrast, consider that the Air Force's B-21 bomber program is taking 15 years from its initial RFP to an initial operational capability in 2025 (assuming no further delays!), and that's merely to replace what is already a pretty capable intercontinental nuclear delivery capability.

But again, as ObsessedNuker says, in 1948, SAC could hardly deliver breakfast, let along kiloton-range indigestion, beyond the Iron Curtain.
 
But again, as ObsessedNuker says, in 1948, SAC could hardly deliver breakfast, let along kiloton-range indigestion, beyond the Iron Curtain.
In July, 1948, SAC had moved the 28th, 301st, and 307th B-29 Groups to Furstenfeldbruck, W. Germany and Marham and Waddington in the UK
More importantly, the special C-54 with the Bomb teams had been sent earlier,so there were loading pits and building set aside for assembly.

Now AEC still had the Cores, and the actual Silverplate aircraft were held back at Labrador , but prepared.

So yeah, July 1st, it would be days to a week to get a live device over and prepared.
 
In July, 1948, SAC had moved the 28th, 301st, and 307th B-29 Groups to Furstenfeldbruck, W. Germany and Marham and Waddington in the UK

But as you say, none of these were even Silverplates. Sort of a bluff, really. (Though I suppose they could have been used for conventional bombing, if war broke out.)
 
But as you say, none of these were even Silverplates. Sort of a bluff, really. (Though I suppose they could have been used for conventional bombing, if war broke out.)
Conventional B-29s did a number on North Korea, even with MiG-15s and their 'DPRK' pilots that spoke very good Russian on the radio
 
I agree with the nuclear framing in this thread from what I've seen.

But I think the Red Army is able to overrun Western Europe more likely than not first, even with nukes hitting their logistical network and possibly their armored spearheads, which is no guarantee in the least bit. The ground forces needed to win in Europe are not there and will take a while to get into position.
 
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What could be going on in the east? Lots of US personal in Japan and still very large US and RN fleets, a trip to Vladivostok and bomb the shit out of it? Soviet army can't be everywhere at once and what can their navy do about it.
 
In July, 1948, SAC had moved the 28th, 301st, and 307th B-29 Groups to Furstenfeldbruck, W. Germany and Marham and Waddington in the UK
More importantly, the special C-54 with the Bomb teams had been sent earlier,so there were loading pits and building set aside for assembly.

Eh? No B-29 groups were sent to Europe until spring of '49. While there was a rotating B-29 group in West Germany, they were too vulnerable to Soviet ground invasion given the weakness of American ground forces… nothing cripples air operations like enemy tanks parked on your airfield. No atomic facilities were prepared in Europe in mid-1948 and no bomb assembly teams had been dispatched prior. Air Force WSP officers only visited select British bases in August, but even these groups were not actually trained in bomb assembly, despite it supposed to be their job, since the AEC was hoarding. In fact, the British didn't even give permission to the US to use their bases for nuclear-delivery purposes until in later 1948, in September when LeMay met with Tedder and got a guarantee on the issue. Bomb pits were only then constructed in October, with other facilities for storage and assembly only beginning development in April 1950. The Air Force's C-54s were tied up shuttling supplies to Berlin and in the OPs scenario are liable to have been lost when the Soviets started shooting down aircraft, which is a serious problem for SAC. What's more, airfield air defenses were practically nonexistent (WSEG inspections noted they consisted of entirely of a single .50 cal machine gun posted at the end of one of the runways), so the fields would be vulnerable to initial Soviet counter-air strikes until the AA could be reinforced. And of course, the Soviet have more fighters then the Western Allies have aircraft, with the European approaches covered by a early-warning net. Given all this, it's pretty clear that strategic bombing raids in the opening stages of a '48 war would achieve nothing but squander scarce bombers and air crews.

Conventional B-29s did a number on North Korea, even with MiG-15s and their 'DPRK' pilots that spoke very good Russian on the radio

Communist supply throughput increased during the course of the war and unlike in Korea, the US doesn’t have the luxury of overwhelming numerical superiority this time around. That shoe is solidly on the other foot. 30 bombers against some 5,000 aircraft isn’t going to be able to achieve jack.

What could be going on in the east? Lots of US personal in Japan and still very large US and RN fleets, a trip to Vladivostok and bomb the shit out of it? Soviet army can't be everywhere at once and what can their navy do about it.

Nothing much. US plans were to stand on the strategic defensive in the Far East. Protect Japan as a future nuke base and that’s pretty much it. Even during the Korean War, the plan was to abandon the peninsula so forces could head over to Europe. An amphibious landing in Vladivostok was never entertained. It would take too many forces, be too far from anywhere that actually matters to the Russians, and be too easily blocked.

the real wonder, looking back, is that it developed so fast. SAC went from a force structure that in 1948 could hardly find Dayton on a map - with no actual bombs in its custody it could use even if it could ! - to something capable of destroying the Soviet Union (and thus, any other country on the planet) as a functional state in a couple of days in the space of just 4-5 years.

I don't know if I'd describe that as a wonder. In 1940, the Red Army was a incoherent mess with only sheer size going for it. By 1945, it was arguably most powerful ground force on the planet. In 1939, the US Army was weaker then Belgium's. By 1944, it was a lean, mean mechanized fighting machine capable of throwing down with any other Great Power's. 4-5 years is really a long time, in military terms particularly if your country possesses a lot of latent capacity.
 
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