Chapter 4 Hawaii and tension in the Pacific
On October 8, 1940, in response to Japanese pressure that leads to the stationing of their troops in French Indochina, and the Japanese government signature on the Tripartite Pact, President Roosevelt decides to station the Pacific Fleet permanently at Pearl Harbor in hopes of restraining further Japanese aggression. Admiral James O Richardson, Commander in Chief US Fleet, who commands the Battle Force and Scouting Force in the Pacific, protests the move. He is ordered to Washington by Navy Secretary Frank Knox, who is worried that his outspoken but highly valuable commander is about to get himself into political trouble by challenging the President. In discussions that at times grow heated, the Secretary talks Richardson into agreeing to listen to the President and follow orders and most importantly, keeping his mouth shut.
Over the next few days Roosevelt and Knox meet privately and then with Richardson and Roosevelt promises to do what he can to strengthen Pearl Harbor but insists that the fleet must stay. Admiral Richardson finally accepts the decision, although it becomes clear to Roosevelt that Richardson is not the man he needs for Chief of Naval Operations, which means Admiral Stark will keep his job, but the Admiral accepts the decision to take what is in effect a partial demotion to Commander Pacific Fleet as the growing threat of Germany requires a new position, Commander Atlantic Fleet, which will require taking some ships from the Pacific and sending them to the Atlantic. Husband Kimmel is promoted to his new rank of Commander Atlantic Fleet in November 1940. Kimmel, with extensive experience with destroyers, cruisers and battleships, is viewed as a good choice for facing the possible war with Germany and the submarine threat from them, while Richardson, who is one of the authors of War Plan Orange, is best suited for the Pacific and the possible war with Japan.
Richardson does however manage to get a few things from his President. Plans to send the carrier Yorktown to the Atlantic are canceled, as Richardson argues that he needs every scout plane he can get, and instead the planned experimental escort carrier Long Island, as well as the carriers Wasp and Ranger, plus the new Hornet when she is completed, will be assigned to the neutrality patrol. He does lose the battleships Idaho, New Mexico and Mississippi, plus all of the Omaha class cruisers plus several heavy cruisers and numerous destroyers. Richardson is not pleased but considers it a worthwhile trade for keeping 4 carriers in the Pacific. He does manage to talk Stark and Knox into giving him a few more fleet oilers however, arguing that as the Atlantic Fleet is primarily patrolling the western Atlantic, that fleet does not need oilers as badly as his fleet does, and that it will extend the range of the Pacific Scouting Force. He gets 6 oilers that will arrive in mid 1941.
Richardson, who like Halsey is a strong proponent of carrier aviation, also asks Admiral Harry Yarnell, recently retired from his post as Commander Asiatic Fleet, to come to Hawaii for a visit and manages to get permission to conduct Fleet Problem XXII, which was planned for the Spring of 1941 and recently canceled be reinstated. The Admiral points out that as the Army is conducting its own maneuvers it is important that the Navy do so as well. Roosevelt, who still considers the Navy 'his service' agrees and Knox grants permission and the necessary funds for it.
On February 8, 1941, Lieutenant General Walter Short, an infantry commander with extensive experience and considered a 'comer' is sent to Hawaii to take command of Army forces there. Soon after his arrival, on February 17, Secretary Stimson sends a letter to General Short that the Secretary had received from Secretary Knox, warning as follows:
“"If war eventuates with Japan, it is believed easily possible that hostilities would be initiated by a surprise attack upon the fleet or the naval base at Pearl Harbor." The letter proceeded: "The dangers envisaged in their order of importance and probability are considered to be: (1) Air bombing attack (2) Air torpedo plane attack, (3) Sabotage, (4) Submarine attack, (5) Mining, (6) Bombardment by gunfire."
Admiral Richardson, who has already received this letter, begins pushing for the strongest possible measures be taken by the Army to prepare for the first two likelihoods, considering sabotage reasonably unlikely with at least basic security measures, the next two a Navy problem, and the final possibility highly unlikely but certainly what the coast defense guns are supposed to defend against. He pressures General Short and General Frederick Martin, commander of the Hawaiian Air Force, to allow the assignment of Marine Corps and Navy personnel to the Air Information Center. The Admiral is also dissatisfied with the degree of anti aircraft protection his three naval air stations (Ewa, Ford Island, and Kaneohe Bay) have and assigns the 2nd and 4th Marine Defense Battalions (less their batteries of 5 inch guns which will be assigned to the 1st Battalion slated for Wake Island, and the 3rd Battalion slated for Midway). This gives Ewa and Kaneohe Bay each 16 3 inch guns and 48 .50 caliber machine guns, plus 2 machine gun companies (48 .30 caliber machine guns) to provide security for the bases (and which can also be sent to Wake or Midway once facilities are available). Richardson requests an additional Marine Defense Battalion once its available for Ford Island. War would come before he got that wish fulfilled. By November 1941 both bases have their Marine defenses completed and ready for war.
However, Richardson finds that Short simply does not understand the air threat, and indeed seems unusually concerned about the sabotage threat of the very large Japanese-American population in Hawaii. The General is also focused more on his infantry and preparing for an amphibious assault which Richardson believes is unlikely in the extreme due to Japanese shipping constraints. Several meetings in March and April are unproductive and Richardson realizes that only Fleet Problem XXII is going to serve to make his point.
Fleet Problem XXII May 1941
In a complex plan developed by Richardson and Yarnell, the fleet is divided into two forces. The Red Force, which will be commanded by Halsey (commander Aircraft Battleforce) and given the carriers Saratoga, Lexington, Enterprise, plus 6 heavy cruisers, 12 destroyers and all 3 available oilers, and told to recreate Fleet Problem XIII. CINCPAC (Commander Pacific Fleet) purposefully neglects to inform the Army, or indeed Admiral Bellinger (commander US Navy Aviation Hawaii) of the first part of the problem, which will be a simulated surprise attack aimed at Pearl Harbor. Admiral Pye, commander of the Battle Force is appointed senior referee, as are several other senior Naval officers, while Admiral Anderson is given the Blue Force, which consists of the battleships and their escorts, and Admiral Brown is given the carrier Yorktown, the remaining cruisers and some destroyers as the scout force for Anderson. Most of the submarines are given to Blue Force as well.
Deciding that as the Red Force is simulating the Japanese, and thus the most likely approach is from the southwest (in the direction of the Japanese held Marshal Islands), Anderson sends Brown in that direction, while keeping his slower battleships in the harbor as directed. Bellinger, with only 40 available PBY Catalina long range flying boats, cannot patrol everywhere, and is forced to make choices. He decides to primarily support Brown, leaving only a handful for the northern search.
Halsey, fully aware of the limitations of the PBY, manages to avoid contact with all but one, and the referee determines that the fighters of his task force would have shot it down before it got off a contact report. The submarines, which are deployed mainly to the west and south, also miss him, and thus Halsey comes to within 200 miles of the north coast of Oahu on June 19. He launches 90 SBD Dauntless dive bombers, 36 TBD Devastator torpedo bombers and 36 Wildcat fighters as a strike. The dive bombers are to eliminate the primary Army airfields of Wheeler and Hickam fields, as well as Ewa and the two Navy patrol plane bases, while the TBDs will act as glide bombers and attack the fleet machine shops, drydocks, and oil tank farms. The fighters will provide cover and conduct simulated strafing attacks on the airfields. Convinced that the shallow depth of Pearl Harbor precludes a torpedo attacks with aerial torpedoes, Halsey ignores that possibility as Yarnell and Richardson also believed this.
The result is a stunning embarrassment for the Army. The Army has not yet received the new SCR270 radar sets and indeed has allocated minimal staff or preparation for them. The Air Information Center is still minimally staffed, and indeed the Marine Corps Liaison, 2 clerks and a lowly Army fighter pilot are the only staff present when the first Dauntless begins its dive on Hickam Field. The Army Anti aircraft units are either parked in storage, or for those guns that are present, their crews are too far away to man them quickly and their ammunition supply is locked. Only a handful of fighters manage to get off the ground during the simulated attack and the referees rule that they are destroyed and their bases wrecked. Only at Ewa and Kaneohe do the defenders score successes, as the Marines are closer to a war footing, although the referees rule that as these units are still below strength and lacking equipment and thus the bases are considered damaged. The strike on the fleet facilities is unopposed as Short has not yet deployed batteries to defend the base, and the referees decide that it would be a total loss.
In short, the Red Force has eliminated the ability of the Army to defend the fleet, and for the Navy to support the fleet. A fully detailed report is soon on the way to Secretary Knox.
The next part of the problem is designed to see if the fleet can intercept the Red Force or prevent further attacks. The Blue Force fleet sorties (which takes several hours), while Admiral Brown and his scouting force hurries north to try and find the Red Force. However Halsey steams due north and then swings north and west to put himself within strike range of Midway, which the referees rule is destroyed (particularly as no aircraft have yet arrived for the airfield). A report of this is also sent to Knox, although Brown is commended for his aggression in attempting to find Halsey.
The remainder of May and into June is spent conducting operations in the Midway area to simulate an amphibious invasion as well as to allow the battleship divisions to practice gunnery and maneuver.
A new Army Commander
Knox is appalled when he reads how successful the humiliation has been of the Army and thus the likely elimination of the ability of the Pacific Fleet to operate out of Hawaii. He forwards the report to Secretary Stimson and asks to meet with the President. In a short meeting, General Marshall and Secretary of War find themselves highly embarrassed by the debacle suffered by the Army, and soon after that Marshall decides that an aviator is needed for senior command in Hawaii. General Hap Arnold, commander of the Army Air Corps, decides he has just the man.
Brigadier General Millard Harmon, recently returned from his duties as an observer in the British Isles and one of the most senior pilots in the entire Army Air Corps, seems like just the man. He has a good understanding of the uses of radar, has watched the RAF use it and he is promoted to Lieutenant General, skipping an entire rank, and sent to Hawaii on July 19, 1941. General Walter Short is sent back to the United States and given command of the 2nd Army in Tennessee, which at present is a training organization where he will spend the next four years.
Hawaii goes to a war footing
In Hawaii, General Harmon takes charge and after inspecting dispositions and plans, asks for a new commander for the 14th Fighter Wing, as well as a corps commander for the ground forces to take charge of their training. He also orders his fighter group and squadron commanders to review the points made by Claire Chennault in his visit in July and insists that his squadrons begin operational training using those tactics. He requests Brigadier John McConnell, who had experience in Hawaii as a fighter squadron commander in 1938, as a new commander for the Hawaiian Air Force and although Hap Arnold had other plans for him, the embarrassment of Fleet Problem XXIII means General Marshall is inclined to give Harmon what he wants.
By the middle of October General Harmon has persuaded Admiral Richardson to create a joint air defense command headquarters, which will have authority over all fighters stationed in Hawaii as well as visiting units while their carriers are in port. Instead of intensive alerts that wear out crews and aircraft, a longer term rotating schedule of retaining 25% of fighters (one flight per squadron), another 25% on 30 minute alert, the third flight of each squadron on 1 hour alert, and the fourth flight (the remaining 25%) on maintenance stand down. He also gives the 72nd Pursuit Squadron, which currently lacks aircraft, all 14 of the obsolete P26 Peashooter fighters on the island, and assigns them the mission of point defense for the harbor, while the obsolescent P36 fighter squadrons are given point defense missions, along with the Marine Corps squadron at Ewa for defending airfields and the modern P40 fighter squadrons given the general interception mission. General McConnell will head Hawaiian Interceptor Command. His first act is to ignore Department of Interior protests and places his 5 radar sets at locations to best optimize their performance. He is also given carte blanche to obtain the personnel he needs from them, and several dozen men are flown to Hawaii from the United States on a priority basis to help train and man the air defense command center and the radar stations and the communications network to make them work.
Harmon and Richardson also set up a combined air search and patrol headquarters which will have control of all Navy reconnaissance aircraft, as well as 18th Bomb Wing with its force of 33 B18 medium bombers and 12 B17D heavy bombers for medium and long range missions. The 13th Bombardment squadron, with its 13 A20 Havoc light bombers, begins practicing low altitude attacks against shipping as General Harmon is unimpressed with their proficiency in that mission. Admiral Bellinger is given command of the air scouting force.
Admiral Richardson, happier now that the air defense and air search issues are being addressed, looks closer at the deployment of the Fleet. He organizes Task Force 9, giving that command to Rear Admiral Draemel, and issues orders that nine 4 stack destroyers (now operating as minesweepers and minelayers), as well as several S boat submarines he orders moved from the West Coast, be on station at all times to maintain a picket line 300 miles north and northwest of Hawaii, the approach he considers the most likely Japanese approach to Hawaii in the event of a carrier strike. The carriers will exercise primary to the south and southwest of Oahu, with the Army bombers covering the west and southwest in support. This allows the Navy Patrol Wings, with their 77 long range PBY Catalina flying boats to cover the north, northwest and west along with Task Force 9. The 12 PBYs out of Midway will also support this mission. He also moves the seaplane tenders Avocet, Swan, Hulbert and Thornton on rotating duty at Kure Atoll and French Frigate Shoals on a rotating basis, along with a destroyer at each location as an escort. Assigned to them are detachments from 2 utility seaplane squadrons from Ford Island, and while the J2F Duck amphibious scout planes have only a patrol range of just under 300 miles, they provide local patrol capability and allow the Catalina's to patrol other areas. This new air defense and scouting arrangement is complete by the end of October 1941.
In early November, General Harmon finally gets a deputy commander in the form of General “Vinegar Joe” Stilwell who takes command of the VI Corps. Although the corps lacks any significant support units as most are still in the continental United States, it does have 2 infantry divisions (the newly organized 24th and 25th Infantry Divisions that formed from the Hawaiian Division), a Coast Artillery Command, and a Anti Aircraft Command. He and General Harmon both urgently request additional engineer units and other corps support units but shipping is not yet available. General Stilwell ends some of the peacetime practices that still remain, such as the emphasis on athletics over readiness, and backs his division commanders as they get rid of deadwood. A string of under performing or just plain bad officers and non commissioned officers are found wanting and sent to the United States, or demoted.
Hawaiian Army and Naval Air Forces December 1941
Air Defense Command Hawaii (Brigadier General McConnell)
Wheeler Field
HQ 14th Pursuit Wing (15th and 18th Pursuit Groups)
15th Pursuit Group w 44th, 47th Pursuit Squadrons (24 P40), 45th Pursuit squadron (12 P36)
72nd Pursuit Squadron (8 P26)
undergoing maintenance and repair (unassigned) 7 P26, 15 P36, 25 P40, 8 observation aircraft
53rd Coast Artillery brigade (AAA) with 18 x 3 inch, 12 x 37mm AA, dozens of machines guns
Operational aircraft are located in revetments, aircraft undergoing repair and maintenance or that are lacking needed spares are in hangers or parked on the ramp
(authors note: Wheeler had 108 revetments built prior to the attack in OTL. The aircraft were instead lined up on the ramp to protect them from sabotage).
Bellows Field
18th Pursuit Group w 6th, 73rd, 78th Pursuit Squadrons (36 P40), 46th Pursuit Group (12 P36)
6 operational observation aircraft of several types
all aircraft are parked on the ramp and dispersed. Revetments are planned but have not yet been built
15th Coast Artillery Brigade (AA) same as 53rd Brigade
Haleiwa Field
47th Pursuit Squadron -12 P40 (assigned as part of 15th Pursuit Group)
parked on the ramp but dispersed
Ewa Field
Marine Air Group 21 (fighters are assigned to 14th Pursuit Wing while in Hawaii)
VMF 211 – 12 Wildcats (operational)(4 additional undergoing maintenance)
VMSB 232 – 24 SBD (16 operational, 8 undergoing repair)
VMSB 231 – 8 SB2U (all undergoing repair, remainder of squadron aboard USS Lexington)
3rd Marine Defense battalion (18 x 3 inch AA, dozens of machine guns), deployed in fortified positions
Air Search Command (Rear Admiral Bellinger)
Midway NAS (forward deployed) VP21 w 12 PBY, VJ3 w 8 float planes
(all aircraft are parked on the ramp or floating in the lagoon and are dispersed)
6th Marine Defense battalion (750 men, 18 x 3 inch AA, 6 x 5 inch anti shipping guns, dozens of machine guns)
Kaheohe NAS
Patrol Wing 2 w VP 11, VP 12, VP 14 (30 PBY operational, 6 undergoing repair in hangers)
operational aircraft parked on the ramp or floating in the bay
4th Marine Defense battalion (18 x 3 inch AA guns, dozens of machine guns) deployed in fortified positions
Ford Island NAS
Patrol Wing 1 w VP 21, VP 22, VP 23 (29 PBY operational, 6 undergoing maintenance and repair)
VJ2 w 18 assorted floatplanes, plus 30 various float planes from the battleships and cruisers (25 operational aircraft)
all aircraft parked on the ramp (dispersed) or in hangers.
5 Wildcat, 5 Buffalo, 2 SBD from the carriers are at Ford Island in hangers undergoing repair
Hickem Field
HQ 18th Bomb Wing (Brigadier General Rudolph)
5th Bomb Group w 23rd, 31st Bomb Squadrons (8 B17D operational, 4 undergoing repair)
11th Bomb Group w 11th, 26th, 42nd Bomb Squadrons (24 B18 operational, 9 undergoing repair and maintenance)
58th Bomb Squadron (9 A20 operational, 5 undergoing repair and maintenance)
also assigned, 2 C33 transports (basically civilian DC2 transport aircraft)
16th Coast Artillery brigade (AA) same as 53rd
Hickem lacks revetments, but aircraft that are operational are dispersed while aircraft undergoing maintenance are in hangers or on the main ramp
Other Defenses
3 additional coast artillery (AA) brigades are deployed, with 1 at Pearl Harbor base, another across the harbor at Ford City, and a third at Schofield Barracks in reserve. This is in addition to the AA units that are part of the coast defense fortifications..