The Battles at Dawn: The Japanese and American Battles that shaped the World War in the Pacific An Alternate History

Driftless

Donor
Having an air force in the Philippines with some muscule and sustained capability would have made a huge difference compared to history
 
Still living seeing this come alive. I can't say I'm catching any changes but it's still fun rereading this and seeing it grow.

Thank you again Galveston Bay for all of your time sharing this with us.
 
Still living seeing this come alive. I can't say I'm catching any changes but it's still fun rereading this and seeing it grow.

Thank you again Galveston Bay for all of your time sharing this with us.

most of the changes thus far are combining two stories into one (thus some paragraphs added and sentences and paragraphs reorganized or changed). There will not be any changes to the overall story line, but some changes in details and further changes in organization and flow.
 
Chapter 4 Hawaii prepares for war
Chapter 4 Hawaii and tension in the Pacific
On October 8, 1940, in response to Japanese pressure that leads to the stationing of their troops in French Indochina, and the Japanese government signature on the Tripartite Pact, President Roosevelt decides to station the Pacific Fleet permanently at Pearl Harbor in hopes of restraining further Japanese aggression. Admiral James O Richardson, Commander in Chief US Fleet, who commands the Battle Force and Scouting Force in the Pacific, protests the move. He is ordered to Washington by Navy Secretary Frank Knox, who is worried that his outspoken but highly valuable commander is about to get himself into political trouble by challenging the President. In discussions that at times grow heated, the Secretary talks Richardson into agreeing to listen to the President and follow orders and most importantly, keeping his mouth shut.

Over the next few days Roosevelt and Knox meet privately and then with Richardson and Roosevelt promises to do what he can to strengthen Pearl Harbor but insists that the fleet must stay. Admiral Richardson finally accepts the decision, although it becomes clear to Roosevelt that Richardson is not the man he needs for Chief of Naval Operations, which means Admiral Stark will keep his job, but the Admiral accepts the decision to take what is in effect a partial demotion to Commander Pacific Fleet as the growing threat of Germany requires a new position, Commander Atlantic Fleet, which will require taking some ships from the Pacific and sending them to the Atlantic. Husband Kimmel is promoted to his new rank of Commander Atlantic Fleet in November 1940. Kimmel, with extensive experience with destroyers, cruisers and battleships, is viewed as a good choice for facing the possible war with Germany and the submarine threat from them, while Richardson, who is one of the authors of War Plan Orange, is best suited for the Pacific and the possible war with Japan.

Richardson does however manage to get a few things from his President. Plans to send the carrier Yorktown to the Atlantic are canceled, as Richardson argues that he needs every scout plane he can get, and instead the planned experimental escort carrier Long Island, as well as the carriers Wasp and Ranger, plus the new Hornet when she is completed, will be assigned to the neutrality patrol. He does lose the battleships Idaho, New Mexico and Mississippi, plus all of the Omaha class cruisers plus several heavy cruisers and numerous destroyers. Richardson is not pleased but considers it a worthwhile trade for keeping 4 carriers in the Pacific. He does manage to talk Stark and Knox into giving him a few more fleet oilers however, arguing that as the Atlantic Fleet is primarily patrolling the western Atlantic, that fleet does not need oilers as badly as his fleet does, and that it will extend the range of the Pacific Scouting Force. He gets 6 oilers that will arrive in mid 1941.

Richardson, who like Halsey is a strong proponent of carrier aviation, also asks Admiral Harry Yarnell, recently retired from his post as Commander Asiatic Fleet, to come to Hawaii for a visit and manages to get permission to conduct Fleet Problem XXII, which was planned for the Spring of 1941 and recently canceled be reinstated. The Admiral points out that as the Army is conducting its own maneuvers it is important that the Navy do so as well. Roosevelt, who still considers the Navy 'his service' agrees and Knox grants permission and the necessary funds for it.

On February 8, 1941, Lieutenant General Walter Short, an infantry commander with extensive experience and considered a 'comer' is sent to Hawaii to take command of Army forces there. Soon after his arrival, on February 17, Secretary Stimson sends a letter to General Short that the Secretary had received from Secretary Knox, warning as follows:

“"If war eventuates with Japan, it is believed easily possible that hostilities would be initiated by a surprise attack upon the fleet or the naval base at Pearl Harbor." The letter proceeded: "The dangers envisaged in their order of importance and probability are considered to be: (1) Air bombing attack (2) Air torpedo plane attack, (3) Sabotage, (4) Submarine attack, (5) Mining, (6) Bombardment by gunfire."

Admiral Richardson, who has already received this letter, begins pushing for the strongest possible measures be taken by the Army to prepare for the first two likelihoods, considering sabotage reasonably unlikely with at least basic security measures, the next two a Navy problem, and the final possibility highly unlikely but certainly what the coast defense guns are supposed to defend against. He pressures General Short and General Frederick Martin, commander of the Hawaiian Air Force, to allow the assignment of Marine Corps and Navy personnel to the Air Information Center. The Admiral is also dissatisfied with the degree of anti aircraft protection his three naval air stations (Ewa, Ford Island, and Kaneohe Bay) have and assigns the 2nd and 4th Marine Defense Battalions (less their batteries of 5 inch guns which will be assigned to the 1st Battalion slated for Wake Island, and the 3rd Battalion slated for Midway). This gives Ewa and Kaneohe Bay each 16 3 inch guns and 48 .50 caliber machine guns, plus 2 machine gun companies (48 .30 caliber machine guns) to provide security for the bases (and which can also be sent to Wake or Midway once facilities are available). Richardson requests an additional Marine Defense Battalion once its available for Ford Island. War would come before he got that wish fulfilled. By November 1941 both bases have their Marine defenses completed and ready for war.

However, Richardson finds that Short simply does not understand the air threat, and indeed seems unusually concerned about the sabotage threat of the very large Japanese-American population in Hawaii. The General is also focused more on his infantry and preparing for an amphibious assault which Richardson believes is unlikely in the extreme due to Japanese shipping constraints. Several meetings in March and April are unproductive and Richardson realizes that only Fleet Problem XXII is going to serve to make his point.

Fleet Problem XXII May 1941
In a complex plan developed by Richardson and Yarnell, the fleet is divided into two forces. The Red Force, which will be commanded by Halsey (commander Aircraft Battleforce) and given the carriers Saratoga, Lexington, Enterprise, plus 6 heavy cruisers, 12 destroyers and all 3 available oilers, and told to recreate Fleet Problem XIII. CINCPAC (Commander Pacific Fleet) purposefully neglects to inform the Army, or indeed Admiral Bellinger (commander US Navy Aviation Hawaii) of the first part of the problem, which will be a simulated surprise attack aimed at Pearl Harbor. Admiral Pye, commander of the Battle Force is appointed senior referee, as are several other senior Naval officers, while Admiral Anderson is given the Blue Force, which consists of the battleships and their escorts, and Admiral Brown is given the carrier Yorktown, the remaining cruisers and some destroyers as the scout force for Anderson. Most of the submarines are given to Blue Force as well.

Deciding that as the Red Force is simulating the Japanese, and thus the most likely approach is from the southwest (in the direction of the Japanese held Marshal Islands), Anderson sends Brown in that direction, while keeping his slower battleships in the harbor as directed. Bellinger, with only 40 available PBY Catalina long range flying boats, cannot patrol everywhere, and is forced to make choices. He decides to primarily support Brown, leaving only a handful for the northern search.

Halsey, fully aware of the limitations of the PBY, manages to avoid contact with all but one, and the referee determines that the fighters of his task force would have shot it down before it got off a contact report. The submarines, which are deployed mainly to the west and south, also miss him, and thus Halsey comes to within 200 miles of the north coast of Oahu on June 19. He launches 90 SBD Dauntless dive bombers, 36 TBD Devastator torpedo bombers and 36 Wildcat fighters as a strike. The dive bombers are to eliminate the primary Army airfields of Wheeler and Hickam fields, as well as Ewa and the two Navy patrol plane bases, while the TBDs will act as glide bombers and attack the fleet machine shops, drydocks, and oil tank farms. The fighters will provide cover and conduct simulated strafing attacks on the airfields. Convinced that the shallow depth of Pearl Harbor precludes a torpedo attacks with aerial torpedoes, Halsey ignores that possibility as Yarnell and Richardson also believed this.

The result is a stunning embarrassment for the Army. The Army has not yet received the new SCR270 radar sets and indeed has allocated minimal staff or preparation for them. The Air Information Center is still minimally staffed, and indeed the Marine Corps Liaison, 2 clerks and a lowly Army fighter pilot are the only staff present when the first Dauntless begins its dive on Hickam Field. The Army Anti aircraft units are either parked in storage, or for those guns that are present, their crews are too far away to man them quickly and their ammunition supply is locked. Only a handful of fighters manage to get off the ground during the simulated attack and the referees rule that they are destroyed and their bases wrecked. Only at Ewa and Kaneohe do the defenders score successes, as the Marines are closer to a war footing, although the referees rule that as these units are still below strength and lacking equipment and thus the bases are considered damaged. The strike on the fleet facilities is unopposed as Short has not yet deployed batteries to defend the base, and the referees decide that it would be a total loss.

In short, the Red Force has eliminated the ability of the Army to defend the fleet, and for the Navy to support the fleet. A fully detailed report is soon on the way to Secretary Knox.

The next part of the problem is designed to see if the fleet can intercept the Red Force or prevent further attacks. The Blue Force fleet sorties (which takes several hours), while Admiral Brown and his scouting force hurries north to try and find the Red Force. However Halsey steams due north and then swings north and west to put himself within strike range of Midway, which the referees rule is destroyed (particularly as no aircraft have yet arrived for the airfield). A report of this is also sent to Knox, although Brown is commended for his aggression in attempting to find Halsey.

The remainder of May and into June is spent conducting operations in the Midway area to simulate an amphibious invasion as well as to allow the battleship divisions to practice gunnery and maneuver.

A new Army Commander
Knox is appalled when he reads how successful the humiliation has been of the Army and thus the likely elimination of the ability of the Pacific Fleet to operate out of Hawaii. He forwards the report to Secretary Stimson and asks to meet with the President. In a short meeting, General Marshall and Secretary of War find themselves highly embarrassed by the debacle suffered by the Army, and soon after that Marshall decides that an aviator is needed for senior command in Hawaii. General Hap Arnold, commander of the Army Air Corps, decides he has just the man.

Brigadier General Millard Harmon, recently returned from his duties as an observer in the British Isles and one of the most senior pilots in the entire Army Air Corps, seems like just the man. He has a good understanding of the uses of radar, has watched the RAF use it and he is promoted to Lieutenant General, skipping an entire rank, and sent to Hawaii on July 19, 1941. General Walter Short is sent back to the United States and given command of the 2nd Army in Tennessee, which at present is a training organization where he will spend the next four years.

Hawaii goes to a war footing
In Hawaii, General Harmon takes charge and after inspecting dispositions and plans, asks for a new commander for the 14th Fighter Wing, as well as a corps commander for the ground forces to take charge of their training. He also orders his fighter group and squadron commanders to review the points made by Claire Chennault in his visit in July and insists that his squadrons begin operational training using those tactics. He requests Brigadier John McConnell, who had experience in Hawaii as a fighter squadron commander in 1938, as a new commander for the Hawaiian Air Force and although Hap Arnold had other plans for him, the embarrassment of Fleet Problem XXIII means General Marshall is inclined to give Harmon what he wants.

By the middle of October General Harmon has persuaded Admiral Richardson to create a joint air defense command headquarters, which will have authority over all fighters stationed in Hawaii as well as visiting units while their carriers are in port. Instead of intensive alerts that wear out crews and aircraft, a longer term rotating schedule of retaining 25% of fighters (one flight per squadron), another 25% on 30 minute alert, the third flight of each squadron on 1 hour alert, and the fourth flight (the remaining 25%) on maintenance stand down. He also gives the 72nd Pursuit Squadron, which currently lacks aircraft, all 14 of the obsolete P26 Peashooter fighters on the island, and assigns them the mission of point defense for the harbor, while the obsolescent P36 fighter squadrons are given point defense missions, along with the Marine Corps squadron at Ewa for defending airfields and the modern P40 fighter squadrons given the general interception mission. General McConnell will head Hawaiian Interceptor Command. His first act is to ignore Department of Interior protests and places his 5 radar sets at locations to best optimize their performance. He is also given carte blanche to obtain the personnel he needs from them, and several dozen men are flown to Hawaii from the United States on a priority basis to help train and man the air defense command center and the radar stations and the communications network to make them work.

Harmon and Richardson also set up a combined air search and patrol headquarters which will have control of all Navy reconnaissance aircraft, as well as 18th Bomb Wing with its force of 33 B18 medium bombers and 12 B17D heavy bombers for medium and long range missions. The 13th Bombardment squadron, with its 13 A20 Havoc light bombers, begins practicing low altitude attacks against shipping as General Harmon is unimpressed with their proficiency in that mission. Admiral Bellinger is given command of the air scouting force.

Admiral Richardson, happier now that the air defense and air search issues are being addressed, looks closer at the deployment of the Fleet. He organizes Task Force 9, giving that command to Rear Admiral Draemel, and issues orders that nine 4 stack destroyers (now operating as minesweepers and minelayers), as well as several S boat submarines he orders moved from the West Coast, be on station at all times to maintain a picket line 300 miles north and northwest of Hawaii, the approach he considers the most likely Japanese approach to Hawaii in the event of a carrier strike. The carriers will exercise primary to the south and southwest of Oahu, with the Army bombers covering the west and southwest in support. This allows the Navy Patrol Wings, with their 77 long range PBY Catalina flying boats to cover the north, northwest and west along with Task Force 9. The 12 PBYs out of Midway will also support this mission. He also moves the seaplane tenders Avocet, Swan, Hulbert and Thornton on rotating duty at Kure Atoll and French Frigate Shoals on a rotating basis, along with a destroyer at each location as an escort. Assigned to them are detachments from 2 utility seaplane squadrons from Ford Island, and while the J2F Duck amphibious scout planes have only a patrol range of just under 300 miles, they provide local patrol capability and allow the Catalina's to patrol other areas. This new air defense and scouting arrangement is complete by the end of October 1941.

In early November, General Harmon finally gets a deputy commander in the form of General “Vinegar Joe” Stilwell who takes command of the VI Corps. Although the corps lacks any significant support units as most are still in the continental United States, it does have 2 infantry divisions (the newly organized 24th and 25th Infantry Divisions that formed from the Hawaiian Division), a Coast Artillery Command, and a Anti Aircraft Command. He and General Harmon both urgently request additional engineer units and other corps support units but shipping is not yet available. General Stilwell ends some of the peacetime practices that still remain, such as the emphasis on athletics over readiness, and backs his division commanders as they get rid of deadwood. A string of under performing or just plain bad officers and non commissioned officers are found wanting and sent to the United States, or demoted.

Hawaiian Army and Naval Air Forces December 1941
Air Defense Command Hawaii (Brigadier General McConnell)
Wheeler Field
HQ 14th Pursuit Wing (15th and 18th Pursuit Groups)
15th Pursuit Group w 44th, 47th Pursuit Squadrons (24 P40), 45th Pursuit squadron (12 P36)
72nd Pursuit Squadron (8 P26)
undergoing maintenance and repair (unassigned) 7 P26, 15 P36, 25 P40, 8 observation aircraft
53rd Coast Artillery brigade (AAA) with 18 x 3 inch, 12 x 37mm AA, dozens of machines guns
Operational aircraft are located in revetments, aircraft undergoing repair and maintenance or that are lacking needed spares are in hangers or parked on the ramp
(authors note: Wheeler had 108 revetments built prior to the attack in OTL. The aircraft were instead lined up on the ramp to protect them from sabotage).

Bellows Field
18th Pursuit Group w 6th, 73rd, 78th Pursuit Squadrons (36 P40), 46th Pursuit Group (12 P36)
6 operational observation aircraft of several types
all aircraft are parked on the ramp and dispersed. Revetments are planned but have not yet been built
15th Coast Artillery Brigade (AA) same as 53rd Brigade

Haleiwa Field
47th Pursuit Squadron -12 P40 (assigned as part of 15th Pursuit Group)
parked on the ramp but dispersed

Ewa Field
Marine Air Group 21 (fighters are assigned to 14th Pursuit Wing while in Hawaii)
VMF 211 – 12 Wildcats (operational)(4 additional undergoing maintenance)
VMSB 232 – 24 SBD (16 operational, 8 undergoing repair)
VMSB 231 – 8 SB2U (all undergoing repair, remainder of squadron aboard USS Lexington)
3rd Marine Defense battalion (18 x 3 inch AA, dozens of machine guns), deployed in fortified positions

Air Search Command (Rear Admiral Bellinger)
Midway NAS (forward deployed) VP21 w 12 PBY, VJ3 w 8 float planes
(all aircraft are parked on the ramp or floating in the lagoon and are dispersed)
6th Marine Defense battalion (750 men, 18 x 3 inch AA, 6 x 5 inch anti shipping guns, dozens of machine guns)

Kaheohe NAS
Patrol Wing 2 w VP 11, VP 12, VP 14 (30 PBY operational, 6 undergoing repair in hangers)
operational aircraft parked on the ramp or floating in the bay
4th Marine Defense battalion (18 x 3 inch AA guns, dozens of machine guns) deployed in fortified positions

Ford Island NAS
Patrol Wing 1 w VP 21, VP 22, VP 23 (29 PBY operational, 6 undergoing maintenance and repair)
VJ2 w 18 assorted floatplanes, plus 30 various float planes from the battleships and cruisers (25 operational aircraft)
all aircraft parked on the ramp (dispersed) or in hangers.
5 Wildcat, 5 Buffalo, 2 SBD from the carriers are at Ford Island in hangers undergoing repair

Hickem Field
HQ 18th Bomb Wing (Brigadier General Rudolph)
5th Bomb Group w 23rd, 31st Bomb Squadrons (8 B17D operational, 4 undergoing repair)
11th Bomb Group w 11th, 26th, 42nd Bomb Squadrons (24 B18 operational, 9 undergoing repair and maintenance)
58th Bomb Squadron (9 A20 operational, 5 undergoing repair and maintenance)
also assigned, 2 C33 transports (basically civilian DC2 transport aircraft)
16th Coast Artillery brigade (AA) same as 53rd
Hickem lacks revetments, but aircraft that are operational are dispersed while aircraft undergoing maintenance are in hangers or on the main ramp

Other Defenses
3 additional coast artillery (AA) brigades are deployed, with 1 at Pearl Harbor base, another across the harbor at Ford City, and a third at Schofield Barracks in reserve. This is in addition to the AA units that are part of the coast defense fortifications..
 
There is a considerable difference in organization and deployment compared to the OTL battle. The number of aircraft available to US control are the same, and there are are no other changes in units.

It all comes down to preparedness, having an actual fully manned and around the clock staffed air defense center, and an actual use of the available air resources for air search. Most importantly it is the concept of joint operations and unified command and control that matter more than any other factor. All of the above is based on the US Military actually paying attention to lessons learned in 3 major fleet problems in the 1920s and 30s, and to the relevant tactical lessons coming out of Europe involving British Navy experience including Taranto, the Hunt for the Bismark, and Norway.

Something woefully missing in OTL

I have a very harsh opinion regarding General Short, and a harsh opinion regarding Kimmel as well. Both were guilty of critical lack of imagination and indeed Short was the wrong man for the job. Kimmel is less guilty, but only be a matter of degrees.

US Navy deployments will be shown in Part 3 Battle at Dawn
 
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Chapter 5 Japanese plans and preparations
Over the last few decades since the Russo-Japanese War the nations of Japan and the United States have drifted from friendship to tension and finally since the Japanese invasion of China and the Panay Incident, increasingly to hostility. The dramatic and sudden defeat and conquest of France and the Netherlands, as well as the increasing pressure placed on the British by the Germans and increasingly obvious weakness of the European colonial powers in Asia has also brought about deep concerns in the United States over the growing probability that Japan will act aggressively in the region.

The Japanese seizure and occupation of bases in French Indochina and the Japanese alliance with the Axis in Europe leads to even worsening tensions and American, British and Dutch economic embargo that make war all but certain. The Japanese militarists in the officer corps in the Navy and Army, while at odds all too often, do agree on one thing. Japan must now have the resources and especially oil from Southeast Asia, or as they are now referring to it, the Southern Resource Area. The United States is in the way of that conquest and thus must be defeated. They also fatefully believe that the United States can be defeated if suitably humbled on the field of battle and that Americans lack the will to wage a bloody war with Japan across the Pacific.

The Japanese Army has been preparing for war with the Soviet Union (and Russia before it) since the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-05. It was only under pressure that Japan withdrew from Siberia in 1922 and there was a major clash with the Soviet Union in the battles of Khalkhin Gol in 1939 that resulted in a major embarrassment to the Japanese Army. That embarrassment led to the Soviet-Japanese Neutrality Pact in April 1941 which was reached in spite of the Tripartite Pact with the Germans, but at the time the Japanese were unaware of the impending German invasion of the Soviet Union that would begin on June 22, 1941. When the Germans invade and throughout the summer of 1941 there is talk in the Army that now is the time to settle accounts with the Soviets. However, the senior leadership, including the new Prime Minister HidekiTojo, are convinced by then Colonel Tsuji Masanobu in the Army Operations Bureau (and in effect the chief planner) that war with the Soviet Union would be a mistake.

It is the obvious strengthening of American defenses in the Philippines, including the plans to deploy American heavy bombers there which Japanese Army Intelligence gleans in mid 1941, and the movement of the American Pacific Fleet and obvious war preparations in Hawaii in the early fall of 1941 that forces a revision to ongoing plans. The Army proposes that six divisions be made available from Japan and Korea and another three divisions from Manchuria, plus significant numbers of support and combat support elements be added to the eleven divisions already set aside for operations. This increases the Army element of the initial and secondary offensives planned from 20% of the ground forces to nearly 40%, and additional air elements are also set aside to increase the Army's air support from 50% to nearly 70% of the combat aircraft available, including all of its parachute and glider forces.

The Decision to strike Pearl Harbor
The Navy too adjusts it plans. Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto has been pressing for a decisive attack on the American Pacific Fleet at its base in Pearl Harbor for months, using the highly successful British attack using torpedo bombers to cripple the Italian Navy at Taranto in 1940, and the recent demise of the German battleship Bismark at the hands of British torpedo bombers and battleships to make his case.

He feels that in a single blow the First Air Fleet (with six aircraft carriers) can eliminate at least 4 of the American battleships and clear the way for operations aimed at the Southern Resource Area. With proper planning and a bit of luck, all 8 of the battleships can be at least damaged enough to knock them out for some weeks, and with luck one or two or even more of the American carriers will be in port and they can be destroyed as well.

This will require eliminating the American ability to resist the strike by removing their fighters from the equation, as well as eliminating any counterstrike ability. A report from Takeo Yoskikawa regarding the embarrassment of the US Army in recent war games as well as the report that US Navy conducted a simulated strike against the Army airfields and fleet base poses a worry to Yamamoto, who thinks that possibly the Americans may anticipate his plan. Yamamoto decides to revise his plan somewhat, and more importantly, decides that as he is seeking Kantai Kessen (the decisive battle) with the Americans in their home waters,it would best be led by him in person. The change takes several days to get approved by Admiral of the Fleet Nagano but in the end Nagano accepts the decision. Four older battleships replace the two fast battleships assigned to southern operations and to support them Yamamoto adds 4 more destroyers and 4 more fleet oilers to the Striking Force. Yamamoto also decides that to support future attacks against the American fleet base, Midway Island should be seized as well. A proposed landing in the Gilbert Islands is canceled, and those forces assigned to deal with the weakly defended US base at Guam, while the South Seas Detachment and the ships assigned to it are pulled from the Guam operation and instead will follow behind the Striking Force and after the raid on Pearl Harbor the carrier fleet will support the seizure of this base, which is good location to stage seaplanes from the Mandates to spy and harass Hawaii, as well as offering a refueling facility for submarines to patrol east of Hawaii and harass naval traffic from the US West Coast.

The Japanese War Plan
However Operation AI is just part of an large scale offensive which has as its goal the objective of securing the American Philippines, British Malaya, Borneo and Burma, and most importantly of all, the Dutch East Indies. This will secure vital oil, rubber, tin, iron ore, rice and a host of other important resources for the Japanese economy that has been greatly strained by years of war in China and now faces desperate circumstances with the American/British/Dutch economic embargoes. A second offensive will then be launched using the troops being made available from Manchuria, Korea and Japan to seize an outer perimeter in the Pacific to include the Aleutian Islands, reinforce the advance base at Midway, secure New Guinea, New Britain and New Ireland to protect the important Japanese bases in Palau and ward off attack aimed at the Philippines, seize Darwin in Australia to protect the Dutch East Indies and an offensive into India to place the British permanently on the defensive there. Once these objectives have been secured, the Americans and British will certainly sue for peace, and then the Nationalist Chinese can be crushed once and for all as they will be cut off from outside aid.

By then the Germans should have defeated the Soviet Union as the Japanese Army planners have determined that most likely it will take at least 2 years to achieve that based on German capabilities and historical precedent from the Great War. By 1943 the Soviets will be helpless in Siberia and can be easily defeated sometime in 1944 by forces that no longer have to deal with the Americans or British.

Planning the Conquest of the Philippines
In regards to the Philippines, the initial plan to conquer the Philippines is put forward based on more general plans developed over the last 20 years in October 1941. The first phase will be the destruction of the primary American airbases at Clark, Nichols, and Nielson, as well as the destruction of the American Navy Yard at Cavite. The next phase will be the seizure of forward bases at Legaspi, Aparri, Vigan, as well as seizing the Cagayan Valley in Luzon, as well as a landing at Davao to seize that useful harbor and establish airfields there for operations toward the eastern Dutch East Indies and Darwin, which is viewed as a primary goal for the defense of the East Indies and Malaya once they are seized (as well as ensuring they are seized more easily by blocking a major route of Allied reinforcements to the East Indies from Australia).

Once American air and naval power in the Philippines has been crippled, then a two prong landing will be conducted at Lingayen Gulf and Lamon Bay and these two forces will drive to Manila and destroy the bulk of the American troops in a pincer movement. Once that is completed the remaining American troops that retreat to Bataan will be mopped up. The final phases will be the seizure of the remaining islands, including a siege and assault on the powerful American fortress at Corregidor. The Japanese Army expects that the campaign should be completed by the end of December, with only mopping up operations necessary after that with the exception of substantial artillery forces needed to eliminate the American fortress at Corregidor which will be completed by the end of January 1942. The remaining southern and central Philippine Islands can be secured by elements of the second phase offensive forces in March 1942 with the entire island chain under complete Japanese control at that point.

Planning the Decisive Battle
The planned strike on Pearl Harbor and the decision to include an invasion of Midway to suck surviving American fleet elements into a fatal battle with overwhelming Japanese forces is a major departure from previous plans the Japanese Navy has made over decades which were based on the Russo-Japanese War. Until Yamamoto pushed for a change, the previous doctrine called for Japanese submarine, cruisers and aircraft to attack and inflict attrition on the near certain American Pacific Fleet drive toward Guam and then the Philippines to relieve their garrison there. This plan assumed that the Americans will have suffered serious damage by the time they reached Guam, and at that point the Japanese battle fleet will have parity in numbers with the Americans, and then superior Japanese training and weapons would inflict another Tsushima (the decisive battle that destroyed the Russian fleet in 1905).

Yamamoto's plan argued that the above plan required the Americans to act exactly as expected, makes no allowances for the potential of the American fleet being built under the Two Ocean Navy bill and thus a substantially reinforced American fleet making such a drive, and also makes no allowances for the possibility that the Americans might pursue a different strategy entirely or launch raids themselves.

Even so the plan to strike Pearl Harbor is radical in conception for much of the Japanese leadership. Yamamoto points out to Admiral Nagano that even if the strike results in heavy Japanese losses, the battlefleet with its 6 battleships (and 2 super battleships nearly ready for service) will be intact and available to meet an American offensive across the Pacific. Indeed it will buy at least a year before such an American offensive can begin, and the old strategy can still be used to blunt that American drive and defeat it as planned. Even if the Americans replace entirely their fleet, their Two Ocean Navy Bill only calls for a similar number of battleships equal to what the Americans have now.

In the spring of 1941 the attack plan itself was being written by Rear Admiral Ryunosuke Kusaka, with his staff led by Captain Minoru Genda and Deputy Chief of Staff, Captain Kameto Kuroshima. Genda has done most of the actual detailed planning and thus is the true brain behind the operation. In late June, as Yamamoto is pressing Nagano to approve the operation, Yamamoto meets with Genda and after reviewing the initial plan overrules some of the assumptions made. He points out that with the American Fleet Problem XXIII and the likely American reaction to that means that surprise can be in no way be assured. The attack must be prepared to fight its way in from the start, and that means that Genda's original plan is less likely to meet with the needed success. Genda meets his rebuff professionally and goes back to work on a revised plan. In the meantime, Yamamoto gets Nagano to agree to Yamamoto leading the fleet himself, and overall approval for the operation and the needed changes to supporting forces for it and other operations being planned.

As the Americans are making their own changes and improving their readiness in Hawaii, the Japanese First Air Fleet is training for the attack in the Kurile Islands. By the middle of November they complete their training and make final preparations for their mission. It is at that time that the Midway Island Invasion force leaves port in Formosa and begins its voyage toward the Marshal Islands which will be their jumping off point.

The final operational plan of Operation AI calls for the following essential tasks:

1. Eliminate the threat of American aviation to the air strikes on the American fleet as well as its ability to launch coordinated strikes against the Striking Force
2. Eliminate the capability of the US Pacific Fleet to interfere with Japanese operations in the Southern Resource Area by sinking or severely damaging at least 4 battleships, and inflicting serious damage on the remainder.
3. Bring to battle American carriers and their escorts if they are not in port, or eliminate them as secondary targets if they are in port. This will remove American ability to harass Japanese operations and garrisons in the Central Pacific.


It is a daring and risky plan as it calls for the Japanese Navy to cross nearly half the Pacific undetected and strike at the heart of American power at the very onset of war and to rely on aircraft carriers as the decisive weapon, with only a handful of fast but thinly armored battle cruisers and a similar number of cruisers as protection. While a substantial number of submarines are also allocated to the operation, they are only likely to inflict some attrition but are not in themselves going to be decisive. Much depends on just over 400 aircraft and their aircrew to win the day.
 
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How much of this you write in this thread have already been included in the other TLs like the Bataanstory? Just curious

most, although combining and editing all into one story line

there will be some revisions during the editing process as additional research happened over the last few years

Speaking of which, Richard Frank (Downfall, Guadalcanal) has a new one out I am currently reading "Tower of Skulls", a history of the Asia Pacific War (Volume I)

Its absolutely superb and a must read and covers start of the China Incident (and some great details on the that campaign) in 1937 until May 1942 and the Japanese offensive into the Southern Resource Area
 
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The merging of the two stories makes the excitement of rereading this all the more enjoyable. I appreciate all the time your putting in with your editing and I look for to each new installment.
 
Some horse trading with the Chinese results in 27 CW21 interceptor aircraft which were en route by ship to China (via Burma) are instead diverted to Manila and the Philippine Air Force. The Chinese are sent 54 P35s fighter aircraft instead, which while old, are sturdy aircraft well suited for local conditions there. The CW21s will be assigned to the Philippine Air Force as the basis of a fighter squadron (with spares).

Cool the see the CW21 (hopefully) performing better than it did OTL. Some thoughts inspired by this; would it be possible for the Philippine Air Force to get their hands on any P-66s? After the US government kept the Swedes from getting them, they bounced around a bit before ending up in China and not doing much. Although, the Swedish order didn't get blocked until September 1941, which might be too late to get them to the Philippines.

The other thought was that it would be useful if a couple P-43s got sent to the Philippines and used for recon work. As far as I know they never had much success as fighters, but had a high ceiling and could go decently fast (also, as fighters they'd still be better than P-35s or P-25s).
 
I made a thread on how the Philippines would not fall to the Japanese in 1942. This timeline answers my question in which the replacement of MacArthur would be the POD for such to occur.
 

Driftless

Donor
I wonder which of the two planes (CW-21 vs P-35) would do better against the Japanese - if all other elements were equal?. The P-35 was hot stuff, when it first came out, but it was well on the wrong side of the technology curve by the end of 1941. The Cw-21 was lightly built, but had a decent reputation for climb and maneuverability.
 
Cool the see the CW21 (hopefully) performing better than it did OTL. Some thoughts inspired by this; would it be possible for the Philippine Air Force to get their hands on any P-66s? After the US government kept the Swedes from getting them, they bounced around a bit before ending up in China and not doing much. Although, the Swedish order didn't get blocked until September 1941, which might be too late to get them to the Philippines.

The other thought was that it would be useful if a couple P-43s got sent to the Philippines and used for recon work. As far as I know they never had much success as fighters, but had a high ceiling and could go decently fast (also, as fighters they'd still be better than P-35s or P-25s).

the time frames didn't work out for the P66 going to the Philippines but I did look at it

I hadn't considered the P43 because of the very small numbers (and they leaked like a sieve apparently in regards to their fuel tanks).
 
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