The Battle at Dawn: The first battle between the United States and Japan December 7-10, 1941

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But reading and commenting about the fallacies of the two combatants in a lecture hall or deckroom is one thing, experiencing the event and suffering the same fate and responding properly in action instead in a plaid peace time footing is another issue.

Not to mention actually producing the weapons and installing them...
 
But reading and commenting about the fallacies of the two combatants in a lecture hall or deckroom is one thing, experiencing the event and suffering the same fate and responding properly in action instead in a plaid peace time footing is another issue.

the really aggravating thing is when you compare the actions of the Asiatic Fleet (which was on a war footing before December 7, had been since November 29) and what Kimmel did. Hart focused on war readiness first, training second. Kimmel focused on training first, readiness far below that. The Atlantic Fleet of course was already in an undeclared shooting war.
 
A little OT, but another way to look at one side of any NC-SD-Iowa class US battleship from a land combat power perspective is: equivalent of 10 Jagdtigers firing on you at 15-22 round/minute, while moving at 20-35 mph. That defines fearsome.

Ten Jagdtigers are shooting much higher velocity rounds than the battleship--but then, the battleship adds 9 guns that make the guns on a Ratte look small...

Also, the battleship's main belt will laugh at the Panzerjaeger's guns; a near miss from the 16" shell could kill the panzer.
 
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An excellent read so far!
A further bit of information on the air crews of Shokaku and Zuikaku was that their Flight crews were leavened with the bulk of the IJN's flight instructors .... losses among these would have had a very negative impact on the training of further replacements.

The IJN torpedo bombers will have a very rough time with an alerted defence, as they have to approach over a a goodly portion of ships. I wouldn't expect many to survive in the group coming in from the east in particular.

About the only mistake I can see so far is that you have USS Helena sailing with the Lexington/Yorktown, while at the same time assembling off Pearl.

Very well done, and looking forward to more!

hmm,editing error ... I will fix it soon
 
Which timeline

in my "Goring Reich" timeline he was sent to Panama after criticizing Lend Lease aid to China, and then got fired for letting the Japanese attack the Panama Canal

He spent some time at West Point as superintendent so he would remain under Army orders with instructions to keep his mouth shut before finally being retired

I am not a fan of General
 
MacArthur isn't popular here, but there needs to be a good solid reason for removing him, one that makes sense in the context of the timeline. Arbitrarily deleting people an author doesn't like, unless it's part of the POD, can seem contrived.
 
Part of the problem with attempting to relieve MacArthur is that he holds the command of the Philippine forces from the government of the PI. yes the Pi are still under US control, but they are in transition to independence so relieving Doug would be difficult. However things like making sure the Bataan defenses are properly set up and storage areas ready to receive supplies can be done by fiat from Washington. The USAAF forces in the PI can be moved sidewise out of Mac's chain of command so that there won't be the delay OTL where Formosa isn't attacked.
 

Driftless

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What general should be in charge of Philippines instead of him

MacArthur isn't popular here, but there needs to be a good solid reason for removing him, one that makes sense in the context of the timeline. Arbitrarily deleting people an author doesn't like, unless it's part of the POD, can seem contrived.

Part of the problem with attempting to relieve MacArthur is that he holds the command of the Philippine forces from the government of the PI. yes the Pi are still under US control, but they are in transition to independence so relieving Doug would be difficult. However things like making sure the Bataan defenses are properly set up and storage areas ready to receive supplies can be done by fiat from Washington. The USAAF forces in the PI can be moved sidewise out of Mac's chain of command so that there won't be the delay OTL where Formosa isn't attacked.

Plus our author's primary POD, is based on Admiral Richardson not getting the push for opposing the movement of the fleet from San Diego to Pearl Harbor. Keeping Richardson in place of Kimmel knocks plenty of pool balls around on the table by itself. Mac over in the Philippines ITTL is probably getting his underwear in a knot for being essentially a secondary point of attention.
 
Just curious: when's the next update?

BTW, if you want to find some way to get rid of MacArthur, do what Fearless Leader did in his TL and somehow kill him off early in the battle...
 
Just finished first read of this site so far...

...Nice work, just one thing, though...

...Why does everyone 'Fire at Will."?

Poor guy - you lot deserve to be haunted by Will's Ghost!
 

Driftless

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USN - Asiatic Fleet - Dec 7, 1941

Note: PT-41 (John Bulkely's boat) at Cavite

Also, note the number of submarines (but I believe the torpedo problem largely negated their presence)

why so little ships ?

Essentially part of all variants of War Plan Orange
As originally conceived, it anticipated a blockade of the Philippines and other US outposts in the Western Pacific. They were expected to hold out on their own while the Pacific Fleet marshaled its strength at bases in California, and guarded against attacks on the Panama Canal. After mobilization (the ships maintained only half of their crews in peacetime), the Fleet would sail to the Western Pacific to relieve American forces in Guam and the Philippines. Afterwards, the fleet would sail North for a decisive battle against the Imperial Japanese Navy's Combined Fleet, and then blockade the Japanese home islands. This was in keeping with the theory of Alfred Thayer Mahan, a doctrine to which every major navy subscribed before World War II, in which wars would be decided by engagements between opposing surface fleets[6] (as they had been for over 300 years).

Rodgers' concept was little different from the one ultimately used in the Pacific War: a "leapfrog" campaign to conquer the Marshalls and Carolines (held by Japan before the war); liberation of the Philippines; and blockade.[3] Absent was the "decisive battle" of Mahan, and of Japanese planning.

American war planners failed to appreciate that technological advances in submarines and naval aviation had made Mahan's doctrine obsolete. In particular, they did not understand that aircraft could effectively sink battleships, nor that Japan might put the US battleship force (the Battle Line) out of action at a stroke—as in fact happened during Pearl Harbor.
 
Famous old joke...

...In the United Kingdom, 'Will' is the shortened form of the masculine forename 'William'. To 'Fire at Will' is to shoot poor Will.

Got it? Good! *Heaves a sigh and goes back to sleep...zzz...zzz...*
 
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