The bad and good apples in the German army

Hi all

I know that the German army was very good in WWI in comparison to other countries but I know that the Generals were not. I want to know the good and bad apples of the German Generals in WWI.

I would also like to know why there were not any good german generals in comparison to 1930s and 1940s Nazi Germany just over a ten years to twenty years later where they had a golden era of generals. I'm talking about Erwin Rommel, Erich von Manstein, Friedrich Paulus, Heinz Guderian, Rudolf Schmidt, Walter Model, Wolfram Freiherr von Richthofen, Werner von Blomberg, Erwin von Witzleben, Ludwig Beck. Correct me if I'm wrong on any of those and other I have not picked.

Regards
 

Towelie

Banned
If this is a clean Wehrmacht thing, drop it like its hot right now, because that is utter crap. The good apples and bad apples title made me a bit suspicious.

But if you are talking about military talent, I would say that the German Army in both world wars and going back a bit further benefited from a very high quality in regards to their junior officers and staff officers. The Germans had their share of good and bad generals, and not all ardent Nazis were bad generals nor were all old school Prussian types great generals, so stereotyping in that regard isn't wise, but the defining feature of German leadership in the wars before WW2 were their high quality staffs and extensive pre war strategic planning. On the battlefield, I would not say that German generals were that much better or worse than their opponents. The Allies had some true morons in their command structures, and the Central Powers did as well.

In WW2, the Germans benefited from having generals who were willing to put contemporary ideas about mobile and armored warfare and deep battle into practice (keep in mind that these generals often did not develop these ideas themselves but merely copied and perfected existing British and Soviet ideas) well before their opponents. In some cases, as with Rommel, you had someone who was extraordinarily talented in force multiplication and baiting an enemy for a counterattack. But in general, the quality of German generals continued the tradition of having very good command staff operations and intuitive and motivated junior officers who could take a plan and make it work on the fly. I would be careful of overly praising German generals specifically, as the concept of Hitler being at fault for every bad decision and none of the good ones was a trap that many fell into in their memoirs, but in general, you are right that they showed demonstrable quality in WW2.
 
Van Creveld wrote a very interesting book called 'fighting power' where he spells out the systems that provided Germany with good officers. He makes strong links between the imperial army and the postwar army with the distinction that the tiny interwar army all officers did the general staff course.
 
I think a better perspective would be to say in comparing the average talent between WWI and WWII in the german general staff. WWII has higher than WWI. (LOL, you could turn that into a hypothesis for a dissertation.)

Van Creveld wrote a very interesting book called 'fighting power' where he spells out the systems that provided Germany with good officers. He makes strong links between the imperial army and the postwar army with the distinction that the tiny interwar army all officers did the general staff course.

I'll buy that, thanks!!
 
I suspect that much of the improvement - in WW2 generals - was that many of them had recent experience fighting a modern war (WW!).
 

EMTSATX

Banned
@Grand Archduke of Austria some of the Generals you name are not such great, or even good Generals. I do not know enough about WWI to offer serious scholarship and discussion. But I have always understood it boiled down to they had their good Generals on the Eastern front, but even at that Hindenburg and Ludendorff did not grasp the "grand" picture. It was more a matter of all the problems Russia had, and the Eastern front was able to maneuver.

From what I always got in the West, they didn't follow their own plans and got bogged down in trench warfare.
 
I suspect that much of the improvement - in WW2 generals - was that many of them had recent experience fighting a modern war (WW!).
I think in general its hard to find a county that has worse WWII generals and admirals than in WWI... (maybe Japan due to lack of grand strategy?)
 
I think in general its hard to find a county that has worse WWII generals and admirals than in WWI... (maybe Japan due to lack of grand strategy?)

This is so true, WW1 informed WW2 to a massive degree from everything like how to break into and through a trench line to how to fight a naval battle.
 
@Grand Archduke of Austria some of the Generals you name are not such great, or even good Generals. I do not know enough about WWI to offer serious scholarship and discussion. But I have always understood it boiled down to they had their good Generals on the Eastern front, but even at that Hindenburg and Ludendorff did not grasp the "grand" picture. It was more a matter of all the problems Russia had, and the Eastern front was able to maneuver.

From what I always got in the West, they didn't follow their own plans and got bogged down in trench warfare.

I included some sketchy ones on purpose to see if anyone would comment on them. I always thought Erwin Rommel, Erich von Manstein, Friedrich Paulus, Heinz Guderian, Rudolf Schmidt and Walter Model were quality ranging from genius to average.

Take Werner von Blomberg for example, I always thought when he was removed from his position and Hitler took it personally it was a massive mistake. It had a negative effect on the war in the end because Hitler could not comprehend everything as an officer such as Blomberg would on military theory, mechanics, industrialisation, strategy, tactics, units, etc.

This is so true, WW1 informed WW2 to a massive degree from everything like how to break into and through a trench line to how to fight a naval battle.

I suppose my question is dead because WWI was a new type of war compared to the Franco-Prussian war. A war had not occurred in Europe since then on that size and because no war introduced this type of warfare between them it was a vicious circle in 1914-1918. The german officers were also from an old type of warfare entering a new type which made them unfamiliar and inadequate on the western front. Finally, this was all centred around the conundrum of the "Schlieffen plan".
 

EMTSATX

Banned
Yeah, I mean like Paulus from all accounts was an adequate staff officer but had no business being in command of field troops. Guderian was an outstanding officer up to a point, but then was promoted past his abilities. You can keep going. But there are people a lot more knowledgeable than I to comment.
 
Take Werner von Blomberg for example, I always thought when he was removed from his position and Hitler took it personally it was a massive mistake. It had a negative effect on the war in the end because Hitler could not comprehend everything as an officer such as Blomberg would on military theory, mechanics, industrialisation, strategy, tactics, units, etc.

Hitler actually had a quite good reason to get rid of Blomberg: he was an opponent to Hitler's desire for a war. Like Ludwig Beck, an ally of Blomberg and another senior military man who Hitler forced out of office, Blomberg recognized the precariousness of Germany's strategic position. Hitler realized it too, he just came to a different conclusion then Blomberg: that Germany had to strike ASAP while it still had the advantage from an early mobilization. Contrary to popular belief, Hitler very much knew the risks he was taking in declaring war on the West and Russia... he just also knew that Germany would never be stronger vis-a-vis her rivals than she was in the late 30's/early 40's. His rejection of the alternative (not going to war at all) was a function of his own personal beliefs about racial struggle, a belief that Blomberg obviously didn't share.

What's extremely telling, however, isn't how Hitler, Blomberg, and Beck grasped these strategic facts. It's how so many other German leaders, both military and civilian, totally failed to do so. Beyond those three, I only know of one other man who understood Germany's strategic situation (Werner Von Fritsch, who also opposed war and was also removed from power by Hitler on trumped up charges at the same time as Blomberg for it) and while you could probably find a few more, they are extraordinarily outnumbered by those who did not comprehend. After the removal of Fritsch and Blomberg, Ludwig Beck spent the entirety of summer 1938 attempting to convince the other Generals to join him in opposing Hitler's plans for war but was met with stony silence and convinced no one.

Beck then resigned his post in August of 1938, penning the prophetic words, "I wish, as Chief of the General Staff, to make it a matter of record that I have refused to approve any kind of National Socialist adventure. A final German victory is impossible." Beck had hoped his resignation might have caused the other generals to see reason and follow his example by resigning en-masse. But not a single one of them followed him. Hitler even managed to get Beck not to publicize his resignation for 'national security reasons', which removed any effect the act might have had on the wider German population.

On the whole, Germany had stand out tacticians and men who were extraordinarily good at operational maneuver, but they were fatally flawed in that their best strategist after the resignation of Ludwig Beck was Adolf Hitler. This is why Axis strategic vision was generally lacking throughout the conflict, both in the west and in the east*. The best strategists realized their nations would lose the coming wars, opposed them, and were removed by those who wanted war anyway and damn reality. The ones who were left may have been tactically and (to a lesser extent) operationally adroit, but they had willingly (if possibly unknowingly) made themselves subservient to strategic lunacy that in the end spelled their doom.

*The Japanese had a similar problem in the debate over their own strategy for war between Yamamoto and Nagano.
 
Last edited:
Hitler actually had a quite good reason to get rid of Blomberg: he was an opponent to Hitler's desire for a war. Like Ludwig Beck, an ally of Blomberg and another senior military man who Hitler forced out of office, Blomberg recognized the precariousness of Germany's strategic position. Hitler realized it too, he just came to a different conclusion then Blomberg: that Germany had to strike ASAP while it still had the advantage from an early mobilization. Contrary to popular belief, Hitler very much knew the risks he was taking in declaring war on the West and Russia... he just also knew that Germany would never be stronger vis-a-vis her rivals than she was in the late 30's/early 40's. His rejection of the alternative (not going to war at all) was a function of his own personal beliefs about racial struggle, a belief that Blomberg obviously didn't share.

What's extremely telling, however, isn't how Hitler, Blomberg, and Beck grasped these strategic facts. It's how so many other German leaders, both military and civilian, totally failed to do so. Beyond those three, I only know of one other man who understood Germany's strategic situation (Werner Von Fritsch, who also opposed war and was also removed from power by Hitler on trumped up charges at the same time as Blomberg for it) and while you could probably find a few more, they are extraordinarily outnumbered by those who did not comprehend. After the removal of Fritsch and Blomberg, Ludwig Beck spent the entirety of summer 1938 attempting to convince the other Generals to join him in opposing Hitler's plans for war but was met with stony silence and convinced no one.

Beck then resigned his post in August of 1938, penning the prophetic words, "I wish, as Chief of the General Staff, to make it a matter of record that I have refused to approve any kind of National Socialist adventure. A final German victory is impossible." Beck had hoped his resignation might have caused the other generals to see reason and follow his example by resigning en-masse. But not a single one of them followed him. Hitler even managed to get Beck not to publicize his resignation for 'national security reasons', which removed any effect the act might have had on the wider German population.

On the whole, Germany had stand out tacticians and men who were extraordinarily good at operational maneuver, but they were fatally flawed in that their best strategist after the resignation of Ludwig Beck was Adolf Hitler. This is why Axis strategic vision was generally lacking throughout the conflict, both in the west and in the east*. The best strategists realized their nations would lose the coming wars, opposed them, and were removed by those who wanted war anyway and damn reality. The ones who were left may have been tactically and (to a lesser extent) operationally adroit, but they had willingly (if possibly unknowingly) made themselves subservient to strategic lunacy that in the end spelled their doom.

*The Japanese had a similar problem in the debate over their own strategy for war between Yamamoto and Nagano.

I can see the point you are putting across in that apart from officer's you mention, they knew what would happen in the end, while everyone else was disillusioned by Hitler. I am afraid that is everyone falling for Hitler's charisma.

I have to admit though even though defeat appeared inevitable and with warfare, it is all about doing the correct action in that moment in time. I believe Hitler could have won because there was so much "potential" lying around. It must be said the allies had more chances and resources whereas the Axis did not, therefore, it required more planning, attention and care. However, Hitler is the one who lost the war even though critique can be applied to other people because he put those people in those positions.
 
Last edited:
I have not done a biography of individual Generals beyond a skimming of their Wiki pages to get at best a feel for who may or may not have a place or what place in my own concept for an alternate history of this era; however, I do like the observations to date. The great strength of German command was its institutional staff system, in part a response to inconsistent leaders, often nobility chosen for reasons other than competence, and the need to give them professional soldiers to conduct the grunt work. A German staff officer was loyal to the General Staff Corps and it acted as a distinct chain of command alien to how an American General would like. Those officers were expected to opine, challenge and even disobey the "General" if they saw disaster looming, but in accord with their relationship to the next higher Chief of Staff who ultimately derived his authority direct from the "Commander-in-Chief." In addition these officers were trained to be adverse to politics, especially after von Seekt's influence from my understanding, despite the wisdom of Clausewitz that war and politics are very much partners, the German officer became politically inept by the time Hitler arrived. As someone else observed, Germany could produce solid tacticians and very good operational minds, in military strategy they had as fine a think tank as any but were fatally flawed in the ability to truly think strategically, i.e. integrate economics, diplomacy or politics, the WWII era Generals seem to be fighting blind in that regard. While I do not think they were bad Generals and there is many layers of reason to this failing, it appears that Hitler arrived in a vacuum of strategic thought and in the face of Generals loyal to the structures but without spirit. This loyalty to their "masters", the civilian authority, is oddly the ideal we profess in American thinking, the Generals serve the government, unfortunately they had no means to "disobey", they had no "higher" authority to defer to in the face of Nazi governance. In measuring these men one finds them crippled by their adherence to serve even under the most obscene command, Hitler was the master of what became a blinded machine, capable of astounding warfare but for no purpose other than the devious fantasy of Hitler's vision. It is one reason I enjoy the study of this topic, it shows the true folly of men.
 
Top