Hitler actually had a quite good reason to get rid of Blomberg: he was an opponent to Hitler's desire for a war. Like Ludwig Beck, an ally of Blomberg and another senior military man who Hitler forced out of office, Blomberg recognized the precariousness of Germany's strategic position. Hitler realized it too, he just came to a different conclusion then Blomberg: that Germany had to strike ASAP while it still had the advantage from an early mobilization. Contrary to popular belief, Hitler very much knew the risks he was taking in declaring war on the West and Russia... he just also knew that Germany would never be stronger vis-a-vis her rivals than she was in the late 30's/early 40's. His rejection of the alternative (not going to war at all) was a function of his own personal beliefs about racial struggle, a belief that Blomberg obviously didn't share.
What's extremely telling, however, isn't how Hitler, Blomberg, and Beck grasped these strategic facts. It's how so many other German leaders, both military and civilian, totally failed to do so. Beyond those three, I only know of one other man who understood Germany's strategic situation (Werner Von Fritsch, who also opposed war and was also removed from power by Hitler on trumped up charges at the same time as Blomberg for it) and while you could probably find a few more, they are extraordinarily outnumbered by those who did not comprehend. After the removal of Fritsch and Blomberg, Ludwig Beck spent the entirety of summer 1938 attempting to convince the other Generals to join him in opposing Hitler's plans for war but was met with stony silence and convinced no one.
Beck then resigned his post in August of 1938, penning the prophetic words, "I wish, as Chief of the General Staff, to make it a matter of record that I have refused to approve any kind of National Socialist adventure. A final German victory is impossible." Beck had hoped his resignation might have caused the other generals to see reason and follow his example by resigning en-masse. But not a single one of them followed him. Hitler even managed to get Beck not to publicize his resignation for 'national security reasons', which removed any effect the act might have had on the wider German population.
On the whole, Germany had stand out tacticians and men who were extraordinarily good at operational maneuver, but they were fatally flawed in that their best strategist after the resignation of Ludwig Beck was Adolf Hitler. This is why Axis strategic vision was generally lacking throughout the conflict, both in the west and in the east*. The best strategists realized their nations would lose the coming wars, opposed them, and were removed by those who wanted war anyway and damn reality. The ones who were left may have been tactically and (to a lesser extent) operationally adroit, but they had willingly (if possibly unknowingly) made themselves subservient to strategic lunacy that in the end spelled their doom.
*The Japanese had a similar problem in the debate over their own strategy for war between Yamamoto and Nagano.