The Axis Powers Invade the Med instead of the USSR in 1941

Thank you for quoting the book. I gather the "people" you mention will have to buy it in order to learn where they are wrong, since you seem unwilling to convey convincing details from the book to the forum. But at least I now know what to buy.

Michele, I haven't read my copy of the book for a while but I believe he's using the 'Operation Orient' chapter for much of his ideas. This was written by Peter G. Tsouras who also wrote Disaster at D-Day, again by Greenhill books. I don't remember it being one of the better chapters, referring to the Kongo's having 16" guns for example struck me as an elementary error.
An earlier chapter (Operation Sphinx?) in the same book looked at the Germans deciding on a Mediterranean strategy stright after the fall of France. It had Gibraltar falling after a hard fight, while the British captured the Canary Islands. In Eqypt forwarned by Ultra the British refused battle retreating both southwards along the Nile & right back to a bridgehead around Basra inviting the Germans to overextend themselves. Unlike Orient iI felt it had the British reacting in a sensible manner instead of just being set up for a fall.

For a successful & well researched (IMO) fictional British defence of the Middle East after an Axis conquest of both Egypt & the Caucasus's see (again from Greenhill Books) David Downings; The Moscow Option: An Alternative Second World War which I found a darn good read & accurately showed the the underlying reasons for the defeat of the Axis despite a string of ATL tactical victories. I really think this one should be required reading for anyone seeking to under play the effect of logistics in an ATL.
 
Michele, I haven't read my copy of the book for a while but I believe he's using the 'Operation Orient' chapter for much of his ideas. This was written by Peter G. Tsouras who also wrote Disaster at D-Day, again by Greenhill books. I don't remember it being one of the better chapters, referring to the Kongo's having 16" guns for example struck me as an elementary error.
An earlier chapter (Operation Sphinx?) in the same book looked at the Germans deciding on a Mediterranean strategy stright after the fall of France. It had Gibraltar falling after a hard fight, while the British captured the Canary Islands. In Eqypt forwarned by Ultra the British refused battle retreating both southwards along the Nile & right back to a bridgehead around Basra inviting the Germans to overextend themselves. Unlike Orient iI felt it had the British reacting in a sensible manner instead of just being set up for a fall.

For a successful & well researched (IMO) fictional British defence of the Middle East after an Axis conquest of both Egypt & the Caucasus's see (again from Greenhill Books) David Downings; The Moscow Option: An Alternative Second World War which I found a darn good read & accurately showed the the underlying reasons for the defeat of the Axis despite a string of ATL tactical victories. I really think this one should be required reading for anyone seeking to under play the effect of logistics in an ATL.

Good post.
Im at difficulty quoting from my books as I have either lent many out or most are at my father’s home and it’s quite a while since I have read them.
I found the Hitler Options a very good read.
Only alternative history book I have here is Virtual History by Niall Ferguson but that seems very limited.
Once I get my book back on the Hitler Options ill run each scenario as a thread.

Think I shall have to buy the Moscow option it sounds quite interesting.
 
Michele, I haven't read my copy of the book for a while but I believe he's using the 'Operation Orient' chapter for much of his ideas. This was written by Peter G. Tsouras who also wrote Disaster at D-Day, again by Greenhill books. I don't remember it being one of the better chapters, referring to the Kongo's having 16" guns for example struck me as an elementary error.
An earlier chapter (Operation Sphinx?) in the same book looked at the Germans deciding on a Mediterranean strategy stright after the fall of France. It had Gibraltar falling after a hard fight, while the British captured the Canary Islands. In Eqypt forwarned by Ultra the British refused battle retreating both southwards along the Nile & right back to a bridgehead around Basra inviting the Germans to overextend themselves. Unlike Orient iI felt it had the British reacting in a sensible manner instead of just being set up for a fall.

For a successful & well researched (IMO) fictional British defence of the Middle East after an Axis conquest of both Egypt & the Caucasus's see (again from Greenhill Books) David Downings; The Moscow Option: An Alternative Second World War which I found a darn good read & accurately showed the the underlying reasons for the defeat of the Axis despite a string of ATL tactical victories. I really think this one should be required reading for anyone seeking to under play the effect of logistics in an ATL.

I agree with your views on Orient too.
 
As I mentioned before Franco’s demands could have been met in late 1940.

Well, that's not what the Germans thought.

To quote a few bits from Antony Beevor's The Battle For Spain:

"As well as arms, fuel, ammunition and food, he wanted in compensation: 'Morocco, Oran, the Sahara as far as the twentieth parallel, and the coastal zone of Guinea as far as the Niger delta'."

"The Nazis, stupified at the price Franco put on entering the war, showed little enthusiasm...."

"This crossed with a memorandum from Franco asking for so much artillery, spare parts, signals equipment, trucks, locomotives and wagons, that German civil servants considered the list beyond the capacity of Germany."
 
Well, that's not what the Germans thought.

To quote a few bits from Antony Beevor's The Battle For Spain:

"As well as arms, fuel, ammunition and food, he wanted in compensation: 'Morocco, Oran, the Sahara as far as the twentieth parallel, and the coastal zone of Guinea as far as the Niger delta'."

"The Nazis, stupified at the price Franco put on entering the war, showed little enthusiasm...."

"This crossed with a memorandum from Franco asking for so much artillery, spare parts, signals equipment, trucks, locomotives and wagons, that German civil servants considered the list beyond the capacity of Germany."

The October 1940 demands could have been met but when Hitler refused he again approached Franco in the next year to meet his demands the demands had by then increased.
 
The first two quotes, including the huge amount of territory Franco wanted to be given before he entered the war are from April 1940.

Talk all you want about the Germans being able to meet those demands, but in OTL they didn't think they could.
 
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