Thank you for quoting the book. I gather the "people" you mention will have to buy it in order to learn where they are wrong, since you seem unwilling to convey convincing details from the book to the forum. But at least I now know what to buy.
Michele, I haven't read my copy of the book for a while but I believe he's using the 'Operation Orient' chapter for much of his ideas. This was written by Peter G. Tsouras who also wrote Disaster at D-Day, again by Greenhill books. I don't remember it being one of the better chapters, referring to the Kongo's having 16" guns for example struck me as an elementary error.
An earlier chapter (Operation Sphinx?) in the same book looked at the Germans deciding on a Mediterranean strategy stright after the fall of France. It had Gibraltar falling after a hard fight, while the British captured the Canary Islands. In Eqypt forwarned by Ultra the British refused battle retreating both southwards along the Nile & right back to a bridgehead around Basra inviting the Germans to overextend themselves. Unlike Orient iI felt it had the British reacting in a sensible manner instead of just being set up for a fall.
For a successful & well researched (IMO) fictional British defence of the Middle East after an Axis conquest of both Egypt & the Caucasus's see (again from Greenhill Books) David Downings; The Moscow Option: An Alternative Second World War which I found a darn good read & accurately showed the the underlying reasons for the defeat of the Axis despite a string of ATL tactical victories. I really think this one should be required reading for anyone seeking to under play the effect of logistics in an ATL.