I would view it as an extension of OTL's unemployment insurance. There's nothing particularly "continental" about it.
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The Anglo-Saxon Social Model
- Thread starter Rattigan
- Start date
I would view it as an extension of OTL's unemployment insurance. There's nothing particularly "continental" about it.
As I thought about it, it's basically going to be a heavily-subsidised insurance policy that individuals can take out if they can't get one on the private market (in a way, not a million miles from how OTL Obamacare works). So quite a way away from both the OTL NHS and continental insurance systems but probably a bit closer to the latter.
So, my current plan is to put up three updates a week (this is liable to slippage, of course, but I'm not too busy at work right now) up to the 1960s, after which I'll probably have to slow down a bit because I haven't got it all worked out yet. By this timetable, I'll have covered British events up to about 1935 over the next two weeks. At this point I plan to take a break from Britain and do updates covering east-central Europe, Germany, Russia, Spain, India, China and the USA since the end of the Great War.
This is a bit of wish-fulfillment on my part, of course, but it was something that was mooted at the time IOTL and, given the greater focus on intra-Commonwealth development, I don't think it's implausible.
My thinking was that the more progressive and democratic theories of John Dewey would have been more prominent ITTL (although, tbh, I'm not entirely sure what would have had to happen to make this come about). These reforms were actually based on the educational reforms in OTL Sweden at around this time (IIRC corporal punishment was banned in schools in 1928). But, of course, these reforms only apply to state-run schools: the public schools are still caning their students at will.
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How about Cecil Reddie remaining in tertiary education longer and aiding in the growth of progressive pedagogy in Britain? Or any other educational Reformer moving to Britain... or people like AS Neill being slightly more compromising... Lots of possibilities, especially given early political support.
Personally I think Ramsay MacDonald was much overrated and that Clynes and Snowden (the latter gets a bad reputation for his austerity policies I know) were the real workhorses of the early Labour governments.
Thomas1195
Banned
The only problem with this TL is that Labour won too many seats. I mean, FPTP was supposed to delay new parties' gain.
That was also true with Labour IOTL, the Labour Party's progress was projected to stall or even decline in a hypothetical election in 1914 without ww1. It took a combo of war entry, conscription, complacency, Cash-for-Peerage and Liberal split to move Labour to the main opposition party.
Certainly Labour are doing a lot better ITTL but, if I may make a little defence of its plausibility for a second, if you look at each election I think their gains make sense. So in 1904-5 Labour takes advantage of the general collapse of the Conservatives across the board, it benefits with generalise dissatisfaction with the government while the Tories still aren't trusted in 1910 and 1916, in 1921 it is the natural repository of progressive and working class votes who are unhappy with the Liberals' handling of the recession, and then in 1924 it continues to harvest urban and poor seats that otherwise might go to the Liberals.
Also it's worth saying that there are other circumstances which mitigate in its favour: the trades unions are slightly stronger ITTL (owing to the earlier introduction of friendly legislation) and more able to politically direct their members; progressive middle and upper class opinion is migrating to Labour earlier and more decisively (rather than more radical parties) because of the closer involvement of the Fabians ITTL; the Conservatives still haven't become entirely sure with how they should address a universal electorate (Tory Democracy and the Orange Strategy are both seen as kind of failed experiments) so working class toryism hasn't developed to anything like the extent we saw IOTL; and the Labour ministers performed notably well in the wartime coalition.
The other thing I'd say is that FPTP can let new parties make big sudden breakthroughs (see OTL SNP in 2015) if they successfully concentrate their electorate, which is what I think TTL Labour is also doing very well (i.e. in urban areas and places with comparatively low turnout). I think the other point to note here is that, influenced by trades union organising, the Labour internal organisation and ground game is streets ahead of its rivals.
(Anyway, you obviously don't have to buy all of that but I hope you find it at least plausible on its own terms. I hope you're enjoying the rest of the TL.)
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So I'll be general about it (and, as you've probably noted, I've not been giving constituency maps in my infoboxes because even I don't have time for that) and there's a lot of overlap between the parties because everything is so tight now, but the main parties' coalitions are:
Labour: as IOTL, Labour's fundamental coalition is between the working classes and the socially conscious middle classes. More specifically, its base is in union members and urban dwellers. This is similar to OTL but much more intense TTL because of the better distribution of urban seats (meaning you can win on lower turnouts) and the unions being better at driving their members out to vote. In addition to this, Labour is now probably the first choice party of the British intelligensia (not a huge constituency by any means but still significant), drawing away people who, in earlier years, would have voted for radical Liberals. In practice this means that they are increasing support amongst middle and upper-middle class technocratic workers (e.g. bank clerks and commercial engineers). They have a more limited support amongst the rural working class, except for in Ireland, where they have made significant gains over the past few years.
Liberals: fundamentally their support comes from the upwardly mobile bourgeoisie and the remnants of the Whig aristocracy. Much of their base lives in provincial towns, where large unionised work is rarer. Their support is particularly intense amongst Nonconforming and Dissenting communities. It also has a strong hold in Scotland, Wales and Cornwall, where the party can make appeals to localism. By the late 1920s, they have basically taken all of the old Protestant Ascendancy from the Conservatives after the failure of the Orange Strategy.
Conservatives: their support is based on the upper classes and rural squires, especially in places where Anglicanism retains a strong cultural hold. Following the failure of the Orange Strategy (or at least its discontinuation after 1924), the party has limited working class appeal outside of Ulster. It also has strong rural roots and competes tightly with the Liberals for libertarian and localist smallholding voters in England, Wales and Scotland. It's appeal in Ireland outside of Ulster is severely compromised and, while not exactly non-existent, mostly gone.
As I said at the beginning, there is a great deal of overlap here (the Liberals are still able to make strong appeals to union members and hold seats in Manchester and Glasgow, for example, albeit the more prosperous bits) but I hope that helps in general.
Liberal-Labour Foreign Policy (1924-1929)
The World's Policeman: Foreign Policy under Austen Chamberlain and Winston Churchill
The Editor of the Paris Treaty: Winston Churchill and his entourage at the London Conference, February 1925
Despite a career that had been focused on the domestic stage, Chamberlain had always had an interest in foreign affairs and it was on this that he devoted much of his attention during his premiership. His ally Churchill returned to government as Foreign Secretary and they worked together closely. Both men saw it as their duty to fix the problems of the Treaty of Versailles and push a reconciliation between France and Germany. Initially, Chamberlain planned to use the League of Nations as a broker between the two powers, something helped by the entry of the United States into the organisation under President Wood (at the instigation of Vice President Henry Cabot Lodge) in 1921. However, the inauguration of W.E.B. Du Bois as President, who was cool on overseas entanglements, in March 1925 put a halt to this possibility and forced the United Kingdom to act outside of the League.
John Maynard Keynes had been elected as the MP for Cambridge University at the 1924 and, although his controversial economic views meant that he was sidelined from economic policy-making, Chamberlain took him into his confidence when it came to matters of global geopolitics and macroeconomics. Chamberlain accepted Keynes’ view that the reparations set in the Paris Treaty would be impossible to pay and should be reduced. A conference in London in February and March 1925 implemented the German debt relief package known as the Churchill Plan. The Plan was tied to a number of geopolitical agreements struck at the same time, and in turn provided a large capital injection into the German economy. This effectively transferred the burdens of Germany’s reparations bill off the German government’s books and to British bond investors. Thus, neatly, British citizens and businesses received a new market for their goods and, in return, they took on the associated economic risk.
Outside of the purely economic sphere, both Churchill and Chamberlain were dissatisfied with the borders agreed at Paris, viewing them as arbitrary and unstable. This assessment had been seemingly borne out by the five years since the end of the Great War, with German governments of various stripes being stuck in a permanent state of near-collapse (there were nine separate ministries between 1918 and 1924) and in August 1924 the entire government had been replaced by Erich Ludendorff and his allies in what amounted to a coup (even if there had been a veneer of legality to it). In January 1923, France had invaded the Ruhr in response to German non-payment of bonds. Meanwhile, in Germany’s eastern provinces and in the new state of Poland-Slovakia, there was a constant state of low-level insurgency, as ethnic German paramilitaries (some sponsored by Junkers, others seemingly acting on their own) attacked Polish and other Slavic communities, with the Polish government instigating reprisals against ethnic Germans in Poland. By the terms of the Churchill Plan, the French government agreed to end their occupation of the Ruhr and the Polish and German governments agreed to undertake population swaps under the auspices of the League of Nations.
While the British government was not entirely sympathetic to German irredentist claims (indeed, behind the scenes Churchill was already warning about giving too much away), the Liberal view was that they should be entitled to pursue them by peaceful means in the context of an international scaffolding (of which the Churchill Plan was seen as the economic plank). To this end, Germany was admitted into the League of Nations in September 1925. In March 1926, France, Germany, Belgium, Italy and the UK signed what came to be known as the Locarno Pact, in which they agreed to settle all future territorial disputes by arbitration. For their work on this agreement, Churchill and Chamberlain shared the 1926 Nobel Peace Prize. Further reductions in Germany reparations would be negotiated in February 1929 under what was known as the Norman Plan.
While these agreements were successful on their own terms, they have since been regarded somewhat ambivalently by historians. On the one hand, the Churchill Plan definitely played a part in stabilising the German economy after its rocky 1918-23 period. However, writers have also pointed to the underlying strength of German industry and its energy sector, the sure footed economic management of the Finance Minister Gustav Stresemann and improved commercial relations with the Soviet Union. It should also be noted that the plan also accepted the Ludendorff coup, and the commensurate death of German democracy, as a fait accompli. Furthermore, while all agree that the underlying impetus behind the Locarno Pact - world peace - was a basically good thing, it should be noted that Chamberlain’s policy of negotiating bilateral arrangements outside of the auspices of the League served to undermine the League’s authority and render it effectively a dead letter, as a potential geopolitical actor, by 1926.
The Editor of the Paris Treaty: Winston Churchill and his entourage at the London Conference, February 1925
Despite a career that had been focused on the domestic stage, Chamberlain had always had an interest in foreign affairs and it was on this that he devoted much of his attention during his premiership. His ally Churchill returned to government as Foreign Secretary and they worked together closely. Both men saw it as their duty to fix the problems of the Treaty of Versailles and push a reconciliation between France and Germany. Initially, Chamberlain planned to use the League of Nations as a broker between the two powers, something helped by the entry of the United States into the organisation under President Wood (at the instigation of Vice President Henry Cabot Lodge) in 1921. However, the inauguration of W.E.B. Du Bois as President, who was cool on overseas entanglements, in March 1925 put a halt to this possibility and forced the United Kingdom to act outside of the League.
John Maynard Keynes had been elected as the MP for Cambridge University at the 1924 and, although his controversial economic views meant that he was sidelined from economic policy-making, Chamberlain took him into his confidence when it came to matters of global geopolitics and macroeconomics. Chamberlain accepted Keynes’ view that the reparations set in the Paris Treaty would be impossible to pay and should be reduced. A conference in London in February and March 1925 implemented the German debt relief package known as the Churchill Plan. The Plan was tied to a number of geopolitical agreements struck at the same time, and in turn provided a large capital injection into the German economy. This effectively transferred the burdens of Germany’s reparations bill off the German government’s books and to British bond investors. Thus, neatly, British citizens and businesses received a new market for their goods and, in return, they took on the associated economic risk.
Outside of the purely economic sphere, both Churchill and Chamberlain were dissatisfied with the borders agreed at Paris, viewing them as arbitrary and unstable. This assessment had been seemingly borne out by the five years since the end of the Great War, with German governments of various stripes being stuck in a permanent state of near-collapse (there were nine separate ministries between 1918 and 1924) and in August 1924 the entire government had been replaced by Erich Ludendorff and his allies in what amounted to a coup (even if there had been a veneer of legality to it). In January 1923, France had invaded the Ruhr in response to German non-payment of bonds. Meanwhile, in Germany’s eastern provinces and in the new state of Poland-Slovakia, there was a constant state of low-level insurgency, as ethnic German paramilitaries (some sponsored by Junkers, others seemingly acting on their own) attacked Polish and other Slavic communities, with the Polish government instigating reprisals against ethnic Germans in Poland. By the terms of the Churchill Plan, the French government agreed to end their occupation of the Ruhr and the Polish and German governments agreed to undertake population swaps under the auspices of the League of Nations.
While the British government was not entirely sympathetic to German irredentist claims (indeed, behind the scenes Churchill was already warning about giving too much away), the Liberal view was that they should be entitled to pursue them by peaceful means in the context of an international scaffolding (of which the Churchill Plan was seen as the economic plank). To this end, Germany was admitted into the League of Nations in September 1925. In March 1926, France, Germany, Belgium, Italy and the UK signed what came to be known as the Locarno Pact, in which they agreed to settle all future territorial disputes by arbitration. For their work on this agreement, Churchill and Chamberlain shared the 1926 Nobel Peace Prize. Further reductions in Germany reparations would be negotiated in February 1929 under what was known as the Norman Plan.
While these agreements were successful on their own terms, they have since been regarded somewhat ambivalently by historians. On the one hand, the Churchill Plan definitely played a part in stabilising the German economy after its rocky 1918-23 period. However, writers have also pointed to the underlying strength of German industry and its energy sector, the sure footed economic management of the Finance Minister Gustav Stresemann and improved commercial relations with the Soviet Union. It should also be noted that the plan also accepted the Ludendorff coup, and the commensurate death of German democracy, as a fait accompli. Furthermore, while all agree that the underlying impetus behind the Locarno Pact - world peace - was a basically good thing, it should be noted that Chamberlain’s policy of negotiating bilateral arrangements outside of the auspices of the League served to undermine the League’s authority and render it effectively a dead letter, as a potential geopolitical actor, by 1926.
I've suspected that the "Anglo-Saxon Social Model" refers to the USA as well.
OTL has the Anglosphere known for an alternative economic model (to a degree) compared to others. This timeline appears to be replicating that, but it's an Anglo-Saxon Social Democracy instead of neoliberalism.
Mmmh, I don't see the germans accepting a population exchange with such rump state.
In return for reparations relief and an end to what was, in effect, an undeclared war? I don't know, I thought it was a pretty good deal to be honest. Also bear in mind that Ludendorff is trying to secure his new regime. Also query how closely either side is going to be enforcing the exchanges. Anyway, I'll be getting on to Germany in more detail in a couple of weeks, where hopefully things will become a bit clearer.
German refugees are gonna be quite influential in german politics in the following years. Remember that apart of Greece and Turkey no other country did population exchanges in this period, I think.
Again (and don't think I am being purely negative I am really enjoying the TL), I have my doubts about Ludendorff being able to secure the popular or even military support to seize power. The man was a capable general and complete fruitcake outside matters military and lacked political nous. Von Schleicher or von Bredow I could see doing it (so could Hitler, that is why he had them shot in 1934) or an early Hindenburg and Hoffmann while he probably wouldn't have wanted to do it but was capable enough. If the old Kaiser had died and a restoration was a realistic proposition, I could even see von Hammerstein-Equord. But Ludendorff is really in Orde Wingate or Walter Walker seizing power in a coup territory if you want a British analogy.
Ludendorff securing power and the UK basically signing in on it by dealing with them is pretty bad. Quite canny from the Germans to accept basically anything if it gets them a stamp of approval. If they get stability, they can rebuild the rest.
I wonder where the USSR's diplomatic situation end up, without the effects of our WW2.
I wonder where the USSR's diplomatic situation end up, without the effects of our WW2.
Hmmm, that's very interesting. I had penciled in von Schleicher and von Bredow as members of Ludendorff's junta but hadn't thought about von Hammerstein-Equord. Given that the Hohenzollerns are still about TTL then he might be a good thought. We can park the name of the guy at the head of the junta for now and come back to it in a couple of weeks when I've thought about it a bit more: suffice it to say that the military took over the government in 1924. PM me if you have any more thoughts.
Thomas1195
Banned
A Liberal/Labour government in 1936 may intervene in a potential Spanish Civil War to support the Republicans in one way or another.