longsword14
Banned
The Americans became truly interested in IndoChina only after the Korean War. The British had nothing to do with it.Yes! Have you been staying current with the latest political rallies?
The Americans became truly interested in IndoChina only after the Korean War. The British had nothing to do with it.Yes! Have you been staying current with the latest political rallies?
The Americans became truly interested in IndoChina only after the Korean War. The British had nothing to do with it.
So in Kissinger's book "On China" he discusses many things including the pivot and the unofficial alliance between the USA and China vs USSR. However it was very clear that Mao did not want a united Vietnam. However he did not want to South Vietnam force on the border (SV takes over NV). He liked their division. Using this formula i could see a weaker NV unable to inflict major damage on SV existing for a long time.
Its funny i can give you alot of information on the Byz empire but on the Vietnam war even though i lived thru it i know much less.
So for this to work you would need :
1. Linebacker 2 to destroy the infrastructure of NV
2. No Watergate (aid would have been forthcoming for the SV (not troops) ) which killed financial support
3. A more stable gov in 72 - 75 -- which was developing
The only way i see the US have victory in Vietnam is 3 million troops at the border and marching north untill they reach Hanoi. Brutal, criminal, horrendous. But, victory.
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Unfortunately, short of this, almost nothing will truly work in this theater.
President Johnson had as his agenda his Great Society plan for his presidency, and he absolutely had no desire whatsoever to lead the United States in a massive regional war in Southeast Asia. He was however obligated somewhat by the SEATO treaty, in which it would look really bad if we did not provide any aide to our South Vietnam allies against communist aggression. Also, being the mid 1960s, the United States government and military during this era was deeply paranoid about the ‘dominos falling’ in Southeast Asia. This means that there was no way we could be completely disengaged from this conflict.
Basically, this is my justification why we had to be involved in this conflict, and in at least a limited capacity. Obviously, the problem is that the path chosen resulted in the collapse of south Vietnam in 1975, with 58,000 Americans killed.
Before mentioning my ideas, I would like to say that in operation Linebacker 2, we finally took some real action against Haiphong harbor (mining) and and the B52 raids were actually starting to overwhelm the North Vietnamese surface to air missile defenses....but unfortunately by this point, it was too little too late, and this conflict was basically already a lost cause. Kissinger and company had negotiated a real shameful exit plan (at least from South Vietnam’s perspective).
So then the real question is (given the guidelines of a limited scope campaign) is there any alternate strategies that could have been more effective, either in reducing the number of American casualties, or maintaining South Vietnam (or some portion of South Vietnamese territory) beyond 1975?
I myself believe the entire concept of Search and Destroy was flawed. The body count mathematics did nothing to really protect the South Vietnamese people, and only served to make the military leadership (falsely) believe that they were making actual progress.
I would rather have seen an emphasis on clearing and holding territory throughout South Vietnam, and using highly integrated combat ‘units’. This means fully integrated US and South Vietnamese combat units. This strategy also requires protecting the boarders from infiltration, which is no small feat given the geography of the region. Ultimately, the purpose of this strategy is to place more emphasis on the South Vietnamese (ARVN) to defend their country.
Unfortunately for him the US public was done with the war, the die was cast, he had no choice but to end it.
I think what really supports your point here was the American reaction to withdrawal '73 as compared with '68.
What Nixon got in '73 "Peace with Honor" was the same deal that LBJ had on the table(s) back in '68, but back then we were calling it "cut and run."
By '73 Americans were so tired of that war that the Hawks were ready to accept any fig-leaf of respect thrown their way, "peace with honor" and the Doves just as exhausted chose not to rub their noses in it, just content to let it end. I grew up with the war, ten years old when it started and 18 when it ended; in the end it was almost profound how quietly the whole thing came to an end. You often hear how there were no parades and such, damn there was almost no reaction at all, short of a quiet sigh of relief and then almost overnight total forgetfulness; a conspiracy of silence.
Right, thats what Linebacker 2 and other operations were for, to give time so they can save face enough. When i tihnk about it Nixon and Johnson handled it reversed. Johnson was fighting the war and secretly tried to make peace whilst Nixon openly declared he wanted to make peace but secrelty hoped for escalation and kept on attacking them, more devastating than anything Johnson had planned.
I wonder, if you grew up with it, what were your feelings when Saigon fell?
Oh! That's an interesting question with a very short answer. By that time I was 20 years old and it was nothing more than a news blurp that turned my head for a moment. I watched it on TV (like I had watched the whole war) and turned away without any reaction. Just another news story, nothing really! I remember watching the tank crash the gate of the Imperial Palace (or some such imagine) and then Ford giving a speech, but when he got two or three sentences in and I just walked away.
That actually surprises and saddens me. I can imagine its weird to think about, confusing even. But was your reaction a sort of denial caused by shame? This is no way a personal question btw, and if you don't want to answer i can understand, i just want to grasp the feeling of the Americans towards those images.
I agree with you regarding Ho and China, ("It's better to eat the French dung for 100 years than Chinese dung for 1000 years") -- but I doubt Mao would have cared whether Ho cared; it wouldn't have surprised me if Mao had Ho removed. I just don't believe Mao lets us advance any further into Asia. - When Mao moved into North Korea I suspect he acted unilaterally, of course that is something we could never possibly know; but MacArthur had North Korea at bay driven to the extreme northeast corner of its territory and on the verge of collapse. I suspect it was Mao's call, not the North Koreans.
Why do you feel the two wars can't be compared? I think they are very similar in many ways.
The only way to 'win' is to never fight it in the first place. South Vietnam was a failed state from the get go, and while facing with a radical nationalistic hardliner North.
@Emperor Norton I sums it up nicely.
Let the planned 1956 election take place and Uncle Ho would have won in a landslide.
Vietnam war a unwinnable war, for France and for the USA.
Yes Uncle Ho wins in a landslide had the powers at be pushed for elections back then!
Also, analyzing this now, the situation was truely hopeless (and I believe Johnson understood this conflict would be a bad fight for us to get involved with from the getgo ... he didn’t like the idea of American boys doin’ the fight’n asian boys ought to be doin).
However, when you say this is unwinable, that’s all very nice in retrospect, but if you start from the Kennedy presidency with American military advisors present in country and under fire, then what decision does Johnson make when he becomes president? With the intelligence available, and in the grander scheme of the Cold War with the Soviet Union, do we cut and run, or further engage? And how do you justify your action?