18. An Irrepressible Conflict
“The bombardment of the Merrimack had worked out exactly as President Seward intended. The upper south had been driven further into the arms of the Union, and men from across the union rushed to enlist into the 60,000-man army. Within hours of Seward’s proclamation, Massachusetts regiments began assembling on Boston Common. The Governor of Iowa, initially worried about manpower shortages, soon found that recruiters were forced to turn away many hopeful enlistees. Faced with such enthusiasm for the fight, Seward amended his proclamation to call for 75,000 men, the maximum size allowed under the law.
The enlistees were mostly untrained, and the army lacked the means to quickly equip and train them. General-in-Chief Winfield Scott envisioned that the first six months of war [1] would be spent readying the army for proper combat, after which the fighting could begin. However, while this was a strategically sound plan, it was not politically sound. The brewing Civil War was borne from a bitter political dispute, and the conflict would be shaped just as much by political concerns as military ones.
At the onset of open hostilities, Union armories held more than 500,000 rifles and small arms, though some 90,000 of those weapons were in Confederate-controlled armories [2]. While the Confederate states scrambled to gather more weapons, including requisitioning hunting rifles and shotguns from backwoodsmen, the Union was also having trouble procuring more arms. The north had a greater ability to manufacture weapons, but the army camps of Washington, Norfolk, St. Louis, Memphis, Nashville, and Raleigh were clogged with inexperienced, undisciplined 90-day volunteers milling about. While General Scott wanted to wait and consolidate the newly expanded army, President Seward was under intense pressure to march on Charleston and deal the Confederacy a fatal blow.
…While the President deliberated his options, the first land battle of the Civil War was fought. Despite deciding to remain in the union, loyalties in Tennessee were still divided. The western third of the state in particular was a hotbed of secessionism. With Confederate support, a group of secessionists led by Governor Isham Harris raised a secessionist militia. The goal was to rally the western and central portions of the state to the Confederate cause. Harris and his allies planned to seize Nashville, forcibly dissolve the unionist legislature, and hold a new secession convention that would bring Tennessee into the Confederacy. General Nathaniel Lyon, the commander of the recently reinforced Nashville garrison, was made aware of this development. As Harris’s 5,000-strong militia marched towards Nashville, they found Lyon’s army blocking the road. In the first battle of the Civil War (though it was more of a skirmish), the small Union force of 2,000 forced the secessionists to retreat.
…On February 7th, 1862, President Seward appointed Irvin McDowell to lead the Army of the Carolinas, with the ultimate goal of taking Charleston. Several smaller Union forces, each numbering around 10-15,000 men, had attempted to invade South Carolina but had been halted by skirmishes and minor battles. McDowell, however, was given command of 30,000 men camped in Raleigh and Fayetteville. It was predicted that this would give him a sizeable numerical advantage over whatever force the Confederates managed to amass. The 90-day mark was nearing, and McDowell was restricted by popular and political pressure from spending much time training his men. Though the cool weather of early March prevented heat from becoming an issue for the army, the soldiers were still green and unaccustomed to marching [3]. This meant that McDowell’s journey to Rockingham took an extra week.”
-From THE WAR BETWEEN THE STATES by Elissa Marconi, published 1998
“The Confederates hastily raised a force of 20,000 from state militia within two months of the bombardment of the Merrimack. This army was, like the Union army camped just across the border, very green. Unlike the Union, the Confederate army also faced a dire equipment shortage. The overwhelming majority of U.S. army arsenals lay in Union states, leaving the state militias of the Confederacy woefully underprepared in comparison to the equally untrained northern army.
Worse, the Confederate Congress was debating a measure that would ban the export of cotton in order to force the United Kingdom and the French Republic to recognize the Confederacy. This, combined with President Seward’s order for the Union navy to blockade southern ports, threatened to cut off the Confederacy from arms shipments before they could even put up a proper fight. Stephens intervened, warning that “our Confederacy will be destroyed within a month without arms, and we cannot get arms without selling cotton.” Stephens used the still-nebulous factions withing the Confederate Congress to defeat the proposed self-boycott [4]. The Confederate army placed orders with European companies for large quantities of rifles, cannon, ammunition, and other vital supplies. The steady stream of foreign-made materiel flowing into southern ports led President Seward to expedite the formation of his blockade. Dozens of new steam frigates and gunboats were ordered to chase down ships violating the blockade, while the vast majority of the existing fleet was put to work turning away ships bound for southern ports. Seward also dispatched his diplomats to dissuade Britain and France from further aiding the Confederacy. Though these efforts were initially met with indifference, by the end of the year, Britain and France would change their tune…”
-From DIPLOMACY IN THE CIVIL WAR by Eugene McConnell, published 2001
“McDowell drew up an ambitious plan of attack. Marching south from Rockingham, he would advance along the road to Camden, an important regional railroad hub. Once Camden was secured, he would then seize the state capital of Columbia, another important railroad city. Meanwhile, P.G.T. Beauregard was camped with his army of 20,000 in Traveler’s Rest, a town in between Columbia and Camden. When Beauregard received a report that McDowell had broken camp and was headed along the road to Camden, he gave the order to his army to head north. While the Union army slowly proceeded south, the Confederates set up defensive works near the small town of Lynchbrook, about fifteen miles north of Camden. The two armies first made contact on the morning of February 21st, when two cavalry patrols met and skirmished.
Beauregard had hoped to wait until a promised reinforcement of 7,000 soldiers had arrived, but McDowell arrived first. After cavalry skirmishes indicated where the Confederate army was positioned, McDowell launched his attack on the morning of March 6th, at 3:40. He dispatched two divisions to flank Beauregard’s army on the right, near the town of New Market. The Union troops ran into trouble early on, as the inexperienced soldiers struggled to maintain proper formations, and the roads they marched on were too narrow for a whole column’s width. Thus, the two divisions only reached New Market at 5:10, having been greatly delayed. This allowed Beauregard to reposition his right to secure the flank. By the time the Union troops began their attack on the Confederate right flank, it was well-guarded, and the fighting quickly became brutal.
While the right flank descended into bloody fighting, Union artillery began bombarding Confederate positions in and around Lynchbrook, including Beauregard’s headquarters. Confederate troops began making feinting attacks, but miscommunication and inexperienced troops made these ineffective. In one instance, two Confederate brigades were ordered to attack a Union position, but only one actually obeyed the command. In the ensuing battle, the Union soldiers brutally repulsed the Confederate assault. The morning phase, plagued by poor communications and green, sluggish troops, ended with the Confederates falling back to await the imminent arrival of reinforcements.
The Union army was too weakened by the morning fighting to disrupt the Confederate withdrawal, but by 1pm, McDowell decided that the army had recovered enough and moved to attack before the Confederate reinforcements could organize. An initial Union advance was halted by a cavalry company, and several Union officers were killed. As the rest of the Union army moved in for the attack, Confederate troops, disguised in Union uniforms, managed to capture two Union cannon that had been left poorly guarded. The fighting around the Confederate positions had turned into a slow, vicious slog. With the capture of the artillery and the entry of the reinforcements into battle, the tide began to turn. The inexperienced Union soldiers were unable to maintain morale in the face of the Confederate reinforcements and the increased casualties. Sensing Union weakness, Beauregard ordered a counterattack. McDowell attempted to exhort his men to keep up the fight, but his exhausted army began to disintegrate.
By 3:20, the Union army had been driven back from the Confederate positions, and Beauregard’s army began to advance in pursuit. Seeing his army begin to panic, McDowell gave the order to retreat at 3:40. The retreat was initially orderly, but as the Confederates pursued and inexperienced soldiers panicked, the withdrawal became a general rout, and the Union army fled back to Rockingham, leaving a trail of equipment in their wake.
The reasons for the Union defeat were many – the army was inexperienced, its march towards Camden was delayed, McDowell was too busy wrangling nearby brigades to direct the battle as a whole. The battle was the bloodiest in American history up to that point, with nearly 1,000 killed and 3,000 wounded in total. Northerners were shocked at the defeat, as the press had crowed that “a decisive victory is soon at hand” and that the Confederates would be crushed “with a single swift blow.” Instead, the Union army had all but fled back to North Carolina. The public demanded that someone face the blame for Lynchbrook, and so Seward unceremoniously relieved Irvin McDowell of his command on March 14th. George McClellan, who had distinguished himself in the Battle of Yorkville, was selected to replace him. The Hero of the Union [5] had entered the fray…”
-From BROTHER KILLING BROTHER: THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAR by Michael Yates, published 2019
[1] OTL, Scott wanted to spend a whole year preparing the army, as the performance of volunteer units in the Mexican American War left him unimpressed with their discipline. TTL, without such a war, Scott has less experience with volunteer forces to inform his planning process.
[2] OTL, it was 135,000. With fewer states seceding and no plot by Buchanan’s Secretary of War to ship northern arms to southern armories, the Confederacy has fewer weapons to seize.
[3] Apparently, soldiers would just wander off the road to pick apples or get water.
[4] OTL, the Confederacy used the months where the Union blockade was still porous to halt exports of cotton to try and strongarm Britain and France into recognizing their independence. TTL, they don’t try such a stupid gamble.
[5] With apologies to George Thomas, of course.