Hmm. I need to point out that I've presented more of an idea than a fixed timeframe or schedule, and that while I'd like to see this pulled off this is looking a little harder to watch.
One opening does present itself in Michele's remarks--that Richthofen has avoided several antagonistic moves against the allies (no naval buildup, no militarization of the Rhineland, no defaulting on reparations but a negotiation), and the scenario does require the Allies to be at least neutral to an Italian/German war.
I also saw Germany acting far later than 1938-9 to give it time to build up to a sufficient level of forces for the operation. I'm not sure that Italy would use this time to its full advantage--indeed, I'm fairly confident that Italy would almost certainly do nothing of the sort. Indeed, I see some kind of disaster in Yugoslavia, like a all-out Croatian uprising, being the critical diversion that gives Germany a chance to move into Austria and forces the UK and France to support Germany over Italy.
Michele's numbers are therefore probably off, but I don't have a good idea of what to give him instead. The economic calculations are also off the table--I'd concede (and I think it was in the OP) that Germany moved slower on rearmament and had no intention of betting their solvency on a quick victory.
I'm hard pressed to say that the UK and France's lack of actions against Italy (but putting an embargo on their country) was some of attempt to gain or retain the support of Mussolini (That's an extremely odd way of going about it.) I would suspect that I might have underrated the Italian Army (which I recall having very capable alpine divisions), but I suspect that Italy's economy and diplomacy would not remain rosy going into the 1940s.
Still mulling this one over, but I think it a refreshing pace from refighting WW2.
One opening does present itself in Michele's remarks--that Richthofen has avoided several antagonistic moves against the allies (no naval buildup, no militarization of the Rhineland, no defaulting on reparations but a negotiation), and the scenario does require the Allies to be at least neutral to an Italian/German war.
I also saw Germany acting far later than 1938-9 to give it time to build up to a sufficient level of forces for the operation. I'm not sure that Italy would use this time to its full advantage--indeed, I'm fairly confident that Italy would almost certainly do nothing of the sort. Indeed, I see some kind of disaster in Yugoslavia, like a all-out Croatian uprising, being the critical diversion that gives Germany a chance to move into Austria and forces the UK and France to support Germany over Italy.
Michele's numbers are therefore probably off, but I don't have a good idea of what to give him instead. The economic calculations are also off the table--I'd concede (and I think it was in the OP) that Germany moved slower on rearmament and had no intention of betting their solvency on a quick victory.
I'm hard pressed to say that the UK and France's lack of actions against Italy (but putting an embargo on their country) was some of attempt to gain or retain the support of Mussolini (That's an extremely odd way of going about it.) I would suspect that I might have underrated the Italian Army (which I recall having very capable alpine divisions), but I suspect that Italy's economy and diplomacy would not remain rosy going into the 1940s.
Still mulling this one over, but I think it a refreshing pace from refighting WW2.