The 2nd Punic War Delayed

[Malta]

There can be some argument that Hannibal decided to attack Rome and their allies too early. In particular as the Carthaginian were still developing their Spanish territories, fighting Iberian tribes (who leapt at the opportunity to hold down reinforcements for Hannibal’s campaigns in Italy) and so forth.

Not to mention other powers nipping at the growing Roman Republic. How long could the 2nd Punic War be delayed and would it provide a boon to Carthaginian influence and power?

 

[BIZANTINUL]

Could the Second Punic war be delayed? Sure, have a more prudent general than Hannibal who would not attack Saguntum and would be content slowly expanding the carthaginian sphere of influence. Would it benefit to the carthaginians on the long term? Probably not, as it would be inevitable that at some point in time the two spheres of influence (carthaginian and roman) would clash and the confrontation would certainly be in the favour of the Romans. I believe, that paradoxically, Hannibal stumbled or choose the perfect solution OTL: a surprising move (crossing the Alps) followed by a string of victories that would incapacitate the enemy so severely that they would be forced to sue for peace and thus restore the balance of forces in the western Mediterenean Sea. If you take that element of surprise that could neutralise the superiority in resources of the Romans, the carthaginians are doomed in the long term.

It is also a matter of which polity is more centralised and more able to access the resources available in a more significant manner. The Romans on the long term have the advantage on this side also: they could integrate the conquered peoples and have a reservoir of manpower for future conquest. Hannibal and the carthaginians in Hispania resembles the medieval condotierri, in some senses, as they have a tenuos contact with the metropolis and can really count on the resources available in Spain at that time and on disgruntled populations in Italy to conduct their campaigns. Even the relationship between Carthage and the other cities in the African hinterland or between Carthage and the local population is tenuos and can become conflictual in case of a prolonged war.

 

[dandan_noodles]

Could the Second Punic war be delayed? Sure, have a more prudent general than Hannibal who would not attack Saguntum and would be content slowly expanding the carthaginian sphere of influence. Would it benefit to the carthaginians on the long term? Probably not, as it would be inevitable that at some point in time the two spheres of influence (carthaginian and roman) would clash and the confrontation would certainly be in the favour of the Romans. I believe, that paradoxically, Hannibal stumbled or choose the perfect solution OTL: a surprising move (crossing the Alps) followed by a string of victories that would incapacitate the enemy so severely that they would be forced to sue for peace and thus restore the balance of forces in the western Mediterenean Sea. If you take that element of surprise that could neutralise the superiority in resources of the Romans, the carthaginians are doomed in the long term.

It is also a matter of which polity is more centralised and more able to access the resources available in a more significant manner. The Romans on the long term have the advantage on this side also: they could integrate the conquered peoples and have a reservoir of manpower for future conquest. Hannibal and the carthaginians in Hispania resembles the medieval condotierri, in some senses, as they have a tenuous contact with the metropolis and can really count on the resources available in Spain at that time and on disgruntled populations in Italy to conduct their campaigns. Even the relationship between Carthage and the other cities in the African hinterland or between Carthage and the local population is tenuous and can become conflictual in case of a prolonged war.

A more complete conquest of Iberia wouldn't neutralize the strategic surprise of a march over the Alps, while providing Carthage greater strategic depth, something it badly needed OTL. The Romans had trouble dispatching more than ~20,000 men to overseas theatres, so if the Carthaginians can keep a 30-40,000 man army cantoned along the Ebro, the Romans may well find it impossible to make headway against Hannibal's strategic base.

The drawback of waiting isn't a loss of surprise, it's that while Hannibal is conquering Spain more thoroughly, the Romans will be conquering Cisalpine Gaul more thoroughly, making it more difficult for Hannibal to recruit enthusiastic allies when he completes his march. This need not be fatal, though. He may still succeed in drawing sufficient allies at a later date, or maybe there's less attrition during his march to and over the Alps, so he arrives strong enough to beat the nearest Roman army and carve out his winter quarters without them.

Also, there's very little real difference in centralization between Rome and Carthage; they're both alliance systems based on a web of bilateral relations of self interest. Indeed, it's possible Carthage was more centralized at this time, having established direct administration of a considerable area in Africa. The real difference is that Carthage drew a greater share of its manpower from the periphery, rather than the core of the empire, which made territorial losses there more dangerous, but this isn't an insurmountable issue.

 

[BIZANTINUL]

A more complete conquest of Iberia wouldn't neutralize the strategic surprise of a march over the Alps, while providing Carthage greater strategic depth, something it badly needed OTL. The Romans had trouble dispatching more than ~20,000 men to overseas theatres, so if the Carthaginians can keep a 30-40,000 man army cantoned along the Ebro, the Romans may well find it impossible to make headway against Hannibal's strategic base.

The drawback of waiting isn't a loss of surprise, it's that while Hannibal is conquering Spain more thoroughly, the Romans will be conquering Cisalpine Gaul more thoroughly, making it more difficult for Hannibal to recruit enthusiastic allies when he completes his march. This need not be fatal, though. He may still succeed in drawing sufficient allies at a later date, or maybe there's less attrition during his march to and over the Alps, so he arrives strong enough to beat the nearest Roman army and carve out his winter quarters without them.

Also, there's very little real difference in centralization between Rome and Carthage; they're both alliance systems based on a web of bilateral relations of self interest. Indeed, it's possible Carthage was more centralized at this time, having established direct administration of a considerable area in Africa. The real difference is that Carthage drew a greater share of its manpower from the periphery, rather than the core of the empire, which made territorial losses there more dangerous, but this isn't an insurmountable issue.

I will try, to the best of my knowledge to adress the arguments listed above:
A. a complete conquest of Iberia is very hard to achieve by the carthaginians even without outside interference; it took the Romans a long time and a few significant reversals to complete the conquest of the whole teritory. You are right the Romans had at that time difficulties in translating armies into Spain but in time they could have an operational base in the south of France from which to act against the carthaginians. They could even play the role of liberators of the iberian tribes, as they did with the Greek City states against Macedon.

B. Waiting for the Romans to consolidate in Galia Cisalpina would make very hard for him to threaten the Roman center of power in Italy as there is now an effective buffer between Italy and the hostile carthaginian teritories. Also it would give Rome aditional time to integrate the newly conquered peoples of Italy and minimize any defection from her side. Acting fast there might be some greek city states, some tribes from south Italy who can rally around Hannibal.

C. I think there was a difference maybe not in degree of centralisation but in the capacity to maintain control over the hinterland. Rome allies remained remarkable loyal ( except Capua) on the other side Carthage suffered from the defection of Utica, from the defection of her libian mercenaries, from the ambiguos attitude of the native north african population etc.

 

[dandan_noodles]

I will try, to the best of my knowledge to adress the arguments listed above:
A. a complete conquest of Iberia is very hard to achieve by the carthaginians even without outside interference; it took the Romans a long time and a few significant reversals to complete the conquest of the whole teritory. You are right the Romans had at that time difficulties in translating armies into Spain but in time they could have an operational base in the south of France from which to act against the carthaginians. They could even play the role of liberators of the iberian tribes, as they did with the Greek City states against Macedon.

They did have an operational base in Massilia; the problem is that a more thoroughly Carthaginian Iberia may just be able to deny them the chance to make any headway. Playing the liberator is all well and good, but the Carthaginians have important nobles from the tribes hostage; it has to be founded on real superiority of strength, which in this scenario the Romans may well lack, for it to amount to anything.

B. Waiting for the Romans to consolidate in Galia Cisalpina would make very hard for him to threaten the Roman center of power in Italy as there is now an effective buffer between Italy and the hostile carthaginian teritories. Also it would give Rome aditional time to integrate the newly conquered peoples of Italy and minimize any defection from her side. Acting fast there might be some greek city states, some tribes from south Italy who can rally around Hannibal.

I think you're overrating the amount of consolidation the Romans would be doing. The Italian peoples aren't going to be appreciably different in the time it takes Hannibal to conquer the lower Tagus + Douro, and without knowledge of Hannibal coming to help, the Gauls probably don't go off half-cocked and revolt prematurely.

C. I think there was a difference maybe not in degree of centralisation but in the capacity to maintain control over the hinterland. Rome allies remained remarkable loyal ( except Capua) on the other side Carthage suffered from the defection of Utica, from the defection of her libian mercenaries, from the ambiguos attitude of the native north african population etc.

The problem was that Carthage just lost more battles than the Romans, thus weakening their control over territories. If the Romans can't make headway because the Spanish resources at Hassdrubal's disposal are too great, then the problem doesn't materialize.

 

[BIZANTINUL]

They did have an operational base in Massilia; the problem is that a more thoroughly Carthaginian Iberia may just be able to deny them the chance to make any headway. Playing the liberator is all well and good, but the Carthaginians have important nobles from the tribes hostage; it has to be founded on real superiority of strength, which in this scenario the Romans may well lack, for it to amount to anything.

I am not quite conviced that the Romans couldn't achieve the military superiority to interfere in Hispania provided the aditional time mentioned above. They achieved that superiority OTL in the second Punic War even though the first defeats were significant. However you might be right and for a time the Romans wouldn't be predisposed to mobilise enough resources to expand in Iberia as there would be richer targets (the greek city states, the weak helenistic monarchies from the east). Even then at some point in time the mineral resources of Spain would be too great a boon for them to pass up.
The problem with Carthaginian Iberia is that the teritory wasn't and would not be ever completely subjugated. Carthaginian Iberia is more like a gradual sphere of influence which weakens as you get farther from the coast, not a teritory where carthaginian law and magistrates operated freely. So the celtiberian tribes, even if Hanibal took hostages had some room to manouver between the two antagonists if the opportunity arose.

I think you're overrating the amount of consolidation the Romans would be doing. The Italian peoples aren't going to be appreciably different in the time it takes Hannibal to conquer the lower Tagus + Douro, and without knowledge of Hannibal coming to help, the Gauls probably don't go off half-cocked and revolt prematurely.

Here it is a question of whether expanding more in Hispania would add or diminish to you military resources. You certainly would have more manpower available but the questions is can you mobilise that manpower to cooperate fully with you, you being a occupying force which tries to slowly curtail the autonomy of the natives of Iberia? Sure the celtiberians would serve as mercenaries and would add quite an added value to your armies but try to expand and Iberia would turn into a quagmire from which you could escape considerably weakend.

Refering to the situation in the Italian Peninsula I beg to differ as the dependence of the Greek city states from Italy and the tribes from southern Italy (Samnites, Ilyrian) would only increase as time goes by. At the time of the First Punic War there were Samnites alive who probably remembered the wars with Rome, Syracuse who had been master of eastern Sicily for a long time (even though in the first Punic war Syracuse was an ally of Rome), the celts in Northern Italy etc. Fast forward a hundred years and Italia would be pacified and the conquered peoples cointerested in advancing the fortunes of the Roman republic in order to advance in the new social order. I believe that there was earlier rather than later a reservoir of malcontents who would serve as willing allies for the Carthaginians. Sure, you may argue, that Italy was gripped by other convulsion in her history (the Social War), but at that point in time there was no question of crushing the Roman dominance but of establishing a more egalitarian relationship between Rome and the other centers of the Italian Peninsula.

Refering to the situation in Gaul, I believe you are right and that as long as there is the prospect of easy aquired conquests in the eastern meditereanean area, Rome would not do much expanding in this area. But as mentioned above is only a matter of time until you need the raw materials produced in Western Europe either to continue to supply your war machine or to alleviate an economic crisis and then a clash between a very powerful Rome and Carthage is inevitable.

I tend to agree with you on the last point as there was a lot of war exhaustion at that point in time. Carthage was a merchant republic and war was very bad for business which could have caused an economic crisis. But I perceive Carthage as a kind of giant with feet of clay completely reliant on a few unreliable "variables" to continue its prosperity: her mercenary armies, having no revolts from the natives of North Africa, having peace to keep open the Western Mediterenean trade routes etc.