The 1930s Army and Navy of Japan in a world of a continued Anglo-Japanese Alliance

Just to add as a strategic driver the Imperial Russian plan was with a start date of 1914 to end up with 16 BB and 8 BC. You can play with dates but there was a hiatus from 04-08 in heavy units. without the RJW maybe starting earlier. So as a target the IJN 8-8 looks like a reasonable response to that ( as does the USN 16 BB plan) The driver though would be the 8 BC that can raid in the Pacific with use of French Bases. I doubt whether anyone would achieve that as sizes and capabilities increase dramatically but its the thinking.
 
Without WW1 then Japan could easily end up with most of the UK's 12" Dreadnoughts and Battlecruisers by 1918. Given the Japanese penchant for overgunning their ships I wouldn't be surprised if these got uprated later
 
The last few posts have assumed a couple of things. One is that there is a US Japan rivalry the other is that there is no UK US rivalry. There is no underlying reason for the former TTL for the latter the US main problem is not raiders in the Pacific its the million strong army on the Canadian border and the worlds biggest baddest bestest navy which sorta changes defence priorities. And gives Japan access to UK heavy industry and automotive industries - with a war theatre with a decent transport net.

But there is no special reason for this rivalry. Apart from the existence of the Pacific ocean why is there tension?
Canada might do its utmost to prevent such tensions, as they have most to lose.
With a different WW1, London remains the global financial center, and the only location where I might see any real friction is in trade, especially at China and South America - I'd assume a neutral US might well remain more assertive towards the Caribbean and Central America.

And since it is the duty of the military planners to always assume the worst and plan accordingly and the Anglo-Japanese Alliance is the only foreign power that has notable presence at the Western Hemisphere, it seems that this is the only enemy, however theoretical, the US Navy would be built and trained to fight.

And as both sides are proud enough to care for prestige and have the money to spend, either a some kind of Naval Treaty involving all three powers or a naval arms race seem likely alternatives - as much as it would make sense to reach some kind of accommondation, jingoism and national prestige might well step into play here, especially as we are talking about democracies with strong lobby groups.
 
The scenario has one big gaping inherent implausibility.

I haven't really pinned down the actual date and details of alt-WW1, just the general outcome.
Needless to say that for this scenario to pass, Britain and France do not conduct strategic reapproachment (because of more tensions at Africa or Mediterranean, different key diplomats, you name it), while honorable Sir Grey is fully focusing on ducks instead of diplomacy. Meanwhile German diplomacy is less disastrous than OTL - not enough to bring about any real alliances, but enough to sooth the tensions so that Britain is content on watching the growth of German power as a counterbalance to Russia with dismay but instead of an outright alarm.

I'm imagining a scenario where the Balkan situation goes a bit differently - Aleksandar Obrenović marries a proper royal and is bit less clueless, hanging on with his pro-Austrian policies and preventing a formation of OTL Balkan League.
Russian refocus to Balkan affairs still leads to a formation of a weaker league with Bulgaria as the central lynchpin. Abdulhamid II is killed at Yıldız in 1905, leading to a different Ottoman regime that defies the Bulgarian declaration of independence in 1908 during the Bosnian Crisis, starting a chain of events that leads to Russian mobilization that is followed by Austro-Hungarian, German and French mobilizations. With Colmar von der Goltz taking over in German military leadership in 1906, Germany defends in the West, while Poland turns into a carnage as Austro-Hungarian, German and Russian armies clash with modern weapons and without the learned lessons from the OTL Russo-Japanese and Balkan Wars.

The French attempts to storm Alsace-Lorraine fail due lack of heavy artillery and strong German defences, while in the East Russian Army led by Kuropatkin is found to be less formidable than the Germans initially feared. Without the unrest and reforms of 1905, the simmering unrest in Russia boils over quicker than OTL, and the new government sues for peace that hands away Poland and a bit of Baltics south of Riga.

Britain orchestrates a peace conference where France gets away relatively easy territorial-wise as far as Europe is concerned, while Germany makes gains in Africa.
Without Haber–Bosch process the Central Powers are at the mercy of the threat of an effective economic blocade, providing Britain with a leverage to use.
The peace leaves all sides less than satisfied with the outcome, and the massive carnage of industrial-level warfare causes a strong rise of pacifist centiments all over the continent.
 
And since it is the duty of the military planners to always assume the worst and plan accordingly and the Anglo-Japanese Alliance is the only foreign power that has notable presence at the Western Hemisphere, it seems that this is the only enemy, however theoretical, the US Navy would be built and trained to fight.

Thereby facilitating the deployment of US armies to either the UK or Japan n the next war.

Military planners developing contingencies is one thing. Spending vast sums of taxpayers money on non existent threats is stupid. Spending larger sums to fight a notional war against your biggest trading partner with which you have had a successful and peaceful relationship for a century career suicide.

And there are alternatives, the South American navies the enemies of United Fruit, hostile raiders from disgruntled european powers.
 
Well, the largely staff exercise-nature plans like OTL Red will most likely still exist, but as you said, it could well be argued that Congress would be happy to keep the US Navy at a deterrent size instead of stubbornly pushing for supremacy for the sake of prestige.
 
Threats constitute intent and capabilities. Intent can change over night, capabilities take time.

To give an idea of what’s at stake in 1913 US foreign trade was worth $4.4b Japan’s $0.7b and the UK’s (excluding empire) was $6.8b. By 1925 this was US $9.5b, Japan $2.0b and UK $10.8b. These numbers were front and centre for considerations around naval power as having your trade cut off would be devastating for your economy.
 
Threats constitute intent and capabilities. Intent can change over night, capabilities take time.

To give an idea of what’s at stake in 1913 US foreign trade was worth $4.4b Japan’s $0.7b and the UK’s (excluding empire) was $6.8b. By 1925 this was US $9.5b, Japan $2.0b and UK $10.8b. These numbers were front and centre for considerations around naval power as having your trade cut off would be devastating for your economy.

Especially since the TTL Great War trade interdiction involved mostly cruiser warfare, and the US exported goods to both sides of the European war.
 
So, without the WW1 there would be no RAF and Britain would mirror OTL Japan with Naval and Army air forces. I suspect that this separation would lead to more technical and tactical links within the similar forces than between national forces.
 
Threats constitute intent and capabilities. Intent can change over night, capabilities take time.

To give an idea of what’s at stake in 1913 US foreign trade was worth $4.4b Japan’s $0.7b and the UK’s (excluding empire) was $6.8b. By 1925 this was US $9.5b, Japan $2.0b and UK $10.8b. These numbers were front and centre for considerations around naval power as having your trade cut off would be devastating for your economy.

... and also created the pressure/push towards the popularization of the concept of autarky in order to insure one's internal economic situation diden't hold them hostage in terms of international interests, making them vulnerable to exploitation or permanent "degradation" by the established powers who controlled the tap. After all, they could see the example of the fate of the once-promising Germany. Which raised national tensions between the powers which fed into a desire to strengthen militaries in a vicious cycle. Sure, we know NOW that autarky dosen't work (Though, in the context of the broader Breton-Woods system that dosen't exist yet ITTL), but prior to the end of WWII that's still a very salient international debate in which the recent evidence seemed to suggest the nationalists/protectionists might have a point.
 
Threats constitute intent and capabilities. Intent can change over night, capabilities take time.

To give an idea of what’s at stake in 1913 US foreign trade was worth $4.4b Japan’s $0.7b and the UK’s (excluding empire) was $6.8b. By 1925 this was US $9.5b, Japan $2.0b and UK $10.8b. These numbers were front and centre for considerations around naval power as having your trade cut off would be devastating for your economy.

Not quite sure what you mean.

If it is the UK US and Japan have lots of foreign trade therefore they are likely to need a navy to protect the trade sure ( although foreign trade for the us includes Canada and Mexico which does not need a navy). But the existence of someone elses Navy does not mean it is a threat to you requiring countermeasures.

The UK will have Navy because it starts with a large navy and is in close proximity to other powers who have navies and a world wide empire requiring lots of trade routes needing lots of protection. However the UK is not a threat to the US because( like the US) it has limited ground forces and neither can realistically threaten the other. Also WHY? both countries can get everything they want from the other by buying and selling it.

OFC both the UK and US are the ones that tend to favour freer trade and in the case of the US is near as damn an autarky anyway. The LoN world economic conference in 27 is calling for an end to tariffs, there are several matters preventing that but most relate to WW1
 
But the existence of someone elses Navy does not mean it is a threat to you requiring countermeasures.
This was the exact case when the USN kept making appeals for funding, the 1916 program in particular. There were also extensive US foreign investments that were up 4 fold to $12.9 billion from pre WW1 that would depend on the benevolence of GB and it's naval power. The US simply didn't want to be in the position of Norway with it's considerable merchant marine living off the collective protection provided by the RN.

However the UK is not a threat to the US because( like the US) it has limited ground forces and neither can realistically threaten the other. Also WHY? both countries can get everything they want from the other by buying and selling it.
Yes, in both cases they rely on free markets but in the inter-war era, tariffs were implemented to 'export unemployment'. GB had made it clear that the US was something to be managed diplomatically since the 1860s as it was stupid fighting it. Number one rule of British diplomacy - 'don't piss in the Atlantic'.
 
This was the exact case when the USN kept making appeals for funding, the 1916 program in particular. There were also extensive US foreign investments that were up 4 fold to $12.9 billion from pre WW1 that would depend on the benevolence of GB and it's naval power. The US simply didn't want to be in the position of Norway with it's considerable merchant marine living off the collective protection provided by the RN.


Yes, in both cases they rely on free markets but in the inter-war era, tariffs were implemented to 'export unemployment'. GB had made it clear that the US was something to be managed diplomatically since the 1860s as it was stupid fighting it. Number one rule of British diplomacy - 'don't piss in the Atlantic'.

On this tangent I would offer that the 1916 Program is very much a Wilsonian vision, it served his conception of the place America needed to assume as a great (maritime) power. It likely needs the backdrop of the war to gain support in Congress as I would argue that the USN was not a favored pork barrel, it had too much infrastructure and its ship needs always under the whim of Congressional deals. If the USA were neutral in the Great War I am dubious if the 1916 program can survive and even if it did the fleet is rather unbalanced. It is my opinion that US involvement in the war elevated Wilson's vision from an equal to a peer and beyond, the USN received far more support as Britain began to show just how its blockade and naval power could strangle American freedom, trade and prerogatives. And it was the rise of Japan, its assertions in Russia and China that sustained the USN, giving it a real enemy. But I make no mistake that an altered Great War could leave the USA very much a Frenemy to the UK, the neutral rights issue was a hot friction point only the exigency of war abated and it smoldered into the 1920s post war.

So that said I can argue the USN needs to be built to safeguard American trade, it is no more a luxury than the RN was, the USA had skated under the coattails of the UK right up until it imposed the blockade and that shattered the illusion. But I think we need a hostile Japan to get anything more than the haphazard effort the USN knew too well. The Treaty era was perfect American politics, cheat the math and save the money, we artificially gained the navy we wanted at the discounted price we preferred. A better surviving RN post war with a surviving Anglo-Japanese accord might be the big enough butterfly to shift the USA into Wilson's independent power dream beyond his term in office. I know it is unpopular but the divergence in Anglo-American relations smoldered right through the 1940s and I argue beyond. Here the split might be more open and the race quite real. The USA could afford a Navy equal to the British and only lacked the fear necessary to sign the checks.
 
On this tangent I would offer that the 1916 Program is very much a Wilsonian vision, it served his conception of the place America needed to assume as a great (maritime) power. It likely needs the backdrop of the war to gain support in Congress as I would argue that the USN was not a favored pork barrel, it had too much infrastructure and its ship needs always under the whim of Congressional deals. If the USA were neutral in the Great War I am dubious if the 1916 program can survive and even if it did the fleet is rather unbalanced. It is my opinion that US involvement in the war elevated Wilson's vision from an equal to a peer and beyond, the USN received far more support as Britain began to show just how its blockade and naval power could strangle American freedom, trade and prerogatives. And it was the rise of Japan, its assertions in Russia and China that sustained the USN, giving it a real enemy. But I make no mistake that an altered Great War could leave the USA very much a Frenemy to the UK, the neutral rights issue was a hot friction point only the exigency of war abated and it smoldered into the 1920s post war.

So that said I can argue the USN needs to be built to safeguard American trade, it is no more a luxury than the RN was, the USA had skated under the coattails of the UK right up until it imposed the blockade and that shattered the illusion. But I think we need a hostile Japan to get anything more than the haphazard effort the USN knew too well. The Treaty era was perfect American politics, cheat the math and save the money, we artificially gained the navy we wanted at the discounted price we preferred. A better surviving RN post war with a surviving Anglo-Japanese accord might be the big enough butterfly to shift the USA into Wilson's independent power dream beyond his term in office. I know it is unpopular but the divergence in Anglo-American relations smoldered right through the 1940s and I argue beyond. Here the split might be more open and the race quite real. The USA could afford a Navy equal to the British and only lacked the fear necessary to sign the checks.

But Britain is neutral in TTL great war, so the blockade issue does not arise. Both the UK and US would be on the same page, a blockade has to be effective to be applied at all and both would be exporting through neutrals, hand over fist until the belligerents run out of hard money.
 
But Britain is neutral in TTL great war, so the blockade issue does not arise. Both the UK and US would be on the same page, a blockade has to be effective to be applied at all and both would be exporting through neutrals, hand over fist until the belligerents run out of hard money.

Indeed, thus the underscoring of why the neutrality of Britain is a butterfly, with it you weaken the need for a strong USN, take away the blockade and the USA may not learn the neutral rights issue, it further weakens an independent naval power position, improves the relations with the UK in so far as it does not put the RN imposing upon the American freedom. I think the butterflies in Asia might be quite large. Against what we know, the real friction is an expansive Japan, first into Manchuria, then into Siberia, that gets the USA awakened, but do we have any of that here? Or is it a combined Anglo-Japanese mission into Russian holdings? A accord to divide and exploit China, any might draw out the USA, but keep pulling away these threads and you might find the USA sliding into an isolated, sleepy and care free posture. OTL relies upon the British irking the USA, being too weak to continue the pissing contest and Japan entering the fray. But a united Anglo-Japan in Asia is a threat into uncharted waters for the USA, she can step up, but was China worth all that?
 
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